Christianity and Greek Philosophy Part 17

We remark, in conclusion, that if the testimony of consciousness is not accepted in all its integrity, we are necessarily involved in the Nihilism of Hume and Fichte; the phenomena of mind and matter are, on a.n.a.lysis, resolved into an absolute nothingness--"a play of phantasms in a void."[246]

(ii.) We turn, secondly, to the _Materialistic School_ as represented by Aug. Comte.

The doctrine of this school is that all knowledge is limited to _material_ phenomena--that is, to appearances _perceptible to sense_. We do not know the essence of any object, nor the real mode of procedure of any event, but simply its relations to other events, as similar or dissimilar, co-existent or successive. These relations are constant; under the same conditions, they are always the same. The constant resemblances which link phenomena together, and the constant sequences which unite them, as antecedent and consequent, are termed _laws_. The laws of phenomena are all we know respecting them. Their essential nature and their ultimate causes, _efficient_ or _final_, are unknown and inscrutable to us.[247]

[Footnote 246: Ma.s.son, "Recent British Philos.," p. 62.]

[Footnote 247: See art. "Positive Philos. of A. Comte," _Westminster Review_, April, 1865, p. 162, Am. ed.]

It is not our intention to review the system of philosophy propounded by Aug. Comte; we are now chiefly concerned with his denial of all causation.

1. _As to Efficient Causes_.--Had Comte contented himself with the a.s.sertion that causes lie beyond the field of sensible observation, and that inductive science can not carry us beyond the relations of co-existence and succession among phenomena, he would have stated an important truth, but certainly not a new truth. It had already been announced by distinguished mental philosophers, as, for example, M. de Biran and Victor Cousin.[248] The senses give us only the succession of one phenomenon to another. I hold a piece of wax to the fire and it melts. Here my senses inform me of two successive phenomena--the proximity of fire and the melting of wax. It is now agreed among all schools of philosophy that this is all the knowledge the senses can possibly supply. The observation of a great number of like cases a.s.sures us that this relation is uniform. The highest scientific generalization does not carry us one step beyond this fact. Induction, therefore, gives us no access to causes beyond phenomena. Still, this does not justify Comte in the a.s.sertion that causes are to us absolutely _unknown_. The question would still arise whether we have not some faculty of knowledge, distinct from sensation, which is adequate to furnish a valid cognition of cause. It does not by any means follow that, because the idea of causation is not given as a "physical quaesitum" at the end of a process of scientific generalization, it should not be a "metaphysical datum" posited at the very beginning of scientific inquiry, as the indispensable condition of our being able to cognize phenomena at all, and as the law under which all thought, and all conception of the system of nature, is alone possible.

[Footnote 248: "It is now universally admitted that we have no perception of the causal nexus in the material world."--Hamilton, "Discussions," p. 522.]

Now we affirm that the human mind has just as direct, immediate, and positive knowledge of _cause_ as it has of _effect._ The idea of cause, the intuition _power_, is given in the immediate consciousness of _mind as determining its own_ operations. Our first, and, in fact, our only presentation of power or cause, is that of _self as willing_. In every act of volition I am fully conscious that it is in my power to form a resolution or to refrain from it, to determine on this course of action or that; and this const.i.tutes the immediate presentative knowledge of power.[249] The will is a power, a power in action, a productive power, and, consequently, a cause. This doctrine is stated with remarkable clearness and accuracy by Cousin: "If we seek the notion of cause in the action of one ball upon another, as was previously done by Hume, or in the action of the hand upon the ball, or the primary muscles upon the extremities, or even in the action of the will upon the muscles, as was done by M. Maine de Biran, we shall find it in none of these cases, not even in the last; for it is possible there should be a paralysis of the muscles which deprives the will of power over them, makes it unproductive, incapable of being a cause, and, consequently, of suggesting the notion of one. But what no paralysis can prevent is the action of the will upon itself, the production of a resolution; that is to say, the act of causation entirely mental, the primitive type of all causality, of which all external movements are only symbols more or less imperfect. The first cause for us, is, therefore, the _will_, of which the first effect is volition. This is at once the highest and the purest source of the notion of cause, which thus becomes identical with that of personality. And it is the taking possession, so to speak, of the cause, as revealed in will and personality, which is the condition for us of the ulterior or simultaneous conception of external, impersonal causes."[250]

