Elements of Morals Part 34

This catalogue, once drawn up, Franklin, reflecting that it would be difficult to fight at the same time thirteen defects and keep his mind on thirteen virtues, had an idea similar to that of Horatius in his combat with the Curiatii: he resolved to fight his enemies one by one; he applied to morality the well-known principle of politicians: "_Divide if thou wilt rule_."

"I made a little book," he says, "in which I allotted a page for each of the virtues. I ruled each page with red ink, so as to have seven columns, one for each day of the week, marking each column with a letter for the day. I crossed these columns with thirteen red lines, marking the beginning of each line with the first letter of one of the virtues; on which line, and in its proper column, I might mark, by a little black spot, every fault I found upon examination to have been committed respecting that virtue upon that day.

"I determined to give a week's strict attention to each of the virtues successively. Thus, in the first week, my great guard was to avoid even the least offense against _temperance_; leaving the other virtues to their ordinary chance, only marking every evening the faults of the day. Thus, if in the first week I could keep my first line, marked T, clear of spots, I supposed the habit of that virtue so much strengthened, and its opposite weakened, that I might venture extending my attention to include the next, and for the following week keep both lines clear of spots. Proceeding thus to the last, I could get through a course complete in thirteen weeks, and four courses in a year. And, like him, who, having a garden to weed, does not attempt to eradicate all the bad herbs at once, which would exceed his reach and his strength, but works on one of the beds at a time, and, having accomplished the first, proceeds to a second; so I should have, I hoped, the encouraging pleasure of seeing on my pages the progress made in virtue, by clearing successively my lines of their spots; till, in the end, by a number of courses, I should be happy in viewing a clean book, after a thirteen weeks' daily examination."

=182. Maxim of Epictetus.=--The wise Epictetus gives us the same advice as Franklin: "If you would not be of an angry temper," he says, "then do not feed the habit. Be quiet at first, then count the days where you have not been angry. You will say: 'I used to be angry every day; now every other day; then every third or fourth day, and if you miss it so long as thirty days, offer a sacrifice to G.o.d."[166] He said, moreover: "If you will practice self-control, take, when it is warm and you are thirsty, a mouthful of fresh water, and spit it out again, and tell no one."

=183. Individual character--Cicero's maxims.=--The philosophers whom we have just cited give us rules to combat and correct our temperament when it is vicious. Cicero, on the contrary, gives us others to maintain our individual character and remain true to it; and these rules are no less useful than the others. He justly observes that every man has his own inclinations which const.i.tute his individual and original character.

"Some," he says, "are more agile in the foot-race; others stronger at wrestling; these are more n.o.ble, those more graceful; Scaurus and Drusus were singularly grave; Laelius, very merry; Socrates was playful and amusing in conversation. Some are simple-minded and frank, others, like Hannibal and Fabius, more crafty. In short, there is an infinite variety of manners and differences of character without their being for that blamable."[167]

Now, this is a very sensible principle of Cicero, that we ought not to go against the inclinations of our nature when they are not vicious:

"_In constraining our talents We do nothing gracefully_,"

said the fabulist. "Let each of us then know his own disposition, and be to himself a severe judge concerning his own defects and qualities. Let us do as the players who do not always choose the finest parts, but those best suited to their talent. aesopus[168] did not often play the part of Ajax." Cicero in this precept, "that every one should remain true to his individual character," goes so far as to justify Cato's suicide, for the reason that it accorded with his character. "Others," he says, "might be guilty in committing suicide; but in the case of Cato, he was right; it was a duty; Cato ought to have died."[169] This is carrying the rights and duties of the individual character somewhat far; but it is certain that, aside from the great general duties of humanity, which are the same for all men, each individual man has a role to play on earth, and this role is in part determined by our natural dispositions; now, we should yield to these dispositions, when they are not vicious, and should develop them.

