Logic: Deductive and Inductive Part 8

Obverse of 4 Some B is not a Some B is not a All B is a Converse

Contra- positive 5 No b is A Some b is A Some b is A

Obverse of 6 All b is a Some b is not a Some b is not a Contrapos

Converse of Obverse 7 Some a is B of Converse

Obverse of Converse of 8 Some a is not b Obverse of Converse

Converse of Obverse 9 Some a is b of Contrapos

Obverse of Converse of 10 Some a is not B Obverse of Contrapos

In this table _a_ and _b_ stand for _not-A_ and _not-B_ and had better be read thus: for _No A is b, No A is not-B_; for _All b is a_ (col. 6), _All not-B is not-A_; and so on.

It may not, at first, be obvious why the process of alternately obverting and converting any proposition should ever come to an end; though it will, no doubt, be considered a very fortunate circ.u.mstance that it always does end. On examining the results, it will be found that the cause of its ending is the inconvertibility of O. For E., when obverted, becomes A.; every A, when converted, degenerates into I.; every I., when obverted, becomes O.; O cannot be converted, and to obvert it again is merely to restore the former proposition: so that the whole process moves on to inevitable dissolution. I. and O. are exhausted by three transformations, whilst A. and E. will each endure seven.

Except Obversion, Conversion and Contraposition, it has not been usual to bestow special names on these processes or their results. But the form in columns 7 and 10 (_Some a is B--Some a is not B_), where the original predicate is affirmed or denied of the contradictory of the original subject, has been thought by Dr. Keynes to deserve a distinctive t.i.tle, and he has called it the 'Inverse.' Whilst the Inverse is one form, however, Inversion is not one process, but is obtained by different processes from E. and A. respectively. In this it differs from Obversion, Conversion, and Contraposition, each of which stands for one process.

The Inverse form has been objected to on the ground that the inference _All A is B ? Some not-A is not B_, distributes _B_ (as predicate of a negative proposition), though it was given as undistributed (as predicate of an affirmative proposition). But Dr. Keynes defends it on the ground that (1) it is obtained by obversions and conversions which are all legitimate and (2) that although _All A is B_ does not distribute _B_ in relation to _A_, it does distribute _B_ in relation to some _not-A_ (namely, in relation to whatever _not-A_ is _not-B_). This is one reason why, in stating the rule in chap. vi. -- 6, I have written: "an immediate inference ought to contain nothing that is not contained, _or formally implied_, in the proposition from which it is inferred"; and have maintained that every term formally implies its contradictory within the _suppositio_.

-- 11. Immediate Inferences from Conditionals are those which consist--(1) in changing a Disjunctive into a Hypothetical, or a Hypothetical into a Disjunctive, or either into a Categorical; and (2) in the relations of Opposition and the equivalences of Obversion, Conversion, and secondary or compound processes, which we have already examined in respect of Categoricals. As no new principles are involved, it may suffice to exhibit some of the results.

We have already seen (chap. v. -- 4) how Disjunctives may be read as Hypotheticals and Hypotheticals as Categoricals. And, as to Opposition, if we recognise four forms of Hypothetical A. I. E. O., these plainly stand to one another in a Square of Opposition, just as Categoricals do.

Thus A. and E. (_If A is B, C is D_, and _If A is B, C is not D_) are contraries, but not contradictories; since both may be false (_C_ may sometimes be _D_, and sometimes not), though they cannot both be true.

And if they are both false, their subalternates are both true, being respectively the contradictories of the universals of opposite quality, namely, I. of E., and O. of A. But in the case of Disjunctives, we cannot set out a satisfactory Square of Opposition; because, as we saw (chap. v. -- 4), the forms required for E. and O. are not true Disjunctives, but Exponibles.

The Obverse, Converse, and Contrapositive, of Hypotheticals (admitting the distinction of quality) may be exhibited thus:

DATUM. OBVERSE.

A. _If A is B, C is D_ _If A is B, C is not d_ I. Sometimes _when A is B, C is D_ Sometimes _when A is B, C is not d_ E. _If A is B, C is not D_ _If A is B, C is d_ O. Sometimes _when A is B, C is not D_ Sometimes _when A is B, C is d_

CONVERSE. CONTRAPOSITIVE.

Sometimes _when C is D, A is B_ _If C is d, A is not B_ Sometimes _when C is D, A is B_ (none) _If C is D, A is not B_ Sometimes _when C is d, A is B_ (none) Sometimes _when C is d, A is B_

As to Disjunctives, the attempt to put them through these different forms immediately destroys their disjunctive character. Still, given any proposition in the form _A is either B or C_, we can state the propositions that give the sense of obversion, conversion, etc., thus:

DATUM.--_A is either B or C;_ OBVERSE.--_A is not both b and c;_ CONVERSE.--_Something, either B or C, is A;_ CONTRAPOSITIVE.--_Nothing that is both b and c is A_.

For a Disjunctive in I., of course, there is no Contrapositive. Given a Disjunctive in the form _Either A is B or C is D_, we may write for its Obverse--_In no case is A b, and C at the same time d_. But no Converse or Contrapositive of such a Disjunctive can be obtained, except by first casting it into the hypothetical or categorical form.

