Famous Sea Fights Part 20

There really were no s.h.i.+ps of any importance available to join the Chinese ironclads, so one is puzzled to imagine what Ito saw. It was only when the firing died away that Admiral Ting sent orders to the "Kw.a.n.g-ping," the transports, gunboats, and torpedo craft to come out. Only the "Kw.a.n.g-ping"

and the torpedo boats obeyed. As the sun went down he formed line ahead, and steered for Port Arthur. First came the two ironclads; then the "Lai-yuen," with her upper works still on fire in places; then the "Ching-yuen," "Ping-yuen," "Kw.a.n.g-ping," and the torpedo boats. Far astern the abandoned "Chao-yung" blazed like a bonfire in the twilight. Ting honestly believed he had beaten off the j.a.panese fleet, and on his arrival at Port Arthur reported a victory. But though j.a.panese opinion was not quite satisfied, Ito had so damaged the Chinese fleet that henceforth he held command of the sea. He had won his success with comparatively small loss. Of all the units of his fleet his flags.h.i.+p, the "Matsus.h.i.+ma," had suffered most. She had two officers killed and three wounded, and 33 men killed and 71 wounded, a total of 109, and about a third of the losses in the entire fleet. The "Hiyei" came next in the casualty list, with 56 killed and wounded. The losses of the other s.h.i.+ps were trifling. The "Ikitsus.h.i.+ma" had 31 killed and wounded; the "Akagi," 28; the "Akitsus.h.i.+ma," 15; the "Fuso," 14; and the "Yos.h.i.+no" and "Saikio," each 11.

The "Takachico" had an officer and two men wounded; the "Naniwa Kan"

(Captain Togo's s.h.i.+p) one man wounded. The "Chiyoda," which lay next to the "Matsus.h.i.+ma," in the main squadron, had not one single casualty. The official return of losses gave these totals:--

Killed. Wounded. Totals.

Officers 10 16 26 Men 80 188 268 -- --- --- 90 204 294

There are no available returns of the Chinese loss. It was certainly much heavier, perhaps a thousand men. But, thanks to their armour, the two "battles.h.i.+ps" suffered comparatively little loss, notwithstanding the terrible fire to which they were exposed for hours. The "Ting-yuen" had 14 killed and 20 wounded, the "Chen-yuen" 7 killed and 15 wounded. The two s.h.i.+ps afterwards took part in the defence of Wei-hai-wei, where one was torpedoed and the other captured by the j.a.panese.

When the first reports of the Yalu battle reached Europe there was much exaggerated talk about the value of the protected cruiser. It was even said by amateur "naval experts" that this type and not the battles.h.i.+p would be the wars.h.i.+p of the future. It is almost needless to say that the battle conveyed no such lesson. If anything, it rather proved the enormous resisting power of the armoured s.h.i.+p. If Ting, instead of his two antiquated coast-defence armour-clads, had had a couple of up-to-date battles.h.i.+ps manned with trained crews, he would certainly have disposed of a good many of the j.a.panese cruisers. The j.a.panese quite realized this, and proceeded to build a heavily armoured fleet.

The most valuable lesson of the battle was the warning of the danger of fires lighted by exploding sh.e.l.ls. This had an immediate influence on s.h.i.+p construction, and on the methods adopted by all navies in clearing for action.

But the most important point of all was that the conduct of the j.a.panese officers and men in the battle, and in the subsequent naval operations in the siege of Wei-hai-wei, made the world realize that a new naval power had arisen in the Far East.

CHAPTER XIII

SANTIAGO DE CUBA

1898

The United States Navy had taken a decisive part in securing victory for the Union in the War of Secession. It had effectively blockaded the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of the Confederacy, captured New Orleans, given valuable help to the army, in seizing the line of the Mississippi, and by the combined effect of these operations isolated the Confederate States from the rest of the world, destroyed their trade, and cut off their supplies.

One would have expected that the importance of sea-power would have been fully appreciated in the United States after such experiences, and that steps would have been taken to form and maintain an effective fleet. But for some twenty years after the war the American Navy was hopelessly neglected. During this period the fleet consisted mainly of some of the miscellaneous collection of s.h.i.+ps of various types built or purchased during the years of conflict. Old monitors that had engaged the batteries of Charleston figured in the Navy List, beside sloops and steam frigates that were little better than armed merchantmen. The only good work that was done by the Navy Department was the training and maintenance of a corps of excellent officers, and to their influence it was due that at last a beginning was made of the building of a new navy.

