The Letters of Queen Victoria Volume Iii Part 87

PEMBROKE LODGE, _23rd August 1859_.

Lord John Russell presents his humble duty to your Majesty; he begs to explain that with respect to reversing the principle of non-intervention, he has never proposed any such course. If intervention were to mean giving friendly advice, or even offering mediation, your Majesty's Government from January to May would have pursued a course of intervention, for they were all that time advising Austria, France, Sardinia, and Germany.

If by friendly and judicious advice we can prevent a b.l.o.o.d.y and causeless war in Italy we are bound to give such advice.

If we refrain from doing so, we may ultimately be obliged to have recourse to intervention; that is to say, we may have to interfere against the ruthless tyranny of Austria, or the unchained ambition of France. It is with a view to prevent the necessity of intervention that Lord John Russell advises friendly representations.

[Pageheading: NON-INTERVENTION]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

ALDERSHOT, _23rd August 1859_.

... With regard to Lord John's letter of to-day, the Queen wishes merely to say that from the outbreak of the war our negotiations have ceased, and that the war is not over till the peace is concluded. Our interference before that period may be prompted by a desire to prevent a future war; but our first duty is not to interfere with the closing of the present. The desire to guard Italy against "the ruthless tyranny of Austria, and the unchained ambition of France" may produce a state of things in Italy, forcing both to make common cause against her, and backed by the rest of Europe to isolate England, and making her responsible for the issue. It will be little satisfaction then to reflect upon the fact that our interference has been merely _advice_.

[Pageheading: FOREIGN POLICY]

_Viscount Palmerston to Queen Victoria._

94 PICCADILLY, _23rd August 1859_.

Viscount Palmerston presents his humble duty to your Majesty, and begs to state that Lord John Russell has shown him your Majesty's communication, in which your Majesty objects to a proposed despatch to Lord Cowley, on the ground that it would be a departure from the principle of non-intervention which has been publicly proclaimed as the rule for Great Britain in the late events between France and Austria. But Viscount Palmerston would beg humbly to submit to your Majesty that the intervention which all parties agreed that this country ought to abstain from, was active interference by force of arms in the war then going on, but that neither of the great political parties meant or a.s.serted that this country should not interfere by its advice and opinions in regard to the matters to which the war related. Viscount Palmerston can a.s.sert that neither he nor any of those who were acting with him out of office ever contemplated giving such a meaning to the doctrine of non-intervention; and that such a meaning never was attached to it by the Conservative Leaders while they were in office, is proved from one end of their Blue Book to the other.[70] The whole course of the Derby Government, in regard to the matters on which the war turned, was one uninterrupted series of interventions by advice, by opinions, and by censure now addressed to one party and now to another. Whatever may be thought of the judgment which was shown by them, or of the bias by which they were guided, the principle on which they acted was undoubtedly right and proper.

England is one of the greatest powers of the world, no event or series of events bearing on the balance of power, or on probabilities of peace or war can be matters of indifference to her, and her right to have and to express opinions on matters thus bearing on her interests is unquestionable; and she is equally ent.i.tled to give upon such matters any advice which she may think useful, or to suggest any arrangements which she may deem conducive to the general good.

It is no doubt true that the Conservative Party, since they have ceased to be responsible for the conduct of affairs, have held a different doctrine, and in their anxiety lest the influence of England should be exerted for the benefit of Italy, and to the disadvantage of Austria, have contended that any partic.i.p.ation by Great Britain in the negotiations for the settlement of Italy would be a departure from the principle of non-intervention; but their own practice while in office refutes their newly adopted doctrine in opposition; and if that doctrine were to be admitted, Great Britain would, by her own act, reduce herself to the rank of a third-cla.s.s European State.

[Footnote 70: This was the Blue Book, the production of which would, according to Lord Malmesbury, have saved the Derby Ministry.]

[Pageheading: ITALIAN POLICY]

[Pageheading: THE QUEEN AND LORD JOHN RUSSELL]

_Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell._

OSBORNE, _24th August 1859_.

