The Works of Mr. George Gillespie Part 23

Princes, therefore, may not suffer bishops to usurp the power of suspending and depriving at their pleasure, and whensoever they commit any such tyranny in smiting of their fellow-servants, it is the part of princes to cause these things to be redressed, and for this end graciously to receive the grievances of oppressed ministers. The Arians of old, being a.s.sembled in a council at Antioch, decreed, that if any ecclesiastical person should, without the advice and the letters of the bishops(1121) of the province, and chiefly of the metropolitan, go to the emperor to put up any grievance unto him, he should be cast out, not only from the holy communion, but from his proper dignity which he had in the church.

Whereupon Osiander hath this observation:(1122) "This canon also was composed against holy Athanasius; for Athanasius being expelled by the Arians, had fled to the emperor Constantine the younger, and had from him obtained a return to his own church. Now this canon is very unjust, which forbids that a bishop, or any other minister of the church, being unjustly oppressed, flee to his G.o.dly civil magistrate; since it was lawful to the apostle Paul to appeal to the Roman emperor wicked Nero, as the Acts of the Apostles witness. But it may be seen in this place, that bishops were very soon seeking dominion, yea, tyranny over the church, and over their colleges." Besides all this, there is yet another thing which ought to have a very princ.i.p.al consideration in the deposition of a minister, and that is, the consent of the church and congregation where he hath served.

Let the magistrate know, saith Gerhard,(1123) "that as the vocation of ministers pertaineth to the whole church, so to the same also pertaineth the removing of ministers; therefore, as a minister ought not to be obtruded upon an unwilling church, so the hearers, being unwilling and striving against it, a fit minister ought not to be plucked away from them." The deposing of a minister, whom the church loves and willingly hears, Balduine accounteth to be high sacrilege,(1124) and holdeth that, as the calling, so the dismissing of ministers pertaineth to the whole church; and so teacheth Junius.(1125) Shortly, as a man is rightly called to the ministerial office and dignity when he is elected by the church and ordained by the presbytery, so is he rightly deposed and put from the same when he is rejected by the church and discharged by the presbytery.

How there was brought forth in Scotland, anno 1610, a certain amphibian brood, sprung out of the stem of Neronian tyranny, and in manners like to his nearest kinsman, the Spanish Inquisition. It is armed with a transcendant power, and called by the dreadful name of the _High Commission_. Among other things, it arrogateth to itself the power of deposing ministers; but how unjustly, thus it appeareth:

1. If those commissioners have any power at all to depose ministers, they have it from the king, whose commissioners they are: but from him they have it not; therefore they have none at all. The proposition is most certain; for they sit not in that commission to judge in their own name, nor by their own authority, (_quum nihil exerceat delegatus nomine proprio_, as Panormitan saith,(1126)) but by virtue only of the commission and delegation which they have of the king. Yea, bishops themselves exercise not any jurisdiction in the High Commission as bishops, but only as the king's commissioners, as Dr Downame acknowledgeth.(1127) The a.s.sumption is grounded upon this reason: The king hath not power to depose ministers; therefore he cannot give this power to others. For _nemo potest plus juris transferre in alium quam sibi competere dignoscatur_,(1128) the king may sometimes inflict such a civil punishment upon ministers, whereupon, secondarily and accidentally, will follow their falling away from their ecclesiastical office and function (in which sense it is said that Solomon deposed Abiathar, as we heard before), but to depose them directly and formally (which the High Commission usurped to do) he hath no power, and that because this deposition is an act of ecclesiastical jurisdiction; whereas the power of ecclesiastical jurisdiction doth no more agree to the king than the power of ecclesiastical order: his power is civil and temporal, not spiritual and ecclesiastical. Dr Field also confesseth,(1129) that none may judicially degrade, or put any one, lawfully admitted, from his degree and order, but the spiritual guides of the church alone.