The first s.h.i.+ps built were of two cla.s.ses. Public opinion was still clinging to the idea that the "Monitor" was a supremely effective type of wars.h.i.+p, and accordingly considerable sums were expended on the building of coast-defence vessels of this type, low-freeboard turret-s.h.i.+ps, carrying a couple of heavy guns in an armoured turret. But s.h.i.+ps were also required that could make ocean voyages, and show the flag in foreign waters, and for this purpose a number of protected cruisers were built, full-rigged, masted steamers, with their guns in broadside batteries.

Still, the United States possessed only a fourth or fifth-rate fleet, and could not have sent to sea a squadron that could rank with the fleets kept in commission regularly by several of the European powers. Advocates of the old American plan of "having no foreign policy" even maintained that the country had no need of an ocean-going fleet, and required only coast-defence s.h.i.+ps and a few light cruisers.

It was not till the end of the 'eighties that American opinion was aroused to the danger of neglecting the sea-power of the States. The splendid American Navy of to-day is the creation of less than twenty years of systematic development. When the war broke out between the United States and Spain over the Cuban question several of the new cruisers and battles.h.i.+ps were available, but many older s.h.i.+ps were still in the service, and a number of armed liners and other makes.h.i.+ft auxiliaries were taken into the navy.

During the period of tension that immediately preceded the war two fleets were concentrated on the Atlantic coast. The North Atlantic Fleet, under Admiral Sampson, at Key West, Florida, and the reserve fleet, officially known as the "Flying Squadron," under Commodore Schley, at Hampton Roads.

The Pacific Squadron, under Commodore Dewey, was at Hong Kong, waiting to sail for the Philippines as soon as war was declared.

In the following list of Sampson's and Schley's squadrons, besides the displacement of each s.h.i.+p, the date of her launch is noted, so as to distinguish between the older and the newer types of wars.h.i.+ps:--

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.

Displacement. Date of Speed.

Tons. Launch. Knots.

Armoured cruiser (flags.h.i.+p)-- _New York_ 8,480 1891 21

Battles.h.i.+ps-- _Iowa_ 11,296 1896 16 _Indiana_ 10,231 1893 15 1/2

Cruisers-- _Cincinnati_ 3,183 1892 19 _Detroit_ } _Montgomery_ } 2,000 1892 17 _Marblehead_ }

Monitors-- _Puritan_ 6,060 1883 } 12 _Terror_ 3,990 1883 }

Torpedo-boats-- _Cus.h.i.+ng_ 105 1890 22 1/2 _Ericsson_ 120 1892 23 _Rodgers_ } 142 1896 { 25 _Foote_ } { 24 1/2 _Porter_ } 185 1896 { 28 1/2 _Dupont_ } { 27 1/2 _Winslow_ 142 1897 24 1/2 (Besides gunboats and tenders.)

FLYING SQUADRON.

Armoured cruiser (flags.h.i.+p)-- _Brooklyn_ 9,153 1895 17

Battles.h.i.+ps-- _Texas_ 6,315 1892 21 _Ma.s.sachusetts_ 10,231 1893 16

Cruisers-- _Columbia_ } 7,475 { 1892 } 23 _Minneapolis_ } { 1893 }

These were the two fleets available for the blockade of Cuba, and the operations of attacking coast fortifications, covering the transportation of the army of invasion, and dealing with any naval force Spain might send to these waters.

Other units were subsequently added to the fleet after both squadrons had concentrated under Sampson's command.

In West Indian waters the Spaniards had only a few light craft and the old cruiser "Reina Mercedes" at Santiago, with her boilers and engines in such a state that she could not go to sea. For many years the Spanish Navy had been sadly neglected, but since 1890 some armoured cruisers had been built, and a flotilla of torpedo-boat destroyers added to the navy. A number of antiquated units figured on the Navy List, including useless "battles.h.i.+ps"

dating from the 'sixties, and small unarmoured cruisers little better than gunboats. There was one fairly modern battles.h.i.+p, the "Pelayo," dating from 1887, but expert opinion was very divided about her value.

When the war broke out the Spanish Pacific Squadron, under Admiral Montojo, was at Manila. To use the words of an American naval officer, it was made up of "a number of old tubs not fit to be called wars.h.i.+ps." It was promptly destroyed by Commodore Dewey's squadron from Hong Kong (Battle of Manila Bay, Sunday, 1 May, 1898). It was the first American victory in the war, and in the national rejoicing there was much exaggeration as to Dewey's exploit, which was compared to Nelson's victories!