[Footnote 249: "It is our _immediate consciousness of effort_, when we exert force to put matter in motion, or to oppose and neutralize force, which gives us this internal conviction of _power_ and _causation_, so far as it refers to the material world, and compels us to believe that whenever we see material objects put in motion from a state of rest, or deflected from their rectilinear paths and changed in their velocities if already in motion, it is in consequence of such an _effort_ somehow exerted."--Herschel's "Outlines of Astronomy," p. 234; see Mansel's "Prolegomena," p. 133.]

[Footnote 250: "Philosophical Fragments," Preface to first edition.]

Thus much for the origin of the idea of cause. We have the same direct intuitive knowledge of cause that we have of effect; but we have not yet rendered a full and adequate account of the _principle of causality_. We have simply attained the notion of our personal causality, and we can not arbitrarily subst.i.tute our personal causality for all the causes of the universe, and erect our own experience as a law of the entire universe. We have, however, already seen (Chap. V.) that the belief in exterior causation is _necessary_ and _universal_. When a change takes place, when a new phenomenon presents itself to our senses, we can not avoid the conviction that it must have a cause. We can not even express in language the relations of phenomena in time and s.p.a.ce, without speaking of causes. And there is not a rational being on the face of the globe--a child, a savage, or a philosopher--who does not instinctively and spontaneously affirm that every movement, every change, every new existence, _must_ have a cause. Now what account can philosophy render of this universal belief? One answer, and only one, is possible. The _reason_ of man (that power of which Comte takes no account) is in fixed and changeless relation to the principle of causation, just as _sense_ is in fixed and changeless relation to exterior phenomena, so that we can not know the external world, can not think or speak of phenomenal existence, except as _effects_. In the expressive and forcible language of Jas. Martineau: "By an irresistible law of thought _all phenomena present themselves to us as the expression of power_, and refer us to a causal ground whence they issue. This dynamic source we neither see, nor hear, nor feel; it is given in _thought_, supplied by the spontaneous activity of mind as the correlative prefix to the phenomena observed."[251] Unless, then, we are prepared to deny the validity of all our rational intuitions, we can not avoid accepting "this subjective postulate as a valid law for objective nature." If the intuitions of our reason are p.r.o.nounced deceptive and mendacious, so also must the intuitions of the senses be p.r.o.nounced illusory and false. Our whole intellectual const.i.tution is built up on false and erroneous principles, and all knowledge of whatever kind must perish by "the contagion of uncertainty."

[Footnote 251: "Essays," p. 47.]

Comte, however, is determined to treat the idea of causation as an illusion, whether under its psychological form, as _will_, or under its scientific form, as _force_. He feels that Theology is inevitable if we permit the inquiry into causes;[252] and he is more anxious that theology should perish than that truth should prevail. The human will must, therefore, be robbed of all semblance of freedom, lest it should suggest the idea of a Supreme Will governing nature; and human action, like all other phenomena, must be reduced to uniform and necessary law.

