Argentina Part 4

[36] "They collected them into fixed habitations, gave them laws, introduced useful and polite arts among them; and, in short, of a barbarous nation, without civilised manners, and without religious principles, they made a good-natured and well-governed people, who strictly observed the Christian ceremonies" (De Bougainville, p. 98).

[37] "These Indians live at present in an entire a.s.surance, that whatever their priests advise them to is good, and whatever they reprehend is bad" (Ulloa, ii. 183).

CHAPTER V

THE SPANISH COLONIAL SYSTEM

Colonies were one of the many new things which were introduced to Europe at the end of the fifteenth century. Of them mediaeval Europe had known nothing since the dissolution of the Roman Empire; the means of communication were too bad, the Asiatic races were too powerful, and the Western world itself was too thinly populated to allow of distant excursions. The planting of settlements was familiar to both Greece and Rome. The Greek system was the simpler of the two, for the city state merely propagated itself by colonies as a plant propagates itself by seeds, and two cities existed instead of one, each independent of the other. But a Roman colony was incorporated as a subordinate and inferior part of the mother state. Greek history and literature were almost unknown in the Middle Ages, and even after the Renaissance they remained much less familiar than Latin. On the other hand, many European States, and especially Spain, inherited their law and their munic.i.p.al systems from Rome, Latin was the international language, and the Church, by far the most powerful mediaeval inst.i.tution, was Roman. It is, therefore, not surprising that Spain followed the Roman colonial system, but all the circ.u.mstances were so different that beyond the mere incorporation and inferiority of the new dominions there was little other resemblance.

The main difference and the main characteristic of the Spanish colonial system was this--the colonies were the private property of the King of Spain. This, then, is the keystone of the edifice--that the dominions were vested in the Crown, not in the nation. The derivation of this theory is doubtless from the fact that in the early exploring days the Spanish and Portuguese kings were, really or apparently, private adventurers, and, in fact, the adventurers always a.s.sumed that they were stewards of royal estates rather than officers of a kingdom. Thus the colonies were the property of the King of Spain for the time being. Ferdinand had, in 1511, established a tribunal to manage his new property. This was the Council of the Indies, which made laws for the colonies and distributed all the appointments and acted as a Court of Appeal from the Audiencia in America. The King made all grants of land, and allowed the colonists only local liberties; the Spanish nation had no concern whatever in the matter. A modern parallel is the Congo Free State as it was a year or two ago.

It is probable that the New World had little to complain of except in the matter of trade and commerce, but here the system was illiberal and short-sighted. The fifth share of the King in the produce of all the gold and silver mines was a small matter in comparison with the mult.i.tude of hara.s.sing restrictions,[38] which Spain never had the wisdom to cancel till it was too late. No colony was allowed to trade with any country except Spain; all the exports, whatever their destination, had first to go to the mother country, and the navigation laws were conceived in a similar spirit. The most glaring instance of stupidity was the prohibition of import trade laid upon Buenos Aires. No Atlantic colonial port might receive goods from Spain except Nombre de Dios. When Argentina purchased goods from Spain they were despatched across the Atlantic to Nombre de Dios, carried by mule across the Isthmus, trans.h.i.+pped to Callao, and then taken over innumerable mountains into the River Plate country. Merely to state such a system is to condemn it, but there was no possibility of altering it, because the whole s.h.i.+pping trade of Spain was in the hands of a syndicate of Cadiz merchants, and they were all-powerful.

As is well known, no foreign State was allowed to trade with Spanish America, nor was any foreigner even allowed to enter it without special permission. Various manufactures were forbidden, and even the cultivation of the vine and olive was placed under restrictions, as it was feared that their produce might compete with the produce of Spain.

In fact, the ideal of the home-staying Spaniard was that the colonies should be mere mining-camps. Gold and silver were regarded as the whole of wealth, and it was considered the height of commercial wisdom to drain the whole produce of the mines of America into Spanish ports without allowing a fraction to be diverted elsewhere.

