The Revolutionary Movement of 1848-9 in Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany Part 18

As this pacific candidate had been shortly after elected President of the French Republic, there seemed little fear that an expedition "tending to compromise European peace," would again be entered upon by France; and the Mountain of the French a.s.sembly had lately sent greetings to the Roman Republic.

Since then the immediate danger to Rome seemed to come rather from the North than from the West, the Triumvirs watched with much anxiety the hesitating att.i.tude of Guerrazzi and the Tuscan Government. So eager had the leaders of the Roman a.s.sembly been for a union between Tuscany and the Roman States that they had even offered to Montanelli and Guerrazzi places in the first Triumvirate, which had been formed before Mazzini and Saffi had been called to power. Guerrazzi, however, had refused to accept this offer; and, while declaring his desire for union with Rome, he professed his inability to find a means for effecting that union. Indeed, Guerrazzi held an almost impossible position. Though unable to make up his mind to accept a Republican Government, he was yet determined to resist any interference, either by Piedmontese or Austrians, in favour of the former Government of Tuscany. And while he still seemed to cherish Italian ideas, he felt that the defeat of Charles Albert had taken away the hopes for any satisfactory continuance of the War of Independence. Under these circ.u.mstances the champions of the restoration of the Grand Duke naturally gained ground in Tuscany. Guerrazzi, distrusted alike by Republicans and Royalists, was unable either to resist this movement, or to guide it according to his own theories; and on April 12 the Munic.i.p.ality of Florence took the matter out of the hands both of Guerrazzi and the a.s.sembly, and decreed the recall of the Grand Duke.

This catastrophe, though a subject of regret, could scarcely have caused much surprise to the leaders of the Roman Republic. A feeling of far deeper pain must have been roused by the final failure of the earliest of all the struggles for liberty of this period. The _coup d'etat_ at Naples of May 15, 1848, though it had shattered the hopes of the Neapolitans, had only intensified the zeal of the Sicilians in their struggle against Ferdinand. As they had just deposed him from the throne, and proclaimed the Duke of Genoa as their King, they thought themselves safe against the restoration of Neapolitan rule; and the Amba.s.sadors of France and England tried to persuade the King of Naples not to send an expedition to Sicily. He refused, however, to listen to these remonstrances; the expedition sailed; and, by his bombardment of Palermo, Ferdinand won for himself throughout Sicily the t.i.tle of Il Re Bombardatore, which was quickly shortened into Bomba.

Ruggiero Settimo, who had taken part in the struggles of 1812 and 1821, was placed at the head of the Sicilian Government, and Garibaldi was invited to come to defend the island. Garibaldi, however, did not arrive; and the chief defence of the island was entrusted to the Polish General Mieroslawski, who, having failed to save Posen from the hands of the Prussians, had become a kind of knight errant of liberty in other parts of Europe. He brought, however, but little good to the causes which he defended. He quarrelled with the Italian General Antonini, and was so often defeated, that the Sicilians began to fear treachery, and at last compelled him to resign his command. The struggle had, in fact, now become hopeless; and on April 17, 1849, the Sicilian Parliament decided to meet no longer. Then Ruggiero Settimo called his friends together, and declared that he was ready to undergo all his troubles again, if they decided to continue the contest. But they believed that the case was now desperate, and voted for peace.

Then Settimo consulted the National Guard, but also in vain; and finding that any further efforts were useless, he resigned his Presidency, and left the island. The separateness of the Sicilian movement lessened, no doubt, in some degree the importance of this defeat; but the gallantry of their struggle had excited much sympathy in Rome; and their fall set free the Neapolitan forces for action against the Roman Republic.

This addition to the dangers which were hara.s.sing the Republic would not perhaps have been so formidable had not a new and more important enemy begun to show signs of hostility at the same period. The election of Louis Napoleon as President of the French Republic had been hailed with some satisfaction both in Venice and Rome; and, after the Roman Republic had been established, two envoys were sent to Paris, who reminded the President of the share he had taken in one of the insurrections against Gregory XVI. Louis Napoleon replied that the time of Gregory XVI. had gone by in Rome, and that his youth was also gone by. Both remarks were undoubtedly true, nor were they in themselves very alarming; but Ledru Rollin, one of the few Frenchmen who really sympathized with Italy, warned Mazzini that danger was coming; and the nature of the danger soon became apparent. On April 16 Odillon Barrot moved in the French a.s.sembly a proposal for a vote of twelve hundred thousand francs for an expedition to Italy; an expedition, he said, which was not to restore the Pope; but to protect liberty and humanity. On April 20 General Oudinot took the command of the expedition, and told his followers that his object was to maintain the old legitimate French influence, and to protect the destinies of Italy from the predominance of the stranger, and of a party who were really in a minority. So kindly was the tone of the French Ministry towards the Romans, that Colonel Frapolli, one of the envoys of the Roman Republic, obtained the leave of the French President to organize a French Legion, which was to fight for the defence of Rome, and to be commanded by Pierre Buonaparte. But Pierre Buonaparte suddenly resigned his command; the prefect was ordered to hinder the embarkation of the Legion; and a large supply of muskets, which had been bought by the Roman Republic, were confiscated by the French Government. In the meantime Oudinot had set sail, and on April 24 he appeared before Civita Vecchia.

