The Works of Mr. George Gillespie Part 4

_Sect_. 3. The urging of these ceremonies as necessary, if there were no more, is a sufficient reason for our refusing them. "To the precepts of G.o.d (saith Balduine) nothing is to be added,(53) Deut. xii. Now G.o.d hath commanded these things which are necessary. The rites of the church are not necessary, wherefore, if the abrogation or usurpation of any rite be urged as necessary, then is an addition made to the commandment of G.o.d, which is forbidden in the word, and, by consequence, it cannot oblige me, neither should anything herein be yielded unto." Who can purge these ceremonies in controversy among us of gross superst.i.tion, since they are urged as things necessary? But of this superst.i.tion we shall hear afterward in its proper place.

CHAPTER II.

THE REASON TAKEN OUT OF ACTS XV. TO PROVE THE NECESSITY OF THE CEREMONIES, BECAUSE OF THE CHURCH'S APPOINTMENT, CONFUTED.

The Bishop of Edinburgh, to prove that of necessity our consciences must be ruled by the will of the law, and that it is necessary that we give obedience to the same, albeit our consciences gainsay, allegeth that apostolical canon,(54) Acts xv., for an example, just as Bellarmine maintaineth, _Festorum observationem ex se indifferentem esse sed posita lege fieri necessariam_(_55_)_._ Hospinian, answering him, will acknowledge no necessity of the observation of feasts, except divine law could be showed for it.(56) So say we, that the ceremonies which are acknowledged by formalists to be indifferent in themselves, cannot be made necessary by the law of the church, neither doth that example of the apostolical canon make anything against us, for, according to Mr Sprint's confession,(57) it was not the force or authority of the canon, but the reason and ground whereupon the canon was made, which caused the necessity of abstaining, and to abstain was necessary for eschewing of scandal, whether the apostles and elders had enjoined abstinence or not.(58) The reason, then, why the things prescribed in that canon are called necessary, ver. 28, is not because, being indifferent before the making and publication of the canon, they became necessary by virtue of the canon after it was made, as the Bishop teacheth, but _quia tunc __ charitas exigebat, ut illa sua libertate qui ex gentibus conversi erant, propter proximi edificationem inter judeos non uterentur, sed ab ea abstinerent,_ saith Chemnitius.(59) This law, saith Tilen,(60) was _propter charitatem et vitandi offendiculi necessitatem ad tempus sancita._ So that these things were necessary before the canon was made. _Necessaria fuerunt,_ saith Ames,(61) _antequam Apostoli quidquam de iis statuerant, non absolute, sed quatenus in iis charitas jubebat morem gerere infirmis, ut cajeta.n.u.s notat. Quamobrem,_ saith Tilen,(62) _c.u.m charitas semper sit colenda, semper vitanda sandala._ "Charity is necessary (saith Beza), even in things which are in themselves indifferent."(63) What they can allege for the necessity of the ceremonies, from the authority and obligatory power of ecclesiastical laws, shall be answered by and by.

CHAPTER III.

THAT THE CEREMONIES THUS IMPOSED AND URGED AS THINGS NECESSARY, DO BEREAVE US OF OUR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY, FIRST, BECAUSE OUR PRACTICE IS ADSTRICTED.

_Sect._ 1. Who can blame us for standing to the defence of our Christian liberty, which we ought to defend and pretend in _rebus quibusvis?_ saith Bucer.(64) Shall we bear the name of Christians, and yet make no great account of the liberty which hath been bought to us by the dearest drops of the precious blood of the Son of G.o.d? _Sumus empti_, saith Parcus:(65) _non igitur nostri juris ut nos mancipemus hominum servitio: id enim manifesta c.u.m injuria redemptoris Christi fieret: sumus liberti Christi.

Magistratui autem,_ saith Tilen,(66) _et ecclesioe proepositis, non nisi usque ad aras obtemperandum, neque ullum certamen aut periculum pro libertatis per Christum n.o.bis partae defensione defugiendum, siquidem mortem ipsius irritam fieri, Paulus a.s.serit, si spiritualis servitutis jugo, nos implicari patiamur._ Gal. v. 1, "Let us stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ hath made us free, and not be entangled again with the yoke of bondage." But that the urging of the ceremonies as necessary doth take away our Christian liberty, I will make it evident in four points.