2. The deposing of ministers pertaineth to cla.s.sical presbyteries, or (if the matter be doubtful and difficult) to synods, as hath been showed. And who, then, can give the High Commission such authority as to take this power from them and a.s.sume it unto itself. These commissioners profess that they have authority to discharge other ecclesiastical judicatories within the kingdom from meddling with the judging of anything which they shall think impertinent for them, and which they shall think good to judge and decide by themselves in their commission: which, if it be so, then, when it pleaseth them, they may make other ecclesiastical judicatories to be altogether useless and of no effect in the church.

3. In this commission ecclesiastical and temporal men are joined together, and both armed with the same power; therefore it is not right nor regular, nor in any ways allowable. For even, as when a minister hath offended in a civil matter, his fault is to be judged by civil judges according to the civil laws, and by no other; so, when he offendeth in an ecclesiastical matter, his fault is to be judged only by ecclesiastical persons according to ecclesiastical laws; and, in such case, Justinian forbiddeth(1130) civil men to be joined with ecclesiastical men in judgment. They are ecclesiastical things or causes which are handled and examined by the High Commission in the process of deposing ministers; and a shame it is to ecclesiastical men, if they cannot, without the help and joining of temporal men, judge and decide things of this quality.

4. As in the matters to be judged, so in the censures and punishments to be inflicted, ecclesiastical and civil men have, in this commission, alike power and authority; for ecclesiastical men therein have power of fining, confining, warding, &c., common to them with the temporal men; and, again, the temporal men have power of excommunication, suspension, deprivation, &c., common to them with the ecclesiastical men. For they all sit there as the king's commissioners, and _eo nomine_, they exercise this jurisdiction; which commission being alike discharged by them all, it is manifest that both temporal men take hold of the keys and ecclesiastical men take hold of the civil sword. And this monstrous confusion and mixture giveth sufficient demonstration that such a form of judgment is not from the G.o.d of order.

Of the abuses and irregularities of the High Commission we may not now speak at greater length, but are hasted to make forward.

CHAPTER IX.

THAT THE LAWFULNESS OF THE CEREMONIES CANNOT BE WARRANTED BY THE LAW OF NATURE.

_Sect._ 1. What our opposites have alleged for the ceremonies, either from the law of G.o.d, or the law of man, we have hitherto answered; but we heard the law of nature also alleged(1131) for holidays, and for kneeling at the communion. And when Hooker(1132) goeth about to commend and defend such visible signs, "which, being used in performance of holy actions, are undoubtedly most effectual to open such matter, as men, when they know and remember carefully, must needs be a great deal the better informed to what effect such duties serve," he subjoineth: "We must not think but that there is some ground of reason even in nature," &c. This is a smoke to blind the eyes of the unlearned. Our opposites have taken no pains nor travail to make us see any deduction of those ceremonies from the law of nature: we desire proofs, not words. In the meanwhile, for giving further evidence to the truth, we will express our own mind touching things warranted by the law of nature.

_Sect._ 2. And, first, we must understand aright what is meant by the law of nature: to wit, that law which G.o.d writeth and imprinteth in the nature of man,(1133) so that it is as it were co-natural and born together with man. Now, if we consider what law was written in the nature of man in his first creation, it was no other than the decalogue, or the moral law.(1134) But the law which we are here to inquire of is that law which, after the fall, G.o.d still writeth in the heart of every man; which (we all know) cometh far short, and wanteth much of that which was written in the heart of man before his fall. That we may understand what this law of nature is which is written in all men's hearts since the fall, we must distinguish _jus naturale_ from _jus divinum naturale_. For that law which is simply called _jus naturale_ is _innatum_, and layeth before the minds of men that way wherein, by the guidance and conduct of nature,(1135) they may be led to that good which is, in the end, proportionate to nature; whereas _jus divinum_ is _inspiratum_, and layeth before us another way, wherein, by a supernatural guidance,(1136) we may be led to a supernatural good, which is an end exceeding the proportion of nature. As for that part of the law of G.o.d which is called _jus divinum naturale_, it is so called in opposition to _jus divinum positivum_.

