Belgium Part 15

Scorning all opposition, William I had not even attempted to conciliate one of the two great parties which divided the Belgian population: the conservative Catholics and the Liberals, advocates of the "Rights of Man" and opposed to the influence of the Church. He had alienated the first by his attempt to monopolize education and the second by the autocratic manner in which he suppressed all opposition. The prosecution against a Liberal journalist, De Potter, who attacked the Government's policy in _Le Courier des Pays-Bas_, brought about the reconciliation of the two parties against the common enemy, in 1828, just as the harsh att.i.tude of Joseph II had caused the alliance of Van der Noot and Vonck on the eve of the Brabanconne Revolution. From anti-Government, the movement became gradually anti-Dutch, and party grievances were henceforth merged into a revival of patriotic feeling, aiming first at administrative separation and later at complete independence.

The final outburst was no doubt hastened by the 1830 Revolution in France, when the legitimist dynasty was overthrown in favour of Louis Philippe d'Orleans, just as the taking of the Bastille determined a corresponding movement in Belgium against Austrian rule. But nothing could be more misleading than to attribute to French influence the popular demonstration which took place in Brussels, on August 25th, following a performance of Auber's _Muette de Portici_ at the Monnaie Theatre. The song which stirred such wild enthusiasm in the b.r.e.a.s.t.s of the Brussels people was purely patriotic, and it was to defend the rights of their country that they sacked the house of Van Maenen, King William's unpopular minister, and the offices of _Le National_, whose director, a French pamphleteer named Libri, was looked upon as a Dutch agent. It is true that the French flag was for a short time hoisted at the Hotel de Ville, but it was soon replaced by the three colours of Brabant.

French influences had been at work, but the French party remained a small minority. Every act of the leaders of the revolution shows that they were bent on obtaining first administrative separation, and later, after such a proposal had been made impossible through the king's stubborn att.i.tude, complete independence. Never did the idea of a union with France commend itself to the people. From Brussels, standing on the language frontier, the revolution spread to Walloon Liege and Flemish Louvain. Most of the important towns, with the exception of Ghent and Antwerp, joined in the movement in both parts of the country.

The Prince of Orange, whose popularity was used in order to calm the mult.i.tude, came to visit Brussels, but, unable to make any definite promise, he was obliged to fly from the city.

[_THE SEPTEMBER DAYS_]

Even at that last hour, the joint kingdom of the Netherlands might have been saved, since the most enthusiastic leaders, like Gendebien, only urged autonomy; but King William remained deaf to all advice of moderation and sent a Dutch army of 12,000 men against Brussels under Prince Frederick. The revolutionary leaders had preserved but small hope, owing to the unpreparedness of the defence. The Belgian success in the street-fighting which took place near the Rue Royale and the adjoining streets was nothing short of a miracle. After three days, Prince Frederick was obliged to leave the town, leaving 2,500 dead behind him; but the losses on the Belgian side had also been heavy, and all reconciliation had become impossible. A provisional Government was formed, a National Congress summoned, the complete independence of the country proclaimed and a new Const.i.tution prepared, a special commission adopting the principle of const.i.tutional monarchy (October 4th).

Meanwhile, the few towns, including Ghent and Antwerp, which had not already done so expelled their garrisons, the citadel of Antwerp alone remaining in Dutch hands.

The fascinating scheme endorsed by the Vienna Congress had completely miscarried. Though only a ruler of great political talent could have realized it, the story of the fifteen years of union between the two countries shows that the king and his Dutch ministers were unable to master the very elements of the difficult proposition they had to solve. Up to the last months several opportunities offered themselves to them of retracing their steps and retrieving the situation. They failed to seize them. A careful survey of events will show that the action brought against De Potter and the choice of The Hague as the seat of the Supreme Court did more to estrange the Belgian bourgeoisie from Dutch rule than the activity of French propagandists. The initial blunder of William I was to ignore the fact that Belgium was not merely a group of ownerless provinces, but a nation as strong in her soul, if not as happy in her fate, as the Dutch nation, deserving the same care and the same consideration. Had he acted as a national prince he would have succeeded, in spite of the sad memories of past oppression, as many princes had succeeded before. But he remained essentially Dutch in his manners and his political outlook, and as such he was bound to fail, as Joseph II, Maximilian and Philip II had failed before him.

