The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Part 2

D. The first target should be relatively untouched by previous bombing, in order that the effect of a single atomic bomb could be determined.

The weather records showed that for five years there had never been two successive good visual bombing days over Tokyo, indicating what might be expected over other targets in the home islands. The worst month of the year for visual bombing was believed to be June, after which the weather should improve slightly during July and August and then become worse again during September. Since good bombing conditions would occur rarely, the most intense plans and preparations were necessary in order to secure accurate weather forecasts and to arrange for full utilization of whatever good weather might occur. It was also very desirable to start the raids before September.

DESCRIPTION OF THE CITIES BEFORE THE BOMBINGS

Hiros.h.i.+ma

The city of Hiros.h.i.+ma is located on the broad, flat delta of the Ota River, which has 7 channel outlets dividing the city into six islands which project into Hiros.h.i.+ma Bay. The city is almost entirely flat and only slightly above sea level; to the northwest and northeast of the city some hills rise to 700 feet. A single hill in the eastern part of the city proper about 1/2 mile long and 221 feet in height interrupted to some extent the spreading of the blast damage; otherwise the city was fully exposed to the bomb. Of a city area of over 26 square miles, only 7 square miles were completely built-up. There was no marked separation of commercial, industrial, and residential zones. 75% of the population was concentrated in the densely built-up area in the center of the city.

Hiros.h.i.+ma was a city of considerable military importance. It contained the 2nd Army Headquarters, which commanded the defense of all of southern j.a.pan. The city was a communications center, a storage point, and an a.s.sembly area for troops. To quote a j.a.panese report, "Probably more than a thousand times since the beginning of the war did the Hiros.h.i.+ma citizens see off with cries of 'Banzai' the troops leaving from the harbor."

The center of the city contained a number of reinforced concrete buildings as well as lighter structures. Outside the center, the area was congested by a dense collection of small wooden workshops set among j.a.panese houses; a few larger industrial plants lay near the outskirts of the city. The houses were of wooden construction with tile roofs.

Many of the industrial buildings also were of wood frame construction.

The city as a whole was highly susceptible to fire damage.

Some of the reinforced concrete buildings were of a far stronger construction than is required by normal standards in America, because of the earthquake danger in j.a.pan. This exceptionally strong construction undoubtedly accounted for the fact that the framework of some of the buildings which were fairly close to the center of damage in the city did not collapse.

The population of Hiros.h.i.+ma had reached a peak of over 380,000 earlier in the war but prior to the atomic bombing the population had steadily decreased because of a systematic evacuation ordered by the j.a.panese government. At the time of the attack the population was approximately 255,000. This figure is based on the registered population, used by the j.a.panese in computing ration quant.i.ties, and the estimates of additional workers and troops who were brought into the city may not be highly accurate. Hiros.h.i.+ma thus had approximately the same number of people as the city of Providence, R.I., or Dallas, Tex.

Nagasaki

Nagasaki lies at the head of a long bay which forms the best natural harbor on the southern j.a.panese home island of Kyushu. The main commercial and residential area of the city lies on a small plain near the end of the bay. Two rivers divided by a mountain spur form the two main valleys in which the city lies. This mountain spur and the irregular lay-out of the city tremendously reduced the area of destruction, so that at first glance Nagasaki appeared to have been less devastated than Hiros.h.i.+ma.

The heavily build-up area of the city is confined by the terrain to less than 4 square miles out of a total of about 35 square miles in the city as a whole.

The city of Nagasaki had been one of the largest sea ports in southern j.a.pan and was of great war-time importance because of its many and varied industries, including the production of ordnance, s.h.i.+ps, military equipment, and other war materials. The narrow long strip attacked was of particular importance because of its industries.

In contrast to many modern aspects of Nagasaki, the residences almost without exception were of flimsy, typical j.a.panese construction, consisting of wood or wood-frame buildings, with wood walls with or without plaster, and tile roofs. Many of the smaller industries and business establishments were also housed in wooden buildings or flimsily built masonry buildings. Nagasaki had been permitted to grow for many years without conforming to any definite city zoning plan and therefore residences were constructed adjacent to factory buildings and to each other almost as close as it was possible to build them throughout the entire industrial valley.