The Queen is really placed in a position of much difficulty, giving her deep pain. She has been obliged to object to so many drafts sent to her from the Foreign Office on the Italian Question, and yet, no sooner is one withdrawn or altered, than others are submitted exactly of the same purport or tendency, if even couched in new words. The Queen has so often expressed her views that she is almost reluctant to reiterate them. She wishes, however, Lord John to re-peruse the two drafts enclosed, which just came to her. If they have any meaning or object, it must be to show to France that it would be to her interest to break in the Treaty of Zurich the leading conditions to which she pledged herself to Austria at Villafranca. Those preliminaries contained but three provisions affecting Austria: (1) That Austria was to cede Lombardy; (2) That an Italian Confederation should be encouraged, of which Venetia was to form part; (3) That the Dukes of Tuscany and Modena were to return to their Duchies. The two latter clauses must be considered as compensations for the losses inflicted in the first. Both the latter are now to be recommended by England, a neutral in the war, to be broken.

Now, either it is expected that our advice will not be listened to, in which case it would not be useful and hardly dignified to give it, or it is expected that France will follow it. If, on finding herself cheated, Austria were to feel herself obliged to take up arms again, we should be directly answerable for this fresh war. What would then be our alternative? Either to leave France in the lurch, to re-fight her own battle, which would entail lasting danger and disgrace on this country, or to join her in the fresh war against Austria--a misfortune from which the Queen feels herself equally bound to protect her country.

As this is a question of principle on which she clearly understood her Cabinet to have been unanimous, she must ask her correspondence to be circulated amongst its members, with a view to ascertain whether they also would be parties to its reversal, and in order to prevent the necessity of these frequent discussions, which, as the Queen has already said, are very painful to her.

[Pageheading: MEDIATION OF LORD GRANVILLE]

_Earl Granville to the Prince Albert._

LONDON, _29th August 1859_.

SIR,--In the middle of last week I received at Aldenham a letter from Mr Sidney Herbert,[71] in which he told me that he had just received a visit from Lord Palmerston, much perturbed and annoyed, saying that the Queen had objected to all Lord John's despatches, and appeared to think that it was objectionable for England to give any advice on the subject of Italian affairs. Mr Herbert gave some good advice to Lord Palmerston, but, from the tone of his letter, I gather that he thought the objections made at Osborne unreasonable. I answered that I entirely concurred with him in the interest of everybody, that no feelings of irritation should exist between the Sovereign and her leading Ministers; that it was possible that the Queen, forgetting how very sensitive Lord John was to criticism, had pulled him up more sharply than he liked, but that I was convinced the objections made were not exactly those mentioned by Lord Palmerston. I heard nothing more till I received on Sat.u.r.day evening a telegram, summoning me to a Cabinet this day. I came to Town immediately, and saw Lord Palmerston yesterday. I enquired the reason of the sudden summons for a Cabinet.

He told me that there had been a discussion between the Queen and Lord John; that the Queen had objected to his (Lord John's) proposal that the despatch of 25th July should be now communicated to the French Government. Lord John had informed him of the fact, and had requested him to communicate with the Queen on the subject. Lord Palmerston then read to me a well-written memorandum on the abstract question of giving advice, which he had sent to Her Majesty. He told me that he had been to Osborne; that the Queen had expressed a wish through Sir Charles Wood that he should not discuss the whole matter with her; that he had had a satisfactory conversation with your Royal Highness, of which he gave me an abstract, which, however, contained his own arguments at greater length than your Royal Highness's. He said that Lord John had made a mistake with respect to the end of the despatch, in which Lord Cowley is desired to withhold it till after the Peace of Zurich was concluded. Lord John gave a different interpretation to it from what appeared to be the case, as described by a previous letter of Lord John, in which he had said that the sentence was added at the suggestion of the Cabinet, and with his entire approval. Lord Palmerston states that the Queen did not feel herself authorised to sanction a departure from what had been decided by the Cabinet, without the concurrence of the Cabinet, and that she thought it desirable, if the Cabinet met, that they should agree on the future policy as regards Italy. Lord John also wished for a Cabinet.