_Sect._ 2. First, They are imposed with a necessity of practice. Spotswood tells us,(67) that public const.i.tutions must be obeyed, and that private men may not disobey them, and thus is our practice adstricted in the use of things which are not at all necessary, and acknowledged _gratis_ by the urgers to be indifferent, adstricted (I say) to one part without liberty to the other, and that by the mere authority of a human const.i.tution, whereas Christian liberty gives us freedom both for the omission and for the observation of a thing indifferent, except some other reason do adstrict and restrain it than a bare human const.i.tution. Chrysostome, speaking of such as are subject to bishops,(68) saith, _In potestate positum est obedire vel non._ Liberty in things indifferent,(69) saith Amandus Pola.n.u.s, _est per quam Christiani sunt liberi in usu vel abstinentia rerum adiaphorarom._ Calvin, speaking of our liberty in things indifferent,(70) saith, We may _eas nunc usurpare nunc omittere indifferenter_, and places this liberty,(71) _tam in abstinendo quam in utendo._ It is marked of the rites of the ancient church,(72) that _liberae fuerunt horum rituum observationes in ecclesia._ And what meaneth the Apostle while he saith, "If ye be dead with Christ from the rudiments of the world, why, as though living in the world, are ye subject to ordinances, (touch not, taste not, handle not, which all are to perish with the using,) after the commandments and doctrines of men?" Col. ii.

20-22. Surely he condemneth not only _humana decreta de ritibus_, but also subjection and obedience to such ordinances of men as take from us liberty of practice in the use of things indifferent,(73) obedience (I say) for conscience of their ordinances merely. What meaneth also that place, 1 Cor. vii. 23, "Be not ye the servants of men?" "It forbids us, (saith Paybody) to be the servants of men, that is, in wicked or superst.i.tious actions, according to their perverse commandments or desires."(74) If he mean of actions that are wicked or superst.i.tious in themselves, then it followeth, that to be subject unto those ordinances, "Touch not, taste not, handle not," is not to be the servants of men, because these actions are not wicked and superst.i.tious in themselves. Not touching, not tasting, not handling, are in themselves indifferent. But if he mean of actions which are wicked and superst.i.tious, in respect of circ.u.mstances, then is his restrictive gloss senseless; for we can never be the servants of men, but in such wicked and superst.i.tious actions, if there were no more but giving obedience to such ordinances as are imposed with a necessity upon us, and that merely for conscience of the ordinance, it is enough to infect the actions with superst.i.tion, _Sunt hominum servi_, saith Bullinqer,(75) _qui aliquid in gratiam hominum faciunt_. This is nearer the truth; for to tie ourselves to the doing of anything for the will or pleasure of men, when our conscience can find no other reason for the doing of it, were indeed to make ourselves the servants of men. Far be it then from us to submit our necks to such a heavy yoke of human precepts, as would overload and undo us. Nay, we will stedfastly resist such unchristian tyranny as goeth about to spoil us of Christian liberty, taking that for certain which we find in Cyprian,(76) _periculosum est in divinis rebus ut quis cedat jure suo_.

_Sect._ 3. Two things are here replied, 1. That there is reason for adstricting of our practice in these things, because we are commanded to obey them that have the rule over us, and to submit ourselves, Heb. xiii.

17,(77) and to submit ourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake, 1 Pet. ii. 16, and that except public const.i.tutions must needs be obeyed, there can be no order,(78) but all shall be filled with strife and contention. _Ans._ 1. As touching obedience to those that are set over us, if they mean not to tyrannise over the Lord's inheritance, 1 Pet. v. 3; and to make the commandments of G.o.d of no effect by their traditions, Mark vii. 9, they must give us leave to try their precepts by the sure will of G.o.d's word; and when we find that they require of us anything in the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d which is either against or beside his written word, then modestly to refuse obedience, which is the only way for order, and shunning of strife and contention. It will be said again, that except we prove the things commanded by those who are set over us to be unlawful in themselves, we cannot be allowed to refuse obedience to their ordinances.

_Ans._ This unlawfulness of the ceremonies in themselves hath been proved by us already, and shall yet again be proved in this dispute. But put the case, they were lawful in themselves, yet have we good reason for refusing them: "David thought the feeding of his body was cause sufficient to break the law of the shew-bread; Christ thought the satisfying of the disciples'

hunger to be cause sufficient to break the ceremony of the Sabbath. He thought, also, that the healing of the lepers' bodies was a just excuse to break the law that forbade the touching of them; much more, then, may we think now in our estimation, that the feeding of other men's souls, the satisfying of our own consciences, together with the consciences of other men, and the healing of men's superst.i.tion and spiritual leprosy, are causes sufficient to break the law of the ceremonies and of the cross, which are not G.o.d's but men's," saith Parker.(79) 2. As touching submission or subjection, we say with Dr Field,(80) _that subjection is generally and absolutely required where obedience is not,_ and even when our consciences suffer us not to obey, yet still we submit and subject ourselves, and neither do nor shall (I trust) show any the least contempt of authority.

_Sect._ 4. Secondly, It is replied, that our Christian liberty is not taken away when practice is restrained, because conscience is still left free. "The Christian liberty (saith Paybody(81)), is not taken away by the necessity of doing a thing indifferent, or not doing, but only by that necessity which takes away the opinion or persuasion of its indifferency,"

So saith Dr Burges,(82) "That the ceremonies in question are ordained to be used necessarily, though the judgment concerning them, and immediate conscience to G.o.d, be left free." _Ans._ 1. Who doubts of this, that liberty of practice may be restrained in the use of things which are in themselves indifferent? But, yet, if the bare authority of an ecclesiastical law, without any other reason than the will and pleasure of men, be made to restrain practice, then is Christian liberty taken away.