_Sect._ 3. _Jus naturale,_ saith Justinian,(1137) _est quod naturo omnia animalia docuit_. This the lawyers take to be the law of nature, which nature, by its sole instinct, teacheth as well to other living creatures as to men; for nature teacheth all living creatures to save and preserve their own being, to decline things hurtful, to seek things necessary for their life, to procreate their like, to care for that which is procreated by them, &c. The Archbishop of Spalato(1138) liketh to speak with the lawyers. _Jus naturale_, saith he, _simpliciter ponitur in omnibus animalibus. Videntur autem_, saith Joachinus Mynsingerus,(1139) _juris consulti, valde in hoc abuti vocabulo juris, c.u.m exemplae praedicta sint potius affectus et inclinationes naturales, quae c.u.m quibusque animantibus enasc.u.n.tur; quas philosophi_ st????? f?s???? _appellant. In brutis enim c.u.m nulla sit ratio, igitur nec ullum jus esse potest._

Aquinas also showeth(1140) that beasts are not properly governed by the law of nature, because _lex_ is _aliquid rationis_. Wherefore they err who would make the law of nature to differ in kind from _jus gentium_, which natural reason hath taught to all nations. For this law of nations _per se speciem non facit_, as saith Mynsingerus.(1141) And the law of nature is also, by the heathen writers, often called _jus gentium_, as Rosinus noteth.(1142) If any will needs have the law of nature distinguished from the law of nations, let them either take Aquinas' distinction,(1143) who maketh the law of nature to contain certain principles, having the same place in practical reason which the principles of scientific demonstrations have in speculative reason; and the law of nations to contain certain conclusions drawn from the said principles: or, otherwise, embrace the difference which is put betwixt those laws by Mattheus Wesenbecius:(1144) _Quae bestiae naturali concitatione; ea_, saith he, _homines ex eodem sensu ac affectione, c.u.m moderatione tamen ratione si faciunt, jure naturae faciunt. Quae bruta non faciunt, sed sola ratione hominis propria, non affectione communis naturae, omnes homines faciunt, fierique opportere intelligunt hoc fit jure gentium._

_Sect._ 4. For my part, I take the law of nature and the law of nations to be one and the same. For what is the law of nations but that which nature's light and reason hath taught so to all nations? Now this is no other than the law of nature. We think, therefore, they have well said,(1145) who comprehend under the law of nature both the common principles of good and evil, virtue and vice, right and wrong, things beseeming and things not beseeming, and likewise the general conclusions which, by necessary consequences, are drawn from the said principles. To come to the particulars, there are three sort of things which the law of nature requireth of man, as both schoolmen(1146) and modern doctors(1147) have rightly taught. The first, it requireth as he is _ens_; the second, as he is _animal_; and the third, as he is _h.o.m.o ratione praeditus_. First, As he is _ens_, the law of nature requireth him to seek the conservation of his own being, and to shun or repel such things as may destroy the same. For so hath nature framed not only all living creatures, but other things also which are without life, that they seek their own conservation, and flee (if they can) from apparent destruction. Let us take one example out of subtle Scalliger,(1148) which is this: If a small quant.i.ty of oil be poured upon a sound board, let a burning coal be put in the midst of it, and the oil will quickly flee back from its enemy, and seek the conservation of itself. This is, therefore, the first precept of the law of nature, that man seek his own conservation, and avoid his own destruction. Whereupon this conclusion necessarily followeth, that he may repel violence with violence. Secondly, As man is a living creature, the law of nature teacheth him to propagate and conserve his kind. Whereupon these conclusions do follow, viz., the commixion of male and female, the procreation of children, the educating of them, and providing for them.

This nature hath taught to man, as a thing common to him with other living creatures.

_Sect._ 5. Thirdly, As a man is a creature endowed with reason, the law of nature teacheth him, 1. Something concerning G.o.d; 2. Something concerning his neighbour; 3. Something concerning himself. I mean some general notions concerning good and evil, in respect of each of these; whereof the Apostle meaneth whilst he saith that the Gentiles "show the work of the law written in their hearts," Rom. ii. 15. First, then, the law of nature teacheth man to know that there is a G.o.d, and that this G.o.d is to be wors.h.i.+pped; whereupon it followeth that man should seek to know G.o.d and the manner of his wors.h.i.+p. Now that which may be known of G.o.d is showed even unto the Gentiles. The Apostle saith _signanter_, t? ???st?? t??