Ill.u.s.tration: MODERN BELGIUM (TREATIES OF 1830-1839 AND 1919).

CHAPTER XXV

THE Sc.r.a.p OF PAPER

Having failed to repress the revolution, King William appealed to the Powers signatories of the eight articles creating the joint kingdom.

Lord Aberdeen answered that the independence of the Belgians was an accomplished fact, but a Conference was, nevertheless, called in London, in order to mediate between the two parties, to which France was invited to send a representative. On November 14, 1830, the conditions of an armistice were settled, according to which both belligerents were to withdraw their forces behind the frontier which divided the two countries before their reunion in 1814.

This arrangement would have restored to Belgium the left bank of the Scheldt, which she had lost since the Munster treaty. The Dutch king protested, and the line was altered from the frontier of 1814 to that of 1790--that is to say, five years before the annexation by the French of the contested territory.

Throughout the negotiations the autocratic Powers--Prussia, Austria and Russia--were opposed to the Belgians. They treated them as rebels who ought to be only too happy to buy their independence at any price. As a matter of fact, if the same wave of nationalism which had stirred Belgium had not, at the same time, caused serious trouble in Poland and Italy, it is doubtful whether England and France could have induced the Conference to accept even the principle of Belgian independence.

But, owing to their internal troubles, both Russia and Austria were disinclined to take action, and Prussia would have found herself isolated if she had maintained an uncompromising att.i.tude.

The Belgians, on the other hand, from the very beginning of the negotiations, placed themselves on an equal footing with Holland, and considered the Conference as a mediator, not as an arbiter. They gratefully accepted its intervention as "prompted by feelings of sympathy for the sufferings of Belgium and by humanitarian motives,"

but refused energetically to bind themselves by any engagement. When, on December 20th, Belgian independence was finally recognized, the Provisory Government remarked that "the balance of power in Europe can still be ensured, and a general peace maintained, by making Belgium independent, strong and happy. If Belgium were to be left without strength and happiness, the new arrangement would be threatened with the same fate as that of the political combination of 1815. Independent Belgium has her share of European duties to fulfil, but it would be difficult to conceive what obligations could be imposed upon her by treaties in the conclusion of which she had no voice."

Such a complete consciousness of their national rights on the part of the Belgian plenipotentiaries can only be explained by the fact that such consciousness had never ceased to exist. This was no new nation struggling for its birth, but an Old nation, as old as any of those who had a.s.sumed the responsibility of planning her future. The Belgian statesmen of 1830 had nothing to improvise. They had merely to pick up the threads broken through the vicissitudes of European struggle. Their new Const.i.tution was based on the old Joyous Entry of Brabant, which Joseph II had vainly attempted to abolish, and whose memory forty years of French and Dutch centralization had not succeeded in obliterating.

Their foreign policy was, in the same way, inspired by a firm attachment to their past and a firmer belief in their future. The London Conference was not long in realizing, when faced by such men as Lebeau, Van de Weyer and De Merode, that they had not merely to deal with vague idealists or eloquent demagogues. It is not enough to say that Belgium was well represented. It would be more accurate to say that her delegates had a good case to defend.

[_THE LONDON CONFERENCE_]

Three treaties were prepared by the London Conference in the course of the negotiations. The first included a series of conditions formulated in January 1831 and known as "Bases of Separation." The second was the outcome of new negotiations which took place during the following months, and is known as "the Treaty of XVIII Articles" (July 1831). The third, framed after the defeat of the Belgian troops by the Dutch and the military and naval intervention of the Powers, is known as "the Treaty of XXIV Articles" (November 1831). Accepted by the Belgians, it was first rejected by William I, and finally sanctioned by him in 1839.

