An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Volume I Part 15

13. The parts of s.p.a.ce inseparable, both really and mentally.

Secondly, The parts of pure s.p.a.ce are inseparable one from the other; so that the continuity cannot be separated, both neither really nor mentally. For I demand of any one to remove any part of it from another, with which it is continued, even so much as in thought. To divide and separate actually is, as I think, by removing the parts one from another, to make two superficies, where before there was a continuity: and to divide mentally is, to make in the mind two superficies, where before there was a continuity, and consider them as removed one from the other; which can only be done in things considered by the mind as capable of being separated; and by separation, of acquiring new distinct superficies, which they then have not, but are capable of. But neither of these ways of separation, whether real or mental, is, as I think, compatible to pure s.p.a.ce.

It is true, a man may consider so much of such a s.p.a.ce as is answerable or commensurate to a foot, without considering the rest, which is, indeed, a partial consideration, but not so much as mental separation or division; since a man can no more mentally divide, without considering two superficies separate one from the other, than he can actually divide, without making two superficies disjoined one from the other: but a partial consideration is not separating. A man may consider light in the sun without its heat, or mobility in body without its extension, without thinking of their separation. One is only a partial consideration, terminating in one alone; and the other is a consideration of both, as existing separately.

14. The parts of s.p.a.ce immovable.

Thirdly, The parts of pure s.p.a.ce are immovable, which follows from their inseparability; motion being nothing but change of distance between any two things; but this cannot be between parts that are inseparable, which, therefore, must needs be at perpetual rest one amongst another.

Thus the determined idea of simple s.p.a.ce distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from body; since its parts are inseparable, immovable, and without resistance to the motion of body.

15. The Definition of Extension explains it not.

If any one ask me WHAT this s.p.a.ce I speak of IS, I will tell him when he tells me what his extension is. For to say, as is usually done, that extension is to have partes extra partes, is to say only, that extension is extension. For what am I the better informed in the nature of extension, when I am told that extension is to have parts that are extended, exterior to parts that are extended, i. e. extension consists of extended parts? As if one, asking what a fibre was, I should answer him,--that it was a thing made up of several fibres. Would he thereby be enabled to understand what a fibre was better than he did before? Or rather, would he not have reason to think that my design was to make sport with him, rather than seriously to instruct him?

16. Division of Beings into Bodies and Spirits proves not s.p.a.ce and Body the same.

Those who contend that s.p.a.ce and body are the same, bring this dilemma:--either this s.p.a.ce is something or nothing; if nothing be between two bodies, they must necessarily touch; if it be allowed to be something, they ask, Whether it be body or spirit? To which I answer by another question, Who told them that there was, or could be, nothing; but SOLID BEINGS, WHICH COULD NOT THINK, and THINKING BEINGS THAT WERE NOT EXTENDED?--which is all they mean by the terms BODY and SPIRIT.

17. Substance, which we know not, no Proof against s.p.a.ce without Body.

If it be demanded (as usually it is) whether this s.p.a.ce, void of body, be SUBSTANCE or ACCIDENT, I shall readily answer I know not; nor shall be ashamed to own my ignorance, till they that ask show me a clear distinct idea of substance.

18. Different meanings of substance.

I endeavour as much as I can to deliver myself from those fallacies which we are apt to put upon ourselves, by taking words for things. It helps not our ignorance to feign a knowledge where we have none, by making a noise with sounds, without clear and distinct significations.