Thus legitimate trade was made extremely difficult, for the Spaniards even discouraged colonial exports from the fear that precious metals might be concealed among them. Accordingly, in 1599, the Governor of Buenos Aires was commanded to forbid exportation and importation alike under penalty of death. But the stringency of the various laws and regulations defeated their own objects, a gigantic contraband trade grew up, and all the officials, from the Governor downward, were implicated in it. Bribes accompanied almost every business transaction.[39] The manufactures of Europe were surrept.i.tiously landed at Buenos Aires, and of course ruined the sale of the goods that had come over oceans, Isthmus, and mountains. This contraband trade was chiefly carried on by the English and the Dutch, and, as Professor Seeley has frequently pointed out, the power to trade with the New World formed for some two hundred years the chief bone of contention in the foreign politics of European countries. The practice of smuggling has had two marked and very pernicious effects upon Spanish-American character; it has fostered contempt of law and the preference of Government service to profitable industry. As the Argentines despised the laws of contraband, so they came to despise all laws, and during their independent history the shackles of the law have been cobwebs light as air to restrain individuals or communities from disturbing the public peace. In a word, out of the contraband trade sprang one of the worst features of South America--lawlessness and turbulence. It is obvious that it also fostered an almost equally injurious spirit--the craving of office. It was easier and more profitable to take bribes from the smugglers than to engage actively in smuggling, and so the tradition has descended to prefer the certain emoluments (direct and indirect) of office to the uncertain gains of trade. In Spanish America it is better to be the nephew of a President than of a successful trader. Of course, it would be absurd to attribute these two evils solely to the contraband trade, but the first has been undoubtedly encouraged, and the second, to a considerable extent, caused by the practice which was forced upon the Spanish colonies by an absurd fiscal system. The economic condition, therefore, of these countries appears to us very sombre. It must, however, be remembered that such treatment of "plantations" was the accepted policy of the age, and probably the reason why Spain was more unfortunate with her foreign possessions than other nations is rather to be found in the indolent character of her sons and her foreign embarra.s.sments than in any particular set of restrictions.

Till the middle of the eighteenth century the principles of the Spanish colonial system were considered the last words of commercial policy by all nations and practically all individuals.[40] That great statesman, Lord Chatham, was fully convinced of the wisdom of these principles. He remarked: "Let the sovereign authority of this country over the colonies be a.s.serted in as strong terms as can be devised, and be made to extend to every point of legislation whatsoever. That we may bind their _trade_, confine their _manufactures_, and exercise every _power_ whatsoever, except that of taking money out of their pocket without their consent."[41] Indeed, the general commercial and colonial policy of Spain was at least as liberal as that of England, and was, during the half century preceding the Revolution, infinitely more liberal, and if we make allowance for the enlargement of the human mind in a hundred and fifty years, it must be admitted that the present commercial policy of the South American Republics compares unfavourably with the Spanish system. There was at least material prosperity. Adam Smith,[42] while censuring the Spanish system of government and considering it inferior to that obtaining in English colonies, recognised that great progress was being made. He says: "The Spanish colonies are under a government in many respects less favourable to agriculture, improvement, and population, than that of the English colonies. They seem, however, to be advancing in all these much more rapidly than any country in Europe. In a fertile soil and happy climate the great abundance and cheapness of land, a circ.u.mstance common to all new colonies, is, it seems, so great an advantage as to compensate many defects in civil government." It is impossible to put down the failure of Spain to anything but defect of character--the grand defect of _manana_, of putting off every exertion till to-morrow, or rather for ever. But it cannot be denied that a hundred years ago the ill-starred country had to face a series of misfortunes which might well have disheartened a more energetic people. The revolutionary spirit which had spread all over the globe was at first wonderfully impotent in the Spanish settlements owing to the rigid disciplinary system which had been in force for upwards of two hundred years. Yet that of itself would have been enough to have taxed all the energies of an ancient and absolute monarchy. Further, Spain contrived to change sides in such a way during the war as to get all the hards.h.i.+ps of defeat and none of the fruits of victory. When she was in alliance with France her fleet was destroyed by the English, and when she was in alliance with England her territory was overrun by the French. At this crisis also she was afflicted by the feeblest king of a feeble line and probably the worst queen and minister that ever lived. Under these circ.u.mstances it can hardly be a matter for wonder that she lost her colonies.