About the time when the French troops were landing, there arrived at the same place a very different force. The leader of this force was Luciano Manara, who had fought so gallantly in the "Five Days" of Milan, and who had afterwards been so hampered by Casati and Charles Albert in his attempt to rescue the Southern Tyrol from Austrian rule.

He, like others, had been disappointed by the failure of Charles Albert's final war; but he had refused to join in the Genoese insurrection, which followed the defeat at Novara, and had preferred to set out with 8,000 men to help the Roman Republic. The difficulties thrown in the way of their march were, however, so great that only 600 remained with Manara by the time that he reached Civita Vecchia.

Oudinot, with extraordinary impudence, disputed the right of the Lombards to interfere on behalf of Rome; and he even tried to persuade them that the cause of Rome was so distinct from that of Lombardy, that the Lombards could consistently join their forces with the French against Rome. Manara indignantly repelled the suggestion; and then Oudinot in vain attempted to exact a promise that the Lombard forces should not act against him until the 4th of May. Manara, having refused this further demand, Oudinot was forced to allow the Lombards to pa.s.s; and Manara marched to Rome to tell the Romans how the French Republic was preparing to defend the cause of "liberty and humanity."

In spite of this plain evidence of his intentions, Oudinot still attempted to play his double part; and, since his utterance about the government of a party in a minority had alarmed the inhabitants of Civita Vecchia, he authorised the Secretary of the Legation to declare the sympathy of the French for the Romans, and to a.s.sure the citizens of Civita Vecchia that the French Army had only come to defend them against the Austrians. Mannucci, the Governor of Civita Vecchia, had wished to oppose the first landing of the French; but he was overborne by the Chamber of Commerce and the Munic.i.p.al Council, who were convinced that the French could not really intend to destroy the freedom which they so much professed to cherish. No sooner, however, had Oudinot effected a landing, than he announced that he would not protect the Anarchical Government of Rome, which had never been officially recognised. The Munic.i.p.ality became alarmed; and Oudinot again altered his tone, and declared that the French would respect the vote of the majority of the population, and did not desire to impose any special form of Government upon them. In spite of the warnings given by Oudinot's previous proclamation, the Munic.i.p.al Council consented to admit him into the town; and, no sooner was he there, than he disarmed the battalion which was to have defended the town; and still further showed his zeal for the interests of "Liberty and humanity," by suppressing a printing office in Civita Vecchia, because it had recently printed an address in which the Papacy was condemned.

In the meantime the news had spread to Rome; and the a.s.sembly were debating how they should receive Oudinot. So deep was the conviction of the reality of the French zeal for freedom, that Armellini actually suggested that Oudinot should be received as a friend. But, while the a.s.sembly were debating, Mazzini entered the hall, and announced that Colonel le Blanc had confessed that the expedition was sent to restore the Papacy. Thereupon the a.s.sembly voted that the Triumvirs should have power to resist force with force. But another difficulty arose; the officers of the National Guard declared that they did not believe their soldiers would fight. Thereupon Mazzini ordered that the battalions of the Guards should defile next morning in front of the Quirinal, where the a.s.sembly were meeting; and, as the Guards pa.s.sed, he put to them the question whether they were for peace or war. A loud shout of "Guerra, guerra!" answered his appeal; and the defence was at once resolved on.

In every district the heads of the people and the representatives of the a.s.sembly were to organize the defence of every inch of the country. Barricades were thrown up; arms were to be given to all the people; while the munic.i.p.ality undertook to provide them with corn, meat, and other eatables. At the same time all foreigners, and particularly all Frenchmen living in Rome, were to be placed under the protection of the nation. Anyone who injured them was to be punished as having violated the honour of Rome. With regard to the actual soldiers to be used in the first defence of the city, they were arranged as follows:--the 1st brigade, commanded by Garibaldi, guarded the line outside the walls, which extends from the Porta Portese to the Porta San Pancrazio. The 2nd brigade, commanded by Colonel Masi, was drawn up before the Porta Cavalleggieri, the Vatican, and the Porta Angelica. The 3rd, under Colonel Savini, stood in reserve in the Piazza Navona. Colonel Galletti commanded the 4th, which was stationed in the Piazza Cesarini; while a reserve force under General Galletti, in which Manara and his Lombard volunteers were included, was held back for the present, to come up when needed.

The whole of the forces were supervised by General Avezzana, who had organized the insurrection in Genoa after the defeat at Novara, and who now acted apparently both as Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief.

On April 29 Avezzana took his staff up to Monte Mario, from which point he could see the French army advancing from Civita Vecchia. As they marched along the road, the French saw everywhere a singular inscription painted upon the walls and posts. It ran as follows:--"Article 5 of the preamble of the French Const.i.tution. The French Republic respects foreign nationalities as it intends to make its own respected.