Names made at pleasure, neither alter the nature of things, nor make us understand them, but as they are signs of and stand for determined ideas. And I desire those who lay so much stress on the sound of these two syllables, SUBSTANCE, to consider whether applying it, as they do, to the infinite, incomprehensible G.o.d, to finite spirits, and to body, it be in the same sense; and whether it stands for the same idea, when each of those three so different beings are called substances. If so, whether it will thence follow--that G.o.d, spirits, and body, agreeing in the same common nature of substance, differ not any otherwise than in a bare different MODIFICATION of that substance; as a tree and a pebble, being in the same sense body, and agreeing in the common nature of body, differ only in a bare modification of that common matter, which will be a very harsh doctrine. If they say, that they apply it to G.o.d, finite spirit, and matter, in three different significations and that it stands for one idea when G.o.d is said to be a substance; for another when the soul is called substance; and for a third when body is called so;--if the name substance stands for three several distinct ideas, they would do well to make known those distinct ideas, or at least to give three distinct names to them, to prevent in so important a notion the confusion and errors that will naturally follow from the promiscuous use of so doubtful a term; which is so far from being suspected to have three distinct, that in ordinary use it has scarce one clear distinct signification. And if they can thus make three distinct ideas of substance, what hinders why another may not make a fourth?

19. Substance and accidents of little use in Philosophy.

They who first ran into the notion of ACCIDENTS, as a sort of real beings that needed something to inhere in, were forced to find out the word SUBSTANCE to support them. Had the poor Indian philosopher (who imagined that the earth also wanted something to bear it up) but thought of this word substance, he needed not to have been at the trouble to find an elephant to support it, and a tortoise to support his elephant: the word substance would have done it effectually. And he that inquired might have taken it for as good an answer from an Indian philosopher,--that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports the earth, as take it for a sufficient answer and good doctrine from our European philosophers,--that substance, without knowing what it is, is that which supports accidents. So that of substance, we have no idea of what it is, but only a confused obscure one of what it does.

20. Sticking on and under-propping.

Whatever a learned man may do here, an intelligent American, who inquired into the nature of things, would scarce take it for a satisfactory account, if, desiring to learn our architecture, he should be told that a pillar is a thing supported by a basis, and a basis something that supported a pillar. Would he not think himself mocked, instead of taught, with such an account as this? And a stranger to them would be very liberally instructed in the nature of books, and the things they contained, if he should be told that all learned books consisted of paper and letters, and that letters were things inhering in paper, and paper a thing that held forth letters: a notable way of having clear ideas of letters and paper. But were the Latin words, inhaerentia and substantio, put into the plain English ones that answer them, and were called STICKING ON and UNDER-PROPPING, they would better discover to us the very great clearness there is in the doctrine of substance and accidents, and show of what use they are in deciding of questions in philosophy.

21. A Vacuum beyond the utmost Bounds of Body.

But to return to our idea of s.p.a.ce. If body be not supposed infinite, (which I think no one will affirm,) I would ask, whether, if G.o.d placed a man at the extremity of corporeal beings, he could not stretch his hand beyond his body? If he could, then he would put his arm where there was before s.p.a.ce without body; and if there he spread his fingers, there would still be s.p.a.ce between them without body. If he could not stretch out his hand, it must be because of some external hindrance; (for we suppose him alive, with such a power of moving the parts of his body that he hath now, which is not in itself impossible, if G.o.d so pleased to have it; or at least it is not impossible for G.o.d so to move him:) and then I ask,--whether that which hinders his hand from moving outwards be substance or accident, something or nothing? And when they have resolved that, they will be able to resolve themselves,--what that is, which is or may be between two bodies at a distance, that is not body, and has no solidity. In the mean time, the argument is at least as good, that, where nothing hinders, (as beyond the utmost bounds of all bodies,) a body put in motion may move on, as where there is nothing between, there two bodies must necessarily touch. For pure s.p.a.ce between is sufficient to take away the necessity of mutual contact; but bare s.p.a.ce in the way is not sufficient to stop motion. The truth is, these men must either own that they think body infinite, though they are loth to speak it out, or else affirm that s.p.a.ce is not body. For I would fain meet with that thinking man that can in his thoughts set any bounds to s.p.a.ce, more than he can to duration; or by thinking hope to arrive at the end of either. And therefore, if his idea of eternity be infinite, so is his idea of immensity; they are both finite or infinite alike.