And yet if her general policy towards them be considered, it must be acknowledged that she deserved her fate less than any colonial power then existing. The Spanish merchants did indeed greatly hamper the development of South America, but they acted in obedience to a theory which was considered axiomatic and which was rigorously put into practice by every other nation. The King and the high officials always exerted their influence in favour of humane treatment of the Indians.

Irala was conspicuous for his humanity, and the protective regulations which he put forward on their behalf and at the beginning of the seventeenth century, when reports reached Spain that the Indians in Tuc.u.man were being ill-treated, it was ordered that Don Francisco de Alfaro, Auditor of the Supreme Court of Peru, should go to Paraguay and investigate the whole matter. The result was the Ordinances of Alfaro in 1612, which abolished both the forcible subjection of Indians and slavery, and subst.i.tuted a small capitation tax. As we have seen, the Court of Madrid warmly seconded the early efforts of the Jesuits. The treatment, then, of subject races was as benevolent as circ.u.mstances and theories would permit, nor were the colonists in practice subject to any considerable severity. The commercial regulations were easily evaded, and the Argentina steadily advanced in prosperity.

The latter days of Spanish rule were extremely creditable to the sagacity and liberality of the Crown and its advisers. In 1764 a line of vessels was established to run between Corunna and various South American ports, with permission to carry Spanish merchandise and bring back in return the products of the colonies, and in 1774 the colonies were allowed intercommunication and trade. In 1778 a new commercial code was drawn up for the benefit of the Spanish Indies, and this was surprisingly liberal for those days. Nine ports in Spain and twenty-four in the colonies were declared "ports of entry," and goods, for the most part, were allowed to pa.s.s in and out freely. The general duty was nominally 3 per cent. on Spanish goods and 7 per cent. on foreign goods; but as the latter had to be s.h.i.+pped from Spain, the duty upon them was really 40 or 50 per cent. If we compare this scale with that now in force, we shall see how greatly South America has retrograded since the removal of the control of Spain. It is interesting to remember that these beneficent regulations were framed while Smith was publis.h.i.+ng the "Wealth of Nations," and that therefore backward Spain antic.i.p.ated both Pitt and Huskisson.

After this Argentina advanced by leaps and bounds. The average export of hides had been 150,000; they soon rose to 800,000, and in one particular year the figure was 1,400,000. At least seventy s.h.i.+ps sailed to Spain every year, and the population of Buenos Aires rose from 37,000 in 1778, to 72,000 in 1800. Buenos Aires became openly what she had long been struggling to be--the _entrepot_ for wine and brandy from Cuzo, hides from Tuc.u.man, tobacco, _yerba mate_, and wood from Paraguay, and gold, silver, copper, rice, sugar, and cocoa from the distant interior. Had the fate of Spain been happier, and the character of her sons stronger, South America would have had a very different destiny, for everything pointed to a period of peaceful development, and the people had a government which was exactly suited to them. The Revolution subst.i.tuted for the mild rule of Spain a preposterous democracy which was only effective or tolerable when metamorphosed into a dictators.h.i.+p, and for more than two centuries of comparative peace an indefinitely long period of disorder and bloodshed.

Before closing this brief sketch of a period which has been both neglected and misunderstood (for it is usually pa.s.sed over with a few reflections upon the perversity and tyranny of Spanish rule) it is desirable to indicate briefly the machinery of government, which underwent substantial alteration only in the last generation of the Spanish dominion. The King had a special body of advisers to help him in the administration of his oversea territory, and this was called the Council of the Indies. There were only two Viceroys--who, of course, were subject to the home authorities--they were the Viceroy of Mexico and the Viceroy of Peru. The latter ruled over the whole of South America. When a new colony was founded it was put under the charge of an Adelantado, or Governor, who was nominally subject to the Viceroy, but in practice he was independent and answerable only to the King. When he vacated office his acts were subject to a review, and he was liable to punishment if found guilty of misconduct, but in the nature of things there was little effective check upon him by the Home Government, and he was really a military ruler with almost despotic powers. However, the Spaniards, following the Roman tradition, always strongly favoured munic.i.p.al government, and provisions were made which modified the arbitrary character of the system, although, as was inevitable, there were loud complaints that the claims of the Creoles--those born in the country--were neglected, and that the good posts were given to Spaniards from over the seas. Even to the last this grievance remained.[43]

The system of local government, which modified this exclusiveness and gave the children of the soil a considerable share in the management of their own affairs, is a most important feature in the history of Argentina.