It does not undertake any war of conquest. It will never use its own forces against the liberty of any people." Whether as a kind of answer to this challenge, or in contempt of it, Oudinot announced to his troops that they came to liberate Rome from the factious party which had expelled the Pope, and which had answered his words of conciliation with ill-considered provocations.

It was at 11.30 a.m. on April 30 that the French and Roman armies first came into collision. Garibaldi advanced from Porta San Pancrazio to meet the French, who were entering the grounds of the Villa Pamfili, and who, hearing the bells of the city ring for the attack, supposed that an insurrection had broken out in favour of the Pope, and that they would have an easy victory. Garibaldi, however, repelled them, after a sharp fight, and made 300 prisoners. But the main attack of the French was in the meantime directed against the Porta Angelica. There one of the French captains had hoped to lead a column into Rome by a secret way near the Vatican. But a fire was poured on the advancing column from the Papal gardens, while the troops from Monte Mario attacked them in the rear. The battle lasted for four hours. The French captain Picarde managed at first to drive back the University battalion; but as he advanced, Colonel Arcioni at the head of a regiment of the Lombard exiles attacked him on one flank, and Galletti at the head of the National Guard on the other; finally Garibaldi, having disposed of his original opponents at the Villa Pamfili, charged the French force, and compelled them to lay down their arms.

Several acts of special valour marked this battle. One officer, named Montaldi, having been surrounded by the French, was beaten to his knees, and fought on with only a piece of his sword left. He had fought under Garibaldi at Monte Video, and was a Genoese by birth. Ugo Ba.s.si[24] distinguished himself by riding about the field urging the Romans to battle. His horse was killed under him, and, as he was embracing it with tears, the French came up and took him prisoner.

Garibaldi himself was wounded; but would not allow it to be known until the battle was over, when he sent privately for the doctor.

On the following day the battle was renewed; the people flocking to the defence of the walls, and the French sharp-shooters being finally driven out from the Pamfili gardens. Garibaldi would now have been able to cut off the French retreat and destroy their army; but the Triumvirs, though they had no faith in Oudinot's promises, believed that, if the French were generously treated, the Republican feeling would awake again in France and overthrow the Government, or defeat their plans; but that, if they were driven to extremities, the French vanity would hinder even the most consistent Republicans from opposing the war. On these grounds, they allowed the French to retreat, granted them a short truce, and set free the prisoners who had been captured.

But the hope of any change of feeling in the French was soon found to be utterly vain. A debate, indeed, had been begun in the French a.s.sembly soon after the sailing of the expedition, and a Committee had been appointed to enquire into the object of the expedition; but Jules Favre, the chairman of that Committee, reported that the Government had no intention of making France a party to the overthrow of the Roman Republic; and that it only interfered in order that, under the French flag, humanity might be respected; and that a limit might be placed on the pretensions of Austria. In spite, therefore, of the opposition of Ledru Rollin, the money for the expedition had been voted by 325 against 283. But even Jules Favre could not be entirely blinded by such phrases as these, when considered in the light of Oudinot's actions; and on May 8 the National a.s.sembly invited the Government to take, without delay, the necessary measures for preventing the expedition to Italy from being diverted from the scope a.s.signed to it; and they therefore decided to send Ferdinand Lesseps to negotiate with the Triumvirs for terms of peace.

In the meantime, the Roman Republic realized that it had to guard itself against two other enemies. On May 2, a Neapolitan army was found to be on its way to Rome. On the 4th, Garibaldi marched to Palestrina, and, with the help of Manara and his Lombard battalion, utterly defeated the Neapolitan forces. Just at the same time, the Bolognese became aware that the threatened attack of the Austrians was about to become a reality. Ferrara was occupied on May 7; but, even with the Austrian troops present in the city, the Munic.i.p.al Council of Ferrara voted, by thirty-seven to three, in favour of the Roman Republic. Such a protest was undoubtedly of use in proving the earnestness of the Roman provinces on behalf of the new Government.

But something more was expected, from a city so heroic in its traditions as Bologna. On May 6 it had been announced by the President of the Munic.i.p.ality that medals were about to be distributed in memory of August 8, 1848. On May 8 it was announced that the Austrians were advancing upon Bologna. In that city, as in Rome, the internal defence was organized in special districts under special leaders, while the National Guard and the University battalion were to fight side by side with the regular troops. By nine o'clock in the morning of the 8th the Austrians were at the gates of Bologna, and before eleven o'clock fierce struggles had taken place at the Porta Galliera, the Porta San Felice, and the Porta Saragozza. The people indignantly refused every proposal for capitulation, and at about four o'clock the Austrians began to bombard the city. Before the end of the day, the President had resigned his office, believing that resistance was useless; but the Munic.i.p.ality having in vain endeavoured to obtain the terms which they had hoped for, the a.s.sault was renewed, and the Austrians discharged rockets into the city from the bell-tower of the Franciscan convent. A special Commission was appointed to carry on the struggle, and the band of one of the regiments, standing under the tree of Liberty in the Piazza San Petronio, encouraged the combatants with music and songs. The struggle, however, was a desperate one, and, on May 10, it was again necessary to send a deputation to ask for a truce.