All feelings, ideas, and principles guaranteed to us by consciousness are to be cast out of the account. Psychology, resting on self-observation, is p.r.o.nounced a delusion. The immediate consciousness of freedom is a dream. Such a procedure, to say the least of it, is highly unphilosophical; to say the truth about it, it is obviously dishonest. Every fact of human nature, just as much as every fact of physical nature, must be accepted in all its integrity, or all must be alike rejected. The phenomena of mind can no more be disregarded than the phenomena of matter. Rational intuitions, necessary and universal beliefs, can no more be ignored than the uniform facts of sense-perception, without rendering a system of knowledge necessarily incomplete, and a system of truth utterly impossible. Every one truth is connected with every other truth in the universe. And yet Comte demands that a large cla.s.s of facts, the most immediate and direct of all our cognitions, shall be rejected because they are not in harmony with the fundamental a.s.sumption of the positive philosophy that all knowledge is confined to _phenomena perceptible to sense_. Now it were just as easy to cast the Alps into the Mediterranean as to obliterate from the human intelligence the primary cognitions of immediate consciousness, or to relegate the human reason from the necessary laws of thought. Comte himself can not emanc.i.p.ate his own mind from a belief in the validity of the testimony of consciousness. How can he know himself as distinct from nature, as a living person, as the same being he was ten years ago, or even yesterday, except by an appeal to consciousness? Despite his earnestly-avowed opinions as to the inutility and fallaciousness of all psychological inquiries, he is compelled to admit that "the phenomena of life" are "_known by immediate consciousness_."[253] Now the knowledge of our personal freedom rests on precisely the same grounds as the knowledge of our personal existence. The same "immediate consciousness"

which attests that I exist, attests also, with equal distinctness and directness, that I am self-determined and free.

[Footnote 252: "The _inevitable tendency_ of our intelligence is towards a philosophy radically theological, so often as we seek to penetrate, on whatever pretext, into the intimate nature of phenomena" (vol. iv. p.

664).]

[Footnote 253: "Positive Philos," vol. ii. p. 648.]

In common with most atheistical writers, Comte is involved in the fatal contradiction of at one time a.s.suming, and at another of denying the freedom of the will, to serve the exigencies of his theory. To prove that the order of the universe can not be the product of a Supreme Intelligence, he a.s.sumes that the products of mind must be characterized by freedom and variety--the phenomena of mind must not be subject to uniform and necessary laws; and inasmuch as the phenomena presented by external nature are subject to uniform and changeless laws, they can not be the product of mind. "Look at the whole frame of things," says he; "how can it be the product of mind--of a supernatural Will? Is it not subject to regular laws, and do we not actually obtain _prevision_ of its phenomena? If it were the product of mind, its order would be variable and free." Here, then, it is admitted that _freedom is an essential characteristic of mind_. And this admission is no doubt a thoughtless, unconscious betrayal of the innate belief of all minds in the freedom of the will. But when Comte comes to deal with this freedom as an objective question of philosophy, when he directs his attention to the only will of which we have a direct and immediate knowledge, he denies freedom and variety, and a.s.serts in the most arbitrary manner that the movements of the mind, like all the phenomena of nature, must be subject to uniform, changeless, and necessary laws. And if we have not yet been able to reduce the movements of mind, like the movements of the planets, to statistics, and have not already obtained accurate prevision of its successions or sequences as we have of physical phenomena, it is simply the consequence of our inattention to, or ignorance of, all the facts. We answer, there are no facts so directly and intuitively known as the facts of consciousness; and, therefore, an argument based upon our supposed ignorance of these facts is not likely to have much weight against our immediate consciousness of personal freedom. There is not any thing we know so immediately, so certainly, so positively, as this fact--_we are free_.

The word "force," representing as it does a subtile menial conception, and not a phenomenon of sense, must also be banished from the domains of Positive Science as an intruder, lest its presence should lend any countenance to the idea of causation. "Forces in mechanics are only _movements_, produced, or tending to be produced." In order to "cancel altogether the old metaphysical notion of force," another form of expression is demanded. It is claimed that all we do know or can possibly know is the successions of phenomena in time. What, then, is the term which henceforth, in our dynamics, shall take the place of "force?" Is it "Time-succession?" Then let any one attempt to express the various forms and intensities of movement and change presented to the senses (as _e.g._, the phenomena of heat, electricity, galvanism, magnetism, muscular and nervous action, etc.) in terms of Time-succession, and he will at once become conscious of the utter hopelessness of physics, without the hyperphysical idea of force, to render itself intelligible.[254] What account can be rendered of planetary motion if the terms "centrifugal force" and "centripetal force" are abandoned? "From the two great conditions of every Newtonian solution, viz., projectile impulse and centripetal tendency, eject the idea of _force_, and what remains? The entire conception is simply made up of this, and has not the faintest existence without it. It is useless to give it notice to quit, and pretend that it is gone when you have only put a new name upon the door. We must not call it 'attraction,'