To begin with, the Governor made grants of land to each white settler. The recipients of the grants became Encomenderos, who received also in fief several Indian villages and took tribute from the inhabitants in return for protection and Christian teaching. The Encomenderos swore "to defend, enrich, and enn.o.ble the kingdom and care for the Indians," and they appear to have discharged their trust with tolerable fidelity.

But the Spaniards are city-dwelling people, and the history of Argentina chiefly centres in the towns where the governing body was the Cabildo, or town council. The Cabildo consisted of from six to twelve members, and although they had bought their offices of the King and held them for life, they imparted no insignificant popular element into the system of government, and when the Revolution came the Cabildos had sufficient vitality to act as the rallying-point for the revolutionists in every district. In Buenos Aires the Cabildo had great power, and the Governor could not easily override it, while in every city in the provinces the little town councils represented Creole and local interests. This system lent itself to particularism and was unfavourable to representative government, which accordingly has not been a success in Argentina, partly owing to this cause and partly to the natural incapacity of the people. It has been always very difficult to obtain a national a.s.sembly even for the decision of the most momentous questions and legislation, elections and administrations are controlled by functionaries rather than by electors and deputies.

Under Spanish rule the Cabildo system worked extremely well. In the thinly populated districts the great proprietors ruled in patriarchal fas.h.i.+on.

Inefficiency and indolence were the chief grievances which the inhabitants of the Plate district could have reasonably urged against their rulers. The commercial regulations, as we have seen, were so bad that they were perpetually evaded, and the Governor and other officials took bribes and connived at the evasions. Thus grew up the evil tradition that official and political careers are above all others desirable, and that the productive cla.s.ses are fair game for every kind of official exaction. But, in spite of all defects, the settlements steadily prospered, there were few serious Indian wars, comparatively little fighting even with the Portuguese or other foreign nations, and civil tumults were few and far between. If we make allowance for the natural progress that all nations must make in the face of all adverse circ.u.mstances, we cannot deny that even Argentina has lost ground in the nineteenth century, as compared with her position in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Another inst.i.tution which exerted great influence upon the history of Spanish America was the Consulado, or Chamber of Commerce. In 1543 the first of these bodies was founded at Seville, and its princ.i.p.al object was to regulate trade with the Indies. The Consulado of Cadiz became eventually by far the most influential and gained an unenviable notoriety for its commerce-destroying enactments; but it was following the accepted commercial principles of the age, and there can be no doubt that the Consulados at Mexico and Lima were beneficial. Their business was to adjudge commercial suits and carry on the entire trade in their respective Viceroyalties, and in general they undertook the commercial development of the settlements. Their policy was cautious and conservative.

Such, then, were the inst.i.tutions which tempered the rigours of personal or despotic rule, modifying either the unlimited power of the Crown or the absolute military sway of the Governor. But in theory the royal authority was as complete as that of the Roman Emperor. Just as in later days Queen Victoria took the t.i.tle of Empress of India as the successor of the Mogul Emperor, so the King of Spain was Emperor of the Indies in succession to Montezuma in Mexico and the Incas in Peru.

The King's will was the source of law; legislation was carried out by means of Cedulas Reales, or Royal Decrees, which were issued by the Council of the Indies in his name, and, as was natural, the attempt was made at regulation on far too complete a scale, and matters which ought to have been settled by local authorities were the subject of decrees, and thus these enactments increased with alarming rapidity.

The principles of these Cedulas soon fell into confusion; it is said that their codification, ordered in 1635, was not carried into effect until 1680, by which time it had become obsolete. It does not appear, however, that the rulers troubled themselves much about the confusion of the law; they would probably have been much more uneasy had all the decrees become effective, for it was obviously impossible to carry on all legislation at such a distance, and travellers and annalists agreed that the Governors and their subordinates usually neglected the law and governed according to equity. The result was not unsatisfactory.