But the combat was soon renewed, and the Bolognese troops were so eager in the attack that the general had to warn them against firing off their pieces needlessly. The pastry cooks were ordered to suspend the making of mere confectionary, in order that there might be more bread for the defenders of the city, and reinforcements were expected from the country districts of the Romagna. General Wimpffen, who was leading the Austrian troops, denounced the defence as "the stupid work of a blind faction;" but the Provisional Government answered that the proclamation signed by Marshal Wimpffen, and forwarded by him to the magistrates, having come without any accompanying evidence, could not be received by them. Weary of acting merely on the defensive, the Bolognese made a sortie from the Porta Maggiore, repelled an attack of the Austrians, and succeeded in joining a body of the Romagnoli, who were coming to the relief of the city. But the chances of uniting with the outside world became less and less; for the Austrian troops drew ever more closely round the city, and, on the 15th, the bombardment was renewed. Then a number of the citizens requested leave to go to Rome, to find out how things were going on there, in order that they might know what was still required of them at headquarters. But this proposal seems to have been a mere utterance of despair; for, on the 16th, it became necessary to abandon the defence and arrange for terms of surrender.

While the Bolognese were engaged in this desperate struggle, Ferdinand Lesseps had arrived in Rome, and was rapidly becoming converted to the belief that the Republican Government was the free choice of the people, and that it was better able to maintain order than the Papacy had been; while a conversation with Mamiani had shown him that even the so-called Moderate Liberals were unwilling to act against the Republic. But, though Lesseps was honest enough to confess these facts, his vanity, both personal and national, prevented him from making the natural inference that neither he nor Oudinot were needed in Rome. He, therefore, proposed that the Roman States should request the paternal protection of the French Republic; that the Roman populations should p.r.o.nounce freely on their form of government; that Rome should receive the French as their friends; and that Roman and French troops should act together in defence of the city. The a.s.sembly rejected these proposals, on the ground that Rome had no need of protection, and that the name of the Roman Republic was not mentioned in the negotiation; and they further complained that, on May 19, while the truce was still in force, the French soldiers had crossed the Tiber. Then the Triumvirs proposed, in their turn, that the Roman Republic should acknowledge the help offered by the French nation against foreign intervention; that the Const.i.tution which had been adopted by the General a.s.sembly should be sanctioned by a popular vote; that Rome should welcome the French soldiers as brothers; but that they should stay outside the city till the Roman Republic called for them. These proposals were accepted, with some modifications, by Lesseps, within the time of the truce; and he left Rome, well satisfied with Mazzini, still better with himself.

Great, however, was the indignation of this unfortunate diplomatist, when, on reaching the camp of Oudinot, he found that the general, without waiting for the expiration of the truce, had suddenly occupied Monte Mario! Lesseps was divided between his feelings as a man of honour and his unwillingness to oppose his countrymen. He threatened at first that if the order for a.s.sault were not withdrawn, he would himself go back to Rome and give the alarm; but when, on his return to the city, the Triumvirs questioned him about the breach of the truce, he a.s.sured them that Monte Mario had only been occupied in order to prevent its falling into the hands of the French reinforcements, which were on their way to Rome. The fact was that, from first to last, Lesseps had been the dupe of the unscrupulous men who were ruling France. While he had been entrusted with apparently peaceful negotiations, secret instructions had been sent to Oudinot to the following effect:--"Tell the Romans that we do not wish to join with the Neapolitans against them. Continue your negotiations in the sense of your declaration. We are sending you reinforcements. Wait for them.

Manage to enter Rome by agreement with the inhabitants; and if you should be compelled to a.s.sault it, do it in the manner that shall be most likely to secure success." Oudinot fully understood his instructions. On May 31 he scornfully rejected the convention which had been accepted by Lesseps; and on the same day Lesseps received his recall to Paris, and Oudinot received orders to take Rome by force.

In the meantime an unfortunate occurrence had called attention to another danger which was threatening the Roman Republic. General Roselli had now been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Roman army; but he found it very difficult to control Garibaldi. After the defeat of the Neapolitan forces, Garibaldi had desired to push on to Velletri.

Roselli forbad him to do so; but Garibaldi disobeyed the orders of his chief, and marched forward. Part of the troops who followed him had not learned to stand fire, and fled at the first attack. Garibaldi was in such danger that he was obliged to send to Roselli for fresh troops.

With the help of these reinforcements, Garibaldi drove back the Neapolitans; but he then disobeyed Roselli's orders for the second time, marched forward to Velletri, and entered it on May 20. Fierce recriminations followed between the friends of Garibaldi and those of Roselli; Garibaldi and his friends maintaining that, but for Roselli's delay, the victory would have been more complete; the supporters of Roselli declaring that, if it had not been for Garibaldi's rashness, Ferdinand himself, and a great part of his army, would have fallen into the hands of the Romans. Roselli further demanded that Garibaldi should be summoned before a Court-Martial for his disobedience to orders. But the Triumvirs felt that there would be a certain incongruity in such a trial, which could only lead to mischief, and they persuaded Roselli to abandon his proposal. Garibaldi's influence, indeed, was strong, not only among his soldiers, but also among the members of the a.s.sembly; and Sterbini, who seems generally to have suspected all existing Governments, demanded that Garibaldi should be made Dictator, and that Roselli's command should be taken from him. This proposal, however, the a.s.sembly rejected, and, on June 3, declared itself in permanence.

