Influence Science and Practice Part 12

[image]The scarcity principle is most likely to hold true under two optimizing conditions. First, scarce items are heightened in value when they are newly scarce. That is, we value those things that have become recently restricted more than those that were restricted all along. Second, we are most attracted to scarce resources when we compete with others for them.

[image]It is difficult to steel ourselves cognitively against scarcity pressures because they have an emotion-arousing quality that makes thinking difficult. In defense, we might try to be alert to a rush of arousal in situations involving scarcity. Once alerted, we can take steps to calm the arousal and a.s.sess the merits of the opportunity in terms of why we want it.

Study Questions Content Mastery 1. What is the relations.h.i.+p between the scarcity principle and Brehm's theory of psychological reactance?

2. What makes the terrible twos and the teenage years especially susceptible to reactance effects?

3. How might modern social science explain the deaths of Shakespeare's famous characters, Romeo and Juliet?

4. What are the standard reactions of a potential audience to banned information?

5. What does the chocolate chip cookies study by Worchel, Lee, and Adewole (1975) indicate about the circ.u.mstances that maximize the effects of the scarcity principle?

Critical Thinking.

1. As a metal, silver has always been both useful and rare. To which of these qualities do you think Xenophon was referring (in 355 BC BC) when he wrote: "No one has ever possessed so much silver as to want no more. If a man finds himself with a huge amount of it, he takes as much pleasure in burying the surplus as in using it."

2. Ovid said, "Easy things n.o.body wants, but what is forbidden is tempting." Explain his meaning in psychological terms.

3. Recall my brother Richard's approach to selling used cars. He never lied to anyone, yet some of his friends accused him of questionable ethics. What do you think? Was his technique ethically acceptable or objectionable? Why?

4. For more than a decade, the major message of a ma.s.sive advertising campaign for Virginia Slims cigarettes was that modern women "have come a long way" from the old days when they were required by social norms to be subdued, proper, and obedient. No longer, implied these ads, should a woman have to feel bound by chauvinistic and outmoded constraints on her independence. No matter what your view of the basic message, use your knowledge of psychological reactance to help explain the following fact: During the lengthy duration of this campaign, the percentage of cigarette smokers rose in only one U.S. demographic group-teenage women.

5. How does the ad that opens this chapter reflect the topic of the chapter?

Chapter 8.

Instant Influence.

Primitive Consent for an Automatic Age Every day in every way, I'm getting better.

-Emile Coue.

Every day in every way, I'm getting busier.

-Robert Cialdini.

BACK IN THE 1960S A MAN NAMED JOE PYNE HOSTED A RATHER remarkable TV talk show that was syndicated from California. The program was made distinctive by Pyne's caustic and confrontational style with his guests-for the most part, a collection of exposure-hungry entertainers, would-be celebrities, and representatives of fringe political or social organizations. The host's abrasive approach was designed to provoke his guests into arguments, to fl.u.s.ter them into embarra.s.sing admissions, and generally to make them look foolish. It was not uncommon for Pyne to introduce a visitor and launch immediately into an attack on the individual's beliefs, talent, or appearance. Some people claimed that Pyne's acid personal style was partially caused by a leg amputation that had embittered him to life; others said, no, he was just vituperative by nature. remarkable TV talk show that was syndicated from California. The program was made distinctive by Pyne's caustic and confrontational style with his guests-for the most part, a collection of exposure-hungry entertainers, would-be celebrities, and representatives of fringe political or social organizations. The host's abrasive approach was designed to provoke his guests into arguments, to fl.u.s.ter them into embarra.s.sing admissions, and generally to make them look foolish. It was not uncommon for Pyne to introduce a visitor and launch immediately into an attack on the individual's beliefs, talent, or appearance. Some people claimed that Pyne's acid personal style was partially caused by a leg amputation that had embittered him to life; others said, no, he was just vituperative by nature.

One evening rock musician Frank Zappa was a guest on the show. This was at a time in the 1960s when very long hair on men was still unusual and controversial. As soon as Zappa had been introduced and seated, the following exchange occurred: Pyne: I guess your long hair makes you a girl. I guess your long hair makes you a girl.

Zappa: I guess your wooden leg makes you a table. I guess your wooden leg makes you a table.

