Life and Times of Washington Part 10

SIR--I find myself just able to hold the pen during a few minutes, and take this opportunity of expressing my sincere grief for having done, written, or said, any thing disagreeable to your excellency. My career will soon be over; therefore, justice and truth prompt me to declare my last sentiments. You are, in my eyes, the great and good man. May you long enjoy the love, veneration, and esteem of these States, whose liberties you have a.s.serted by your virtues. I am, with the greatest respect, sir,

Your excellency's most obedient humble servant, THS. CONWAY.

7. Footnote: Gordon says: "May 13, 1778. General Burgoyne landed at Portsmouth. On his arrival at London, he soon discovered that he was no longer an object of court favor. He was refused admission to the royal presence; and from thence experienced all those marks of being in disgrace, which are so well understood, and so quickly observed by the retainers and followers of courts."

8. Footnote: As early as the month of April, 1776, Turgot had said to the ministers of Louis XVI--"The supposition of the absolute separation between Great Britain and her Colonies seems to me infinitely probable.

This will be the result of it; when the independence of the Colonies shall be entire and recognized by the English themselves, a total revolution will follow in the political and commercial relations between Europe and America; and I firmly believe that every other mother-country will be forced to abandon all empire over her Colonies, and to leave an entire freedom of commerce with all nations, to content herself with partaking with others in the advantages of a free trade, and with preserving the old ties of friends.h.i.+p and fraternity with her former colonists. If this is an evil, I believe that there exists no remedy or means of hindering it; that the only course to pursue is to submit to the inevitable necessity, and console ourselves as best we may under it.

I must also observe, that there will be a very great danger to all such powers as obstinately attempt to resist this course of events; that after ruining themselves by efforts above their means, they will still see their Colonies equally escape from them, and become their bitter enemies, instead of remaining their allies." Memoire de M. Turgot, a l'occasion du Memoire remis par M. le Compte de Vergennes sur la maniere dont la France at l'Espagne doivent envisager les suites de la querelle entre la Grande Bretagne et ses Colonies. In "Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe pendant les Regnes to Louis XV. et de Louis XVI."

Par L.P. Segue l'aine.

9. Footnote: The commissioners published their final manifesto and proclamation to the Americans on the 3d of October, and on the 10th.

Congress issued a cautionary declaration in reply. No overtures were made to the commissioners from any quarter, and not long after they embarked for England. Thacher, in his "Military Journal," states that "Governor Johnstone, one of the commissioners, with inexcusable effrontery, offered a bribe to Mr. Reed, a member of Congress. In an interview with Mrs. Ferguson at Philadelphia, whose husband was a Royalist, he desired she would mention to Mr. Reed, that if he would engage his interest to promote the object of their commission, he might have any office in the Colonies in the gift of his Britannic majesty, and ten thousand pounds in hand. Having solicited an interview with Mr.

Reed, Mrs. Ferguson made her communication. Spurning the idea of being purchased, he replied that he was not worth purchasing, but such as he was, the King of Great Britain was not rich enough to do it."

10. Footnote: They alleged that their horses had been disabled, and the clothing embezzled.

CHAPTER XIV

MONMOUTH. 1778.

For prosecuting the campaign of 1778 Was.h.i.+ngton had not been provided with an adequate force. The committee of Congress who visited the army at Valley Forge had agreed that the army should consist of about 40,000 men, besides artillery and horse. In May (1778) the army, including the detachments at different places, was found to amount only to 15,000, with little prospect of increase. At Valley Forge Was.h.i.+ngton had 11,800.

The British army at this time numbered 33,000. With such odds the plan of operations for this season must necessarily be defensive.

From the position which Was.h.i.+ngton had taken at Valley Forge, and from the activity and vigilance of his patrols, the British army in Philadelphia was straitened for forage and fresh provisions. A considerable number of the people of Pennsylvania were well affected to the British cause and desirous of supplying the troops, while many more were willing to carry victuals to Philadelphia, where they found a ready market and payment in gold or silver, whereas the army at Valley Forge could pay only in paper money of uncertain value. But it was not easy to reach Philadelphia nor safe to attempt it, for the American parties often intercepted and took the provisions without payment and not unfrequently chastised those engaged. The first operations on the part of the British, therefore, in the campaign of 1778, were undertaken in order to procure supplies for the army. About the middle of March a strong detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Mawhood, made a foraging excursion for six or seven days into Jersey, surprised and defeated the American parties at Hanc.o.c.k's and Quinton's bridges on Always creek, which falls into the Delaware to the south of Reedy Island, killed or took fifty or sixty of the militia prisoners, and after a successful expedition returned to Philadelphia with little loss.