The reader who wishes to pursue this subject further, will find it elaborately treated in Dr. Keynes' _Formal Logic_, Part II.; to which work the above chapter is indebted.

CHAPTER VIII

ORDER OF TERMS, EULER'S DIAGRAMS, LOGICAL EQUATIONS, EXISTENTIAL IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS

-- 1. Of the terms of a proposition which is the Subject and which the Predicate? In most of the exemplary propositions cited by Logicians it will be found that the subject is a substantive and the predicate an adjective, as in _Men are mortal_. This is the relation of Substance and Attribute which we saw (chap. i. -- 5) to be the central type of relations of coinherence; and on this model other predications may be formed in which the subject is not a substance, but is treated as if it were, and could therefore be the ground of attributes; as _Fame is treacherous, The weather is changeable_. But, in literature, sentences in which the adjective comes first are not uncommon, as _Loud was the applause, Dark is the fate of man, Blessed are the peacemakers_, and so on. Here, then, 'loud,' 'dark' and 'blessed' occupy the place of the logical subject. Are they really the subject, or must we alter the order of such sentences into _The applause was loud_, etc.? If we do, and then proceed to convert, we get _Loud was the applause_, or (more scrupulously) _Some loud noise was the applause_. The last form, it is true, gives the subject a substantive word, but 'applause' has become the predicate; and if the substantive 'noise' was not implied in the first form, _Loud is the applause_, by what right is it now inserted?

The recognition of Conversion, in fact, requires us to admit that, formally, in a logical proposition, the term preceding the copula is subject and the one following is predicate. And, of course, materially considered, the mere order of terms in a proposition can make no difference in the method of proving it, nor in the inferences that can be drawn from it.

Still, if the question is, how we may best cast a literary sentence into logical form, good grounds for a definite answer may perhaps be found.

We must not try to stand upon the naturalness of expression, for _Dark is the fate of man_ is quite as natural as _Man is mortal_. When the purpose is not merely to state a fact, but also to express our feelings about it, to place the grammatical predicate first may be perfectly natural and most effective. But the grounds of a logical order of statement must be found in its adaptation to the purposes of proof and inference. Now general propositions are those from which most inferences can be drawn, which, therefore, it is most important to establish, if true; and they are also the easiest to disprove, if false; since a single negative instance suffices to establish the contradictory. It follows that, in re-casting a literary or colloquial sentence for logical purposes, we should try to obtain a form in which the subject is distributed--is either a singular term or a general term predesignate as 'All' or 'No.' Seeing, then, that most adjectives connote a single attribute, whilst most substantives connote more than one attribute; and that therefore the denotation of adjectives is usually wider than that of substantives; in any proposition, one term of which is an adjective and the other a substantive, if either can be distributed in relation to the other, it is nearly sure to be the substantive; so that to take the substantive term for subject is our best chance of obtaining an universal proposition. These considerations seem to justify the practice of Logicians in selecting their examples.

For similar reasons, if both terms of a proposition are substantive, the one with the lesser denotation is (at least in affirmative propositions) the more suitable subject, as _Cats are carnivores_. And if one term is abstract, that is the more suitable subject; for, as we have seen, an abstract term may be interpreted by a corresponding concrete one distributed, as _Kindness is infectious_; that is, _All kind actions suggest imitation_.

If, however, a controvertist has no other object in view than to refute some general proposition laid down by an opponent, a particular proposition is all that he need disentangle from any statement that serves his purpose.

-- 2. Toward understanding clearly the relations of the terms of a proposition, it is often found useful to employ diagrams; and the diagrams most in use are the circles of Euler.

These circles represent the denotation of the terms. Suppose the proposition to be _All hollow-horned animals ruminate_: then, if we could collect all ruminants upon a prairie, and enclose them with a circular palisade; and segregate from amongst them all the hollow-horned beasts, and enclose them with another ring-fence inside the other; one way of interpreting the proposition (namely, in denotation) would be figured to us thus:

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 1.]

An Universal Affirmative may also state a relation between two terms whose denotation is co-extensive. A definition always does this, as _Man is a rational animal_; and this, of course, we cannot represent by two distinct circles, but at best by one with a thick circ.u.mference, to suggest that two coincide, thus:

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 2.]

The Particular Affirmative Proposition may be represented in several ways. In the first place, bearing in mind that 'Some' means 'some at least, it may be all,' an I. proposition may be represented by Figs. 1 and 2; for it is true that _Some horned animals ruminate_, and that _Some men are rational_. Secondly, there is the case in which the 'Some things' of which a predication is made are, in fact, not all; whilst the predicate, though not given as distributed, yet might be so given if we wished to state the whole truth; as if we say _Some men are Chinese_.

This case is also represented by Fig. 1, the outside circle representing 'Men,' and the inside one 'Chinese.' Thirdly, the predicate may appertain to some only of the subject, but to a great many other things, as in _Some horned beasts are domestic_; for it is true that some are not, and that certain other kinds of animals are, domestic. This case, therefore, must be ill.u.s.trated by overlapping circles, thus:

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 3.]

The Universal Negative is sufficiently represented by a single Fig. (4): two circles mutually exclusive, thus:

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 4.]

That is, _No horned beasts are carnivorous_.

Lastly, the Particular Negative may be represented by any of the Figs.