The Approach to Philosophy Part 3

"The view of a fine country, a succession of agreeable prospects, a free air, a good appet.i.te, and the health I gain by walking; the freedom of inns, and the distance from everything that can make me recollect the dependence of my situation, conspire to free my soul, and give boldness to my thoughts, throwing me, in a manner, into the immensity of things, where I combine, choose, and appropriate them to my fancy, without restraint or fear. I dispose of all nature as I please."[64:6]

[Sidenote: Religion as Belief in the Disposition of the Residual Environment, or Universe.]

- 20. In such confidence or distrust, inspired originally by the social environment, and similarly suggested by other surroundings of life, we have the key to the religious consciousness. But it is now time to add that in the case of religion these att.i.tudes are concerned with the universal or supernatural rather than with present and normal human relations.h.i.+ps. Religious reactions are "total reactions."

"To get at them," says William James, "you must go behind the foreground of existence and reach down to that curious _sense of the whole residual cosmos as an everlasting presence_, intimate or alien, terrible or amusing, lovable or odious, which in some degree everyone possesses. This _sense of the world's presence_, appealing as it does to our peculiar individual temperament, makes us either strenuous or careless, devout or blasphemous, gloomy or exultant about life at large; and our reaction, involuntary and inarticulate and often half unconscious as it is, is the completest of all our answers to the question, 'What is the character of this universe in which we dwell?'"[65:7]

This _residual environment_, or profounder realm of tradition and nature, may have any degree of unity from chaos to cosmos. For religion its significance lies in the idea of original and far-reaching power rather than in the idea of totality. But that which is at first only "beyond," is _practically_ the same object as that which comes in the development of thought to be conceived as the "world" or the "universe."

We may therefore use these latter terms to indicate the object of religion, until the treatment of special instances shall define it more precisely. Religion is, then, _man's sense of the disposition of the universe to himself_. We shall expect to find, as in the social phenomena with which we have just dealt, that the manifestation of this sense consists in a general reaction appropriate to the disposition so attributed. He will be fundamentally ill at ease, profoundly confident, or will habitually take precautions to be safe. The ultimate nature of the world is here no speculative problem. The savage who could feel some joy at living in the universe would be more religious than the sublimest dialectician. It is in the vividness of the sense of this presence that the acuteness of religion consists. I am religious in so far as the whole tone and temper of my living reflects a belief as to what the universe thinks of such as me.

[Sidenote: Examples of Religious Belief.]

- 21. The examples that follow are selected because their differences in personal flavor serve to throw into relief their common religious character. Theodore Parker, in describing his own boyhood, writes as follows:

"I can hardly think without a shudder of the terrible effect the doctrine of eternal d.a.m.nation had on me. How many, many hours have I wept with terror as I lay on my bed, till, between praying and weeping, sleep gave me repose. But before I was nine years old this fear went away, and I saw clearer light in the goodness of G.o.d. But for years, say from seven till ten, I said my prayers with much devotion, I think, and then continued to repeat, 'Lord, forgive my sins,' till sleep came on me."[67:8]

Compare with this Stevenson's Christmas letter to his mother, in which he says:

"The whole necessary morality is kindness; and it should spring, of itself, from the one fundamental doctrine, Faith.

If you are sure that G.o.d, in the long run, means kindness by you, you should be happy; and if happy, surely you should be kind."[67:9]

Here is destiny frowning and destiny smiling, but in each case so real, so present, as to be immediately responded to with helpless terror and with grateful warm-heartedness.

The author of the "Imitatio Christi" speaks thus of the daily living of the Christian:

"The life of a Christian who has dedicated himself to the service of G.o.d should abound with eminent virtues of all kinds, that he may be really the same person which he is by outward appearance and profession. Indeed, he ought not only to be the same, but much more, in his inward disposition of soul; because he professes to serve a G.o.d who sees the inward parts, a searcher of the heart and reins, a G.o.d and Father of spirits: and therefore, since we are always in His sight, we should be exceedingly careful to avoid all impurity, all that may give offence to Him whose eyes cannot behold iniquity. We should, in a word, so far as mortal and frail nature can, imitate the blessed angels in all manner of holiness, since we, as well as they, are always in His presence. . . . And good men have always this notion of the thing. For they depend upon G.o.d for the success of all they do, even of their best and wisest undertakings."[68:10]

Such is to be the practical acknowledgment of G.o.d in the routine of life. The more direct response to this presence appears abundantly in St. Augustine's conversation and reminiscence with G.o.d.