Te??, Rom. i. 19, meaning those few and small sparkles of the knowledge of G.o.d which nature's inbred light discovered unto the Gentiles, for making them inexcusable, namely, that there is an eternal power and G.o.dhead, which men ought to reverence and to wors.h.i.+p. 2. The law of nature teacheth man to hold fast friends.h.i.+p and amity with his neighbours, forasmuch as he is _animal sociale. Violare alterum_, saith Cicero, _naturae legae prohibemur_.(1149) For the law of nature biddeth us do to others as we would have others to do unto us, Luke vi. 31. And from these precepts it followeth, that we should not offend other men; that we should keep promises; stand to bargains; give to every man his own, &c. 3. As touching a man's self, the law of nature teacheth him that he should not live as a reasonless creature, but that all his actions should be such as may be congruous and beseeming for a creature endued with reason: Whereupon it followeth, that he should live honestly and virtuously, that he should observe order and decency in all his actions, &c. Hence the Apostle saith, that nature itself teacheth that it is a shame for a man to have long hair, 1 Cor. xi. 14, because it is repugnant to that decency and comeliness which the law of nature requireth. For, among other differences(1150) which nature hath put betwixt men and women, this is one, that it hath given to women thicker and longer hair than to men, that it might be as a veil, to adorn and cover them. The reason whereof nature hath hid in the complexion of a woman, which is more humid than the complexion of a man; so that, if a man should take him to this womanish ornament, he should but against nature transform himself (in so far) into a woman.

_Sect._ 6. These things being permitted, I will add four reasons to prove that neither sacred significant ceremonies in general, nor kneeling, holidays, &c., in particular, can be warranted unto us by the law of nature. 1. The law of nature cannot direct us unto a supernatural end, as is acknowledged not only by our divines,(1151) but by Aquinas also.(1152) It only teacheth us to seek and to do _bonum, velut finem naturae_,(1153) such a good as is an end proportioned to nature. All these precepts of the law of nature which we have spoken of could never lead men to a supernatural good. It is only the divine law,(1154) revealed from G.o.d, which informeth the minds of men with such notions as are _supra naturam_, and which may guide them _ad finem supernaturalem_. But all sacred significant ceremonies which, by their holy and spiritual significations, express to us some mysteries of grace, and of the kingdom of G.o.d, must be thought to direct us unto a supernatural good; therefore they are not of that sort of things which the law of nature requireth; for this law goeth no higher than to teach men that there is a G.o.d, and that this G.o.d is to be wors.h.i.+pped, the knowledge of which things is not a good exceeding the proportion of nature: for it was found in the Gentiles themselves, who knew no other spiritual and supernatural good than that which was proportioned to nature. Let me now conclude this reason with Scalliger's words, _Neque enim quae supra naturae leges sunt, ex naturae legibus judicanda censeo_.(1155)

_Sect._ 7. 2. As the ceremonies, by their sacred, spiritual, and mystical significations, direct us unto a supernatural good, so they are thought to guide us unto the same by a way which nature's light could never discover unto men. But, in the law of nature, as we are directed unto no other good than such as is proportioned to nature, so are we guided unto the same _natura duce_,(1156) that is to say, by such common notions as G.o.d hath imprinted in the nature of all men. Now, I suppose our opposites will not unwillingly reckon their sacred significant ceremonies among those things of the Spirit of G.o.d which a natural man cannot receive, because they are spiritually decerned, 1 Cor. ii. 14. What then have they to do with the law of nature? If it be said, that they necessarily follow upon those first principles and conclusions which a natural man receiveth, I answer, This shall never be proved. They will say, perhaps, that nature teacheth us to use certain rites in the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d, to observe set times for his wors.h.i.+p, also to kneel down in reverence of G.o.d whom we wors.h.i.+p.

_Ans._ Be it so: but how make they up a necessary connection betwixt certain rites and significant ceremonies of human inst.i.tution; betwixt set times, and some more days than one of seven; betwixt kneeling in the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d _in genere_, and kneeling at the sacrament _in specie_, unless they say that nature requireth us to kneel in every act of wors.h.i.+p, and never to wors.h.i.+p G.o.d without kneeling on our knees?