Junius saith,(83) that _externum opus ligatur_ from the use of things indifferent, when the conscience is not bound; but in that same place he showeth, that the outward action is bound and restrained only _quo usque circ.u.mstantiae ob quas necessitas imperata est, se extendunt_. So that it is not the authority of an ecclesiastical law, but the occasion and ground of it, which adstricts the practice when the conscience is left free. 2.

When the authority of the church's const.i.tution is obtruded to bind and restrain the practice of Christians in the use of things indifferent, they are bereaved of their liberty, as well as if an opinion of necessity were borne in upon their consciences. Therefore we see when the Apostle, 1 Cor.

vii., gives liberty of marriage, he doth not only leave the conscience free in its judgment of the lawfulness of marriage, but also give liberty of practice to marry or not to marry. And Col. ii. 21, when he giveth instances of such human ordinances as take away Christian liberty, he saith not, _you must think that you may not touch_, &c., but "touch not,"

&c., telling us, that when the practice is restrained from touching, tasting, handling, by the ordinances of men, then is Christian liberty spoiled, though the conscience be left free. Camero, speaking of the servitude which is opposed to Christian liberty, saith,(84) that it is either _animi servitus_, or _corporis servitus_. Then if the outward man be brought in bondage, this makes up spiritual thraldom, though there be no more. But, 3. The ceremonies are imposed with an opinion of necessity upon the conscience itself, for proof whereof I proceed to the next point.

CHAPTER IV.

THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY OUR CHRISTIAN LIBERTY PROVED BY A SECOND REASON, NAMELY, BECAUSE CONSCIENCE ITSELF IS BOUND AND ADSTRICTED.

_Sect._ 1. Bishop Lindsey hath told us,(85) that the will of the law must be the rule of our conscience, so that conscience may not judge other ways than the law determines. Bishop Spotswood will have the sentence of superiors to direct the conscience,(86) and will have us to esteem that to be best and most seemly which seemeth so to them. Bishop Andrews, speaking of ceremonies,(87) not only will have every person inviolably to observe the rites and customs of his own church, but also will have the ordinances about those rites to be urged under pain of the anathema. I know not what the binding of the conscience is, if this be not it: _Apostolus gemendi partes relinquit, non cogendi auctoritatem tribuit ministris quibus plebs non auscultat_.(88) And shall they who call themselves the apostles'

successors, compel, constrain and enthral, the consciences of the people of G.o.d? Charles V., as popish as he was, did promise to the Protestants,(89) _Nullam vim ipsorum conscientiis illatum iri_. And shall a popish prince speak more reasonable than protestant prelates? But to make it yet more and plentifully to appear how miserably our opposites would enthral our consciences, I will here show, 1. What the binding of the conscience is. 2. How the laws of the church may be said to bind. 3.

What is the judgment of formalists touching the binding-power of ecclesiastical laws.

_Sect._ 2. Concerning the first of these we will hear what Dr Field saith:(90) "To bind the conscience (saith he) is to bind the soul and spirit of man, with the fear of such punishments (to be inflicted by him that so bindeth) as the conscience feareth; that is, as men fear, though none but G.o.d and themselves be privy to their doings; now these are only such as G.o.d only inflicteth," &c. This description is too imperfect, and deserves to be corrected. To bind the conscience is _illam auctoritatem habere, ut conscientia illi subjicere sese debeat, ita ut peccatum sit, si contra illam quidquam fiat_, saith Ames.(91) "The binder (saith Perkins(92)) is that thing whatsoever which hath power and authority over conscience to order it. To bind is to urge, cause, and constrain it in every action, either to accuse for sin, or to excuse for well-doing; or to say, this may be done, or it may not be done." "To bind the conscience (saith Alsted(93)) _est illam urgere et adigere, ut vel excuset et accuset, vel indicet quid fieri aut non fieri possit_." Upon these descriptions, which have more truth and reason in them, I infer that whatsoever urges, or forces conscience to a.s.sent to a thing as lawful, or a thing that ought to be done, or dissent from a thing as unlawful, or a thing which ought not to be done, that is a binder of conscience, though it did not bind the spirit of a man with the fear of such punishments as G.o.d alone inflicteth. For secluding all respect of punishment, and not considering what will follow, the very obliging of the conscience for the time, _ad a.s.sensum_, is a binding of it.(94)