Primitive Automaticity Aside from containing what may be my favorite ad-lib, the dialogue between Pyne and Zappa ill.u.s.trates a fundamental theme of this book: Very often when we make a decision about someone or something we don't use all of the relevant available information. We use, instead, only a single, highly representative piece of the total. An isolated piece of information, even though it normally counsels us correctly, can lead us to clearly stupid mistakes-mistakes that, when exploited by clever others, leave us looking silly or worse.

At the same time, a complicating companion theme has been present throughout this book: Despite the susceptibility to stupid decisions that accompanies a reliance on a single feature of the available data, the pace of modern life demands that we frequently use this shortcut. Recall that early in Chapter 1 Chapter 1, we compared this shortcut to the automatic responding of lower animals, whose elaborate behavior patterns could be triggered by the presence of a lone stimulus feature-a cheep-cheep sound, a shade of red breast feather, or a specific sequence of light flashes. The reason these lower animals must often rely on such solitary stimulus features of their environments is their restricted mental capacity. Their small brains cannot begin to register and process all of the relevant information in their environments. So these species have evolved special sensitivities to certain aspects of the information. Because those selected aspects of information are normally enough to cue a correct response, the system is usually very efficient: Whenever a mother turkey hears cheep, cheep, click, whirr click, whirr, out rolls the proper maternal behavior in a mechanical fas.h.i.+on that conserves much of her limited brainpower for dealing with the other situations and choices she must face in her day. fas.h.i.+on that conserves much of her limited brainpower for dealing with the other situations and choices she must face in her day.

We, of course, have vastly more effective brain mechanisms than do mother turkeys, or any other animal group, for that matter. We are unchallenged in the ability to take into account a mult.i.tude of relevant facts and, consequently, to make good decisions. Indeed, it is this information-processing advantage over other species that has helped make us the dominant form of life on the planet.

Still, we have our capacity limitations, too; and, for the sake of efficiency, we must sometimes retreat from the time-consuming, sophisticated, fully informed brand of decision making to a more automatic, primitive, single-feature type of responding. For instance, in deciding whether to say yes or no to a requester, we frequently pay attention to a single piece of the relevant information in the situation. In preceding chapters, we have explored several of the most popular of the single pieces of information that we use to prompt our compliance decisions. They are the most popular prompts precisely because they are the most reliable ones, those that normally point us toward the correct choice. That is why we employ the factors of reciprocation, consistency, social proof, liking, authority, and scarcity so often and so automatically in making our compliance decisions. Each, by itself, provides a highly reliable cue as to when we will be better off saying yes instead of no.

We are likely to use these lone cues when we don't have the inclination, time, energy, or cognitive resources to undertake a complete a.n.a.lysis of the situation. When we are rushed, stressed, uncertain, indifferent, distracted, or fatigued, we tend to focus on less of the information available to us. When making decisions under these circ.u.mstances, we often revert to the rather primitive but necessary single-piece-of-good-evidence approach.1 All this leads to an unnerving insight: With the sophisticated mental apparatus we have used to build world eminence as a species, we have created an environment so complex, fast-paced, and information-laden that we must increasingly deal with it in the fas.h.i.+on of the animals we long ago transcended. All this leads to an unnerving insight: With the sophisticated mental apparatus we have used to build world eminence as a species, we have created an environment so complex, fast-paced, and information-laden that we must increasingly deal with it in the fas.h.i.+on of the animals we long ago transcended.

1 For evidence of such perceptual and decisional narrowing, see Albarracin & Wyer (2001); Bodenhausen (1990); Chajut & Algom (2003); Easterbrook (1959); Gilbert and Osborne (1989); Hockey and Hamilton (1970); Keinan (1987); Kruglanski and Freund (1983); Mackworth (1965); Milgram (1970); Paulus, Martin, and Murphy (1992); Sengupta & Johar (2001); Tversky and Kahneman (1974); and Webster, Richter, and Kruglansk (1996). For evidence of such perceptual and decisional narrowing, see Albarracin & Wyer (2001); Bodenhausen (1990); Chajut & Algom (2003); Easterbrook (1959); Gilbert and Osborne (1989); Hockey and Hamilton (1970); Keinan (1987); Kruglanski and Freund (1983); Mackworth (1965); Milgram (1970); Paulus, Martin, and Murphy (1992); Sengupta & Johar (2001); Tversky and Kahneman (1974); and Webster, Richter, and Kruglansk (1996).