This is the final settlement which popular history will remember as the "sc.r.a.p of paper."

According to the Bases of Separation, Belgium lost the left bank of the Scheldt, but this stream was to remain entirely free. She also lost Luxemburg, which "would continue to belong to the German Confederation."

It will be remembered that, under the treaty of Vienna, this Belgian province had been converted into a Grand Duchy and given to King William, in exchange for his possessions in Germany, but the king had declared, at the time, that the "Grand Duchy would be considered as an integral part of the State." Accordingly, Luxemburg shared the political life of the rest of the kingdom, sending deputies to the Chambers and being, from every point of view, considered as a Belgian province. Luxemburgers had even taken a prominent part in the revolutionary movement. One of them remarked in Congress, during the debate which followed the Conference resolutions, that "national sovereignty was transferred from Brussels to the Foreign Office," and by an overwhelming majority (169 against 9) the Congress protested against any delimitation of Belgian territory made without the consent of the representatives of the nation.

[_BASES OF SEPARATION_]

A period of acute tension followed this refusal. King William had not raised the blockade of the Scheldt, in spite of the conditions of the armistice, and the Belgians consequently continued their military operations in front of Maestricht, which had not yet been evacuated.

The Conference urged cessation of hostilities and prompt acceptance.

The Government remaining obdurate, an ultimatum was sent fixing June 1st as the last date on which the Belgians had to submit and threatening military intervention. On June 6th, Lord Ponsonby, British representative at Brussels, and General Belliard, the French representative, were formally recalled by their respective Governments, but the action of the Powers was delayed owing to differences of opinion concerning the method of intervention. This allowed Belgium some time to reopen negotiations, and her delegates in London finally obtained the revision of the "Bases of Separation." A new agreement was drafted, on June 26th, known as "the Treaty of XVIII Articles,"

according to which Belgium became permanently neutral, while the questions of Luxemburg and Maestricht remained in abeyance, further negotiations concerning the contested territories having to be pursued direct between Belgium and Holland.

Ill.u.s.tration: LEOPOLD I. (REIGNED 1831-1865).

From a portrait by Lievin de Winne.

_Ph. B._

This diplomatic success was not only due to the perseverance of the Belgian delegates but also to Prince Leopold's wise decision not to accept the crown unless a satisfactory solution was reached. It must be recalled that, as soon as the Belgian Congress had decided on const.i.tutional monarchy, the names of several candidates had been discussed. The conservative Powers favoured the candidature of the Prince of Orange, hoping thus to restore in the future the union of the two countries. But this proposal had met with an overwhelming opposition in Belgium. The candidature of the Duke of Nemours, son of Louis Philippe, had then been considered, and by a narrow majority of two votes the Belgian Congress decided in his favour. Such a choice could not be approved in England, since it would have meant, sooner or later, French hegemony over the Belgian coast and Antwerp. Louis Philippe, therefore, refused the Belgian offer. Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, widower of Princess Charlotte, was practically an English Prince, having spent most of his life in England; he was of German extraction, and a marriage was contemplated between him and Princess Marie Louise, Louis Philippe's daughter. He had already acquired a great reputation for wisdom, which gained him later the t.i.tle of the "Nestor of Europe." It was felt that no better man could be found to fill such a delicate post, and both English and French diplomats were inclined to remove all obstacles which might prevent him from accepting the Belgian offer.

The Prince's influence and the Belgian diplomats' firm att.i.tude succeeded in altering the Conference's views. The Belgians were no longer treated as rebels and ordered to submit, but as free people whose claims must be considered. "Everybody says," wrote Lord Palmerston to Lord Granville, "that the Belgians are mad and that it is useless to discuss with them. I have noticed that there is a good deal of method in their madness." Talleyrand, who was not too well disposed towards the Belgian emissaries and "their reticences," wrote on June 24th: "We have been in conference for forty hours, but the Belgian delegates are so little accustomed to this kind of negotiations, they create so many difficulties, that we cannot get on and I am tired out.