22. The Power of Annihilation proves a Vacuum.

Farther, those who a.s.sert the impossibility of s.p.a.ce existing without matter, must not only make body infinite, but must also deny a power in G.o.d to annihilate any part of matter. No one, I suppose, will deny that G.o.d can put an end to all motion that is in matter, and fix all the bodies of the universe in a perfect quiet and rest, and continue them so long as he pleases. Whoever then will allow that G.o.d can, during such a general rest, ANNIHILATE either this book or the body of him that reads it, must necessarily admit the possibility of a vacuum. For, it is evident that the s.p.a.ce that was filled by the parts of the annihilated body will still remain, and be a s.p.a.ce without body. For the circ.u.mambient bodies being in perfect rest, are a wall of adamant, and in that state make it a perfect impossibility for any other body to get into that s.p.a.ce. And indeed the necessary motion of one particle of matter into the place from whence another particle of matter is removed, is but a consequence from the supposition of plenitude; which will therefore need some better proof than a supposed matter of fact, which experiment can never make out;--our own clear and distinct ideas plainly satisfying that there is no necessary connexion between s.p.a.ce and solidity, since we can conceive the one without the other. And those who dispute for or against a vacuum, do thereby confess they have distinct IDEAS of vacuum and plenum, i. e. that they have an idea of extension void of solidity, though they deny its EXISTENCE; or else they dispute about nothing at all. For they who so much alter the signification of words, as to call extension body, and consequently make the whole essence of body to be nothing but pure extension without solidity, must talk absurdly whenever they speak of vacuum; since it is impossible for extension to be without extension. For vacuum, whether we affirm or deny its existence, signifies s.p.a.ce without body; whose very existence no one can deny to be possible, who will not make matter infinite, and take from G.o.d a power to annihilate any particle of it.

23. Motion proves a Vacuum.

But not to go so far as beyond the utmost bounds of body in the universe, nor appeal to G.o.d's omnipotency to find a vacuum, the motion of bodies that are in our view and neighbourhood seems to me plainly to evince it. For I desire any one so to divide a solid body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it possible for the solid parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that superficies, if there be not left in it a void s.p.a.ce as big as the least part into which he has divided the said solid body. And if, where the least particle of the body divided is as big as a mustard-seed, a void s.p.a.ce equal to the bulk of a mustard-seed be requisite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its superficies, where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 less than a mustard-seed, there must also be a s.p.a.ce void of solid matter as big as 100,000,000 part of a mustard-seed; for if it hold in the one it will hold in the other, and so on IN INFINITUM. And let this void s.p.a.ce be as little as it will, it destroys the hypothesis of plenitude. For if there can be a s.p.a.ce void of body equal to the smallest separate particle of matter now existing in nature, it is still s.p.a.ce without body; and makes as great a difference between s.p.a.ce and body as if it were mega chasma, a distance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we suppose not the void s.p.a.ce necessary to motion equal to the least parcel of the divided solid matter, but to 1/10 or 1/1000 of it, the same consequence will always follow of s.p.a.ce without matter.

24. The Ideas of s.p.a.ce and Body distinct.

But the question being here,--Whether the idea of s.p.a.ce or extension be the same with the idea of body? it is not necessary to prove the real existence of a VACUUM, but the idea of it; which it is plain men have when they inquire and dispute whether there be a VACUUM or no. For if they had not the idea of s.p.a.ce without body, they could not make a question about its existence: and if their idea of body did not include in it something more than the bare idea of s.p.a.ce, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world; and it would be as absurd to demand, whether there were s.p.a.ce without body, as whether there were s.p.a.ce without s.p.a.ce, or body without body, since these were but different names of the same idea.

25. Extension being inseparable from Body, proves it not the same.

It is true, the idea of extension joins itself so inseparably with all visible, and most tangible qualities, that it suffers us to SEE no one, or FEEL very few external objects, without taking in impressions of extension too. This readiness of extension to make itself be taken notice of so constantly with other ideas, has been the occasion, I guess, that some have made the whole essence of body to consist in extension; which is not much to be wondered at, since some have had their minds, by their eyes and touch, (the busiest of all our senses,) so filled with the idea of extension, and, as it were, wholly possessed with it, that they allowed no existence to anything that had not extension. I shall not now argue with those men, who take the measure and possibility of all being only from their narrow and gross imaginations: but having here to do only with those who conclude the essence of body to be extension, because they say they cannot imagine any sensible quality of any body without extension,--I shall desire them to consider, that, had they reflected on their ideas of tastes and smells as much as on those of sight and touch; nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst, and several other pains, they would have found that THEY included in them no idea of extension at all, which is but an affection of body, as well as the rest, discoverable by our senses, which are scarce acute enough to look into the pure essences of things.