Sometimes the consequences can be calamitous. Remember the FBI's infamously misguided a.s.sault on Branch Davidian Church headquarters in Waco, Texas? According to an a.n.a.lysis by U.S. Justice Department consultants, during the FBI's 51-day siege of the Branch Davidian's compound, the agency collected so much information that it had to ignore the vast majority of it. Said Professor Robert Louden, one of the Justice Department's consultants, "The FBI had such an intelligence information overload that . . . they just fell back on past practice-and since they didn't have any experience with religion, they treated it like a standard barricade" ("Overload of Advice," 1993). The disastrous outcome was that, when the FBI finally attacked, more than 80 sect members died in an act of faith- and fear-fueled self-immolation. they didn't have any experience with religion, they treated it like a standard barricade" ("Overload of Advice," 1993). The disastrous outcome was that, when the FBI finally attacked, more than 80 sect members died in an act of faith- and fear-fueled self-immolation.

Modern Automaticity John Stuart Mill, the British economist, political thinker, and philosopher of science, died over 135 years ago. The year of his death (1873) is important because he is reputed to have been the last man to know everything there was to know in the world. Today, the notion that one of us could be aware of all known facts is laughable. After eons of slow acc.u.mulation, human knowledge has s...o...b..lled into an era of momentum-fed, multiplicative, monstrous expansion. We now live in a world where most of the information is less than 15 years old. In certain fields of science alone (physics, for example), knowledge is said to double every eight years. The scientific information explosion is not limited to such arcane arenas as molecular chemistry or quantum physics, but extends to everyday areas of knowledge where we strive to keep ourselves current-health, child development, nutrition. What's more, this rapid growth is likely to continue, since researchers are pumping their newest findings into an estimated 400,000 scientific journals worldwide.

Apart from the streaking advance of science, things are quickly changing much closer to home. According to yearly Gallup polls, the issues rated as most important on the public agenda are becoming more diverse and are surviving on that agenda for a shorter time. In addition, we travel more and faster; we relocate more frequently to new residences, which are built and torn down more quickly; we contact more people and have shorter relations.h.i.+ps with them; in the supermarket, car showroom, and shopping mall, we are faced with an array of choices among styles and products that were unheard of last year and may well be obsolete or forgotten by next year. Novelty, transience, diversity, and acceleration are acknowledged as prime descriptors of civilized existence.

This avalanche of information and choices is made possible by burgeoning technological progress. Leading the way are developments in our ability to collect, store, retrieve, and communicate information. At first, the fruits of such advances were limited to large organizations-government agencies or powerful corporations. With further developments in telecommunications and computer technology, access to such staggering amounts of information is falling within the reach of individual citizens. Extensive cable and satellite systems provide one route for that information into the average home.

The other major route is the personal computer. In 1972, Norman Macrae, an editor of The Economist Economist, speculated prophetically about a time in the future:

The prospect is, after all, that we are going to enter an age when any duffer sitting at a computer terminal in his laboratory or office or public library or home can delve through unimaginable increased mountains of information in ma.s.s-a.s.sembly data banks with mechanical powers of concentration and calculation that will be greater by a factor of tens of thousands than was ever available to the human brain of even an Einstein. (Macrae, 1972) delve through unimaginable increased mountains of information in ma.s.s-a.s.sembly data banks with mechanical powers of concentration and calculation that will be greater by a factor of tens of thousands than was ever available to the human brain of even an Einstein. (Macrae, 1972)

Opting Out of the Options Too many options can prove wearisome.

1984, David Sipress, from Wishful Thinking, 1987, by Harper and Row 1984, David Sipress, from Wishful Thinking, 1987, by Harper and Row.

Just one decade later, Time Time magazine signaled that Macrae's future age had arrived by naming a machine, the personal computer, as its Man of the Year. magazine signaled that Macrae's future age had arrived by naming a machine, the personal computer, as its Man of the Year. Time's Time's editors defended their choice by citing the consumer "stampede" to purchase small computers and by arguing that "America [and], in a larger perspective, the entire world will never be the same." Macrae's vision is presently being realized. Millions of ordinary "duffers" are sitting in front of computers with the potential to present and a.n.a.lyze enough data to bury an Einstein. editors defended their choice by citing the consumer "stampede" to purchase small computers and by arguing that "America [and], in a larger perspective, the entire world will never be the same." Macrae's vision is presently being realized. Millions of ordinary "duffers" are sitting in front of computers with the potential to present and a.n.a.lyze enough data to bury an Einstein.