A conference took place to-day at Prince Leopold's; it lasted until eight. It will continue at my house and last probably till late in the night." The next day, the XVIII Articles were signed.

Prince Leopold having accepted the crown, the new treaty was sanctioned by the Belgian Congress on July 9th. Less than a month later, on August 2nd, the Dutch armies, breaking the armistice, invaded Belgian territory and defeated the Belgian forces at Louvain. Owing to the armed intervention both of England and France, the Dutch were forced to retreat, but these military operations had set the seal on Belgian hopes.

[_THE XXIV ARTICLES_]

The Powers were now "firmly determined to stop, by all available means, the resumption of hostilities which would threaten Europe with a general war," and, on November 15th, King Leopold was obliged to accept, under strong protest, a new agreement, known as "the Treaty of XXIV Articles," which, though preserving the country's independence and neutrality, deprived her of her natural frontiers and tore from her territories whose inhabitants had shared her life since the early Middle Ages. The Scheldt was given the status of an international river, according to the General Act of Vienna, the supervision of pilotage, buoying and dredging operations being entrusted to a Dutch-Belgian commission. Belgium retained half of Luxemburg (the area known to-day as the province of Luxemburg), while the other half, with the town of Luxemburg, remained in the hands of the Dutch king, and const.i.tuted a Grand Duchy attached to the German Confederation. "In exchange" for their portion of Luxemburg, the Belgians were obliged to relinquish their rights over Eastern Limburg and Maestricht, which became the Dutch provinces of the same name. Such were the "final and irrevocable" decisions of the Powers.

Though the compromise was entirely in his favour, King William refused to sanction it. From the beginning of the negotiations the Dutch had contended that, by the separation of Belgium and Holland, Article XIV of the treaty of Munster (that is to say, the right of Holland to close the Scheldt in time of peace or war) came into force again.

Disregarding the liberal principles laid down at Vienna, they wanted to go back to the old regime of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which subjected Belgium to their control. Holding Maestricht, the key of the Meuse, and the Lower Scheldt, the key of Antwerp, they intended to treat independent Belgium as they had treated the Spanish and Austrian provinces.

Laborious negotiations proceeded during the following years, and, in 1838, King William declared himself at last prepared to sign the treaty on the consideration of the payment of a toll of one florin and a half per ton on every s.h.i.+p entering and leaving the stream on its way to Antwerp.

Meanwhile, Limburg and Luxemburg had remained Belgian, and the bonds attaching the sacrificed provinces to the country had become so strong that the forthcoming settlement provoked emphatic protests. Pet.i.tions were sent to the king, and delegations came to Brussels urging resistance. Once more, Belgian negotiators multiplied their efforts in London and Paris. But, this time, the friendly Powers remained adamant and the Government was made to understand that, if the Belgians created difficulties, nothing would prevent the German Confederation and the King of Holland from annexing Luxemburg and Limburg by force. In the spring of 1839 the Belgian Chamber was at last compelled to give its final decision. Three ministers had resigned from the Government. The Austrian and Prussian "charges d'affaires" had left the capital. It was common knowledge that several Prussian army corps were ma.s.sed on the Eastern frontier. Under such a threat, and this time without the support of England and France, the Chamber was faced with the cruel alternative of sanctioning partial annexation or seeing the very life of the nation jeopardized by foreign invasion. The deputies of Limburg and Luxemburg were the most emphatic in their opposition: "Suicide will follow fratricide," exclaimed a deputy of Maestricht, while a representative of Ruremonde urged armed resistance. "I would rather give my life a thousand times," protested a Luxemburger, "than a vote which would oppress my conscience until my last day." On March 12th, Mr. Metz, who was unable to walk through illness, was carried to his seat and declared that "neither the king, nor the Conference, nor the Government, nor the Chambers had the right to dispose of his life" by "a sacrilegious treaty which takes away four hundred thousand Belgians from the country of their choice and covers Belgium with eternal shame."