"How evil have not my deeds been; or if not my deeds my words; or if not my words my will? But Thou, O Lord, art good and merciful, and Thy right hand had respect unto the profoundness of my death, and removed from the bottom of my heart that abyss of corruption. And this was the result, that I willed not to do what I willed, and willed to do what thou willedst. . . . How sweet did it suddenly become to me to be without the delights of trifles! And what at one time I feared to lose, it was now a joy to me to put away. For Thou didst cast them away from me, Thou true and highest sweetness.

Thou didst cast them away, and instead of them didst enter in Thyself--sweeter than all pleasure, though not to flesh and blood; brighter than all light, but more veiled than all mysteries; more exalted than all honor, but not to the exalted in their own conceits. Now was my soul free from the gnawing cares of seeking and getting. . . . And I babbled unto Thee my brightness, my riches, and my health, the Lord my G.o.d."[69:11]

In these two pa.s.sages we meet with religious conduct and with the supreme religious experience, the direct wors.h.i.+p of G.o.d. In each case the heart of the matter is an individual's indubitable conviction of the world's favorable concern for him. The deeper order of things const.i.tutes the real and the profoundly congenial community in which he lives.

[Sidenote: Typical Religious Phenomena: Conversion.]

- 22. Let us now apply this general account of the religious experience to certain typical religious phenomena: _conversion_; _piety_; and religious _instruments_, _symbolisms_, _and_ modes of _conveyance_.

Although recent study of the phenomenon of _conversion_ has brought to light a considerable amount of interesting material, there is some danger of misconceiving its importance. The psychology of conversion is primarily the psychology of crisis or radical alteration, rather than the psychology of religion. For the majority of religious men and women conversion is an insignificant event, and in very many cases it never occurs at all. Religion is more purely present where it is normal and monotonous. But this phenomenon is nevertheless highly significant in that religion and irreligion are placed in close juxtaposition, and the contribution of religion at its inception thereby emphasized. In general it is found that conversion takes place during the period of adolescence. But this is the time of the most sudden expansion of the environment of life; a time when there is the awakening consciousness of many a new presence. This is sometimes expressed by saying that it is a period of acute self-consciousness. Life is conscious of itself as over against its inheritance; the whole setting of life sweeps into view.

Some solution of the life problem, some coming to terms with the universe, is the normal issue of it. Religious conversion signifies, then, that in this fundamental adjustment a man defines and accepts for his life a certain att.i.tude on the part of the universe. The examples cited by the psychologists, as well as the generalizations which they derive, bear out this interpretation.

"General Booth, the founder of the Salvation Army, considers that the first vital step in saving outcasts consists in making them feel that some decent human being cares enough for them to take an interest in the question whether they are to rise or sink."[71:12]

The new state is here one of courage and hope stimulated by the glow of friendly interest. The convert is no longer "out in the cold." He is told that the world wishes him well, and this is brought home to him through representations of the tenderness of Christ, and through the direct ministerings of those who mediate it. But somehow the convert must be persuaded to realize all this. He must _believe_ it before it can mean anything to him. He is therefore urged to pray--a proceeding that is at first ridiculous to him, since it involves taking for granted what he disbelieves. But therein lies the critical point. It is peculiar to the object in this case that it can exist only for one who already believes in it. The psychologists call this the element of "self-surrender." To be converted a man must somehow suffer his surroundings to put into him a new heart, which may thereupon confirm its object. Such belief is tremendously tenacious because it so largely creates its own evidence. Once believe that "G.o.d, in the long run, means kindness by you," and you are likely to stand by it to the end--the more so in this case because the external evidence either way is to the average man so insufficient. Such a belief as this is inspired in the convert, not by reasoning, but by all the powers of suggestion that personality and social contagion can afford.

[Sidenote: Piety.]

- 23. The psychologists describe _piety_ as a sense of unity. One feels after reading their accounts that they are too abstract. For there are many kinds of unity, characteristic of widely varying moods and states.

Any state of rapt attention is a state of unity, and this occurs in the most secular and humdrum moments of life. Nor does it help matters to say that in the case of religion this unity must have been preceded by a state of division; for we cannot properly characterize any state of mind in terms of another state unless the latter be retained in the former.

