Elements of Morals Part 22

"When she had become more familiar with me, and a closer connection had emboldened her to speak freely, I put to her something like the following questions: 'Tell me, my wife, dost thou begin to understand why I have chosen thee, and why thy parents have given thee to me?... If the G.o.ds give us children, we must consult with each other and do our best in bringing them up: for it will be a happiness for both of us to find in them the protectors and support of our old age. But from this day on, all that is in this house is ours in common; what is mine is thine, and thou hast thyself already put in common all that thou hast brought. We have but to count which has brought most; but we must well remember one thing, and that is, that it will be the one of us two who will best manage the common property that shall have brought the most valuable share of capital.'

"To this, my wife replied: 'In what can I a.s.sist thee? What am I able to do? All depends on thee. My mother told me that my task was to conduct myself well.'--'Yes, by Jupiter!' I replied, 'and my father also told me the same thing; but it is the duty of a well-behaving couple so to behave that they may be as prosperous as possible, that by honest and just means they may add new goods to those they have. The G.o.ds, forsooth, did well when they coupled man with woman for the greatest utility of mankind. The interest of the family and house demands work without and within. Now the G.o.ds, from the first, adapted the nature of woman for the cares and the works of the interior, and that of man for the cares and the works of the exterior. Cold, heat, travels, war, man is so const.i.tuted as to be able to bear all; on the other hand, the G.o.ds have given to woman the inclination and mission to nurse her offspring; it is also she who is in charge of the provisions, whilst man's care is to ward off all that could injure the household.

"'As neither is by nature perfect in all points, they necessarily need each other; and their union is all the more useful, as what the one lacks may be supplied by the other. Therefore, O wife, it behooves us, when instructed regarding the functions the G.o.ds have a.s.signed to each of us, to endeavor to acquit ourselves the best we can of those that are inc.u.mbent on both.

"'There is, however,' I said, 'one function of thine which will please thee least, and that is, that if any one of thy slaves should sicken, thou, by the cares due to all, shouldst watch over his or her recovery.'

'By Jupiter,' said my wife, 'nothing will please me more, since, recovering by my care, they will be grateful to me and show me still more affection than in the past.' This answer delighted me," continued Ischomachus, "and I said to her: 'Thou shalt have other cares more agreeable, namely, when of an unskilled slave thou shalt make a good spinner; when of an ignorant steward or stewardess, thou shalt make a capable, devoted, intelligent servant. But the sweetest charm shall be, when, more perfect than I, thou shalt have made me thy servant; when, instead of fearing old age, lest it deprive thee of thy influence in thy household, thou shalt have gained the a.s.surance that in growing old thou becomest for me a still better companion, for thy children a still better housekeeper, for thy household a still more honored mistress. For beauty and goodness do not depend on youth: they increase through life in the eyes of men, by means of virtues.'"[71]

We shall say a few words, without laying greater stress than necessary, about a question often debated, namely, that of the dissolution of marriage or divorce. We may observe, on this subject, with an excellent moralist,[72] whom we have already cited, that as marriage becomes purer, its dissolution will become more and more difficult. In former days, the first aspect of the conjugal relation showed the husband to be the master of the woman; he bought her and sent her again away as he would a slave--he had the right of repudiation. Later on, he could no longer send her away from him without asking the law to p.r.o.nounce a divorce; but he was at first alone in claiming this right. Next, woman obtained the same right in her turn. At last divorce was suppressed, at least in some States, and particularly in our country;[73] and we think, with the moralist quoted above, that this is the true road to progress.

An English moralist[74] has justly said: "If love is a pa.s.sion which a trifle may start and a trifle kill, friends.h.i.+p is a calm affection cemented by reason and habit. It becomes stronger by rule, and it is never so strong as when two persons unite in the pursuit of a common interest. How many slight annoyances will they not endeavor to overlook, out of prudence, if they are obliged to live with each other, and which, with the prospect of an easy separation, would be allowed to fester even to aversion!" It is a duty for the individual conscience, even though divorce should be legally permitted, to consider marriage absolutely indissoluble, or at least make it a last resort; it is, above all, a strict duty, in contracting a marriage, not to look to divorce as a hope and end.