lest there should seem to be a _power_ within; we are to speak of it only as 'gravitation,' because that is only 'weight,' which is nothing but a 'fact,' as if it were not a fact that holds a power, a true dynamic affair, which no imagination can chop into incoherent successions.[255] Nor is the evasion more successful when we try the phrase, 'tendency of bodies to mutual approach.' The approach itself may be called a phenomenon; but the 'tendency' is no phenomenon, and can not be attributed by us to the bodies without regarding them as the residence of force. And what are we to say of the _projectile impulse_ in the case of the planets? Is that also a phenomenon? Who witnessed and reported it? Is it not evident that the whole scheme of physical astronomy is a resolution of observed facts into dynamic equivalents, and that the hypothesis posits for its calculations not phenomena, but proper forces? Its logic is this: _If_ an impulse of certain intensity were given, and _if_ such and such mutual attractions were constantly present, then the sort of motions which we observe in the bodies of our system _would follow_. So, however, they also would _if_ willed by an Omnipotent Intelligence."[256] It is thus clearly evident that human science is unable to offer any explanation of the existing order of the universe except in terms expressive of Power or Force; that, in fact, all explanations are utterly unintelligible without the idea of causation. The language of universal rational intuition is, "all phenomena are the expression of power;" the language of science is, "every law implies a force."

[Footnote 254: See Grote's "Essay on Correlation of Physical Forces,"

pp. 18-20; and Martineau's "Essays," p. 135.]

[Footnote 255: "Gravity is a real _power_ of whose agency we have daily experience."--Herschel, "Outlines of Astronomy," p. 236.]

[Footnote 256: Martineau's "Essays," p. 56.]

It is furthermore worthy of being noted that, in the modern doctrine of the Correlation and Conservation of Forces, science is inevitably approaching the idea that all kinds of force are but forms or manifestations of some _one_ central force issuing from some _one_ fountain-head of power. Dr. Carpenter, perhaps the greatest living physiologist, teaches that "the form of force _which may be taken as the type of all the rest_" is the consciousness of living effort in volition.[257] All force, then, is of one type, and that type is mind; in its last a.n.a.lysis external causation may be resolved into Divine energy. Sir John Herschel does not hesitate to say that "it is reasonable to regard the force of gravitation as the direct or indirect result of a consciousness or will exerted somewhere."[258] The humble Christian may, therefore, feel himself amply justified in still believing that "power belongs to G.o.d;" that it is through the Divine energy "all things are, and are upheld;" and that "in G.o.d we live, and move, and have our being;" he is the Great First Cause, the Fountain-head of all power.

[Footnote 257: "Human Physiology," p. 542.]

[Footnote 258: "Outlines of Astronomy," p. 234.]

2. _As to Final Causes_--that is, reasons, purposes, or ends _for_ which things exist--these, we are told by Comte, are all "disproved" by Positive Science, which rigidly limits us to "the history of _what is_,"

and forbids all inquiry into reasons _why it is_. The question whether there be any intelligent purpose in the order and arrangement of the universe, is not a subject of scientific inquiry at all; and whenever it has been permitted to obtrude itself, it has thrown a false light over the facts, and led the inquirer astray.

