Calvinistic Controversy Part 1

Calvinistic Controversy.

by Wilbur Fisk.

A DISCOURSE

ON

PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION.

According as he hath chosen us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before him in love.

Having predestinated us unto the adoption of children, by Jesus Christ, to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, Ephesians i, 4, 5.

In this pa.s.sage, the kindred doctrines of predestination and election are brought into view. To discuss them, to notice some errors respecting them, and to exhibit what is believed to be the Scriptural and rational view of these doctrines, is the proposed object of the present discourse. In doing this, much that is new cannot be expected. The whole ground of this controversy has been examined and re-examined; and the various arguments, on both sides, have been urged and opposed, by the most able polemics in philosophy and theology. The most, therefore, that can now be expected, is to give a concise view of the subject, in a form and manner suited to the present state of the controversy, and to the circ.u.mstances of the present congregation.

It is hoped, at least, that the subject may be investigated in the spirit of Christianity; and that there will be no loss of brotherly and Christian candour, if there be no gain, on the side of truth. Yet, in a desire to give no offence, I must not suppress the truth, nor neglect to point out, as I am able, the absurdity of error, and its unprofitable influences on the minds of those who propagate or receive it. The truth should be spoken, but it should be spoken in love. Neither the subject, nor the age, nor the occasion, will admit of temporizing. With these views, we come to our subject, by examining,

I. Predestination in general;

II. Predestination, in its particular relation to the doctrine of election.

I. By predestination, we understand an efficient predetermination to bring about or accomplish any future event. But as G.o.d alone has knowledge to comprehend futurity, and power to direct and control future events; predestination, in a _proper_ and _strict_ sense, can only be used in reference to him. And with respect to G.o.d, predestination is that efficient determination which he has maintained from eternity, respecting the control, direction, and destiny of the laws, events, and creatures of the universe.--That G.o.d hath a predetermination of this kind, there can be no doubt; and therefore, on this fact, there can be no dispute. But the ground of controversy is, the unlimited extent to which some have carried this idea of predestination. Calvin, on this subject, says, "Every action and motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of G.o.d, so that nothing can come to pa.s.s, but was ordained by him." The a.s.sembly's Catechism is similar:--"G.o.d did, from all eternity, unchangeably ordain whatever comes to pa.s.s." And Mr. Buck defines predestination to mean, "The decree of G.o.d, whereby he hath, for his own glory, foreordained whatever comes to pa.s.s." With these definitions, which, it is seen, are the same in substance, agree all the Calvinistic divines in Europe and America.--To this view of predestination, others, and we confess ourselves of that number, have objected. We believe that the character and acts of intelligent beings, so far at least as their moral accountability is concerned, are not definitely fixed, and efficiently produced, by the unalterable purpose and efficient decree of G.o.d. Here therefore we are at issue. We believe, with the rigid predestinarians, that G.o.d hath fixed the laws of the physical and moral world, and that he hath a general plan, suited to all the various circ.u.mstances and contingencies of his government; but that it is no part of this plan, efficiently to control and actuate the human will. So far, therefore, as these ultra-predestinarians go beyond us, they affirm what we deny; and of course the burden of proof falls upon them. We shall first, then, hear and answer the arguments in defence of their system, and then bring up our arguments against it.[1]

The supporters of this system endeavour to establish their views by a threefold argument--the foreknowledge of G.o.d--the necessity of a plan--and Scripture testimony.

1. The first argument is founded on foreknowledge. It is sometimes contended that predestination and foreknowledge are the same. This, however, by the more judicious, is not now insisted on. For it is self-evident, that _to know_, and _to decree_, are distinct operations; and to every one acquainted with the common definition of the terms, they must convey distinct and different ideas. And if these are distinct operations in the _human_ mind, they must be also in the _Divine_ mind, unless it can be shown that these terms, when applied to G.o.d, have an entirely different meaning from that by which they are understood among men. And as this cannot be pretended, the more common and plausible argument is, that the foreknowledge of G.o.d necessarily _implies_ predestination. "For how," they ask, "can an action that is really to come to pa.s.s, be foreseen, if it be not determined? G.o.d foreknew every thing from the beginning; but this he could not have known, if he had not so determined it." "G.o.d," says Piscator, "foresees nothing but what he has decreed, and his decree precedes his knowledge." And Calvin says, "G.o.d therefore foreknows all things that will come to pa.s.s, because he has decreed they shall come to pa.s.s." But to this idea there are insuperable objections. Prescience is an essential attribute of the Divine nature. But a determination to do this or that, is not essential to the Divine nature. For aught we can see, G.o.d might determine to make a particular planet or not to make it, and in either case the perfection of his nature is not affected. But _to know_, is so essential to him, that the moment he ceases to know all that is, or will be, or might be, under any possible contingency, he ceases to be G.o.d. Is it not absurd, then, to say the least, to make an essential attribute of Deity depend upon the _exercise_ of his attributes?--the Divine prescience depend upon his decrees and determinations? It would seem, by this argument, that, if not in the order of time, at least, in the order of thought, and in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of an attribute preceded the attribute itself; and, in short, the attribute must be exercised, as a cause, to bring it into existence! To this monstrous conclusion we are led by following out this argument. And connected with it is another, equally monstrous and absurd. If G.o.d must predetermine events in order to know them, then, as the cause is in no case dependent on the effect, the decrees of G.o.d must be pa.s.sed and his plan contrived, independently of his knowledge, which only had an existence as the effect of these decrees. What must be the character of that plan, and of those decrees, which were formed and matured without knowledge, we will not stop to examine, for the idea borders too closely upon the ludicrous to be dwelt upon in a serious discourse. And yet I cannot see how this conclusion can be avoided, reasoning from such premises. It seems to us, therefore, altogether more consistent to consider that, in the order of cause and effect, the exercise of the Divine attributes is consequent upon their existence; and that the plan of the Almighty is the result of his infinite knowledge; and that the decrees of his throne flow forth from the eternal fountain of his wisdom. This idea, moreover, accords with the Scriptures:--"For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son." "Elect according to the foreknowledge of G.o.d the Father." In these pa.s.sages predestination and the decree of election are most clearly founded on foreknowledge. This, therefore, must settle the question: G.o.d foreknows in order to predestinate; but he does not predestinate in order to foreknow.[2]