_Sect._ 8. 3. _Jus naturae_ is _ubique idem_, as Rosinus:(1157) it is approved _communi omnium gentium judicio atque a.s.sensu_, as the Professors of Leyden:(1158) it is one and the same among all nations, in respect of the principles of it, as Aquinas(1159) and Zanchius:(1160) the law of nature _fixa est cordibus nostris_, as Stella:(1161) yea, it is "so written in our hearts that iniquity itself cannot blot it out," as Augustine saith;(1162) and we learn from the Apostle, that the law of nature is manifest in the Gentiles, for G.o.d hath showed it unto them, Rom.

i. 19; therefore there is none ignorant, saith Pareus.(1163) Whatsoever, then, the law of nature requireth, it doth clearly and necessarily follow upon those principles which are written in every man's conscience, unless we set up new divinity, and either say that the principles of the law of nature are not written in every man's conscience, or else that they may be at some time abolished and rased out of the consciences of men; which were to leave men without a witness. Nay, saith Augustine,(1164) the heaven and the earth, and all that is in them, on every side, cease not to bid all men love G.o.d, that they be made inexcusable. Now if all the principles of the law of nature be firmly and clearly written in every man's conscience, and cannot but be known to every man who has the use of natural judgment and reason, it followeth, that they who will prove or warrant anything by the law of nature, must only take their premises from every man's conscience, and say, as the Apostle saith, "Judge in yourselves," &c., "doth not even nature itself teach you," &c., 1 Cor. xi. 13, 14; as if the Apostle said, This principle of nature is fixed in all your hearts, that men should affect honesty and comeliness. Go to reason in yourselves, from the judgment of nature, whether it follow not, upon this principle, that a man should not wear long hair, forasmuch as his wearing of long hair is repugnant to the principle of nature. _Committ.i.t ipsis judicium_, saith Pareus; _ipsos testes, imo judices appellat_,(1165) so that, if the ceremonies be warranted unto us by the law of nature, the judgment must be committed to every man's conscience, and so should every man be convinced in himself, by such a principle of nature, from which the ceremonies have a necessary and manifest deduction. Yet we attest the Searcher of all hearts, that we have never been convinced in ourselves, by such a principle of nature, no, not after diligent search and inquiry.

_Sect._ 9. 4. Let our opposites say to us, once for all, upon what precept of the law of nature do they ground the ceremonies; for I have before opened up all sorts of things which the law of nature requireth of man as he is _ens_; and as he is _animal_ belongeth not to our purpose. As for that which it requireth of him as he is a creature endued with reason, there is one part of it that concerneth ourselves, viz., that we should live honestly, and _secundum modum rationis_, that we should observe order and decency in all our actions. This order and decency do not respect our holy duties to G.o.d, nor comprehend any sacred ceremony in his wors.h.i.+p; but they look to usward, and are referred only to such beseeming qualities as are congruous and convenient to a reasonable nature in all its actions.

Yea, even generally, we may say with Scalliger,(1166) _Ordinem dico sine quo natura constare non potest. Nihil enim absque ordine vel med tata est vel effecit illa._ Another part of that which nature requireth of man, as he is a creature endued with reason, concerneth (as we showed) our neighbours, whom it teacheth us not to harm nor offend, &c. And if our opposites would reckon with us here, their ceremonies will appear repugnant to nature, because of the detriment and offence which they offer unto us, whereof we have spoken in our argument of scandal. But there was a third part, concerning G.o.d and his wors.h.i.+p; and here must our opposites seek a warrant for the ceremonies. Now, albeit nature (as was said) teaches all men that there is an eternal and mighty G.o.d, who should be wors.h.i.+pped and honoured by them, yet it descendeth not unto such particular precepts as can have any show of making aught for significant ceremonies. _Omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum, esse deos_; but yet _quales sint_, saith Cicero, _varium est_.(1167) And as nature hath not taught men to know the nature and attributes of the G.o.dhead, together with the sacred Trinity of persons in the same; so neither hath it taught what sort or manner of wors.h.i.+p should be given unto G.o.d. _Lex naturalis rerum communium est_,(1168) and doth only inform us with those common notions called ????a? e????a?. Concerning the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d, it speaks only _de genere_, not _de specie_: wherefore there can be no inference from that wors.h.i.+p which the law of nature requireth, either of any distinct kind of wors.h.i.+p or of any ceremony in that kind, no more than it followeth, _Si est animal, est Asinus; for a genere ad speciem non valet consequentia affirmando_.