THE ATTACKS

Hiros.h.i.+ma

Hiros.h.i.+ma was the primary target of the first atomic bomb mission. The mission went smoothly in every respect. The weather was good, and the crew and equipment functioned perfectly. In every detail, the attack was carried out exactly as planned, and the bomb performed exactly as expected.

The bomb exploded over Hiros.h.i.+ma at 8:15 on the morning of August 6, 1945. About an hour previously, the j.a.panese early warning radar net had detected the approach of some American aircraft headed for the southern part of j.a.pan. The alert had been given and radio broadcasting stopped in many cities, among them Hiros.h.i.+ma. The planes approached the coast at a very high alt.i.tude. At nearly 8:00 A.M., the radar operator in Hiros.h.i.+ma determined that the number of planes coming in was very small--probably not more than three--and the air raid alert was lifted. The normal radio broadcast warning was given to the people that it might be advisable to go to shelter if B-29's were actually sighted, but no raid was expected beyond some sort of reconnaissance.

At 8:15 A.M., the bomb exploded with a blinding flash in the sky, and a great rush of air and a loud rumble of noise extended for many miles around the city; the first blast was soon followed by the sounds of falling buildings and of growing fires, and a great cloud of dust and smoke began to cast a pall of darkness over the city.

At 8:16 A.M., the Tokyo control operator of the j.a.panese Broadcasting Corporation noticed that the Hiros.h.i.+ma station had gone off the air.

He tried to use another telephone line to reestablish his program, but it too had failed. About twenty minutes later the Tokyo railroad telegraph center realized that the main line telegraph had stopped working just north of Hiros.h.i.+ma. From some small railway stops within ten miles of the city there came unofficial and confused reports of a terrible explosion in Hiros.h.i.+ma. All these reports were transmitted to the Headquarters of the j.a.panese General Staff.

Military headquarters repeatedly tried to call the Army Control Station in Hiros.h.i.+ma. The complete silence from that city puzzled the men at Headquarters; they knew that no large enemy raid could have occurred, and they knew that no sizeable store of explosives was in Hiros.h.i.+ma at that time. A young officer of the j.a.panese General Staff was instructed to fly immediately to Hiros.h.i.+ma, to land, survey the damage, and return to Tokyo with reliable information for the staff. It was generally felt at Headquarters that nothing serious had taken place, that it was all a terrible rumor starting from a few sparks of truth.

The staff officer went to the airport and took off for the southwest.

After flying for about three hours, while still nearly 100 miles from Hiros.h.i.+ma, he and his pilot saw a great cloud of smoke from the bomb.

In the bright afternoon, the remains of Hiros.h.i.+ma were burning.

Their plane soon reached the city, around which they circled in disbelief. A great scar on the land, still burning, and covered by a heavy cloud of smoke, was all that was left of a great city. They landed south of the city, and the staff officer immediately began to organize relief measures, after reporting to Tokyo.

Tokyo's first knowledge of what had really caused the disaster came from the White House public announcement in Was.h.i.+ngton sixteen hours after Hiros.h.i.+ma had been hit by the atomic bomb.

Nagasaki

Nagasaki had never been subjected to large scale bombing prior to the explosion of the atomic bomb there. On August 1st, 1945, however, a number of high explosive bombs were dropped on the city. A few of these bombs. .h.i.t in the s.h.i.+pyards and dock areas in the southwest portion of the city. Several of the bombs. .h.i.t the Mitsubis.h.i.+ Steel and Arms Works and six bombs landed at the Nagasaki Medical School and Hospital, with three direct hits on buildings there. While the damage from these few bombs were relatively small, it created considerable concern in Nagasaki and a number of people, princ.i.p.ally school children, were evacuated to rural areas for safety, thus reducing the population in the city at the time of the atomic attack.

On the morning of August 9th, 1945, at about 7:50 A.M., j.a.panese time, an air raid alert was sounded in Nagasaki, but the "All clear" signal was given at 8:30. When only two B-29 superfortresses were sighted at 10:53 the j.a.panese apparently a.s.sumed that the planes were only on reconnaissance and no further alarm was given. A few moments later, at 11:00 o'clock, the observation B-29 dropped instruments attached to three parachutes and at 11:02 the other plane released the atomic bomb.