_Sect._ 3. Touching the second, it is certain that human laws, as they come from men, and in respect of any force or authority which men can give them, have no power to bind the conscience. _Neque enim c.u.m hominibus, sed c.u.m uno Deo negotium est conscientis nostris_, saith Calvin.(95) Over our souls and consciences, _nemini quicquam juris nisi Deo_, saith Tilen.(96) From Jerome's distinction, that a king _praeest nolentibus_ but a bishop _volentibus_, Marcus Antonius de Dominis well concludeth: _Volentibus gregi praeesso, excludit omnem jurisdictionem et potestatem imperativam ac coactivam et solam significat directivam, ubi, viz., in libertate subditi est et parere et non parere, ita ut qui praeest nihil habeat quo nolentem parere adigat ad parendum._(97) This point he proveth in that chapter at length, where he disputeth both against temporal and spiritual coactive jurisdiction in the church. If it be demanded to what purpose serveth then the enacting of ecclesiastical laws, since they have not in them any power to bind the conscience, I answer, The use and end for which ecclesiastical laws do serve is, 1. For the plain discovery of such things as the law of G.o.d or nature do require of us, so that law which of itself hath power to bind, cometh from the priests and ministers of the Lord neither ??t???at?????? nor ????et????, but _declarative_, Mal. ii. 7. 2. For declaring to us what is fittest in such things as are, in their own nature, indifferent, and neither enforced by the law of G.o.d nor nature, and which part should be followed in these things as most convenient. The laws of the church, then, are appointed to let us see the necessity of the first kind of things, and what is expedient in the other kind of things, and therefore they are more properly called directions, instructions, admonitions, than laws. For I speak of ecclesiastical laws _qua tales_, that is, as they are the const.i.tutions of men who are set over us; thus considered, they have only _vim dirigendi et monendi_.(98) It is said of the apostles, that they were const.i.tuted _doctrinae Christi testes, non novae doctrinae legist tores_.(99) And the same may be said of all the ministers of the gospel, when discipline is taken in with doctrine. He is no nonconformist who holdeth _ecclesiam in terris agere partes oratoris, seu legati obsecrantis et suadentis_.(100) And we may hitherto apply that which Gerson, the chancellor of Paris, saith:(101) "The wisest and best among the guides of G.o.d's church had not so ill a meaning as to have all their const.i.tutions and ordinances taken for laws properly so named, much less strictly binding the conscience, but for threatenings, admonitions, counsels, and directions only, and when there groweth a general neglect, they seem to consent to the abolis.h.i.+ng of them again;" for seeing, _lex inst.i.tuitur, c.u.m promulgatur, vigorem habet, c.u.m moribus utentium approbatur._

_Sect._ 4. But as we have seen in what respect the laws of the church do not bind, let us now see how they may be said to bind. That which bindeth is not the authority of the church, nor any force which the church can give to her laws. It must be then somewhat else which maketh them able to bind, when they bind at all, and that is _ratio legis_, "the reason of the law," without which the law itself cannot bind, and which hath the chiefest and most princ.i.p.al power of binding. An ecclesiastical law, saith Junius,(102) d?ata??? _sive depositio, non vere lex est, sed_ d?at?p?s??

aut canon, ac proindedirigit quidem ut canon agentem voluntarie: non autem necessitate cogit, ut lex etiam involuntarium quod si forte ante accedit coactio, ea non est de natura canonis sed altunde pervenit. An ecclesiastical canon, saith Tilen,(103) _ducit volentem, non trahit nolentem: quod si accedat coactio, ea ecclesiastici canonis natura est prorsus aliena_, Calvin's judgment is,(104) that an ecclesiastical canon binds, when _manifestam utilitatem prae se fert_, and when either _tu prepon_ or _charitatis ratio_ doth require, that we impose a necessity on our liberty. It binds not, then, by its own authority in his mind. And what saith the canon law itself?(105) _Sed sciendum est quod ecclesiasticae prohibitiones proprias habent causas quibus cessantibus, cessant et ipsae._ Hence Junius saith,(106) that the law binds not _per se_, but only _propter ordinem charitatem, et cautionem scandali_. Hence Ames,(107) _quamvis ad justas leges humanas, justo modo observandas, obligentur homines in conscientiis suis a Deo; ipsae tamen leges humanae, qua sunt leges hominum, non obligant conscientiam._ Hence Alsted:(108) "Laws made by men of things indifferent, whether they be civil or ecclesiastical, do bind the conscience, in so far as they agree with G.o.d's word, serve for the public good, maintain order, and finally, take not away liberty of conscience." Hence the professors of Leyden say,(109) that laws bind not _primo et per se, sed secundario, et per accidens_; that is,(110) _quatenus in illis lex aliqua Dei violator_. Hence I may compare the const.i.tutions of the church with _responsa juris consultorum_ among the Romans, which obliged no man, _nisi ex aequo et bono_, saith Daneus.(111) Hence it may be said, that the laws of the church do not only bind _scandali et contemptus ratione_, as Hospinian,(112) and in case _libertas fiat c.u.m scandalo_, as Parcus;(113) for it were scandal not to give obedience to the laws of the church, when they prescribe things necessary or expedient for the eschewing of scandal, and it were contempt to refuse obedience to them, when we are not certainly persuaded of the unlawfulness or inexpediency of the things prescribed.