Modern day visionaries-like Bill Gates, chairman of Microsoft-agree with Macrae, a.s.serting that we are creating an array of devices capable of delivering a universe of information "to anyone, anywhere, anytime" (Davidson, 1999). But notice something telling: Our modern era, often termed The Information Age, has never been called The Knowledge Age. Information does not translate directly into knowledge. It must first be processed-accessed, absorbed, comprehended, integrated, and retained.

Shortcuts Shall Be Sacred Because technology can evolve much faster than we can, our natural capacity to process information is likely to be increasingly inadequate to handle the abundance of change, choice, and challenge that is characteristic of modern life. More and more frequently, we will find ourselves in the position of lower animals-with a mental apparatus that is unequipped to deal thoroughly with the intricacy and richness of the outside environment. Unlike the lower animals, whose cognitive powers have always been relatively deficient, we have created our own deficiency by constructing a radically more complex world. The consequence of our new deficiency is the same as that of the animals' long-standing one: when making a decision, we will less frequently engage in a fully considered a.n.a.lysis of the total situation. In response to this "paralysis of a.n.a.lysis," we will revert increasingly to a focus on a single, usually reliable feature of the situation. abundance of change, choice, and challenge that is characteristic of modern life. More and more frequently, we will find ourselves in the position of lower animals-with a mental apparatus that is unequipped to deal thoroughly with the intricacy and richness of the outside environment. Unlike the lower animals, whose cognitive powers have always been relatively deficient, we have created our own deficiency by constructing a radically more complex world. The consequence of our new deficiency is the same as that of the animals' long-standing one: when making a decision, we will less frequently engage in a fully considered a.n.a.lysis of the total situation. In response to this "paralysis of a.n.a.lysis," we will revert increasingly to a focus on a single, usually reliable feature of the situation.2 2 Even trial judges employ this shortcut approach rather than the considered and contemplative one we expect from them. In bail determinations for instance, they are more likely to base their decisions on the earlier choice of a prosecutor, police officer, or prior court than on a more complex a.n.a.lysis that includes factors related to due process (Dhami, 2003). Even trial judges employ this shortcut approach rather than the considered and contemplative one we expect from them. In bail determinations for instance, they are more likely to base their decisions on the earlier choice of a prosecutor, police officer, or prior court than on a more complex a.n.a.lysis that includes factors related to due process (Dhami, 2003).

When those single features are truly reliable, there is nothing inherently wrong with the shortcut approach of narrowed attention and automatic responding to a particular piece of information. The problem comes when something causes the normally trustworthy cues to counsel us poorly, to lead us to erroneous actions and wrongheaded decisions. As we have seen, one such cause is the trickery of certain compliance pract.i.tioners, who seek to profit from the mindless and mechanical nature of shortcut responding. If, as it seems, the frequency of shortcut responding is increasing with the pace and form of modern life, we can be sure that the frequency of this trickery is destined to increase as well.

What can we do about the expected intensified attack on our system of shortcuts? More than evasive action, I urge forceful countera.s.sault; however, there is an important qualification. Compliance professionals who play fairly by the rules of shortcut responding are not to be considered the enemy; to the contrary, they are our allies in an efficient and adaptive process of exchange. The proper targets for counter-aggression are only those individuals who falsify, counterfeit, or misrepresent the evidence that naturally cues our shortcut responses.

Let's take an ill.u.s.tration from what is perhaps our most frequently used shortcut. According to the principle of social proof, we often decide to do what other people like us are doing. It makes all kinds of sense since, most of the time, an action that is popular in a given situation is also functional and appropriate. Thus, an advertiser who, without using deceptive statistics, provides information that a brand of toothpaste is the largest selling has offered us valuable evidence about the quality of the product and the probability that we will like it. Provided that we are in the market for a tube of good toothpaste, we might want to rely on that single piece of information, popularity, to decide to try it. This strategy will likely steer us right, will unlikely steer us far wrong, and will conserve our cognitive energies for dealing with the rest of our increasingly information-laden, decision-overloaded environment. The advertiser who allows us to use effectively this efficient strategy is hardly our antagonist but rather our cooperating partner. environment. The advertiser who allows us to use effectively this efficient strategy is hardly our antagonist but rather our cooperating partner.