THE FOURTH PART.

AGAINST THE INDIFFERENCY OF THE CEREMONIES.

CHAPTER I.

OF OUR OPPOSITES' PLEADING FOR THE INDIFFERENCY OF THE CEREMONIES.

If it seem to any that it is a strange method to speak now of indifferency, in the end of this dispute, which ought rather to have been handled in the beginning of it, they may consider, that the method is not ours, but our opposites'; for they have been fleeing upon Icarus' wings, and soaring so high that their wings could not but melt from them: so have they, from necessity fallen down to expediency; from it to lawfulness; and from thence to indifferency.

I knew certain of them, who, after reasoning about the ceremonies with some of our side, required, in the end, no more but that they would only acknowledge the indifferency of the things in themselves. And so being wooed and solicitously importuned by our former arguments against the ceremonies, they take them to the weaving of Penelope's web, thereby to suspend us, and to gain time against us: this indifferency, I mean, which they shall never make out, and which themselves, otherwhiles, unweave again. Always, so long as they think to get any place for higher notions about the ceremonies, they speak not so meanly of them as of things indifferent; but when all their forces of arguments and answers are spent in vain, then are our ears filled with uncouth outcries and declamations, which tend to make themselves appear blameless for receiving, and us blameworthy for refusing matters of rite and indifferency.

Upon this string they harp over and over again, in books, in sermons, in private discourses. Mr G. Powell (in his book _De Adiaphoris_), and Tilen (in the 12th and 17th chapters of his _Paraenesis_), condemn those who make aught ado about the controverted English ceremonies, for so much as they are things indifferent. Paybody, in his Apology for kneeling at the communion, standeth much upon the indifferency of this gesture, both in every wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d, and in that sacrament namely. The Archbishop of St.

Andrews, in his sermon at Perth a.s.sembly, because he could not prove this indifferency, he chose to suppose it. "Of the indifferency of these articles (saith he) I think there is little or no question amongst us."

Whether he spake this of ignorance or of policy, I leave it to be guessed at. Howsoever, if we should thus compose our controversy about the ceremonies, embrace them, and practise them, so being that they be only called things indifferent, this were to cure our church, as L. Sylla cured his country, _durioribus remediis quam pericula erant_, saith Seneca.(1169) Wherefore we will debate this question of indifferency also.

CHAPTER II.

OF THE NATURE OF THINGS INDIFFERENT.

_Sect._ 1. To say nothing here of the h.o.m.onymy of the word _indifferent_, but to take it in that signification which concerneth our present purpose, it signifieth such a mean betwixt good and evil in human actions, as is alike distant from both these extremes, and yet susceptive of either of them. _Indifferens_, saith Calepin, is that _quod sua natura neque bonum est neque malum_. Aquinas(1170) calleth that an indifferent action which is neither good nor evil. _Rem indifferentem voco quae neque bona neque mala in se est_, saith a later writer.(1171)

But Dr Forbesse(1172) liketh to speak in another language. He will have that which is indifferent to be opponed to that which is necessary; and a thing indifferent he taketh to be such a thing as is neither necessarily to be done, nor yet necessarily to be omitted, in respect of any necessity of the commandment of G.o.d; or such a thing as is neither remunerable with eternal life, and commendeth a man unto the reward of G.o.d, nor yet is punishable with eternal death, and polluteth a man with guiltiness. Now, because he knew that divines define a thing indifferent to be that which is neither good nor evil, he therefore distinguisheth a twofold goodness of an individual action.(1173) The one he calleth _bonitas generalis, concomitans, et sine qua non_; by which goodness is meant the doing of an action in faith, and the doing of it for the right end, as he expoundeth himself. This goodness, he saith, is necessary to every human action, and hindereth not an action to be indifferent. The other he calleth _bonitas specialis, causans, et propter quam_. This goodness he calleth legal, and saith that it maketh an action necessary; in which respect indifferent actions are not good, but those only which G.o.d in his law hath commanded, and which are remunerable with eternal life.