_Sect._ 5. But out of the case of scandal or contempt, divines teach that conscience is not bound by the canon of the church made about order and policy. _Extra casum scandali et destinatae rebellionis, propter commune bonum, non peccat qui contra const.i.tutiones istas fecerit_, saith Junius.(114) "If a law (saith Perkins)(115) concerning some external right or thing indifferent, be at some time or upon some occasion omitted, no offence given, nor contempt showed to ecclesiastical authority, there is no breach made in the conscience." Alsted's rule is,(116) _Leges humanae non obligant quando omitti possunt sine impedimento finis ob quem feruntur sine scandalo aliorum, et sine contemptu legislatoris._ And Tilen teacheth us,(117) that when the church hath determined the mutable circ.u.mstances, in the wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d, for public edification, _privatorum conscientiis liberum est quandoque ista omittere, modo offendicula vitentur, nihil que ex contemptu ecclesiae ac ministerii publici petulanti ?a???t??a vel ?e??d???a facere videantur._

_Sect._ 6. We deny not, then, that the church's canons about rites, which serve for public order and edification, do bind. We say only, that it is not the authority of the church framing the canon that binds, but the matter of the canon chiefly warranted by G.o.d's word.(118) _Scimus enim quaecunque ad decorum et ordinem pertinent, non habenda esse pro humanis placitas, quia divinitus approbantur._ Therefore we think concerning such canons, "that they are necessary to be observed so far forth only, as the keeping of them maintaineth decent order, and preventeth open offence."(119)

_Sect._ 7. If any say that I derogate much from the authority of the church when I do nothing which she prescribeth, except I see it lawful and expedient, because I should do this much for the exhortation and admonition of a brother. _Ans._ 1. I give far more reverence to the direction of the church than to the admonition of a brother, because that is ministerial, this fraternal, that comes from authority, this only from charity, that is public, this private, that is given by many, this by one.

And, finally, the church hath a calling to direct me in some things wherein a brother hath not. 2. If it be still instanced that, in the point of obedience, I do no more for the church than for any brother, because I am bound to do that which is made evident to be lawful and expedient, though a private Christian do but exhort me to it, or whether I be exhorted to it or not. For answer to this I say, that I will obey the directions of the church in many things rather than the directions of a brother; for in two things which are in themselves indifferent, and none of them inexpedient, I will do that which the church requireth, though my brother should exhort me to the contrary. But always I hold me at this sure ground, that I am never bound in conscience to obey the ordinances of the church, except they be evidently lawful and expedient. This is that, _sine quo non obligant_, and also that which doth chiefly bind, though it be not the only thing which bindeth. Now, for making the matter more plain, we must consider that the const.i.tutions of the church are either lawful or unlawful. If unlawful, they bind not at all; if lawful, they are either concerning things necessary, as Acts xv. 28, and then the necessity of the things doth bind, whether the church ordain them or not; or else concerning things indifferent, as when the church ordaineth, that in great towns there shall be sermon on such a day of the week, and public prayers every day at such an hour. Here it is not the bare authority of the church that bindeth, without respect to the lawfulness or expediency of the thing itself which is ordained (else we were bound to do every thing which the church ordains, were it never so unlawful, for _quod compet.i.t alicui qua tali, compet.i.t omni tali_: we behold the authority of the church making laws, as well in unlawful ordinances as in lawful), nor yet is it the lawfulness or expediency of the thing itself, without respect to the ordinance of the church (for possibly other times and diets were as lawful, and expedient too, for such exercises, as those ordained by the church); but it is the authority of the church prescribing a thing lawful or expedient. In such a case, then neither doth the authority of the church bind, except the thing be lawful and expedient, nor doth the lawfulness and expediency of the thing bind, except the church ordain it; but both these jointly do bind.

_Sect._ 8. I come now to examine what is the judgment of formalists touching the binding of the conscience by ecclesiastical laws. Dr Field saith, that the question should not be proposed, whether human laws do bind the conscience, but "whether binding the outward man to the performance of outward things by force and fear of outward punishment to be inflicted by men, the non-performance of such things, or the non-performance of them with such affections as were fit, be not a sin against G.o.d, of which the conscience will accuse us,"(120) &c. Unto this question thus proposed and understood of human laws, and where no more is considered as giving them power to bind, but only the authority of those who make them; some formalists do give (as I will show), and all of them (being well advised) must give an affirmative answer. And, I pray, what did Bellarmine say more,(121) when, expressing how conscience is subject to human authority, he taught that conscience belongeth _ad humanum forum, quatenus h.o.m.o ex praecepto ita obligator ad opus externum faciendum, ut si non faciat, judicat ipse in conscientia sua se male facere, et hoc sufficit ad conscientiam obligandam?_ But to proceed particularly.