The discoveries of modern astronomy are specially instanced by Comte as completely overthrowing the notion of any conscious design or intelligent purpose in the universe. The order and stability of the solar system are found to be the _necessary_ consequences of gravitation, and are adequately explained without any reference to purposes or ends to be fulfilled in the disposition and arrangement of the heavenly bodies. "With persons unused to the study of the celestial bodies, though very likely informed on other parts of natural philosophy, astronomy has still the reputation of being a science eminently religious, as if the famous words, 'The heavens declare the glory of G.o.d, had lost none of their truth... No science has given more terrible shocks to the doctrine of _final causes_ than astronomy.[259]

The simple knowledge of the movement of the earth must have destroyed the original and real foundation of this doctrine--the idea of the universe subordinated to the earth, and consequently to man. Besides, the accurate exploration of the solar system could not fail to dispel that blind and unlimited admiration which the general order of nature inspires, by showing in the most sensible manner, and in a great number of different respects, that the orbs were certainly not disposed in the most advantageous manner, and that science permits us easily to conceive a better arrangement, by the development of true celestial mechanism, since Newton. All the theological philosophy, even the most perfect, has been henceforth deprived of its princ.i.p.al intellectual function, the most regular order being thus consigned as necessarily established and maintained in our world, and even in the whole universe, _by the simple mutual gravity of its several parts_."[260]

The task of "conceiving a better arrangement" of the celestial orbs, and improving the system of the universe generally, we shall leave to those who imagine themselves possessed of that omniscience which comprehends all the facts and relations of the actual universe, and foreknows all the details and relations of all possible universes so accurately as to be able to p.r.o.nounce upon their relative "advantages." The arrogance of these critics is certainly in startling and ludicrous contrast with the affected modesty which, on other occasions, restrains them from "imputing any intentions to nature." It is quite enough for our purpose to know that the tracing of evidences of _design_ in those parts of nature accessible to our observation is an essentially different thing from the construction of a scheme of _optimism_ on _a priori_ grounds which shall embrace a universe the larger portion of which is virtually beyond the field of observation. We are conscious of possessing some rational data and some mental equipment for the former task, but for the latter we feel utterly incompetent.[261]

[Footnote 259: In a foot-note Comte adds: "Nowadays, to minds familiarized betimes with the true astronomical philosophy, the heavens declare no other glory than that of Hipparchus, Kepler, Newton, and all those who have contributed to the ascertainment of their laws." It seems remarkable that the great men who _ascertained_ these laws did not see that the saying of the Psalmist was emptied of all meaning by their discoveries. No persons seem to have been more willing than these very men named to ascribe all the glory to Him who _established_ these laws.

Kepler says: "The astronomer, to whom G.o.d has given to see more clearly with his inward eye, from what he has discovered, both can and will glorify G.o.d;" and Newton says: "This beautiful system of sun, planets, comets could have its origin in no other way than by the purpose and command of an intelligent and powerful Being. We admire him on account of his perfections, we venerate and wors.h.i.+p him on account of his government."--Whewell's "Astronomy and Physics," pp. 197, 198.]

[Footnote 260: "Positive Philosophy," vol. ii. pp. 36-38; Tulloch, "Theism," p. 115.]

[Footnote 261: Chalmers's "Inst.i.tutes of Theology," vol. i. pp. 117, 118.]

The only plausible argument in the above quotation from Comte is, that the whole phenomena of the solar system are adequately explained by the law of gravitation, without the intervention of any intelligent purpose.

Let it be borne in mind that it is a fundamental principle of the Positive philosophy that all human knowledge is necessarily confined to phenomena _perceptible to sense_, and that the fast and highest achievement of human science is to observe and record "the invariable relations of resemblance and succession among phenomena." We can not possibly know any thing of even the existence of "causes" or "forces"

lying back of phenomena, nor of "reasons" or "purposes" determining the relations of phenomena. The "law of gravitation" must, therefore, be simply the statement of a fact, the expression of an observed order of phenomena. But the simple statement of a fact is no _explanation_ of the fact. The formal expression of an observed order of succession among phenomena is no _explanation_ of that order. For what do we mean by an explanation? Is it not a "making plain" to the understanding? It is, in short, a complete answer to the questions _how_ is it so? and _why_ is it so? Now, if Comte denies to himself and to us all knowledge of efficient and final causation, if we are in utter ignorance of "forces"

operating in nature, and of "reasons" for which things exist in nature, he can not answer either question, and consequently nothing is explained.