A corps of Pennsylvania militia, daily varying in number, sometimes not exceeding fifty, sometimes amounting to 600, under General Lacey, had taken post at a place called Crooked Billet, about seventeen miles from Philadelphia on the road to New York, for the purpose of intercepting the country people who attempted to carry provisions to the British army. Early on the morning of the 4th of May, Colonel Abercrombie and Major Simcoe, with a strong detachment, attempted to surprise this party, but Lacey escaped with little loss, except his baggage, which fell into the hands of the enemy.

On the 7th of May the British undertook an expedition against the galleys and other s.h.i.+pping which had escaped up the Delaware after the reduction of Mud Island, and destroyed upward of forty vessels and some stores and provisions. The undisputed superiority of the British naval force and the consequent command of the Delaware gave them great facilities in directing a suitable armament against any particular point, and the movements of the militia, on whom Congress chiefly depended for repelling sudden predatory incursions and for guarding the roads to Philadelphia, were often tardy and inefficient. The roads were ill guarded, and the British frequently accomplished their foraging and returned to camp before an adequate force could be a.s.sembled to oppose them.

To remedy these evils--to annoy the rear of the British troops in case they evacuated Philadelphia, which it was now suspected they intended to do, and also to form an advanced guard of the main army--Lafayette, with upward of 2,000 chosen men and six pieces of artillery, was ordered to the east of the Schuylkill, and took post on Barren Hill, seven or eight miles in advance of the army at Valley Forge. Sir William Howe immediately got notice of his position and formed a plan to surprise and cut him off. For that purpose a detachment of 5,000 of the best troops of the British army, under General Grant, marched from Philadelphia on the night of the 20th of May and took the road which runs along the Delaware and consequently does not lead directly to Barren Hill. But after advancing a few miles the detachment turned to the left, and proceeding by White Marsh pa.s.sed at no great distance from Lafayette's left flank and about sunrise reached a point in his rear where two roads diverged, one leading to the camp of the marquis, the other to Matson's ford, each about a mile distant. There General Grant's detachment was first observed by the Americans, and the British perceived by the rapid movements of some hostile hors.e.m.e.n that they were seen. Both Lafayette's camp and the road leading from it to Matson's ford were concealed from the British troops by intervening woods and high grounds. General Grant spent some time in making dispositions for the intended attack. That interval was actively improved by Lafayette, who, although not apprised of the full extent of his danger, acted with prompt.i.tude and decision.

He marched rapidly to Matson's ford, from which he was somewhat more distant than the British detachment, and reached it while General Grant was advancing against Barren Hill in the belief that Lafayette was still there. The Americans hurried through the ford leaving their artillery behind, but on discovering they were not closely pursued some of them returned and dragged the field pieces across the river; a small party was also sent into the woods to r.e.t.a.r.d the progress of the British advanced guard, if it should approach while the artillery was in the ford.

On finding the camp at Barren Hill deserted General Grant immediately pursued in the track of the retreating enemy toward Matson's ford. His advanced guard overtook some of the small American party, which had been sent back to cover the pa.s.sage of the artillery, before they could recross the river and took or killed a few of them, but on reaching the ford General Grant found Lafayette so advantageously posted on the rising ground on the opposite bank and his artillery so judiciously placed that it was deemed unadvisable to attack him. Thus the attempt against Lafayette failed, although the plan was well concerted and on the very point of success. In the British army sanguine expectations of the favorable issue of the enterprise were entertained, and in order to insure a happy result a large detachment, under General Grey, in the course of the night took post at a ford of the Schuylkill, two or three miles in front of Lafayette's right flank, to intercept him if he should attempt to escape in that direction, while the main body of the army advanced to Chestnut Hill to support the attack, but on the failure of the enterprise the whole returned to Philadelphia.

General Grant's detachment was seen by Was.h.i.+ngton from the camp at Valley Forge about the time it was discovered by the troops at Barren Hill, alarm guns were fired by his order to warn Lafayette of his danger, and the whole army was drawn out to be in readiness to act as circ.u.mstances might require. The escape of the detachment was the cause of much joy and congratulation in the American and of disappointment and chagrin in the British army.