_Sect._ 9. I begin with Field himself, whose resolution of the question proposed is,(122) that we are bound only to give obedience to such human laws as prescribe things profitable, not for that human laws have power to bind the conscience, but because the things they command are of that nature, that not to perform them is contrary to justice or charity.

Whereupon he concludeth out of Stapleton, that we are bound to the performance of things prescribed by human laws, in such sort, that the non-performance of them is sin, not _ex sola legislatoris voluntate, sed ex ipsa legum utilitate_. Let all such as be of this man's mind not blame us for denying of obedience to the const.i.tutions about the ceremonies, since we find (for certain) no utility, but, by the contrary, much inconveniency in them. If they say that we must think those laws to be profitable or convenient, which they, who are set over us, think to be so, then they know not what they say. For, exempting conscience from being bound by human laws in one thing, they would have it bound by them in another thing. If conscience must needs judge that to be profitable, which seemeth so to those that are set over us, then, sure, is power given to them for binding the conscience so straitly, that it may not judge otherwise than they judge, and force is placed in their bare authority for necessitating and constraining the a.s.senting judgment of conscience.

_Sect._ 10. Some man perhaps will say that we are bound to obey the laws made about the ceremonies, though not for the sole will of the law-makers, nor yet for any utility of the laws themselves, yet for this reason, that scandal and contempt would follow in case we do otherwise. _Ans._ We know that human laws do bind in the case of scandal or contempt. But that nonconformity is neither scandal nor contempt, Parker hath made it most evident.(123) For, as touching contempt, he showeth out of fathers, councils, canon law, schoolmen, and modern divines, that _non obedire_ is not contempt, but _nolle obedire_, or _superbiendo repugnare_. Yea, out of Formalists themselves, he showeth the difference betwixt subjection and obedience. Thereafter he pleadeth thus, and we with him: "What signs see men in us of pride and contempt? What be our _cetera opera_ that bewray such an humour? Let it be named wherein we go not two miles, when we are commanded to go but one, yea, wherein we go not as many miles as any shoe of the preparation of the gospel will bear us. What payment, what pain, what labour, what taxation made us ever to murmur? Survey our charges where we have laboured, if they be not found to be of the faithfulest subjects that be in the Lord, we deserve no favour. Nay, there is wherein we stretch our consciences to the utmost to conform and to obey in divers matters. Are we refractory in other things, as Balaam's a.s.s said to his master? Have I used to serve thee so at other times?" And as touching scandal, he showeth first, that by our not conforming, we do not scandalise superiors, but edify them, although it may be we displease them, of which we are sorry, even as Joab displeased David when he contested against the numbering of the people, yet did he not scandalise David, but edify him. And, secondly, whereas it might be alleged, that nonconformity doth scandalise the people, before whom it soundeth as it were an alarm of disobedience, we reply with him, "Daniel will not omit the ceremony of looking out at the window towards Jerusalem. Mordecai omitteth the ceremony of bowing the knee to Haman; Christ will not use the ceremony of was.h.i.+ng hands, though a tradition of the elders and governors of the church then being. The authority of the magistrate was violated by these, and an incitement to disobedience was in their ceremonial breach, as much as there is now in ours."

_Sect._ 11. But some of our opposites go about to derive the obligatory power of the church's laws, not so much from the utility of the laws themselves, or from any scandal which should follow upon the not obeying of them, as from the church's own authority which maketh them. Camero speaketh of two sorts of ecclesiastical laws:(124) 1. Such as prescribe things frivolous or unjust, meaning such things as (though they neither detract anything from the glory of G.o.d, nor cause any damage to our neighbour, yet) bring some detriment to ourselves. 2. Such as prescribe things belonging to order and shunning of scandal. Touching the former, he teacheth rightly, that conscience is never bound to the obedience of such laws, except only in the case of scandal and contempt, and that if at any time such laws may be neglected and not observed, without scandal given, or contempt shown, no man's conscience is holden with them. But touching the other sort of the church's laws, he saith, that they bind the conscience indirectly, not only _respectu materiae praecepti_ (which doth not at all oblige, except in respect of the end whereunto it is referred, namely, the conserving of order, and the not giving of scandal), but also _respectu praecipientis_, because G.o.d will not have those who are set over us in the church to be contemned. He foresaw (belike), that whereas it is pretended in behalf of those ecclesiastical laws which enjoin the controverted ceremonies, that the things which they prescribe pertain to order and to the shunning of scandal, and so bind the conscience indirectly in respect of the end, one might answer, I am persuaded upon evident grounds that those prescribed ceremonies pertain not to order, and to the shunning of scandal, but to misorder, and to the giving of scandal; therefore he laboured to bind such an one's conscience with another tie, which is the authority of the law-makers. And this authority he would have one to take as ground enough to believe, that that which the church prescribeth doth belong to order and the shunning of scandal, and in that persuasion to do it. But, 1. How doth this doctrine differ from that which himself setteth down as the opinion of Papists,(125) _Posse los qui praesunt ecclesiae, cogere fideles ut id credant vel faciant, quod ipsi judicaverint?_ 2. It is well observed by our writers,(126) that the apostles never made things indifferent to be necessary, except only in respect of scandal, and that out of the case of scandal they still left the consciences of men free, which observation they gather from Acts XV.