On that very day Oudinot gave another proof of his peculiar ideas of French honour. The day before, he had promised to defer the attack until June 4. The grounds of the Villa Pamfili lie at a short distance from the Porta San Pancrazio, and were then more thickly wooded than they are now. On the night of June 2 they were occupied by three companies of Bolognese. These soldiers, trusting to the honour of Oudinot, were sleeping peacefully, when suddenly two French divisions entered the wood. They surrounded and captured 200 of the soldiers; but the remaining 200 retreated fighting, before a body of 8,000 French. Garibaldi hastened up with reinforcements, and the fight lasted from 2 a.m. till 6 p.m. on June 3. Four times were the houses in the grounds of the Villa Pamfili lost and won. The walls shook with the thunder of the French and Roman artillery; and the houses were filled with the dead and wounded of both armies. But the treachery of Oudinot had been successful in securing him so good a position, that the houses at last remained in the hands of the French, although they were so ruined that they afforded them very little protection.

[Ill.u.s.tration: IL VASCELLO, ROME (_taken since the siege_).]

This struggle seemed only to rouse the energies of the Romans to new efforts. Between the Villa Pamfili and the Porta San Pancrazio, stood an old house which, from its shape, was known as the Vascello or little s.h.i.+p; and it was by the walls of this house that, for nearly a month from this time, General Medici and Garibaldi held their own against the numbers, the training, and the treachery of the French.

Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the Romans in the defence of their city. The walls were crowded with people during the fight; youths, not able yet to bear arms, rushed into the crash of battle.

And girls went, while the cannon was still firing, to search for the dead, to encourage the combatants, and to heal the wounded. But treachery steadily gained ground upon valour. Enrico Dandolo, a young captain in Manara's regiment, was about to attack a company of Frenchmen, when the French captain cried out, "We are friends!"

Dandolo ordered the attack to be suspended, and advanced to the Frenchman, holding out his hand. The French at once fired, and Dandolo and more than a third of his company fell dead. Oudinot, however, over-estimated the credulity of the Romans; for on June 12 he demanded to be admitted into Rome, on the ground that his intentions had been misunderstood, and that he wished to secure Roman liberty. When, however, he was reminded of his violation of Lesseps's agreement, he showed his zeal for Roman liberty by proceeding to bombard the city.

But there were still some Frenchmen who held different views from Oudinot's on the subject of their country's honour. On the very day when the bombardment of Rome began, Ledru Rollin and his friends, having in vain tried to secure a condemnation of the Roman expedition from the French a.s.sembly, took up arms for a final effort to vindicate the honour of France against its faithless rulers. But the revolutionary force of France had been wasted in the Socialist insurrection of the previous year; and, after a gallant struggle, the champions of French honour and liberty were suppressed by General Changarnier. The failure of this effort must, no doubt, have been terribly disappointing to those Romans who had hoped to the last that France would vindicate herself against those who were dishonouring her. And, as if to bring home to the Romans how isolated their position was becoming as defenders of liberty, there came to them, shortly after, the news of the final downfall of German liberty.

Ever since April 24, when the King of Prussia refused the crown of Germany, he had been following a steady course of opposition to the Liberal movements in favour of German unity; and on May 24 he had recalled the Prussian Deputies from the Frankfort a.s.sembly. This had encouraged the other Princes of Germany to dissolve their local parliaments and recall their subjects from the Frankfort Parliament; while the strengthening of the troops near Frankfort seemed to limit the freedom of debate among the few deputies who remained. At last, on June 6, the few remaining representatives of German unity decided to transfer their place of meeting from Frankfort to Stuttgart. The Baden Republicans had in the meantime taken the stronger course of appealing for the last time to insurrection; but both the const.i.tutional and the revolutionary attempt to save the liberties of Germany proved hopeless. On June 18 the remnant of the German Parliament was dispersed by the Wurtemberg soldiers; the Baden rising failed, to a great extent from the quarrels between the Polish general Mieroslawski and the Baden general Sigel; and the Prussian soldiers trampled out the last remains of German liberty.

In the meantime the Austrians were capturing city after city in the Roman provinces; and the French were pressing nearer to the city. But the enthusiasm of the Romans did not slacken. As Garibaldi went through the hospitals to visit the wounded, several of the sufferers sprang from their beds to embrace his knees, with cries of "Papa, papa"; and the women exerted themselves gallantly to relieve the sufferings of the wounded. The French did not even now seem absolutely certain of victory; for when a sortie, planned by Garibaldi on June 22, had ended in a fiasco, a certain M. Corcelles attempted to reopen diplomatic negotiations. But Mazzini, warned by his experience of Lesseps, sternly repelled all proposals for negotiation; and the struggle was renewed. The state of the Roman Republic was, however, really desperate. On June 24 came the news that, after twenty-five days' struggle, Ancona had fallen into the hands of the Austrians, who had almost immediately violated the understanding on which it had been surrendered.