That a strong detachment of hostile troops should pa.s.s at a small distance from Lafayette's flank and gain his rear un.o.bserved seems to argue a want of due vigilance on the part of that officer, but a detachment of the Pennsylvania militia had been posted at a little distance on his left and he relied on them for watching the roads in that quarter. The militia, however, had quitted their station without informing him of their movement, and consequently his left flank and the roads about White Marsh remained unguarded.

This was the last enterprise attempted by Sir William Howe. Soon after he resigned the command of the army. So far back as the month of October in the preceding year he had requested to be relieved from the painful service in which he was engaged. On the 14th of April, 1778, he received the King's permission to resign, but at the same time he was directed, while he continued in command, to embrace every opportunity of putting an end to the war by a due employment of the force under his orders. In the beginning of June after having received, in a triumphal procession and festival, a testimony of the approbation and esteem of the army he sailed for England, leaving the troops under the care of Sir Henry Clinton as his successor.

Sir William Howe has been much blamed for inactivity and for not overwhelming the Americans, but he was at least as successful as any other general employed in the course of the war. He was cautious and sparing of the lives of his men. In his operations he discovered a respectable share of military science, and he met with no great reverses. They who blame him for want of energy may look to the history of Generals Burgoyne and Cornwallis for the fate of more enterprising leaders in America.

About the time when Howe resigned the command of the army the British government ordered the evacuation of Philadelphia. While the British had an undisputed naval superiority Philadelphia was in some respects a good military station. Although in all the States a decided majority of the people gave their support to Congress, yet in every province south of New England there was a considerable minority friendly to the claims of the mother country. The occupation of Philadelphia, the princ.i.p.al city of the confederation, encouraged the latter cla.s.s of the inhabitants, and the army there formed a point round which they might rally. But Philadelphia is more than 100 miles up the Delaware, and as Howe had been unable to drive Was.h.i.+ngton from the field he had found some difficulty in subsisting his army in that city, even when the British s.h.i.+ps had the full command of the sea and could force their way up the great rivers; but when the empire of the ocean was about to be disputed by the French Philadelphia became a hazardous post on account of the difficulty and uncertainty of procuring provisions, receiving communications, or sending aid to such places as might be attacked. It was accordingly resolved to abandon that city, and after s.h.i.+pping his cavalry, formed of the German troops and American Loyalists, his provision train and heavy baggage, on the few vessels that were in the river, Clinton had to march the remainder of his army through the Jerseys to New York, where the communication with the ocean is more easy.

The preparations for this movement could not be so secretly made as to escape the notice of the Americans, and to be in readiness for it was one reason of detaching Lafayette to Barren Hill, where he had been exposed to so much danger. Was.h.i.+ngton called in his detachments and pressed the State governments to hasten the march of their new levies in order that he might be enabled to act offensively; but the new levies arrived slowly, and in some instances the State Legislatures were deliberating on the means of raising them at the time when they should have been in the field.

Although Was.h.i.+ngton was satisfied of the intention of the British Commander-in-Chief to evacuate Philadelphia yet it was uncertain in what way he would accomplish his purpose, but the opinion that he intended to march through the Jerseys to New York gained ground in the American camp; and in this persuasion Was.h.i.+ngton detached General Maxwell with the Jersey brigade across the Delaware to cooperate with General d.i.c.kinson, who was a.s.sembling the Jersey militia, in breaking down the bridges, felling trees across the roads, and impeding and hara.s.sing the British troops in their retreat, but with orders to be on his guard against a sudden attack.

Was.h.i.+ngton summoned a council of war to deliberate on the measures to be pursued in that emergency. It was unanimously resolved not to molest the British army in pa.s.sing the Delaware, but with respect to subsequent operations there was much difference of opinion in the council. General Lee, who had lately joined the army after his exchange, was decidedly against risking either a general or partial engagement. The British army he estimated at 10,000 men fit for duty, exclusive of officers, while the American army did not amount to more than 11,800; he was, therefore, of opinion that with so near an equality of force it would be criminal to hazard a battle. He relied much on the imposing att.i.tude in which their late foreign alliance placed them, and maintained that nothing but a defeat of the army could now endanger their independence. Almost all the foreign officers agreed in opinion with General Lee, and among the American generals only Wayne and Cadwalader were decidedly in favor of attacking the enemy. Under these circ.u.mstances Was.h.i.+ngton, although strongly inclined to fight, found himself constrained to act with much circ.u.mspection.

