The Papers And Writings Of Abraham Lincoln Part 153

ORDER TO GENERAL H. W. HALLECK.

WAs.h.i.+NGTON, D. C., September 3, 1862.

Ordered, That the general-in-chief, Major-General Halleck, immediately commence, and proceed with all possible despatch; to organize an army, for active operations, from all the material within and coming within his control, independent of the forces he may deem necessary for the defense of Was.h.i.+ngton when such active army shall take the field.

By order of the President:

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

[Indors.e.m.e.nt.]

Copy delivered to Major-General Halleck, September 3, 1862, at 10 p.m.

E. D. TOWNSEND, a.s.sistant-Adjutant General.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL H. G. WRIGHT.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WAs.h.i.+NGTON, D. C., September 7, 1862.

GENERAL WRIGHT, Cincinnati, Ohio:

Do you know to any certainty where General Bragg is? May he not be in Virginia?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. T. BOYLE.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WAs.h.i.+NGTON, D. C., September 7, 1862.

GENERAL BOYLE, Louisville, Kentucky:

Where is General Bragg? What do you know on the subject?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL J. E. WOOL.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WAs.h.i.+NGTON, D.C.

September 7, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL Wool, Baltimore:

What about Harper's Ferry? Do you know anything about it? How certain is your information about Bragg being in the valley of the Shenandoah?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL G. B, McCLELLAN.

WAs.h.i.+NGTON, September 8, 1862. 5 P.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLELLAN, Rockville, Maryland:

How does it look now?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GENERAL D. C. BUELL.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WAs.h.i.+NGTON, September 8, 1862. 7.20 P.M.

GENERAL BUELL:

What degree of certainty have you that Bragg, with his command, is not now in the valley of the Shenandoah, Virginia?

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO T. WEBSTER.

WAs.h.i.+NGTON, September 9, 1862.

THOMAS WEBSTER, Philadelphia:

Your despatch received, and referred to General Halleck, who must control the questions presented. While I am not surprised at your anxiety, I do not think you are in any danger. If half our troops were in Philadelphia, the enemy could take it, because he would not fear to leave the other half in his rear; but with the whole of them here, he dares not leave them in his rear.