Some moralists have asked whether marriage was a duty. We do not hesitate to answer in the negative;[75] that it is not a duty in the case of women is evident, since it is their lot not to choose themselves, but to be chosen; now it does not always depend on them to find some one to choose them; and if it is not an obligation for one of the two s.e.xes, it would be strange if it were one for the other. Besides, the right of celibacy cannot be denied to one who gives up family life to devote himself to works of charity, as in the religious orders, and if this be a sufficient reason, there are many more of the same kind which might sanction the same conduct: as, for example, devotion to science or the country. If it be objected that every one owes himself to the preservation of the race, and that if no one married the race would perish, we can reply that there will always be men ready enough to marry, so that no such consequences need be feared.

But the liberty of celibacy can be granted by the moral law on two conditions only: the first, that it be based on serious reasons and not on selfishness; namely, that there be good reasons to believe that one could render more service in that state than in an imprudently contracted marriage. The second condition, that celibacy does not interfere with purity of morals--the relations between the s.e.xes being, in fact, only proper and legitimate in marriage.

The relations between the s.e.xes outside of marriage can only be adultery, seduction, or licentiousness. In the first case, the woman is induced to violate her duties, her vows, to give up all that alone can guarantee her dignity. In the second, the honor and dignity of a whole life is sacrificed to pa.s.sion; in the third, you make yourself an accomplice to a public and deliberate shame--a shame which would not exist except for just such accomplices. At any rate, the dignity of the woman--that is to say, of the weaker s.e.x--is sacrificed to the pa.s.sion of the stronger.

=126. Duties of parents toward their children.=--An English philosopher said: "Such a one is the father of such a one; hence he is his master,"

and he claims that paternal authority was thus based on the authority of masters.h.i.+p.

This is a profound error. In the first place, no man can be absolutely the master of another man, unless that other be a slave: there can only exist relations of obedience or allegiance, required by social necessity, but which do not permit any man to be in absolute dependence upon another. The relation between father and child is, it is true, of a particular kind; but it is not any more than the other the authority of a master over his slave, or of a proprietor over his property.

Let us look into its origin, and we shall find, at the same time, the extent and the limits of paternal authority.

To begin with, we will observe that, although usage has consecrated the term paternal authority as meaning the authority exercised by parents over children, this authority includes the rights of both; of the mother as well as of the father: 1, in default of the father, in case of absence or death, the mother has over the child exactly the same authority as the father; 2, it is an absolute duty with parents to see that there be not, in regard to their children, two separate authorities in the house, two kinds of contradictory orders; in the eyes of the child there should be but one and the same authority, exercised by two persons, but essentially indivisible; 3, in cases of conflict, the will of the father should prevail, unless the law interfere; but the father should use such a privilege only as a last resort, and where it can be made evident that it is in the interest of the child. Even then he should see that the obedience to one of the parents be no disobedience to the other, for that would be destroying at its root the very authority he makes use of.

Paternal authority is, then, the common authority of both parents over their children; and it is only an exception to the rule when the authority of one parent becomes detrimental to that of the other.

What is now the principle of this authority? A purely physical reason is given for it; that the child, namely, is in some respect a part of the parents. But this reason is not sufficient; for it would presuppose paternal authority to last all through life under the same conditions and same degree of force; whereas it continues ever diminis.h.i.+ng as the child becomes able to govern himself.

The true reason for paternal or maternal authority lies in the feebleness of the child, in its physical, intellectual, and moral incapacity. The child in coming into the world is utterly incapable of doing for itself.

Supposing even that it could satisfy its physical wants, experience shows that it could not give itself an education, without which it cannot be truly a man. This state of feebleness requires, then, indispensable a.s.sistance, and an a.s.sistance of long duration. It needs a hand to support and feed it, a heart to love it, an intelligence to enlighten it. To whom belongs this _role_ of educator, protector, sustainer? "There have been some who have wished to take the child from the family to give it to the State; this is a great error; for the child should evidently belong to those without whom he would have no existence. In the first place, it were burdening society with a thing it is not responsible for; moreover, it has no right upon the child, no particular tie existing between them; finally, it offers no sufficient guaranty, and there can be at best expected of it but a vague and general solicitude, if, indeed, the same is not a partial one, and in favor of those from whom it may derive most advantages; whilst parents should unquestionably have charge of the child, since it is through them it exists; and having charge of it, gives them a right to it: and how could they be responsible for this being they have given life to, if they could not in some measure dispose of it? There are three ties between the parents and the child: a physical bond, a heart-bond, a reason-bond: no other authority rests on more natural principles; none is more necessary, none is protected by greater guarantees."[76]