_Sect._ 2. But that we may have the vanity of these quiddities discovered to us, let us only consider how falsely he supposeth that there are some things which we do neither laudably nor culpably, and for which we shall neither be rewarded (it is his own phrase which I use) nor yet punished by G.o.d. I thought we had learned from Scripture that we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ, to give an account of every word which we speak, and of every deed which we do in the flesh, and accordingly to receive either a reward or a punishment. What! Could the Doctor say that these good actions which he calleth indifferent, and of which he saith that they are done in faith, and for the right end, are not laudable nor remunerable? Nay, but he saith(1174) that the general goodness which accompanieth the action is remunerable, because it is necessary, but the action itself is not necessary, because that general goodness may be had as well in the omission of it, or in the doing of the contrary, as in the doing of it, whereupon he would have it to follow that the action itself is not remunerable.

_Ans._ 1. The Doctor had done well to have remembered that he is speaking only of individual actions, and that _actus individuatur a circ.u.mstantus et adjecto modo_, so that whilst all that he saith turneth to this, that one action considered in itself, without the circ.u.mstances and concomitant goodness, is not remunerable, he maketh not out his point; for he saith no more in effect, but that _actus quo ad speciem_ is not remunerable, which none of us denieth.

2. An individual good action of that kind which the Doctor calleth necessary, is no otherwise remunerable and laudable than an individual good action of that kind which he calleth indifferent, for example, when I go to hear G.o.d's word upon the Lord's day, let this action of mine be considered _quo ad individuum_, is it any otherwise remunerable than in respect of the goodness which accompanieth it? Whence it is that the hearing of hypocrites, not being accompanied with such goodness, is not remunerable, yet the hearing of the word is an action necessary, because commanded? Now may we know wherein standeth the difference betwixt the remunerable good of this action of hearing, and remunerable good of one of those actions which the Doctor calleth indifferent, for example, a woman's action of marrying.

I perceive what the Doctor would answer, for he saith,(1175) if a woman marry in the Lord, this action is good _respectu adjecti modi, quamvis in se sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum_, implying that if, on the other part, an individual action be necessary (as for example the action of hearing the word), then it is in itself good, _etiam quo ad individuum_.

But, I reply, what means he by these words, _in se_? Means he the individual nature of the action? Nay, then the sense shall be no other than this, _quo ad individuum, etiam quo ad individuum_. And, besides, the Doctor cannot define to us any other nature in an individual thing than the nature of the species or kind.

Is it not holden _individuum non posse definiri, nisi definitione specici_?(1176) Sure a perfect definition, expressing the nature of the thing defined, cannot be given to any individual thing other than the definition of the species, needs, therefore, must the Doctor, by _in se_, understand the specifical nature, and, indeed, when divines speak of things indifferent, _in se_, _per se_, or _sua natura_, they mean only things indifferent _quo ad speciem_. Yet thus also the Doctor hath said nonsense, for so we should take his words, _quamvis quoad speciem sit media et libera, etiam quo ad individuum_.

_Sect._ 3. But to let his manner of speaking pa.s.s, we will consider what he would or could have said. There is no difference which can here be imagined except this: That the individual action of hearing the word (when one heareth aright) is good and remunerable in a double respect, namely, because it is both good in itself, or _quo ad speciem_, and likewise _respectu adjecti modi_, whereas a woman's action of marrying (when she marrieth in the Lord) is only good and remunerable in the last respect, namely, _respectu modi_, for, _in se_, or, _quo ad speciem_, it hath no remunerable goodness in it.

_Ans._ What do we hear of any difference betwixt these actions _quo ad speciem_? That which we crave is, that a difference may be showed betwixt the remunerable goodness of the one and of the other, both being considered _quo ad individuum_.