I replied that there seemed to be a double question: first, a difference between the Queen and Lord John Russell and himself; and second, the whole question of our Italian Policy. On the first point I could not but remember the apprehension generally felt at the formation of his first Government; that the feeling between the Sovereign and himself might not be such as to give strength to the Government; that the result, however, was most satisfactory. I was not aware of either the Queen or himself having given way on any one point of principle, but the best understanding was kept up in the most honourable way to both, and that, at the end of his Ministry, I knew that the Queen had expressed to several persons how much she regretted to lose his services. That I most sincerely hoped that there was no chance of misunderstanding now arising; that would be most disadvantageous to the Sovereign, to the public service, to the Government, and, above all, to himself. He interrupted me by a.s.suring me that there was not the slightest chance of this. He repeated to me flattering things said by the Queen at the close of his last Administration, and told me that it was impossible for the Queen to have been more kind and civil than at his visit last week at Osborne.

I continued that in Italian matters I believed the Cabinet was agreed.

Our language to Italian Governments ought to show sympathy with Italy, and let them know that we were anxious that they should be left free to act and decide for themselves; that it should inform them in the clearest manner that in no case were they to obtain active a.s.sistance from us, and it ought to avoid giving any advice as to their conduct, which might make us responsible for the evil or danger which might accrue from following such advice. That our language to France and Austria ought to press upon them in every _judicious_ manner the expediency of doing that which was likely to secure the permanent happiness of Italy, and to persuade them to abstain from forcing upon the Italians, persons and forms of Government to which they objected; nothing like a menace or a promise to be used....

I then saw Sidney Herbert, who told me that Charles Wood's report had entirely changed the aspect of things; that it was clear that the Queen had come to the a.s.sistance of the Cabinet, instead of opposing them; that reason had been entirely on her side, and that Johnny had reduced the question now to the single point, which was not of much importance, whether the 25th July despatch should now be communicated or not. He told me that Lord John was in a state of great irritation, and ready to kick over the traces. I dined at Lord Palmerston's, and met Sir Charles Wood and Mr Gladstone. I had some guarded conversation with the latter, who seemed very reasonable. Sir Charles Wood gave me all the information which I required. It appears to me that the really important point is that the whole Cabinet should know the real question between the Queen and her Ministers, and that, if Lord John can find plausible reasons for changing the date of the communication of the despatch, it may be better for the Queen to consent to this.

Some of us will take care to have a decided opinion about the future course of our policy.

I presume Sir George Grey will be at the Cabinet, and will be able to report to your Royal Highness what has pa.s.sed. If he is not there, I will write again. I have the honour to be, Sir, with great respect, your Royal Highness's obedient, humble, and faithful Servant,

GRANVILLE.

[Footnote 71: See Lord Fitzmaurice's _Life of Lord Granville_, vol. i. chap. xiii.]

[Pageheading: THE QUEEN'S POSITION]

_Earl Granville to the Prince Albert._

PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE, _29th August 1859_.

SIR,--The Cabinet was very satisfactory. Lord John looked ill, and evidently ashamed of much of his case. Many of the Cabinet thought that the despatch of 25th July had not only been sent but communicated. Others attached a different meaning to the closing paragraph than what it appears to bear. Lord John produced a most objectionable draft of despatch in lieu of that of the 25th. It was universally condemned, and Lord Palmerston was empowered to tell the Queen that the Cabinet now thought that the despatch of the 25th might be communicated.

Lords Palmerston and John Russell asked for further powers during the Recess, and recommended that we should give an opinion in favour of annexation of duchies to Sardinia. This was decidedly objected to, and we all professed our readiness to meet again if necessary.[72]

The Cabinet thoroughly understood what had pa.s.sed between the Queen and her two Ministers, although we could not get Lord John to show us all we required.

Gladstone took me aside after it was over to say that I must have thought him stupid yesterday evening, that now he knew the facts he thought Her Majesty had been put to most unnecessary annoyance. The Chancellor said something of the same sort. I never saw the Cabinet more united.