In the meantime the French slowly advanced in the struggle by the Vascello, Medici continually driving them back. Many of the houses were battered down, but the inhabitants were provided by the Triumvirs with fresh lodgings in the deserted houses of the Cardinals. When the French knocked down part of the walls, the citizens picked up the stones to repair them. At last, however, on June 29, Oudinot resolved to make a final effort, and directed his forces against Garibaldi's house, which was known as the Villa Spada. Twice the invaders attacked this house, and twice they were repelled. Then they succeeded in capturing a barricade which had been raised in front of the house; but again the Romans recaptured it. Garibaldi fought in the midst of his followers, singing a war-song; and more than a hundred of his soldiers fell round him. Seven times the barricade was taken and retaken; the gallant Manara was killed; and at last, after twelve hours' fighting, it was discovered that the Porta San Pancrazio was no longer tenable.

On June 30 the Roman a.s.sembly met, and Mazzini propounded to them three alternatives. Either they should continue the defence, which now seemed impossible; or they should yield altogether; or, thirdly, they should cut their way out into the provinces, and continue the struggle there.

Mazzini strongly urged the third course. While the debate was still proceeding, Garibaldi in his red s.h.i.+rt, covered with mud, sprang into the a.s.sembly. He declared that further defence was impossible, unless they were prepared to abandon the Trastevere, and break down the bridges. Under these circ.u.mstances, he supported Mazzini's recommendation, that they should cut their way out into the provinces, and carry on the struggle there. Cernuschi, however, proposed the following resolution:--"The Roman Const.i.tuent a.s.sembly abandons a defence which has become impossible, and remains at its post."

This motion was carried; the Triumvirs resigned their post to the Munic.i.p.ality, and a new Triumvirate was elected to carry out the terms of peace.

Then Garibaldi called round him his followers in the Piazza San Pietro, and addressed them as follows:--"I have nothing to give you but hunger, sufferings, and battles; the bare earth for your bed, and the burning sun for your refreshment. Yet let him who does not yet disbelieve in the fortune of Italy follow me." He then marched out from the Porta San Giovanni, followed by 4,000 men. They made their way to the northern part of the Roman States; but after much suffering and privation, they were forced to abandon the struggle. Ugo Ba.s.si and others fell into the hands of the Austrians, and were shot. Garibaldi and a small remnant of his followers succeeded in escaping from the country.

In the meantime the Roman Munic.i.p.al Council attempted to make terms with Oudinot; but finding it impossible to secure honourable conditions, they declared that they yielded only to force. On July 3 the French troops entered Rome; and while they marched through the city they found all the shops closed, and heard from every side the cries of "Death to Cardinal Oudinot! Death to the soldiers of the Pope! Death to the Croats of France!" On the same day the Roman a.s.sembly proclaimed from the Capitol the Const.i.tution of the Republic. On the next day a regiment of French infantry dissolved the a.s.sembly by force; and soon after a Commission of three Cardinals was appointed to govern Rome.

The hopes of Italy now centred in Venice, where, ever since the abandonment of Milan by Charles Albert in the previous August, the Republican Government had struggled alone against Austria. So fierce had been the feeling caused by Charles Albert's treatment of Venice, that it had required all Manin's influence to hinder a violent attack on the Sardinian Commissioner. The Sardinian Admiral, indeed, attempted at first to disregard the orders of Charles Albert, and to continue the defence of Venice, but he was compelled after a time to withdraw. Manin, however, was anxious to secure foreign allies for Venice; and, shortly after his abandonment by Charles Albert, he appealed to France for help. The French Government answered by those vague and cheap promises which meant nothing; while the English Consul at Venice tried to form an Austrian party in the city; and Lord Palmerston worried Manin with all sorts of useless proposals for diplomatic compromises. But if Manin found little help from foreign Governments, he received much encouragement from those Italians who had not yet despaired of their country. In September, 1848, 1,200 soldiers who had served under Durando arrived in Venice; and on October 3 a vessel brought 6,000 guns from Genoa. The Austrian blockade, indeed, pressed ever closer, and on October 10 it had become so close that food could not be brought into the town. But so little did Manin lose heart that on October 11 he declared to the a.s.sembly that Venice was in a better state for defence than when the Dictators.h.i.+p had been established in August; and the a.s.sembly in turn voted that Manin and the two colleagues who had been appointed to a.s.sist him should be entrusted with all political negotiations, saving the ratification by the a.s.sembly of the final treaty. So great was the mutual confidence between Manin and the poorer cla.s.ses of Venice, that in January, 1849, two Gondoliers were chosen to a.s.sist him in the Government.