Having made all the requisite preparations Sir Henry Clinton, early in the morning of the 18th of June (1778), led the British army to the confluence of the Delaware and Schuylkill, where boats and other vessels were ready to receive them, and so judicious were the arrangements made by Admiral Lord Howe that all the troops, with the baggage and artillery, were carried across the Delaware and safely landed on the Jersey side of the river before 10 in the forenoon. Many of the Loyalists of Philadelphia accompanied the army, carrying their effects along with them, and such of them as ventured to remain behind met with little indulgence from their irritated countrymen. Several of them were tried for their lives and two Quakers were executed. The Americans entered the city before the British rear guard had entirely left it.

There were two roads leading from Philadelphia to New York--the one running along the western bank of the Delaware to Trenton Ferry, and the other along the eastern bank to the same point. The British army had wisely crossed the river at the point where it was least exposed to molestation and entered on the last of these two roads. In marching through a difficult and hostile country Sir Henry Clinton prudently carried along with him a considerable quant.i.ty of baggage and a large supply of provisions, so that the progress of the army, thus heavily enc.u.mbered, was but slow. It proceeded leisurely through Huddersfield, Mount Holly, and Crosswick, and reached Allentown on the 24th (June, 1778), having in seven days marched less than forty miles. This slow progress made the Americans believe that Sir Henry Clinton wished to be attacked. General Maxwell, who was posted at Mount Holly, retired on his approach, and neither he nor General d.i.c.kinson was able to give him much molestation.

As the march of the British army till it pa.s.sed Crosswick was up the Delaware, and only at a small distance from that river, Was.h.i.+ngton, who left Valley Forge on the day that Sir Henry Clinton evacuated Philadelphia, found it necessary to take a circuitous route and pa.s.s the river higher up at Coryell's Ferry, where he crossed it on the 22d and took post at Hopewell on the high grounds in that vicinity, and remained during the 23d in that position.

From Allentown there were two roads to New York--one on the left, pa.s.sing through South Amboy to the North river; the other on the right, leading to Sandy Hook. The first of these was somewhat shorter but the river Raritan lay in the way and it might be difficult and dangerous to pa.s.s it in presence of a hostile force. Sir Henry Clinton, therefore, resolved to take the road to Sandy Hook by which the Raritan would be altogether avoided.

Although a great majority in the American council of war were averse to fighting, yet Was.h.i.+ngton was strongly inclined to attack the British army. He summoned the council of war a second time and again submitted the subject to their consideration, but they adhered to their former opinion, and Was.h.i.+ngton, still inclined to attack the enemy, determined to act on his own responsibility.

The Jersey militia and a brigade of Continentals, under Generals d.i.c.kinson and Maxwell, hovered on the left flank of the British army; General Cadwalader, with a Continental regiment and a few militia was in its rear, and Colonel Morgan, with his rifle regiment 600 strong, was on its right. These detachments were ordered to hara.s.s the enemy as much as possible.

As Sir Henry Clinton proceeded on the route toward Sandy Hook Was.h.i.+ngton strengthened his advanced guard till it amounted to 5,000 men. General Lee, from his rank, had a claim to the command of that force, but at first he declined it and Lafayette was appointed to that service. But General Lee perceiving the importance of the command solicited the appointment which he had at first declined, and was accordingly sent forward with a reinforcement, when, from seniority, the whole of the advanced guard became subject to his orders.

On the evening of the 27th (June, 1778) Sir Henry Clinton took a strong position on the high grounds about Freehold Court House, in the county of Monmouth. His right was posted in a small wood; his left was covered by a thick forest and a mora.s.s; he had a wood in front, also a marsh for a considerable s.p.a.ce toward his left, and he was within twelve miles of the high grounds at Middletown, after reaching which no attempt could be made upon him with any prospect of success. His position was una.s.sailable, but Was.h.i.+ngton resolved to attack his rear in the morning, as soon as it descended from the high grounds into the plain beyond them and gave orders accordingly to Lee, who was at Englishtown, three miles in the rear of the British army and as much in advance of the main body of the Americans.

By the strong parties on his flanks and rear Clinton was convinced that the hostile army was at hand, and suspecting that an attempt on his baggage was intended on the morning of the 28th he changed his order of march and put all the baggage under the care of General Knyphausen, who commanded the van division of his army, in order that the rear division, consisting of the flower of the troops under Cornwallis, might be unenc.u.mbered and ready to act as circ.u.mstances might require. Clinton remained with the rear division.