Not only would the State, in taking possession of the child, enc.u.mber itself with functions for the performance of which it is unfitted, but it would also violate the natural rights of the human heart. Parents are, then, invested by nature herself, with the duty of supporting and educating their children. But this duty calls for authority. How could a father and mother direct the child in the path of right and justice; how could they impart to it their wisdom and experience; how could they prepare the way for its becoming in its turn a moral agent--one, namely, that acts and governs himself of his own accord--if they are not at the same time invested with the authority that commands obedience?

Paternal authority, as we see by this, has no other origin than the actual interest of the child: the mission of the parents is to represent it; they have in some respect the government of its life. The whole authority of the father upon the child is, then, limited by the interests and the rights of the child itself. Beyond what may be useful to its physical and moral existence, the father can do nothing. Such are the extent and limits of his authority.

From these principles we deduce:

1. That parents have now no right of life and death upon their children as they have had under certain legislations.

2. That they have neither the right to strike them, maltreat them, wound them--in short, treat them as they would animals or things; and although usage appears to allow certain corporeal punishments, it will always be a bad example and a bad habit to use blows as a means of education.

3. Parents have no right to traffic with the liberty of their sons, to sell them as slaves as in ancient times, or to turn them into instruments of gain, as in many families even to this day. Certainly one could not wholly forbid a father to make a child work toward the support of the family, but it must be done without losing sight of the child's strength, and without sacrificing its intellectual and moral education.

4. Parents have no right to corrupt their children, by making them accomplices in their own profligacy.

Grotius justly distinguishes three periods in paternal authority:[77] the first, when the children have as yet no discernment, and are not capable of acting with full knowledge; the second, when their judgment, being already ripe, they are still members of the family and have no business of their own; the last, when they have left their father's house, either to become heads of families themselves, or to enter into another. In the first of these conditions, the will of the parents is entirely subst.i.tuted for that of the children, and their authority, within the limits above stated, is consequently absolute. In the third case, the son, having reached his majority or maturity, has conquered for himself an independent will; paternal authority must consequently change into moral influence, which a grateful son will respect, but which is no longer, properly so called, an authority. Finally, in the intermediate state, which is the most difficult of all, the paternal will, whilst remaining preponderant, yields more and more to the will of the children, thereby preparing it toward becoming sufficient to itself.

Let us examine the duties of the parents at these different periods of paternal authority.

There is, to begin with, a general duty, which overrules the whole life of the parents as well as of the children, and which is independent of the latter's age: it is the duty of love. Parents must love their children; it is the foundation of all the rest. It may perhaps be objected that love is a natural feeling and cannot be a duty; that the heart is not subject to the will; that one may love or not love, according as one is by nature so const.i.tuted; that duty therefore has nothing to do with it. It is also said that paternal or maternal love is so natural a sentiment that it is useless to make a duty of it.

These arguments do not appear to us decisive; and we have already answered them. We cannot, of course, create within ourselves sentiments which do not already exist. But we can cultivate or allow to die out sentiments which do exist within us naturally. The degree of sensibility in each individual depends, I admit, on his or her peculiar const.i.tution of mind and heart; but it depends on us to reach the highest degree of sensibility we are capable of. For example, he who leaves his children or removes them from him (unless it be for their good[78]) may be certain that the love he bears them will insensibly die out. He, on the contrary, who takes the trouble to busy himself with his children, to win their love by intelligent and constant attentions, will necessarily feel his heart grow softer by this intercourse, and his natural feelings will gain more and more strength.

But if it is a duty to love one's children, it is also in consequence of this duty that one should love them for themselves, and not for one's self. It is not our happiness we should seek in our children, but theirs; and for this reason does it sometimes become necessary to govern one's own sensibility, and deny children pleasures detrimental to their best interests. The excess of tenderness is often, as has been said, but a want of tenderness; it is a sort of delicate selfishness, shrinking from the pain the seeming suffering of the children might inflict, and not knowing how to refuse them any thing for fear of displeasing them, prepares for them in this manner cruel deceptions against the time when they will have to face the sad realities of life.