Current ideas about history are very often wrong; they are often the repet.i.tion at third or fourth hand of an extremely indifferent authority. An American traveller may have come with the preconceived belief that all republics are free and all monarchies grinding tyrannies, and having accordingly stated that the condition of South America under Spanish rule was miserable, his statement has been echoed by all his successors. Or, again, another writer notices that the commercial regulations were absurd and vexatious, and he declares that the colonies were paralysed by the blight of Spanish rule. A third has no difficulty in discovering instances of atrocities committed against the Indians who worked in the Peruvian mines, and he enlarges upon the greed and inhumanity of the Spaniards. Thus the whole history, which possesses few striking incidents to tempt investigators, is distorted by prejudice and the three hundred years of Spanish rule are summarily dismissed as a barren period, fruitful in nothing but misery.

In fact, from first to last the Spanish colonies enjoyed a more liberal trade policy than did those of England. The reason that the abuses of the Spanish colonies were so much more prominent was that the Spanish trade was incomparably more valuable than the North American. Again, apart from the mines, the Spanish treatment of the Indians was considerably in advance of the standards of the time in humanity, nor would it be easy to find any body of men in the three centuries who pursued a wiser and juster policy towards inferior and conquered races. And, further, such cruelty as was perpetrated was the work of private exploiters or, at worst, of disobedient officials. The King of Spain and the ecclesiastics of Spain made every effort to redress the instances of ill-treatment which came to their ears. It was Charles III. who encouraged the Jesuits to proceed upon their mission of mercy, and if he had had the power he would have restrained the cruelty of the Portuguese Paulistas. The condition of the River Plate settlements under Spanish rule compares favourably with that of most civilised nations during the same period.

A recent writer,[44] summing up the general subject, makes some remarks which deserve quotation: "In discussing the often-repeated accusation of Spanish oppression, it is necessary to define what sort of oppression is meant: whether oppression of the Indians by the whites, or oppression of the whites by the Spanish Government. If the former is meant, then the Creoles were as guilty as the Europeans, and both were more guilty than the Spanish Government and its immediate representatives. If the latter, the restraint of the whites was in fact the measure of protection enjoyed by the natives; free immigration and large autonomy granted to European settlers would have meant extermination or enslavement. But the theory of a universal control which should foster both 'commonwealths' and protect the weaker was largely ineffective; and in this failure lay the troubles of the Indians....

"The usual exclusion of Creoles from the highest posts was a grievance; but both its extent and its significance were much exaggerated during the struggle for independence, since a very large number of subordinate posts, some of them commanding large influence and dignity, were usually held by Creoles. In fact, almost all the revolutionary leaders were connected with the royal service through posts held either by themselves or by their fathers....

"Here was an empire which, by the testimony of its own administrators, was honeycombed with continuous decay in all directions; yet this empire survived repeated external shocks, continually extended its influence, and after three centuries evoked the admiration of foreign observers. This vitality is not explained by the theoretic system of administration, nor yet by the practical neglect of that system.

Perhaps the explanation may partly be found in personal character....

Examples constantly recur of admirable and loyal service, which has something Oriental in its simplicity and self-abandonment; in emergencies the presence of one capable leader counterbalances all vices. Again, the undefinable Spanish quality of _hidalguia_, which animated the better part of the community, especially in New Spain, showed itself in a n.o.ble charity and hospitality, a liberal and careless use of wealth, indifference to material results, and an old-fas.h.i.+oned, uncalculating loyalty, sometimes almost fantastic."

The Spaniards had not the constructive genius of the Romans, and both in the mechanical contrivances of civilisation and in the moral force which founds laws and inst.i.tutions they were far inferior. But they played very much the same part in South America which the Romans did in Europe.