And that which is characteristic of the religious sense of unity would seem to be just such an overcoming of difference. There is a recognition of two distinct att.i.tudes, which may be more or less in sympathy with one another, but which are both present even in their fullest harmony.

Were I to be taken out of myself so completely as to forget myself, I should inevitably lose that sense of sympathy from which arises the peculiar exultation of religious faith, a heightened experience of the same type with the freedom and spontaneity that I experience in the presence of those with whom I feel most in accord. The further graces and powers of religion readily submit to a similar description. My sense of positive sympathy expresses itself in an att.i.tude of well-wis.h.i.+ng; living in an atmosphere of kindness I instinctively endeavor to propagate it. My buoyancy is distinctly of that quality which to a lesser degree is due to any sense of social security; my power is that of one who works in an environment that reenforces him. I experience the objective or even cosmical character of my enterprises. They have a momentum which makes me their instrument rather than their perpetrator.

A paradoxical relation between religion and morality has always interested observers of custom and history. Religion is apparently as capable of the most fiendish malevolence as of the most saintly gentleness. Fielding writes that,

"When religion is brought out or into daily life and used as a guide or a weapon in the world it has no effect either for good or evil. Its effect is simply in strengthening the heart, in blinding the eyes, in deafening the ears. It is an intensive force, an intoxicant. It doubles or trebles a man's powers. It is an impulsive force sending him headlong down the path of emotion, whether that path lead to glory or to infamy.

It is a tremendous stimulant, that is all."[74:13]

Religion does not originate life purposes or define their meaning, but stimulates them by the same means that works in all corporate and social activity. To work with the universe is the most tremendous incentive that can appeal to the individual will. Hence in highly ethical religions the power for good exceeds that of any other social and spiritual agency. Such religion makes present, actual, and real, that good on the whole which the individual otherwise tends to distinguish from that which is good for _him_. In daily life the morally valid and the practically urgent are commonly arrayed against one another; but the ethical religion makes the valid urgent.

[Sidenote: Religious Instruments, Symbolism, and Modes of Conveyance.]

- 24. The _instruments_ of religion are legion, and it is in order here only to mention certain prominent cases in which their selection would seem to have direct reference to the provocation and perpetuation of such a sense of att.i.tude as we have been describing. This is true in a general way of all _symbolism_. There is no essential difference between the religious symbol and such symbols as serve to remind us of human relations.h.i.+ps. In both cases the perceptual absence of will is compensated for by the presence of some object a.s.sociated with that will. The function of this object is due to its power to revive and perpetuate a certain special social atmosphere. But the most important vehicle of religion has always been personality. It is, after all, to priests, prophets, and believers that religious cults have owed their long life. The traits that mark the prophet are both curious and sublime. He is most remarkable for the confidence with which he speaks for the universe. Whether it be due to lack of a sense of humor or to a profound conviction of truth, is indifferent to our purpose. The power of such men is undoubtedly in their suggestion of a force greater than they, whose designs they bring directly and socially to the attention of men. The prophet in his prophesying is indeed not altogether distinguished from G.o.d, and it is through the mediation of a directly perceptible human att.i.tude that a divine att.i.tude gets itself fixed in the imagination of the believer. What is true of the prophet is equally true of the preacher whose function it is not to represent G.o.d in his own person, but to depict him with his tongue. It is generally recognized that the preacher is neither a moralizer nor a theologian.

But it is less perfectly understood that it is his function to suggest the presence of G.o.d. His proper language is that of the imagination, and the picture which he portrays is that of a reciprocal social relations.h.i.+p between man and the Supreme Master of the situation of life. He will not define G.o.d or prove G.o.d, but introduce Him and talk about Him. And at the same time the a.s.sociation of prayer and wors.h.i.+p with his sermon, and the atmosphere created by the meeting together of a body of disciples, will act as the confirmation of his suggestions of such a living presence.

The _conveyance_ of any single religious cult from generation to generation affords a signal ill.u.s.tration of the importance in religion of the recognition of att.i.tude. Religions manage somehow to survive any amount of transformation of creed and ritual. It is not what is done, or what is thought, that identifies the faith of the first Christians with that of the last, but a certain reckoning with the disposition of G.o.d.