The story becomes quite different, however, when a compliance pract.i.tioner tries to stimulate a shortcut response by giving us a fraudulent signal for it. The enemy is an advertiser who seeks to create an image of popularity for a brand of toothpaste by, say, constructing a series of staged "unrehea.r.s.ed interview" commercials in which an array of actors posing as ordinary citizens praises the product. Here, where the evidence of popularity is counterfeit, we, the principle of social proof, and our shortcut response to it, are all being exploited. In an earlier chapter, I recommended against the purchase of any product featured in a faked "unrehea.r.s.ed interview" ad and urged that we send the product manufacturers letters detailing the reason and suggesting that they dismiss their advertising agency. I also recommended extending this aggressive stance to any situation in which a compliance professional abuses the principle of social proof (or any other weapon of influence) in this manner. We should refuse to watch TV programs that use canned laughter. If we see a bartender begin a s.h.i.+ft by salting the tip jar with a bill or two, that bartender should get no tip from us. If, after waiting in line outside a nightclub, we discover from the amount of available s.p.a.ce that the wait was designed to impress pa.s.sersby with false evidence of the club's popularity, we should leave immediately and announce our reason to those still in line. In short, we should be willing to use boycott, threat, confrontation, censure, tirade, nearly anything, to retaliate.

I don't consider myself pugnacious by nature, but I actively advocate such belligerent actions because in a way I am at war with the exploiters. We all are. It is important to recognize, however, that their motive for profit is not the cause for hostilities; that motive, after all, is something we each share to an extent. The real treachery, and what we cannot tolerate, is any attempt to make their profit in a way that threatens the reliability of our shortcuts. The blitz of modern daily life demands that we have faithful shortcuts, sound rules of thumb in order to handle it all. These are no longer luxuries; they are out-and-out necessities that figure to become increasingly vital as the pulse quickens. That is why we should want to retaliate whenever we see someone betraying one of our rules of thumb for profit. We want that rule to be as effective as possible. To the degree that its fitness for duty is regularly undercut by the tricks of a profiteer, we naturally will use it less and will be less able to cope efficiently with the decisional burdens of our day. That we cannot allow without a fight. The stakes are far too high.

Summary [image]Modern life is different from any earlier time. Because of remarkable technological advances, information is burgeoning, choices and alternatives are expanding, knowledge is exploding. In this avalanche of change and choice, we have had to adjust. One fundamental adjustment has come in the way we make decisions. Although we all wish to make the most thoughtful, fully considered decision possible in any situation, the changing form and accelerating pace of modern life frequently deprive us of the proper conditions for such a careful a.n.a.lysis of all the relevant pros and cons. More and more, we are forced to resort to another decision-making approach-a shortcut approach in which the decision to comply (or agree or believe or buy) is made on the basis of a single, usually reliable piece of information. The most reliable and, therefore, most popular such single triggers for compliance are those described throughout this book. They are commitments, opportunities for reciprocation, the compliant behavior of similar others, feelings of liking or friends.h.i.+p, authority directives, and scarcity information. make decisions. Although we all wish to make the most thoughtful, fully considered decision possible in any situation, the changing form and accelerating pace of modern life frequently deprive us of the proper conditions for such a careful a.n.a.lysis of all the relevant pros and cons. More and more, we are forced to resort to another decision-making approach-a shortcut approach in which the decision to comply (or agree or believe or buy) is made on the basis of a single, usually reliable piece of information. The most reliable and, therefore, most popular such single triggers for compliance are those described throughout this book. They are commitments, opportunities for reciprocation, the compliant behavior of similar others, feelings of liking or friends.h.i.+p, authority directives, and scarcity information.

[image]Because of the increasing tendency for cognitive overload in our society, the prevalence of shortcut decision making is likely to increase proportionately. Compliance professionals who infuse their requests with one or another of the triggers of influence are more likely to be successful. The use of these triggers by pract.i.tioners is not necessarily exploitative. It only becomes so when the trigger is not a natural feature of the situation but is fabricated by the pract.i.tioner. In order to retain the beneficial character of shortcut response, it is important to oppose such fabrication by all appropriate means.

Study Questions Critical Thinking 1. Pick any three of the weapons of influence described in this book. Discuss in each case how the weapon could be used to enhance compliance in what you would consider an exploitative manner and in what you would consider a nonexploitative manner.

2. For each of the three weapons of influence you choose, describe the way you would defend yourself should the weapon be used against you in an exploitative fas.h.i.+on.

3. Describe the three most important lessons that you have learned about the influence process from this book.

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