The bomb exploded high over the industrial valley of Nagasaki, almost midway between the Mitsubis.h.i.+ Steel and Arms Works, in the south, and the Mitsubis.h.i.+-Urakami Ordnance Works (Torpedo Works), in the north, the two princ.i.p.al targets of the city.

Despite its extreme importance, the first bombing mission on Hiros.h.i.+ma had been almost routine. The second mission was not so uneventful.

Again the crew was specially trained and selected; but bad weather introduced some momentous complications. These complications are best described in the brief account of the mission's weaponeer, Comdr., now Capt., F. L. Ashworth, U.S.N., who was in technical command of the bomb and was charged with the responsibility of insuring that the bomb was successfully dropped at the proper time and on the designated target. His narrative runs as follows:

"The night of our take-off was one of tropical rain squalls, and flashes of lightning stabbed into the darkness with disconcerting regularity. The weather forecast told us of storms all the way from the Marianas to the Empire. Our rendezvous was to be off the southeast coast of Kyushu, some 1500 miles away. There we were to join with our two companion observation B-29's that took off a few minutes behind us.

Skillful piloting and expert navigation brought us to the rendezvous without incident.

"About five minutes after our arrival, we were joined by the first of our B-29's. The second, however, failed to arrive, having apparently been thrown off its course by storms during the night. We waited 30 minutes and then proceeded without the second plane toward the target area.

"During the approach to the target the special instruments installed in the plane told us that the bomb was ready to function. We were prepared to drop the second atomic bomb on j.a.pan. But fate was against us, for the target was completely obscured by smoke and haze. Three times we attempted bombing runs, but without success. Then with anti-aircraft fire bursting around us and with a number of enemy fighters coming up after us, we headed for our secondary target, Nagasaki.

"The bomb burst with a blinding flash and a huge column of black smoke swirled up toward us. Out of this column of smoke there boiled a great swirling mushroom of gray smoke, luminous with red, flas.h.i.+ng flame, that reached to 40,000 feet in less than 8 minutes. Below through the clouds we could see the pall of black smoke ringed with fire that covered what had been the industrial area of Nagasaki.

"By this time our fuel supply was dangerously low, so after one quick circle of Nagasaki, we headed direct for Okinawa for an emergency landing and refueling".

GENERAL COMPARISON OF HIROs.h.i.+MA AND NAGASAKI

It was not at first apparent to even trained observers visiting the two j.a.panese cities which of the two bombs had been the most effective.

In some respects, Hiros.h.i.+ma looked worse than Nagasaki. The fire damage in Hiros.h.i.+ma was much more complete; the center of the city was. .h.i.t and everything but the reinforced concrete buildings had virtually disappeared. A desert of clear-swept, charred remains, with only a few strong building frames left standing was a terrifying sight.

At Nagasaki there were no buildings just underneath the center of explosion. The damage to the Mitsubis.h.i.+ Arms Works and the Torpedo Works was spectacular, but not overwhelming. There was something left to see, and the main contours of some of the buildings were still normal.

An observer could stand in the center of Hiros.h.i.+ma and get a view of the most of the city; the hills prevented a similar overall view in Nagasaki. Hiros.h.i.+ma impressed itself on one's mind as a vast expanse of desolation; but nothing as vivid was left in one's memory of Nagasaki.

When the observers began to note details, however, striking differences appeared. Trees were down in both cities, but the large trees which fell in Hiros.h.i.+ma were uprooted, while those in Nagasaki were actually snapped off. A few reinforced concrete buildings were smashed at the center in Hiros.h.i.+ma, but in Nagasaki equally heavy damage could be found 2,300 feet from X. In the study of objects which gave definite clues to the blast pressure, such as squashed tin cans, dished metal plates, bent or snapped poles and like, it was soon evident that the Nagasaki bomb had been much more effective than the Hiros.h.i.+ma bomb. In the description of damage which follows, it will be noted that the radius for the amount of damage was greater in Nagasaki than Hiros.h.i.+ma.

GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE ATOMIC EXPLOSIONS

In considering the devastation in the two cities, it should be remembered that the cities' differences in shape and topography resulted in great differences in the damages. Hiros.h.i.+ma was all on low, flat ground, and was roughly circular in shape; Nagasaki was much cut up by hills and mountain spurs, with no regularity to its shape.