The proclamation of the Republic in Rome had excited both the sympathies and the fears of Manin; for while he saw in it a step towards an Italian Republic, in which Venice might take a part, he also saw that it might hasten an Austrian intervention in the Roman States. The failure of Charles Albert's final effort in April, 1849, so alarmed the Venetians that Manin began to speculate on the desirability of accepting an Austrian Prince as Const.i.tutional Sovereign of Lombardo-Venetia. But the Hungarian Declaration of Independence once more revived his hopes, and from that time his one aim in foreign policy was to secure and strengthen an alliance between Venice and Hungary. Yet the month of May, in which this alliance was concluded, seemed one of the most desperate periods in the fortunes of Venice. The fortress of Malghera, which lies on an island in the lagunes, about two hours' gondola journey west of Venice, was the scene of one of the fiercest struggles between the Austrians and Venetians. General Haynau had effected a landing on this island, and attempted to seize the fortress; but the Venetians on their side let loose the waters to swamp the Austrian trenches, sent boats under the fire of the Austrians to bring food to the defenders, and made expeditions to carry off oxen, even from the country already occupied by the Austrians. So desperate was the resistance that Radetzky treated Haynau's attempt as a failure, and sent General Thurn to take his place. But, partly by breaking a truce, partly by force of superior numbers, the Austrians succeeded in carrying the day; and on May 26, when the fortress had been reduced to ruins, the Venetians were compelled to abandon Malghera, and to retreat to some islands nearer the city. In the following month Manin again tried to enter into negotiations with Radetzky; but a letter from Kossuth encouraged him to stand firm; and he made such demands for independence that the Austrians scornfully rejected them.

In spite, however, of the encouragement which he had sent to Manin, Kossuth's own position was one of increasing danger. The Declaration of Independence of April 14 had been followed by the resignation of several Hungarian officers; and Gorgei, though unwillingly retaining his command, became more and more antagonistic in his att.i.tude towards Kossuth. This mutual distrust was one of the main causes of a step not very creditable to either party, and which is reckoned by military critics one of the most unfortunate in the war. On April 26, Gorgei and General Klapka had, by a desperate march, rescued the fortress of Komorn from the Austrians; and Klapka and others believed that, if Gorgei had followed up this success by marching to Raab, he might have been able to reopen communications with Vienna. Kossuth, however, was anxious that Buda-Pesth should not be allowed to remain in the hands of the Austrians, and he therefore desired Gorgei to turn his forces to the deliverance of the capital. Gorgei, in common with all the military leaders, believed this proposal to be a mistake; but he has frankly recorded his reasons for readily obeying Kossuth's orders. If he had followed up his advantages and marched into Austria, a Republic, he believed, would have been proclaimed in Hungary; and a compromise with the Austrian Government would have become impossible; whereas, by occupying Buda-Pesth, he thought that he should gain a vantage ground which would enable him to persuade both parties to accept the modified Const.i.tution for Hungary which he desired. Hence it came to pa.s.s that the greater part of May was taken up by the siege of the fortress of Buda, while Gorgei was intriguing with Kossuth's opponents in the Diet, and the Austrians were gaining ground in Hungary. And while he was with difficulty holding his own against Gorgei's intrigues, Kossuth was alarmed by the news that a more formidable enemy had once more appeared on the scene.

On May 1 the Emperor of Austria had formally appealed to the Russians to a.s.sist him against his Hungarian subjects; and in June the Russian forces began to gather near the pa.s.ses of the Carpathians. On the 17, Colonel Szab encountered the Russians near the Temos Pa.s.s. When he first advanced to meet them, he believed that he had only to do with some skirmis.h.i.+ng troops, such as those with whom he had previously dealt. But more and more soldiers pressed in to the attack, and Szab was compelled to retreat. Two days later Colonel Kiss, at the head of a band of Szeklers, came up to resist the invaders; and, while those who were on the hills above hurled down stones and wood on the Russians, the soldiers below, though only 400 in number, resisted so gallantly that the Russians at first fled before them. At last, however, Kiss was laid senseless by a shot, and his soldiers were seized with a panic and fled in disorder.

Bem, who had returned to Transylvania about the end of May, now attempted to rally the Szekler by inspiriting appeals to the memories of their former struggles. On June 25 he recaptured the Saxon town of Bistritz, and then encountered in the open field a combined corps of Russians and Austrians. For seven hours he held out against them; but new reinforcements came up, and he was compelled to retreat. The enormous numbers of the Russians seem to have impressed Bem's followers, and to have increased their original panic. The country was overrun by the enemy; Hermannstadt was captured and recaptured, and when, on August 5, it at last fell into the hands of the Russians, Bem narrowly escaped with his life. Even then he wished to continue the struggle; but on August 7 he was summoned to North Hungary by Kossuth, to advise him in his difficulties with Gorgei.

After an attempt to supersede Gorgei by Meszaros, Kossuth had been compelled to allow the former to resume the command; but he had by no means recovered confidence in him, and he felt ready to clutch at any proposal which would extricate himself and his country from their difficulties. Amongst other suggestions he proposed to offer to Jancu and the Roumanian leaders independent commands in the Hungarian Army, and to concede to them most of the points about which they had been fighting. He had even opened negotiations with Jancu for this purpose; but Bem steadily opposed the scheme, and the negotiations came to nothing. But Kossuth's great hope was to supersede Gorgei by Bem. This proposal, however, was opposed, not only by Gorgei himself, but also by Csanyi, who seems throughout to have sympathised with Gorgei, as against Kossuth. Bem, therefore, returned to the war.