France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy are not more distinctively Roman than Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Colombia are Spanish. As Spain was in language and inst.i.tutions the most completely Romanised of all European countries, so she has left her mark upon the West more distinctively than any other colonising Power. For good or evil, Buenos Aires, Lima, and the rest are Spanish cities, and there seems no reason to believe that they will ever be anything else, and the Spanish influence seems likely to be as permanent as the Roman in Southern Europe. Nor will any candid student of the history of the continent be unwilling to acknowledge that it was no small achievement for a nation to build up and administer such an empire, and he will regret that ignorance and prejudice have prevented the world from giving the praise due to a vast political and religious experiment which, in spite of extraordinary difficulties, was successful as far as its own character was concerned, and which, when it broke down by reason of the weakness of the mother country, left behind it all its inst.i.tutions, political, religious, and social. Governors became Dictators or Presidents, but everything remains substantially Spanish.

FOOTNOTES:

[38] The following is a typical example. "In 1602 a custom-house was established at Cordoba for the purpose of levying duties equivalent to 50 per cent. of the value of all commodities pa.s.sing between Peru and the River Plate. It was not till 1665 that this irritating restraint on commercial business was relaxed" (C. E. Akers, "A History of South America," p. 11).

[39] "The commerce between Peru and Buenos Aires is chiefly for cattle and mules; such as are concerned in the former, go first to the Governor, and ask his leave to drive a herd of cattle into Peru, which is never refused when backed by a present of some thousand pieces of eight" ("An Account of the Spanish Settlements in America (1762)"

331).

[40] "In the trade to America every nation endeavours to engross as much as possible the whole market of its own colonies, by fairly excluding all other nations from any direct trade to them" (Adam Smith, "Wealth of Nations," ii. 129).

[41] Thackeray, "A History of William Pitt," ii. 73, 74.

[42] "Wealth of Nations," i. 203.

[43] Writing of the time of Galvez, Funes (iii. 225) says: "Civil and military appointments were never before distributed with such complete partiality to the European Spaniards. In general, the native-born were shut out; they were not esteemed worthy to be appointed door-keepers of the offices." He also remarks that there was similar exclusiveness in the distribution of ecclesiastical preferment.

[44] A. F. Kirkpatrick, "Cambridge Modern History," x. 277-9.

CHAPTER VI

THE ENGLISH FAILURE IN ARGENTINA

In the early years of the nineteenth century England was engaged in a life and death struggle with Napoleon, and Spain and Holland, two of the chief colonial Powers, were in alliance with the Corsican. At Trafalgar, in 1805, the naval power of France and Spain had been shattered, but Napoleon was master of practically the whole of Europe, and he was devising weapons against his enemies which he hoped would be more potent than fleets or armies. England's trade and industries were advancing rapidly, but the long-continued war tended to spoil her markets, and Napoleon was attempting to prevent his subject allies from engaging in any trade whatever with the enemy. Consequently there was throughout the war frequent distress, especially in the North of England, and the manufacturing interest was urgent upon the Government to find new markets. Possibly in some cases the effective fighting strength of England was dissipated in distant expeditions, but in these years some of the most valuable additions were made to our Empire, and if the expedition which is to be related had been in competent hands, the history of South America would have been changed and England would have had vast dominions in every continent of the world.

One such was acquired in South Africa in January, 1806, when Cape Town was rapidly and easily taken from the Dutch. Sir Home Popham commanded the naval forces while Sir David Baird was Commander-in-Chief. Popham was an able and restless man, and hearing a few months later from an American sea-captain that the people of Buenos Aires and Montevideo were oppressed by the Spanish Government and would welcome the English as liberators, he resolved to make an attempt in that quarter and persuaded Baird to lend him a brigade.[45] The flotilla consisted of five s.h.i.+ps of war and five transports, and the little army numbered 1,635 men under the command of that fine soldier, General Beresford.