and 1 Cor. x. Camero himself noteth,(127) that though the church prescribed abstinence from things sacrificed to idols, yet the Apostle would not have the faithful to abstain for conscience' sake: why then holdeth he, that beside the end of shunning scandal and keeping order, conscience is bound even by the church's own authority? 3. As for the reason whereby he would prove that the church's laws do bind, even _respectu praecipientis_, his form of speaking is very bad. _Deus_ (saith he) _non vult contemni praepositos ecclesiae, nisi justa et necessaria de causa._ Where falsely he supposeth, not only that there may occur a just and necessary cause of contemning those whom G.o.d hath set over us in the church, but, also, that the not obeying of them inferreth the contemning of them. Now, the not obeying of their laws inferreth not the contemning of themselves (which were not allowable), but only the contemning of their laws. And as Jerome,(128) speaketh of Daniel, _Et nunc Daniel regis jussa contemnens_, &c.; so we say of all superiors in general, that we may sometimes have just reasons for contemning their commandments, yet are we not to contemn, but to honour themselves. But, 4. Let us take Camero's meaning to be, that G.o.d will not have us to refuse obedience unto those who are set over us in the church: none of our opposites dare say, that G.o.d will have us to obey those who are set over us in the church in any other things than such as may be done both lawfully and conveniently for the shunning of scandal; and if so, then the church's precept cannot bind, except as it is grounded upon such or such reasons.

_Sect._ 12. Bishop Spotswood and Bishop Lindsey, in those words which I have heretofore alleged out of them, are likewise of opinion, that the sole will and authority of the church doth bind the conscience to obedience. Spotswood will have us, without more ado, to esteem that to be best and most seemly, which seemeth so in the eye of public authority. Is not this to bind the conscience by the church's bare will and authority, when I must needs constrain the judgment of my conscience to be conformed to the church's judgment, having no other reason to move me hereunto but the sole will and authority of the church? Further, he will have us to obey even such things as authority prescribeth not rightly (that is, such rites as do not set forward G.o.dliness), and that because they have the force of a const.i.tution. He saith that we should be directed by the sentence of superiors, and take it as a sufficient ground to our consciences for obeying. Bellarmine speaketh more reasonably:(129) _Legesae human non obligant sub pna mortis aeternae, nisi quatenus violatione legis humanae offenditur Deus._ Lindsey thinketh that the will of the law must be the rule of our consciences; he saith not the _reason_ of the law, but the _will_ of the law. And when we talk with the chief of our opposites, they would bind us by sole authority, because they cannot do it by any reason.

But we answer out of Pareus,(130) that the particular laws of the church bind not _per se_, or _propter ipsum speciale mandatum ecclesiae. Ratio: quia ecclesia res adiaphoras non jubet facere vel omittere propter suum mandatum, sed tantum propter justas mandandi causas, ut sunt conservatio ordinis, vitatio scandali: quae quamdiu non violantur, conscientias liberas relinquit._

_Sect._ 13. Thus we have found what power they give to their canons about the ceremonies for binding of our consciences, and that a necessity not of practice only upon the outward man, but of opinion also upon the conscience is imposed by the sole will of the law-makers. Wherefore, we pray G.o.d to open their eyes, that they may see their ceremonial laws to be substantial tyrannies over the consciences of G.o.d's people. And for ourselves, we stand to the judgment of sounder divines, and we hold with Luther,(131) that _unum Dominum habemus qui animas nostras gubernat._ With Hemmingius,(132) that we are free _ab omnibus humanis ritibus, quantum quidem ad conscientiam attinet._ With the Professors of Leyden,(133) that this is a part of the liberty of all the faithful, that in things pertaining to G.o.d's wors.h.i.+p, _ab omni traditionum humanarum jugo liberas habeant conscientias, c.u.m solius Dei sit, res ad religionem pertinentes praescribere_.

CHAPTER V.

THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY CHRISTIAN LIBERTY, PROVED BY A THIRD REASON, VIZ., BECAUSE THEY ARE URGED UPON SUCH AS, IN THEIR CONSCIENCES, DO CONDEMN THEM.