Kossuth, left unsupported, became more and more alarmed. Csanyi and Gorgei pressed for his resignation; and, while he was doubting, he received the news that Bem had been dangerously wounded in battle. The report, indeed, was exaggerated; and Bem wrote a letter to a.s.sure Kossuth of the slightness of his wound, and to encourage him to stand firm. But this letter never arrived, and the next news which Bem received was that Kossuth had abdicated, and Gorgei been declared Dictator of Hungary. Bem wrote a letter of remonstrance to Kossuth, and, at the same time, marched towards Lugos, in the Banat, to meet the Russians. Dembinski, who was now in Bem's army, disobeyed his orders, and Bem was defeated. On that very day, August 13, Gorgei surrendered at Vilagos with all his forces to the Russian general.

This surrender is now believed to have been necessary on military grounds. The advances made by the Austrians during the siege of Buda, and the Russian conquest of Transylvania had placed Hungary at the mercy of the conqueror. Nevertheless, it cannot be doubted that the quarrel between Gorgei and Kossuth, and the factions which the former had stirred up in the army, had tended considerably to bring about this result; while, with regard to the terms of surrender, General Gorgei has never been able to explain how it was that, while the amnesty was so scrupulously observed towards himself both by the Austrians and Russians, the generals, whose only fault was that they had served under him, were ruthlessly put to death by Haynau. Anyhow, whatever may have been the excuses for the act, the surrender of Vilagos produced a startling close to the Hungarian War. Bem, indeed, hastened back to Transylvania, and attempted to rouse his former followers; and General Klapka held out for a month longer at Komorn.

But Bem's efforts were of no avail; Klapka's defence only served to secure rather better terms; and both these generals, as well as Kossuth, were forced to take refuge in Turkey.

The news of the surrender of Vilagos did not reach Venice till August 20. There Manin had had much difficulty in still retaining the control which had been necessary for the guidance of affairs; and on August 6 a minority of 28 in the a.s.sembly had protested against his reappointment as Dictator. The cholera had now been added to the other horrors of the siege; provisions were growing scarce; and thus the news of Gorgei's surrender came as the last straw to break down the hopes of the defenders of Venice. On the 22nd, therefore, the Government agreed to yield. Manin succeeded in preventing the riots which seemed likely to break out on the news of the capitulation; and on August 30 the final surrender of Venice to the Austrians brought to a close the long struggle for liberty which had begun with the Sicilian rising of 1848.

On December 20, 1849, there appeared the following statement in a Swiss paper: "In front of Manin's door was a stone on which his name was engraved. The Austrians broke it to pieces; but the smallest fragments of it have been collected by the Venetians as sacred relics."

So ended the revolutionary period of 1848 and 1849. Those Revolutions had displayed, in a way unknown before, the strength and the weakness of the national principle. The enthusiasm for liberty, and the power of generous self-sacrifice, which was kindled by the feeling for a common language and common traditions, had been shown in each of the Revolutions; and they had struck a blow at the merely diplomatic and military settlements of States which produced a lasting effect. But, on the other hand, with the love for men of the same race and language there awoke in all these nations, with terrible force, the hatred and scorn for men of other races and languages; and thus, while the leaders of the movement taught tyrants their danger, they supplied them at the same time with a defence against that danger,--with another justification of the old maxim of tyrants, "Divide et impera."

And so the work of the Revolutionists did not fail; but yet it could not achieve all the n.o.ble ends for which it was intended.

The time which followed the defeat of the Revolutionists was to show both their failure and their success. The dreary period of reaction from 1849 to 1859 could not have been expected by any sane man to be of long duration. But the time of reawakening was not like the time of the first dawn of hope. The work which had been enn.o.bled by the thought of Mazzini, by the sword of Garibaldi, by the statesmans.h.i.+p of Manin, and the eloquent enthusiasm of Ciceruacchio, was to be carried to completion by the intrigues of Cavour, and the interested speculation of Louis Napoleon. In the place of the wisdom of Robert Blum, and the wild popular energy of Hecker, was to arise the stern hard policy of "blood and iron"; and, as Germany had failed to absorb Prussia, Prussia was finally to absorb Germany. The blunders and prejudices of the leaders of the Vienna Revolution were to be reproduced by Schmerling, without their self-sacrifice or generosity. But at the same time Francis Deak, the wise statesman, who had stood aside in dislike of the fiercer and more unscrupulous policy of other Magyar leaders, was to re-establish gradually for his country the freedom which she had lost for a time during the Revolutionary struggle. The race struggles of the Austro-Hungarian Empire were to be renewed in a milder form, and the solution of their difficulties postponed to a distant future; while the yet more dangerous problems of Socialism, which had forced themselves in so untimely a manner on the citizens of Vienna and Berlin, were gradually to a.s.sume ever greater prominence in the affairs of Europe.

Thus it will be seen that the Revolutions of 1848 to '49 were but the climax of movements of which we have not yet seen the end; but, for good and for evil, they left a mark on Europe, which is never likely to be entirely effaced.

THE END.