Popham was disobeying his orders and leaving Cape Town defenceless, but he knew that the acquisition of a new trade opening would atone for any technical disobedience in the eyes of the Home Government. The expedition left Table Bay on the 13th of April, 1806, and reached the River Plate on June 10th. Very wisely Popham proceeded to Buenos Aires instead of Montevideo, and on June 25th anch.o.r.ed off Quilmes, which is 15 miles south of the capital, and disembarked the same evening. The Spanish Viceroy made a very feeble resistance, and the next day the English force was encamped in the suburb of Barracas. On the 27th of June Beresford hoisted the English flag on the fort and a city of 72,000 inhabitants had been captured by a weak brigade. The Viceroy fled to Cordoba, and undoubtedly the feebleness displayed by the Spanish officials on that occasion helped to prepare the ground for the subsequent Revolution. The Argentines, indeed, had lost the qualities of self-help and initiative under the paternal rule of Spain, but they were ashamed of the surrender to so small a force, and under their nonchalant att.i.tude there was an eager desire to expel the foreigners if an opportunity should arise. All that was needed was a leader, and a leader was found in Jacques Liniers. He was a Frenchman who had been thirty years in the service of Spain, and at the time of the invasion he was Governor of Misiones. Seeing that the people were ripe for an attempt upon the English he made his way to Montevideo and asked for help from the General in command. This was readily given, and with a small force he marched to Colonia and thence pa.s.sed over by boats to Conchas, 21 miles north of Buenos Aires. Meanwhile Puirredon, a Creole patriot, had been skirmis.h.i.+ng in the neighbourhood, and had succeeded in capturing a gun from the English. This success, which was won by Gauchos, greatly emboldened Liniers and gave him confidence in the abilities of his followers for partisan warfare. His force amounted to 1,124 men with two large guns and four small pieces. On August 10th he suddenly entered the northern suburb of Buenos Aires.

The next day he summoned Beresford to surrender, and on his refusal the attack began. On the 12th the enemy forced their way to the Cathedral which overlooks the square where the English had their headquarters, and soon, by annoying street-fighting, compelled them to abandon all the neighbouring streets. From the square itself Beresford was forced by artillery fire to retreat, and the situation was soon seen to be untenable. After 165 had been killed or wounded, the English force, which had attempted an enterprise for which its numbers were altogether inadequate, surrendered to General Liniers. He honourably desired to keep the terms, which were that the soldiers should be embarked for England and not serve again until exchanged, but the Spanish authorities maintained that they had surrendered at discretion and marched them up-country as prisoners of war. Beresford, it may be added, contrived to escape six months later. The people of Buenos Aires had learned the lesson that if they desired security they must depend upon themselves rather than upon Spain. The first step they took was to depose their faint-hearted Viceroy and set up Liniers in his place.

Popham had sent home a glowing account of the commercial possibilities of the new conquest, and English traders made immense preparations to take advantage of the opportunity which was indeed sufficiently great.

Sir David Baird had sent reinforcements of 1,400 men from the Cape, which arrived after the surrender, but of course Popham was too weak to retake the capital. He landed at Maldonado on the left bank and awaited reinforcements which were soon forthcoming, for the Cabinet had been greatly elated by the easy initial victory. On October 11th Admiral Sterling sailed from England in charge of a military force of 4,350 and a month later an expedition of equal strength under General Crauford followed for Chile. When the news of the disaster to Beresford reached England a swift s.h.i.+p was despatched after Crauford, ordering him to sail to the River Plate. Finally there followed General Whitelocke with additional troops and orders to take command of the whole expedition. The total armament amounted to twelve thousand men, eighteen s.h.i.+ps of war, and eighty transports--a force amply sufficient to command success if it were well handled, but unfortunately it was placed in incompetent hands. The Ministry of All the Talents failed to justify its t.i.tle in the planning of expeditions and the allocation of commanders.

John Whitelocke,[46] the new commander, had served with moderate success in the West Indies, but he owed his advancement (chiefly in pacific appointments) to his brother-in-law, Matthew Lewis, the Deputy Secretary at War, and father of the well-known "Monk" Lewis. But his appointment to this important command remains a mystery. It appears from Windham's Diary that he wished to give the command to Sir John Stuart, while Leveson-Gower was in favour of Whitelocke, and the annotator to the Diary declares that the Duke of York decided in favour of Whitelocke. This does not seem very probable, and though Lord Holland, who was a member of the not very competent Cabinet, suggests more plausibly that Whitelocke as Inspector-General of Recruiting was opposed to an important scheme of Windham, who therefore wished to get rid of him, still this view seems untenable in face of Windham's positive statement. The appointment can only be considered as one of the many blunders which sometimes counteract England's usual good luck; and on this occasion the effect was complete.