26. Essences of Things.

If those ideas which are constantly joined to all others, must therefore be concluded to be the essence of those things which have constantly those ideas joined to them, and are inseparable from them; then unity is without doubt the essence of everything. For there is not any object of sensation or reflection which does not carry with it the idea of one: but the weakness of this kind of argument we have already shown sufficiently.

27. Ideas of s.p.a.ce and Solidity distinct.

To conclude: whatever men shall think concerning the existence of a VACUUM, this is plain to me--that we have as clear an idea of s.p.a.ce distinct from solidity, as we have of solidity distinct from motion, or motion from s.p.a.ce. We have not any two more distinct ideas; and we can as easily conceive s.p.a.ce without solidity, as we can conceive body or s.p.a.ce without motion, though it be never so certain that neither body nor motion can exist without s.p.a.ce. But whether any one will take s.p.a.ce to be only a RELATION resulting from the existence of other beings at a distance; or whether they will think the words of the most knowing King Solomon, 'The heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee;'

or those more emphatical ones of the inspired philosopher St. Paul, 'In him we live, move, and have our being,' are to be understood in a literal sense, I leave every one to consider: only our idea of s.p.a.ce is, I think, such as I have mentioned, and distinct from that of body. For, whether we consider, in matter itself, the distance of its coherent solid parts, and call it, in respect of those solid parts, extension; or whether, considering it as lying between the extremities of any body in its several dimensions, we call it length, breadth, and thickness; or else, considering it as lying between any two bodies or positive beings, without any consideration whether there be any matter or not between, we call it distance;--however named or considered, it is always the same uniform simple idea of s.p.a.ce, taken from objects about which our senses have been conversant; whereof, having settled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another as often as we will, and consider the s.p.a.ce or distance so imagined, either as filled with solid parts, so that another body cannot come there without displacing and thrusting out the body that was there before; or else as void of solidity, so that a body of equal dimensions to that empty or pure s.p.a.ce may be placed in it, without the removing or expulsion of anything that was, there.

28. Men differ little in clear, simple ideas.

The knowing precisely what our words stand for, would, I imagine, in this as well as a great many other cases, quickly end the dispute. For I am apt to think that men, when they come to examine them, find their simple ideas all generally to agree, though in discourse with one another they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that men who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of speaking of the several schools or sects they have been bred up in: though amongst unthinking men, who examine not scrupulously and carefully their own ideas, and strip them not from the marks men use for them, but confound them with words, there must be endless dispute, wrangling, and jargon; especially if they be learned, bookish men, devoted to some sect, and accustomed to the language of it, and have learned to talk after others.

But if it should happen that any two thinking men should really have different ideas, I do not see how they could discourse or argue one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every floating imagination in men's brains is presently of that sort of ideas I speak of. It is not easy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from custom, inadvertency, and common conversation. It requires pains and a.s.siduity to examine its ideas, till it resolves them into those clear and distinct simple ones, out of which they are compounded; and to see which, amongst its simple ones, have or have not a NECESSARY connexion and dependence one upon another. Till a man doth this in the primary and original notions of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain principles, and will often find himself at a loss.

CHAPTER XIV.

IDEA OF DURATION AND ITS SIMPLE MODES.

1. Duration is fleeting Extension.

There is another sort of distance, or length, the idea whereof we get not from the permanent parts of s.p.a.ce, but from the fleeting and perpetually peris.h.i.+ng parts of succession. This we call DURATION; the simple modes whereof are any different lengths of it whereof we have distinct ideas, as HOURS, DAYS, YEARS, &c., TIME and ETERNITY.