On the eve of the war a Spanish fleet, officially known as the Atlantic Squadron, had been concentrated, under the command of Admiral Cervera, in the Portuguese harbour of St. Vincent, in the Cape de Verde Islands, and the local authorities somewhat strained the laws of neutrality by allowing Cervera to use the port to complete his preparations for some time after the outbreak of the war.

The composition of the squadrons was as follows:--

Displacement. Date of Speed.

Tons. Launch. Knots.

Armoured cruisers-- _Infanta Maria Teresa_ (flags.h.i.+p) } { 1891 } _Vizcaya_ } 6890 { 1891 } 20 _Almirante Oquendo_ } { 1890 } _Cristobal Colon_ 6480 1896 20

Torpedo-boat destroyers-- _Terror_ } _Furor_ } 400 1896-7 28 _Pluton_ }

Torpedo-boats-- _Azor_, _Ariete_, _Rayo_.

Auxiliary cruiser-- _Ciudad de Cadiz_ (an armed liner acting as mother-s.h.i.+p to the torpedo-boats).

The armoured cruisers were all of the same type, s.h.i.+ps with an armoured deck under water protecting the engines and magazines, a 6-inch armour belt, and an armoured barbette fore and aft, mounting a 9 1/2-inch Hontoria gun. They had a secondary armament of ten 6-inch quick-firers, besides a number of lighter guns for defence against torpedo craft, and had maxims mounted in their fighting tops. The "Cristobal Colon," originally built for the Italian Navy as the "Giuseppe Garibaldi," and purchased by Spain and renamed, had only the quick-firers, and had no guns in her barbettes. These had originally been armed with Armstrong guns. The heavy Armstrongs were taken out of her at Cadiz to be replaced by Hontorias, but these were not ready when the war came, and the "Cristobal Colon" sailed for St. Vincent without them. The torpedo-boat destroyers were of the best and latest type of their cla.s.s, and recently built on the Clyde.

The war in the Atlantic began by Sampson's squadron leaving Key West, establis.h.i.+ng the blockade of Western Cuba, reconnoitring the sea defences of Havana, and exchanging some sh.e.l.ls with them at long range. Then, in order to satisfy popular feeling in America, Sampson bombarded the batteries of San Juan, in Puerto Rico, an operation that had no real effect on the fortunes of the war, and inflicted only trifling local loss on the Spaniards.

An army had been a.s.sembled at Tampa, in Florida, and a huge fleet of transports was collected to ferry it over to Cuba. Its destination was supposed to be the western end of the island, where, in co-operation with the insurgents by land and the fleet by sea, it would besiege and capture Havana. But again and again the sailing of the fleet was delayed, and there was alarm in the cities of the Atlantic states, because the newspapers published wild reports of phantom armadas hovering off the coast. When news came that Cervera had sailed from St. Vincent, and for many days there was no trace of his movements, there was a quite unnecessary alarm as to what the Spanish squadron might do. A wise Press censors.h.i.+p would have been very useful to the United States, but there was little or no attempt to control the wild rumours published by the newspapers.

For some days after the declaration of war (23 April) Cervera's squadron lay at St. Vincent. All the s.h.i.+ps were repainted a dead black, some coal was taken on board, and quant.i.ties of ammunition transferred from the holds of the "Ciudad de Cadiz" to the magazines of the cruisers. At last, on 29 April, Cervera sailed, leaving the torpedo-boats and the armed liner in port, and taking with him only his high-speed s.h.i.+ps, the four armoured cruisers, and the three destroyers.

His course was westward, and it was conjectured that San Juan de Puerto Rico was his destination. The distance is about 2400 miles, and supposing that he would proceed at a cruising speed of ten knots, in order to economize his coal, it was calculated that he would be across the Atlantic in ten days, reaching the West Indies about 9 May. Two swift armed liners that had been attached to Schley's squadron were sent out to sweep the Western Atlantic, and it was expected that by the end of the first week in May they would bring back news of the enemy, but 7 May came and brought no news. s.h.i.+ps arriving in ports on both sides of the ocean told of having seen the smoke of a squadron on the horizon in so many places that it seemed as if the Atlantic must be full of fleets. Look-out stations as far north as the New England States told of glimpses of wars.h.i.+ps seen far off in the morning twilight, or vaguely distinguished through mist and rain.

But definite news of Cervera there was none. It seemed as if his squadron had vanished into s.p.a.ce.