To avoid pressing on Knyphausen Cornwallis remained on his ground until about 8, and then descending from the heights of Freehold into an extensive plain took up his line of march in rear of the front division.

General Lee had made dispositions for executing orders given the preceding evening, and repeated in the morning, and soon after the British rear had moved from its ground prepared to attack it. General d.i.c.kinson had been directed to detach some of his best troops, to take such a position as to cooperate with him, and Morgan, with his riflemen, was ordered to act on the right flank.

Lee appeared on the heights of Freehold soon after Cornwallis had left them, and following the British into the plain ordered General Wayne to attack the rear of their covering party with sufficient vigor to check it, but not to press it so closely as either to force it up to the main body or to draw reinforcements to its aid. In the meantime he intended to gain the front of this party by a shorter road, and, intercepting its communication with the line, to bear it off before it could be a.s.sisted.

While in the execution of this design an officer in the suite of Was.h.i.+ngton came up to gain intelligence and Lee communicated to him his present object. Before he reached the point of destination, however, there was reason to believe that the British rear was much stronger than had been conjectured. The intelligence on this subject being contradictory, and the face of the country well calculated to conceal the truth, he deemed it advisable to ascertain the fact himself.

Sir Henry Clinton, soon after the rear division was in full march, received intelligence that an American column had appeared on his left flank. This, being a corps of militia, was soon dispersed and the march was continued. When his rear guard had descended from the heights he saw it followed by a strong corps, soon after which a cannonade was commenced upon it, and at the same time a respectable force showed itself on each of his flanks. Suspecting a design on his baggage he determined to attack the troops in his rear so vigorously as to compel a recall of those on his flanks, and for this purpose marched back his whole rear division. This movement was in progress as Lee advanced for the purpose of reconnoitering. He soon perceived his mistake respecting the force of the British rear, but still determined to engage on that ground although his judgment disapproved the measure--there being a mora.s.s immediately in his rear, which would necessarily impede the reinforcements which might be advancing to his aid and embarra.s.s his retreat should he be finally overpowered. This was about 10. While both armies were preparing for action General Scott (as stated by General Lee) mistook an oblique march of an American column for a retreat, and in the apprehension of being abandoned left his position and repa.s.sed the ravine in his rear.

Being himself of opinion that the ground was unfavorable Lee did not correct the error he ascribed to Scott but ordered the whole detachment to regain the heights. He was closely pressed and some slight skirmis.h.i.+ng ensued without much loss on either side.

As soon as the firing announced the commencement of the action the rear division of the army advanced rapidly to the support of the front. As they approached the scene of action, Was.h.i.+ngton, who had received no intelligence from Lee giving notice of his retreat, rode forward, and to his utter astonishment and mortification met the advanced corps retiring before the enemy without having made a single effort to maintain its ground. The troops he first saw neither understood the motives which had governed Lee nor his present design, and could give no other information than that by his orders they had fled without fighting.

Was.h.i.+ngton rode to the rear of the division where he met Lee, to whom he spoke in terms of some warmth, implying disapprobation of his conduct.

[2]

Orders were immediately given to Colonel Stewart and Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay to form their regiments for the purpose of checking the pursuit, and Lee was directed to take proper measures with the residue of his force to stop the British column on that ground. Was.h.i.+ngton then rode back to arrange the rear division of the army.

These orders were executed with firmness, and, when forced from his ground, Lee brought off his troops in good order, and was directed to form in the rear of Englishtown.

This check afforded time to draw up the left wing and second line of the American army on an eminence covered by a mora.s.s in front. Lord Stirling, who commanded the left wing, brought up a detachment of artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington, and some field pieces, which played with considerable effect on a division of the British which had pa.s.sed the mora.s.s, and was pressing on to the charge. These pieces, with the aid of several parties of infantry, effectually stopped the advance of the enemy.

Finding themselves warmly opposed in front, the British attempted to turn the left flank of the American army, but were repulsed. They then attempted the right with as little success. General Greene had advanced a body of troops with artillery to a commanding piece of ground in his front, which not only disappointed the design of turning the right, but enfiladed the party which yet remained in front of the left wing.

At this moment General Wayne was advanced with a body of infantry to engage them in front, who kept up so hot and well-directed a fire that they soon withdrew behind the ravine to the ground on which the action had commenced immediately after the arrival of Was.h.i.+ngton.