=184. Self-examination.=--Finally, what is especially important, considered from a practical standpoint and in the light of moral discipline, is, that each one should render himself an exact account of his own disposition, his defects, oddities, vices, so that he be able to correct them. Such was the practical sense of that celebrated maxim formerly inscribed over the temple at Delphi: "Know thyself." This is Socrates' own interpretation of it in his conversations with his disciples: "Tell me, Euthydemus, have you ever gone to Delphi?"--"Yes, twice."--"And did you observe what is written somewhere on the temple-wall: Know Thyself?"--"I did."--"Think you that to know one's self it is enough to know one's own name? Is there nothing more needed? And as those who buy horses do not think they know the animal they wish to buy till they have examined it and discovered whether it is obedient or restive, vigorous or weak, swift or slow, etc., must we not likewise know ourselves to judge what we are really worth?"--"Certainly."--"It is then obvious that this knowledge of himself is to man a source of much good, whilst being in error about himself exposes him to a thousand evils. Those who know themselves well, know what is useful to them, discern what they can or cannot do; now, in doing what they are capable of doing, they procure the necessaries of life and are happy. Those who, on the contrary, do not know themselves, fail in all their enterprises, and fall into contempt and dishonor."[170]

=185. Examination of the conscience.=--To know one's self well, it is necessary to examine one's self. Hence a practice often recommended by moralists, and particularly Christian moralists, known also by the ancients, namely, the _examination of the conscience_.

There is a fine picture of it in Seneca's writings: "We should," says the philosopher, "call, every day, our conscience to account. Thus did s.e.xtius; when his daily work was done, he questioned his soul: Of what defect hast thou cured thyself to-day? What pa.s.sion hast thou combated? In what hast thou become better? What more beautiful than this habit of going thus over the whole day!... I do the same, and being my own judge, I call myself before my own tribunal. When the light has been carried away from my room, I begin an inquest of the whole day; I examine all my actions and words. I conceal nothing, allow myself nothing. And why should I hesitate to look at any of my faults when I can say to myself: Take care not to do so again: for to-day I forgive thee?"[171]

To designate all the practices which experience of life has suggested to the moralists, to induce men to better, correct, perfect themselves in right doing, would be an endless task. No better method in this respect than to read the Christian moralists: Bossuet, Fenelon, Nicole, Bourdaloue. The advice they give concerning the proper use of time, opportunities, temptations, false shame, loose conversations, perseverance, can be applied to morals as well as to religion. Reading, meditation, proper company, good advice, selection of some great model to follow, etc., are the princ.i.p.al means we should employ to perfect ourselves in the right: "If we extirpated and uprooted, every year, a single vice only, we should soon become perfect men."[172]

=186. Kant's Catechism.=--An excellent practice in moral education is what Kant calls a moral catechism, in which the master, under the form of questions and answers, sums up the principles of morality. The pupil learns thereby to account for ideas of which he is but vaguely conscious, and which he often confounds with principles of another order, with the instinct of happiness, for example, or the consideration of self-interest.

The following are some extracts from Kant's _Moral Catechism_.[173]

_Teacher._--What is thy greatest and even thy only wish on earth?

The pupil remains silent.[174]

_Teacher._--Is it not always to succeed in everything according to thy wishes and will? How do we call such a state?

The pupil remains silent.

_Teacher._--We call it _happiness_ (namely, constant prosperity, a life all satisfaction, and to be absolutely content with one's condition). Now, if thou hadst in thy hands all possible earthly happiness, wouldst thou keep it wholly to thyself, or share it with thy fellow-beings?

_Pupil._--I should share it with them; I should make others happy and contented also.

_Teacher._--This already shows that thou hast a good _heart_. Let us see now if thou hast also a good _judgment_. Wouldst thou give to the idler soft cus.h.i.+ons; to the drunkard wine in abundance, and all else that will produce drunkenness; to the rogue agreeable manners and a fine presence, that he might the more easily deceive; to the violent man, audacity and a strong fist?

_Pupil._--Certainly not.

_Teacher._--Thou seest then that if thou heldst all happiness in thy hands, thou wouldst not, without reflection, distribute it to each as he desires; but thou wouldst ask thyself how far he is _worthy_ of it. Would it not also occur to thee to ask thyself whether thou art thyself worthy of happiness?

_Pupil._--Undoubtedly.