A corollary of what precedes, is that the father should love all his children equally, and guard against showing a preference. He should have no favorites among them, still less victims. He should not, from feelings of family pride, prefer the boys to the girls, or the oldest to the youngest. He should not even yield to the natural predilection which inclines us to give our preference to the most amiable, the most intelligent, the most attractively endowed. It has often been observed that mothers have a particular tenderness for the feeblest of their children, or those that have given most trouble. If preference is at all justifiable it is in this case.

After having established the general principle of the duties of the head of a family, namely, love, and an equal love, for all his children, let us consider the particular duties this general duty comprises. They bear upon two princ.i.p.al points: the preservation and the education of the children.

We have seen that the fact of giving life to children, carries with it as an inevitable consequence the duty of preserving it to them. The child not being able to provide its own food, the parents must furnish it: this results from the very nature of things.

Whence it follows, that a father must work to provide for his children: this is so evident and necessary a duty that there is hardly any need of dwelling on it.

But it is not only for the present that the head of the family ought to provide; he should provide for the future also. He should, on the one hand, foresee the case when, by some possible misfortune, he may be taken from his children before they are grown; and on the other, prepare the way to their providing for themselves. The first case shows us how economy and prudence become thus a sacred duty for the head of a family. This also explains how it may be a duty in contracting a marriage not to lose sight of the question of property: not that this consideration should not give way before others more important; but other things being equal, the best marriage is that which, keeping in view the future interests of the children, provides against the case when by some misfortune they may be left orphans at an early age.

In supposing the most favorable cases, the father and mother may hope that they will live long enough to see their children becoming in their turn independent persons, able to provide for themselves. It is in view of this, that parents should plan a profession or a career for their children; in most cases, it is a necessity, it is expedient in all. But the preparation for a career presupposes education; and here the material interests and security of the children blend with their intellectual and moral interests.

Everybody recognizes in the education of children two distinct things: instruction and education properly so called: the first has for its object the mind; and the second the character. These two things must not be separated: for, without instruction, all education is powerless; and without a moral education, instruction may be dangerous.

Parents should then--and it is a strict duty--give to their children the instruction their resources and condition allow; but they are not permitted to leave them in ignorance if they have the means to educate them. Some narrow minds still believe that instruction is of no use to the people, and is even a dangerous thing. This has been sufficiently refuted.

The greatest number of crimes and offenses are committed by the most ignorant cla.s.ses: the more they learn, the better will they understand the duties of their condition and the dignity of human nature. It has been justly said that little knowledge may be more dangerous than ignorance: for this reason should men be raised above the dangerous point, and be put in possession of as much knowledge as their condition warrants.

Instruction has two useful effects: first, it increases the resources of a man, renders him better qualified for a greater variety of things; it is then, as political economy styles it, a capital. Parents, in having their children taught, give them thereby a far more substantial and productive capital than what they could transmit to them by gift or legacy. In the second place, instruction elevates man and enn.o.bles his nature. If it is reason that distinguishes man from the brute, knowledge enlarges and heightens reason. Instruction thus works together with moral education and forms one of its essential parts.

The head of a family who then, from personal interest, negligence, ill-will, or, in fine, from ignorance, deprives his children of the instruction which is their due, fails thereby in an essential duty.[79]

It must, moreover, be admitted, that instruction alone does not suffice; science alone does not form character; persuasion, authority, example, the moral action of every instant is necessary thereto. It is a great problem to know how much of fear and gentleness, restraint and liberty should enter in paternal education. All agree that a child should not be brought up through fear alone, as the animals are. As Fenelon admirably puts it, "Joy and confidence should be the natural state of mind of children; otherwise their intelligence becomes obscured, their courage droops; if they are lively, fear will irritate them; if soft, it will make them stupid; fear is like the violent remedies employed in extreme illnesses: they purge; but they injure the const.i.tution and wear out its organs; a soul led by fear is always the feebler for it."