Practically, however, Comte regards gravitation as a force. The order of the solar system has been established and is still maintained by the mutual gravity of its several parts. We shall not stop here to note the inconsistency of his denying to us the knowledge of, even the existence of, force, and yet at the same time a.s.suming to treat gravitation as a force really adequate to the explanation of the _how_ and _why_ of the phenomena of the universe, without any reference to a supernatural will or an intelligent mind. The question with which we are immediately concerned is whether gravitation _alone_ is adequate to the explanation of the phenomena of the heavens? A review _in extenso_ of Comte's answer to this question would lead us into all the inextricable mazes of the nebular hypothesis, and involve us in a more extended discussion than our s.p.a.ce permits and our limited scientific knowledge justifies. For the ma.s.ses of the people the whole question of cosmical development resolves itself into "a balancing of authorities;" they are not in a position to verify the reasonings for and against this theory by actual observation of astral phenomena, and the application of mathematical calculus; they are, therefore, guided by balancing in their own minds the statements of the distinguished astronomers who, by the united suffrages of the scientific world, are regarded as "authorities." For us, at present, it is enough that the nebular hypothesis is rejected by some of the greatest astronomers that have lived. We need only mention the names of Sir William Herschel, Sir John Herschel, Prof. Nichol, Earl Rosse, Sir David Brewster, and Prof. Whewell.

But if we grant that the nebular hypothesis is ent.i.tled to take rank as an established theory of the development of the solar system, it by no means proves that the solar system was formed without the intervention of intelligence and design. On this point we shall content ourselves with quoting the words of one whose encyclopaedian knowledge was confessedly equal to that of Comte, and who in candor and accuracy was certainly his superior. Prof. Whewell, in his "Astronomy and Physics,"

says: "This hypothesis by no means proves that the solar system was formed without the intervention of intelligence and design. It only transfers our view of the skill exercised and the means employed to another part of the work; for how came the sun and its atmosphere to have such materials, such motions, such a const.i.tution, and these consequences followed from their primordial condition? How came the parent vapor thus to be capable of coherence, separation, contraction, solidification? How came the laws of its motion, attraction, repulsion, condensation, to be so fixed as to lead to a beautiful and harmonious system in the end? How came it to be neither too fluid nor too tenacious, to contract neither too quickly nor too slowly for the successive formation of the several planetary bodies? How came that substance, which at one time was a luminous vapor, to be at a subsequent period solids and fluids of many various kinds? What but design and intelligence prepared and tempered this previously-existing element, so that it should, by its natural changes, produce such an orderly system"?[262] "_The laws of motion alone will not produce the regularity which we admire in the motion of the heavenly bodies_. There must be an original adjustment of the system on which these laws are to act; a selection of the arbitrary quant.i.ties which they are to involve; a primitive cause which shall dispose the elements in due relation to each other, in order that regular recurrence may accompany constant change, and that perpetual motion may be combined with perpetual stability."[263]

[Footnote 262: "Astronomy and Physics," p. 109.]

[Footnote 263: Chalmers's "Inst.i.tutes of Theology," vol. i. p. 119.]

The harmony of the solar system in all its phenomena does not depend upon the operation of any _one_ law, but from the special adjustment of several laws. There are certain agents operating throughout the entire system which have different properties, and which require special adjustment to each other, in order to their beneficial operation. 1st.