The successive generations of Christians are introduced into the spiritual world of their fathers, with its furnis.h.i.+ng of hopes and fears remaining substantially the same; and their Christianity consists in their continuing to live in it with only a slight and gradual renovation. To any given individual G.o.d is more or less completely represented by his elders in the faith in their exhortations and ministerings; and through them he fixes as the centre of his system an image of G.o.d his accuser or redeemer.

[Sidenote: Historical Types of Religion. Primitive Religions.]

- 25. The complete verification of this interpretation of the religious experience would require the application of it to the different historical cults. In general the examination of such instances is entirely beyond the scope of this chapter; but a brief consideration may be given to those which seem to afford reasonable grounds for objection.

First, it may be said that in _primitive religions_, notably in fetichism, tabooism, and totemism, there is no recognition of a cosmical unity. It is quite evident that there is no conception of a universe.

But it is equally evident that the natural and historical environment in its generality has a very specific practical significance for the primitive believer. It is often said with truth that these earliest religions are more profoundly pantheistic than polytheistic. Man recognizes an all-pervading interest that is capable of being directed to himself. The selection of a deity is not due to any special qualification for deification possessed by the individual object itself, but to the tacit presumption that, as Thales said, "all things are full of G.o.ds." The disposition of residual reality manifests to the believer no consistency or unity, but it is nevertheless the most constant object of his will. He lives in the midst of a capriciousness which he must appease if he is to establish himself at all.

[Sidenote: Buddhism.]

- 26. Secondly, in the case of _Buddhism_ we are said to meet with a religion that is essentially atheistic.

"Whether Buddhas arise, O priests, or whether Buddhas do not arise, it remains a fact and the fixed and necessary const.i.tution of being, that all its const.i.tuents are transitory."[78:14]

The secret of life lies in the application of this truth:

"O builder! I've discovered thee!

This fabric thou shalt ne'er rebuild!

Thy rafters all are broken now, And pointed roof demolished lies!

This mind has demolition reached, And seen the last of all desire!"[78:15]

The case of Buddha himself and of the exponents of his purely esoteric doctrine, belong to the reflective type which will presently be given special consideration. But with the ordinary believer, even where an extraneous but almost inevitable polytheism is least in evidence, the religious experience consists in substantially the same elements that appear in theistic religions. The individual is here living appropriately to the ultimate nature of things, with the ceaseless periods of time in full view. That which is brought home to him is the illusoriness and hollowness of things when taken in the spirit of active endeavor. The only profound and abiding good is nothingness. While nature and society conspire to mock him, Nirvana invites him to its peace. The religious course of his life consists in the use of such means as can win him this end. From the stand-point of the universe he has the sympathy only of that wisdom whose essence is self-destruction.

And this truth is mediated by the imagination of divine sympathy, for the Blessed One remains as the perpetual incarnation of his own blessedness.

[Sidenote: Critical Religion.]

- 27. Finally there remains the consideration of the bearing of this interpretation upon the more refined and disciplined religions. The religion of the critically enlightened man is less naive and credulous in its imagery. G.o.d tends to vanish into an ideal or a universal, into some object of theoretical definition. Here we are on that borderland where an a.s.signment of individual cases can never be made with any certainty of correctness. We can generalize only by describing the conditions that such cases must fulfil if they are properly to be denominated religious. And there can be no question of the justice of deriving such a description from the reports of historical and inst.i.tutional religions. An idealistic philosophy will, then, be a religion just in so far as it is rendered practically vivid by the imagination. Such imagination must create and sustain a social relations.h.i.+p. The question of the legitimacy of this imagination is another matter. It raises the issue concerning the judgment of truth implied in religion, and this is the topic of the next chapter. At any rate the religious experience _may be_ realized by virtue of the metaphorical or poetical representation of a situation as one of intercommunication between persons, where reflective definition at the same time denies it. The human wors.h.i.+pper may supply the personality of G.o.d from himself, viewing himself as from the divine stand-point. But whatever faculty supplies this indispensable social quality of religion, he who defines G.o.d as the ultimate goodness or the ultimate truth, has certainly not yet wors.h.i.+pped Him. He begins to be religious only when such an ideal determines the atmosphere of his daily living; when he regards the immanence of such an ideal in nature and history as the object of his will; and when he responds to its presence in the spirit of his conduct and his contemplation.

FOOTNOTES:

[54:1] Cf. Caird: _The Evolution of Religion_, Lectures II, III.

[58:2] Cf. Leuba: _Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion_, _Monist_, Vol. XI, p. 195.