_Sect._ 1. If Christian liberty be taken away, by adstricting conscience in any, much more by adstricting it in them who are fully persuaded of the unlawfulness of the thing enjoined; yet thus are we dealt with. Bishop Lindsay gives us to understand, that after the making and publication of an ecclesiastical canon, about things of this nature, albeit a man in his own private judgment think another thing more expedient than that which the canon prescribeth, yet in that case his conscience must be ruled by the will of the law, and not by his own judgment. And Bishop Spotswood, to such as object, that their conscience will not suffer them to obey, because they are persuaded that such things are not right, answereth; that the sentence of their superiors ought to direct them, and make their conscience yield to obedience. Their words I have before transcribed. By which it doth manifestly appear, that they would bear dominion over our consciences, not as lords only, by requiring the willing and ready a.s.sent of our consciences to those things which are urged upon us by their sole will and authority, but even as tyrants, not caring if they get so much as constrained obedience, and if by their authority they can compel conscience to that which is contrary to the p????f???a and full persuasion which it hath conceived.

_Sect._ 2. It will be said, that our consciences are in an error, and therefore ought to be corrected by the sentence of superiors, whose authority and will doth bind us to receive and embrace the ceremonies, though our consciences do condemn them. _Ans._ Giving, and not granting, that our consciences do err in condemning the ceremonies, yet, so long as they cannot be otherwise persuaded, the ceremonies ought not to be urged upon us; for if we be made to do that which our consciences do condemn, we are made to sin, Rom. xiv. 23. It is an audacious contempt, in Calvin's judgment,(134) to do anything _repugnante conscientia_. The learned Casuists teach us, that an erring conscience, though _non obligat_, yet _ligat_; though we be not obliged to do that which it prescribeth, yet are we bound not to do that which it condemneth. _Quicquid fit repugnante et reclamante conscientia, peccatum est, etiamsi repugnantia ista gravem errorem includat_, saith Alsted.(135) _Conscientia erronca obligat, sic intelligendo, quod faciens contra peccet_, saith Hemmingius.(136) This holds ever true of an erring conscience about matters of fact, and especially about things indifferent. If any say, that hereby a necessity of sinning is laid on them whose consciences are in an error, I answer, that so long as a man keeps an erroneous conscience, a necessity of sinning lies on him, and that through his own fault. This necessity ariseth from this supposition, that he retain his erring conscience, and so is not absolute, because he should inform his conscience rightly, so that he may both do that which he ought to do, and do it so from the approbation of his conscience. If it be said again, What should be done to them who have not laid down the error of conscience, but do still retain the same? I answer, _eligatur id quod tutius et melius est_.(137) If therefore the error of conscience be about weighty and necessary matters, then it is better to urge men to the doing of a necessary duty in the service of G.o.d, than to permit them to neglect the same, because their erring conscience disapproveth it; for example, it is better to urge a profane man to come and hear G.o.d's word than to suffer him to neglect the hearing of the same, because his conscience alloweth him not to hear. But if the error of conscience be about unnecessary things, or such as are in themselves indifferent, then it is _pars tutior_, the surest and safest part not to urge men to do that which in their consciences they condemn.

Wherefore, since the ceremonies are not among the number of such necessary things as may not be omitted without the peril of salvation, the invincible disallowance of our consciences should make our opposites not press them upon us, because by practising them we could not but sin, in that our consciences judge them unlawful. If any of our weak brethren think that he must and should abstain from the eating of flesh upon some certain day, though this thing be in itself indifferent, and not necessary, yet, saith Baldwin,(138) "he who is thus persuaded in his conscience, if he should do the contrary, sinneth."

_Sect._ 3. Conscience, then, though erring, doth ever bind in such sort, that he who doth against his conscience sinneth against G.o.d. Which is also the doctrine of Thomas.(139) But, without any more ado, it is sufficiently confirmed from Scripture. For, was not their conscience in an error who thought they might not lawfully eat all sorts of meat? Yet the Apostle showeth that their conscience, as erring as it was, did so bind, that they were d.a.m.ned if they should eat such meat as they judged to be unclean, Rom. xiv. 14, 23. The reason wherefore an erring conscience bindeth in this kind is, _quoniam agens_, &c.(140) "Because he who doth any thing against his conscience doth it against the will of G.o.d, though not materially and truly, yet formally and by way of interpretation, forsomuch as that which conscience counselleth or prescribeth, it counselleth it under the respect and account of the will of G.o.d. He who reproacheth some private man, taking him to be the king, is thought to have hurt not the private man, but the king himself. So he that contemneth his conscience contemneth G.o.d himself, because that which conscience counselleth or adviseth is taken to be G.o.d's will." If I go with certain men upon such a course as I judge and esteem to be a treasonable conspiracy against the king (though it be not so indeed), would not his Majesty (if he knew so much), and might he not, justly condemn me as a wicked traitor? But how much more will the King of kings condemn me if I practice the ceremonies which I judge in my conscience to be contrary to the will of G.o.d, and to rob him of his royal prerogative?

CHAPTER VI.

THAT THE CEREMONIES TAKE AWAY CHRISTIAN LIBERTY PROVED BY A FOURTH REASON, VIZ., BECAUSE THEY ARE PRESSED UPON US BY NAKED WILL AND AUTHORITY, WITHOUT GIVING ANY REASON TO SATISFY OUR CONSCIENCES.