There is _Gravitation,_ prevailing apparently through all s.p.a.ce. But it does not prevail alone. It is a force whose function is to balance other forces of which we know little, except that these, again, are needed to balance the force of gravitation. Each force, if left to itself, would be the destruction of the universe. Were it not for the force of gravitation, the centrifugal forces which impel the planets would fling them off into s.p.a.ce. Were it not for these centrifugal forces, the force of gravitation would dash them against the sun. The ultimate fact of astronomical science, therefore, is not the law of gravitation, but the _adjustment_ between this law and other laws, so as to produce and maintain the existing order.[264] 2d. There is _Light_, flowing from numberless luminaries; and _Heat_, radiating everywhere from the warmer to the colder regions; and there are a number of adjustments needed in order to the beneficial operation of these agents. Suppose we grant that by merely mechanical causes the sun became the centre of our system, how did it become also the _source of its vivifying influences_? "How was the fire deposited on this hearth? How was the candle placed on this candlestick?" 3d. There is an all-pervading _Ether_, through which light is transmitted, which offers resistance to the movement of the planetary and cometary bodies, and tends to a dissipation of mechanical energy, and which needs to be counter-balanced by well-adjusted arrangements to secure the stability of the solar system. All this balancing of opposite properties and forces carries our minds upward towards Him who holds the balances in his hands, and to a Supreme Intelligence on whose adjustments and collocations the harmony and stability of the universe depends.[265]

[Footnote 264: Duke of Argyll, "Reign of Law," pp. 91, 92.]

[Footnote 265: M'Cosh, "Typical Forms and Special Ends," ch. xiii.]

The recognition of all teleology of organs in vegetable and animal physiology is also persistently repudiated by this school. When Cuvier speaks of the combination of organs in such order as to adapt the animal to the part which it has to play in nature, Geoffroy Saint Hilaire replies, "I know nothing of animals which have to play a part in nature." "I have read, concerning fishes, that, because they live in a medium which resists more than air, their motive forces are calculated so as to give them the power of progression under these circ.u.mstances.

By this mode of reasoning, you would say of a man who makes use of crutches, that he was originally destined to the misfortune of having a leg paralyzed or amputated.[266] "With a modesty which savors of affectation, he says, "I ascribe no intentions to G.o.d, for I mistrust the feeble powers of my reason. I observe facts merely, and go no farther. I only pretend to the character of the historian of _what is_."

"I can not make Nature an intelligent being who does nothing in vain, who acts by the shortest mode, who does all for the best."[267] All the supposed consorting of means to ends which has. .h.i.therto been regarded as evidencing Intelligence is simply the result of "the elective affinities of organic elements" and "the differentiation of organs" consequent mainly upon exterior conditions. "_Functions are a result, not an end_.

The animal undergoes the kind of life that his organs impose, and submits to the imperfections of his organization. The naturalist studies the play of his apparatus, and if he has the right of admiring most of its parts, he has likewise that of showing the imperfection of other parts, and the practical uselessness of those which fulfill no functions."[268] And it is further claimed that there are a great many structures which are clearly useless; that is, they fulfill no purpose at all. Thus there are monkeys, which have no thumbs for use, but only rudimental thumb-bones hid beneath the skin; the wingless bird of New Zealand (Apteryx) has wing-bones similarly developed, which serve no purpose; young whalebone whales are born with teeth that never cut the gums, and are afterwards absorbed; and some sheep have horns turned about their ears which fulfill no end. And inasmuch as there are some organisms in nature which serve no purpose of utility, it is argued there is no design in nature; things are _used_ because there are antecedent conditions favorable for _use_, but that use is not the _end_ for which the organ exists. The true naturalist will never say, "Birds have wings given them _in order_ to fly;" he will rather say, "Birds fly _because_ they have wings." The doctrine of final causes must, therefore, be abandoned.

[Footnote 266: Whewell, "History of Inductive Sciences," vol. ii. p.

486.]

[Footnote 267: Id., ib., vol. ii. p. 490.]

[Footnote 268: Martin's "Organic Unity in Animals and Vegetables," in M.