_Teacher._--Well, then, that which in thee inclines to happiness, is called _inclination_; that which judges that the first condition to enjoy happiness is to be worthy of it, is the _reason_; and the faculty thou hast to overcome thy inclination by thy reason, is _liberty_. For example, if thou couldst without injuring any one procure to thyself or to one of thy friends a great advantage by means of an adroit falsehood, what says thy reason?

_Pupil._--That I must not lie, whatever great advantage may result from it to me or to my friend. Falsehood is _degrading_, and renders man _unworthy_ of being happy. There is in this case absolute necessity imposed on me by a command or prohibition of my reason, and which should silence all my inclinations.

_Teacher._--What do we call this necessity of acting conformably to the law of reason?

_Pupil._--We call it _duty_.

_Teacher._--Thus is the observance of our duty the general condition on which we can alone be worthy of happiness. _To be worthy of happiness and to do one's duty is one and the same thing._

APPENDIX[175] TO CHAPTER VIII.

THE UNION OF CLa.s.sES.

A subject which has attracted much attention, and which is often referred to in conversation, in books, in political a.s.semblies, is the various _cla.s.ses_ of society; there are upper and lower cla.s.ses, and between these two, a middle cla.s.s. We speak of laboring cla.s.ses, poor cla.s.ses, rich cla.s.ses. These are expressions which it were desirable should disappear.

They relate to ancient customs, ancient facts, and in the present state of society correspond no longer to situations now all clearly defined. They are vestiges which last long after the facts to which they corresponded have disappeared, and which retained are often followed by grave consequences. They give rise to misunderstanding, false ideas, sentiments more or less blameworthy. I should like to show that in the present state of society, there are no longer any cla.s.ses, that there are only men, individuals. The word _cla.s.ses_, in a strict sense, can be applied only to a state of society where social and natural advantages are conferred by the law to certain men at the expense of others; where some can procure these advantages whilst others never can; where the public burden weighs on a certain cla.s.s, on a certain number of men, whilst the others are entirely free from it, and this, I repeat, by the sanction of law, and by social organization.

This state of things has existed, with more or less differences and notably great changes, in all past centuries. Its lowest degree is, for example, that where it is impossible for certain men to procure to themselves the goods desired by all, where they can never own any kind of property, however small, where they are themselves considered property; where, instead of being allowed to sell and buy, they are themselves sold and bought, themselves reduced to an object of commerce. This state is that called _slavery_.

Slavery, in its strict sense, is the state where man is the property of other men, is a thing; where he is bought and sold, and where his work does not belong to him, but to his master.

This state of things existed through all antiquity. Society, with the ancients, was divided into two great _cla.s.ses_ (the term is here perfectly in its place), cla.s.ses very unequal in numbers, where the more numerous were the property of the least numerous. The citizens, as they were called, or freemen, who const.i.tuted a part of the State, the Republic, had no need of working to make a living, because they owned living instruments of work--men.

This state of things, you well know, did not only exist in antiquity; it was perpetuated till our days, and it is not very long since it still existed in some of the greatest societies of the world. We may consider it at present as wholly done away with.

A notch higher, we find the state called _serfdom_, where man is not wholly interdicted to own property, and where he is allowed a family, which fact const.i.tutes the superiority of serfdom over slavery. It is obvious that in a state of slavery, there can be no family: a man, the property of another, liable to be bought and sold, can have no family.

Serfdom, which in the Middle Ages existed in all European societies, and but recently was abolished in Russia, allowed the individual a family, and in a certain measure even the right of property; but he was a part of the land on which he was born, and, like that land, belonged to a master, a _lord_.