On the other hand, everybody admits also that an excessive indulgence is as dangerous as a despotic authority. Rousseau ingenuously remarks: "The best means of making your child miserable is to accustom it to obtaining all it wants; for its desires will incessantly grow with the facility with which it can satisfy them; sooner or later the inability to content it, will, despite yourself, oblige you to refuse, and this unexpected denial will give it more pain than the deprivation of the thing itself. First it will want the cane you have in your hand; then your watch; then the bird in the air; the bright star in the sky; in short, all that it sees: and unless you were a G.o.d, how could you satisfy it?" This remark of Rousseau refers to the earliest childhood, but it can be applied to all ages.

It is evident that all the duties we have here mentioned relate princ.i.p.ally to the first of the three periods distinguished by Grotius. As the children grow up, their own personal responsibility gradually takes the place of the paternal responsibility, and there comes the time of the third state above mentioned, when both father and mother no longer owe their children any thing more than love or advice. Instead of being answerable for their existence, it is rather the reverse. It is the children's turn to become responsible for the happiness and safety of their parents.

But, as we have said, the really difficult moment is that when the young man, awakening to himself, becomes conscious of a will, and, without experience and sense of proportion, wishes to exercise this will without restraint. It is here especially that the paternal will must show itself firm without despotism, and persuasive without flattery and weakness, and where it becomes necessary that the paternal authority be firmly rooted in the first age and upon solid foundations, so that the young man, even in his fits of self-will, may submit to this authority with confidence and respect. There is no particular formula which could set forth a rule of conduct obligatory under all circ.u.mstances. Tact in this case is better than rules.

=127. Duties of children.=--The German philosopher Fichte, in his book on _Ethics_, has said some very good things touching the duties of children; we will cite from it some of the pages devoted to this subject.[80]

"The right of parents to set limits to the liberty of their children cannot be questioned. I should respect the liberty of another man, because I regard him as a being morally educated, whose liberty is the necessary means whereby he may reach the end reason points out to him. I cannot be his judge, for he is my equal. But it is not the same in the case of my child. I regard my child not as a moral creature already formed, but to be formed; and it is precisely for this reason that it is my duty to educate it. The same reason which commands me to respect the liberty of my equals, commands me to limit that of my child.

"But I am to limit this liberty only in so far as the use the child may make of it might be injurious to the very end of its education. Any other repression is contrary to duty, for it is contrary to the end in view. It is the very liberty of the child which must be instructed; and that this instruction be possible, the child must be free. Parents should not, therefore, through mere caprice, forbid children, with a view, as is said, to break their will: it is only where the will would run counter to the direct aims of their education that it should be broken. Here, however, parents must be the sole judges; and are answerable to their conscience alone." "The only duty of the child," says Fichte again, "is _obedience_: this should be developed before any other moral sentiment; for it is the root of all morality. Later on, when in the sphere left free by the parents, morality has become possible, the duty of obedience is still the greatest of all duties, the child should not wish to be free beyond the limits fixed by the parents themselves."

Fichte explains next very ingeniously, how obedience is the only way by which the child can _imitate_ the morality it cannot yet know: "The same relation which binds the full-grown man to the moral law, and to its author, G.o.d, binds the child to its parents. We should do all that duty commands us to do, absolutely and without troubling ourselves about consequences; but to be able to do this, we must suppose these consequences to be in the hands of G.o.d, and intended for our good: the same with the child in regard to parental commands. Christianity represents G.o.d in the image of a father, and justly so. But we should not simply be satisfied always and incessantly to speak of his goodness; we should also think of our obligations toward him; of our obedience, and that childlike trust free from all anxiety and uneasiness which we ought to cultivate in regard to his will. To create a similar obedience is the only means by which parents may implant the sentiment of morality in the hearts of their children: it is, therefore, a real duty for parents to exercise their children in a similar obedience. It is a very false notion, which, like many others, we owe to the ruling _eudemonism_[81] of the day, that wrong inclinations of the child can be thwarted by reasoning with it.

There is implied in this notion the absurdity of supposing the child to be possessed of a greater share of reasoning power than ourselves: for even adults are most of the time prompted in their acts by inclination, and not by reason.[82]

"Another question presents itself now: How far, in its relation to its parents, should the child's absolute obedience go? This question may have two sides: the one as to the extent of this obedience, and the other as to its limits; _how far_ it should go; or in regard to length of time, _how long_ it shall last, and, if it is to cease at all, at what particular time it is to stop?