[_SUBMISSION_]

The Government's action was defended by Mr. Nothomb, who, though a Luxemburger and an ardent patriot, realized too well the danger of the situation not to urge submission: "We have not yet had the opportunity of rendering any service to Europe. She has no reason to be grateful to us. If it were not for our pressing need of independence, nothing up to now justifies our existence. What matter to her our national soul tempered by age-long traditions! If we resist, she will put an end to our existence as a free State with a stroke of the pen. In bending before the inevitable, Belgium will save her nationality, spare the disputed districts the horrors of war, and make a sacrifice which Europe will be obliged to take into account on the day when, bearing no responsibility in the outbreak of war, the country will be able to claim her revenge!" Another argument urged by some supporters of the Government was based on the fact that, though not legally bound by her former acceptance of the XXIV Articles, which had remained in abeyance for seven years, Belgium's faith had been pledged to it: "I believe,"

said one of them, "that international treaties have a real value, that they are not merely sc.r.a.ps of paper. I believe that Right more than Force governs the affairs of this world, and that, in the end, it pays to fulfil one's obligations, however painful these may be."

A tragic incident occurred on March 14th. Mr. Bekaert-Baekelandt, deputy of Courtrai, had first been opposed to the Government's policy.

He had, however, been gradually convinced that all resistance had become useless. This conversion to the inevitable had broken his heart.

He ended his speech by alluding to the return at a future date of the deputies of the sacrificed provinces to the Belgian Chamber.

"Meanwhile," he said, "they will remain Belgians like ourselves, and they will be generous enough to consider that our votes are extorted by force, that they are a painful sacrifice imposed upon us by foreign nations. They will no doubt appreciate how powerless we are to avoid this sad obligation...." He did not proceed further, and fell dead.

[_NEUTRALITY_]

These manifestations have been compared with the heartrending scenes which took place at the time of the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, but it would be wrong to draw too hasty conclusions from such a comparison. On the one hand, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine is far more recent. On the other, Dutch administration and the Grand-Ducal regime did not provoke the same opposition among the people. If Belgian irredentism proved very strong at the beginning, it gradually diminished, owing mainly to the fact that the patriots, on both sides of the frontier, were unable to entertain any hope of reunion during the long period of neutrality which paralysed Belgian foreign policy.

Recent manifestations which took place on the occasion of the revision of the 1839 treaties towards the reunion of Zeeland Flanders, Luxemburg and Limburg to Belgium must, however, not be misjudged. They must not be considered as the outcome of a crude instinct towards aggrandis.e.m.e.nt, following the military success of the Belgian army at the end of the Great War, or of a wild thirst for revenge, but merely as the outburst of irredentist feelings, nursed in silence during eighty years of neutrality, and revived, among a certain group of intellectuals, by the fierce struggle waged by the nation for the safeguard of its liberties. As for the demand of military guarantees made by the Government during these negotiations, a demand which must be clearly distinguished from the irredentist agitation just mentioned, it was merely prompted by the circ.u.mstances in which Belgium is placed at the present time. The territorial losses inflicted upon the country in 1839 were largely compensated for by the pact of neutrality entered into by the Great Powers, which provided Belgium with the strongest and most unequivocal guarantees respecting her territorial integrity.

Provided these guarantees were observed faithfully, the closing of the Scheldt by Holland in time of war, the critical situation on the Eastern frontier created by the indefensible cul-de-sac of Dutch Limburg, and the supremacy in Luxemburg of a foreign Power, did not seriously jeopardize the country's security. The treaties of 1839 were considered as forming a whole, the moral safeguard of guaranteed neutrality counterbalancing, to a certain extent, the new territorial encroachments. With the disappearance of neutrality, the subst.i.tution of new guarantees of security for the old ones seemed obvious. The demands formulated at the Paris Conference by the Belgian people and Government--free access from the sea towards Belgian ports in order to ensure communication between the country and her allies in time of war, a military entente with Holland towards the defence of Dutch Limburg, and a rapprochement with Luxemburg--were therefore the natural outcome of the revision of the 1839 settlement.

CHAPTER XXVI

NEUTRAL INDEPENDENCE