The serf then was, as it is commonly called, attached to the _glebe_, to the land, unable to leave it, unable to buy or sell except under extremely restricted conditions, and thus a part of the soil on which he was born, he belonged with that soil to his lord. This state of things was gradually bettered. The serfs, little by little, acquired by their work a small capital; they succeeded in buying their liberty from their lords. It is this which gave rise to that ancient society, called _ancien regime_, which preceded the French Revolution. But all men were not serfs; things had not reached that point; serfdom had already been abolished by means of certain contracts, certain sums of money which the workingmen paid as a sign of their former thraldom. Yet was there still in force much that was iniquitous, forming what is called an aristocratic society, where, for example, some men had the exclusive right of holding and transmitting to their children territorial property, which they were not allowed to put in trade, the exclusive right of holding public functions, of having grades in the army, the right of hunting and fis.h.i.+ng, etc. And conversely, on the other hand, whilst the minority enjoyed so exclusively all these privileges, the costs of society rested on the greater number, and these costs the serfs were obliged to pay. Hence a society in which there were cla.s.ses, since the law conferred social advantages on some in preference to others, and heavy burdens resting on some without resting on others.

As it is not my purpose to write here the history of modern society, I need not enter into all the details of these facts, which are, besides, quite well known.

You all know that these great social injustices and iniquitous practices disappeared at the time of the Revolution, and that the princ.i.p.al object of the French Revolution of 1789 was precisely to suppress all these privileges conceded to some, and these burdens unequally imposed on others. From that moment, there was equality in law, that is to say, that all men belonging to our present society are allowed to acc.u.mulate property, exercise public functions, rise to higher grades--in a word, are considered fit to obtain all the advantages which society has to offer, and which nature allows them to desire and acquire.

Since 1789, society, as a matter of course, has continued to move in the same grooves, and, thanks to work and compet.i.tion, all that which still existed by way of social inequalities has gradually disappeared; if, by chance, there still remain in our laws such vestiges of former inequality, they will in time, and with the help of all enlightened men, disappear; for it is now a truth fully recognized that the good of humanity demands that at least all legal inequalities should be done away with, and that all men, without distinction, should be allowed to acquire any advantages which their special faculties, and the conditions wherein they are placed, enable them to acquire. I say, then, that this being the case, there is no reason why, in the present state of society, men should any longer be designated by cla.s.ses. They are men, and men alone, and as such they should be allowed to enjoy common advantages, to live by their work--namely, to const.i.tute themselves into families, to cultivate their intelligence, to wors.h.i.+p G.o.d according to their conscience--in a word, to enjoy all the rights we call the rights of a man and citizen.

But when in a society all legal inequalities have been suppressed, does it necessarily follow that an absolute equality will be the final result? No.

Society can only do away with inequalities of its own making; inequalities which, from causes we have not time here to set forth, were added to the already existing natural inequalities. For there are natural inequalities; inequalities which may be called individual inequalities, there being no two persons in the world exactly the same. From this fact alone--men being in a thousand ways different from each other--it necessarily follows that each man's condition is different from that of his fellow-men. Hence an infinite mult.i.tude of inequalities which have always existed and always will exist, because they result from the nature of things; and such inequalities must be clearly distinguished from those dependent on the law.

What now are the princ.i.p.al causes of these inequalities, which I call individual inequalities? They are of two kinds: the inherent faculties of the individual, and the circ.u.mstances wherein he is placed.

The faculties of the individual are the work of nature: they spring from his moral and physical organization; and, as I have said above, there being no two men exactly alike, either physically or morally, it naturally follows that there are differences, and these differences bring with them inequalities. Let us, for instance, take the most important of all these differences, namely, physical strength, health. Man is a living being, an organized being, and his organization is subject to the most delicate, most numerous, most complicated conditions. Hence many differences. Some are born strong, robust, able to brave all kinds of temperatures, all sorts of trials--trials of work, of outside events, sometimes the trials of their own excesses even.

Others, on the contrary, are born with a feeble const.i.tution; they are weak, delicate, they cannot bear trials the same as the others.

This is a first difference, and this difference, you well know, may be subdivided into a mult.i.tude of others; for there are no two individuals equally healthy, equally strong. What will be the natural result? This, for example: that where strength is required (and every one needs more or less physical strength to accomplish certain heavy works), the strongest will have the advantage over the others; and, after a certain time, of two men who started at the same time, under the same conditions, with equal moral advantages, one, owing to his physical strength, shall have accomplished a great deal, and the other less; one shall have earned much, the other little: their career is unequal.