But foreknowledge is pressed into this argument in another form. "The foreknowledge of G.o.d," it is said, "is tantamount to a decree; because, inasmuch as G.o.d cannot be in a mistake, whatever he foreknows must take place--his knowledge makes it certain." This is indeed s.h.i.+fting the argument; for if G.o.d's knowledge makes an event certain, of course it is not his predetermination. But, according to this notion, every thing contained in the idea of predestination is implied in foreknowledge, which is only throwing the subject back on the ground first glanced at, that knowledge and decree are both one, which is obviously absurd.

Beside, such an idea would make the scriptures that represent G.o.d's foreknowledge as distinct from his decree and antecedent to it, worse than unmeaning: "Whom he did foreknow, them he did predestinate," would mean, "whom he did predestinate, them he did predestinate"--and, "Elect according to the foreknowledge of G.o.d," would only mean, "that the decree of election was _according_ to the decree of election!" the absurdity of which is too apparent to need comment. And it may be urged, farther, in reply to this argument, that knowledge or foreknowledge cannot, in the nature of things, have the least possible influence in making an event certain. It is not at all difficult to conceive how the certainty of an event can beget knowledge; but if any one thinks that knowledge is the cause of certainty, let him show it--to me such a connection is inconceivable. Whatever G.o.d foreknows or foresees, will undoubtedly come to pa.s.s. But the simple question is, Does the event take place because it is foreknown, or is it foreknown because it will take place? Or, in other words, Does G.o.d know an event to be certain because it is certain, or does his knowing it to be certain make it certain? The question thus stated, at once suggests the true answer; for he would be considered a fool or a madman who should seriously a.s.sert that a knowledge of a certainty produced that certainty. According to that, a certainty must exist in order to be foreknown; and it must be foreknown in order to exist! From all which it appears that foreknowledge can have no influence in making a future event certain.

Since, therefore, foreknowledge is not predestination; and does not, according to Scripture or reason, follow predestination as a consequence, and has no possible influence in making an event certain, no proof can be drawn from the Divine prescience in favour of the doctrine that _G.o.d hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pa.s.s_.

2. But predestination is argued from the necessity of a Divine plan. "It cannot be conceived," it is said, "that G.o.d would leave things at random, and have no plan. But no alteration of his plan can take place upon condition that his creatures act in this or that way." But this argument is easily answered, at least for the present. For it a.s.sumes what ought to be proved; and what has not, to my knowledge, ever been proved, viz. that to deny Calvinian predestination, is to deny that G.o.d has a perfect plan. We acknowledge and maintain that G.o.d has a plan, one part of which is, to govern his responsible subjects, without controlling their will, by a fixed decree--to punish the incorrigible, and save those who repent and believe. Does such a plan imply the necessity of a change, "on condition that his creatures act in this or that way?" If, indeed, it was necessary for G.o.d to decree an event, in order to foreknow it, this inference might be just. But as this is seen to be false, it follows that a perfect G.o.d, whose eye surveys immensity and eternity at a glance, and who necessarily knows all possibilities and contingencies; all that is, or will be, can perfectly arrange his plan, and preclude the possibility of a disappointment, although he does not, by a decree of predestination, fix all the volitions and acts of his subjects. Even in human governments, where the rulers can have no knowledge of the individuals who will transgress, or of the nature and extent of the transgressions, the principles and plan of government undergo no change to accommodate themselves to the contingent acts of the subjects. How absurd, then, to suppose that the all-wise Ruler of the universe will be subject to disappointment, unless he predestinate the transgressions of sinners, and the obedience of his saints! The truth is, in my view, this idea detracts from the wisdom of G.o.d; for the perfection of his plan, as they maintain it, is predicated on the imperfection of his attributes. But our view of the Divine plan accords well with our idea of his infinite nature. Over the universe, and through eternity, he throws his all-pervading knowledge--as he is in every point of wide immensity, so he is in every moment of long eternity--and can such a G.o.d be disappointed?

3. "But," say the advocates of this system, "supposing there are difficulties in this subject, the Scriptures abound with pa.s.sages which at once prove the doctrine." If this is true, then indeed we must submit. But the question is, where are these pa.s.sages? After such a strong a.s.sertion, it would probably appear surprising to one unacquainted with this subject, to learn that there is not a single pa.s.sage which teaches directly that G.o.d hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pa.s.s. Yet this is the fact. If this doctrine is taught in Scripture, it is in an indirect manner. Nor will it follow, because G.o.d hath predestinated some things, that he hath, therefore, decreed all things. All those pa.s.sages then which have been so frequently quoted as proof of this doctrine, which only go to prove, that G.o.d hath predetermined certain events, are not proof in point. Where are the pa.s.sages that say he hath decreed all things? We know of many which say of certain events that have come to pa.s.s, that G.o.d did not _command_ them, nor _will_ them; so that the abundant Scripture proof seems altogether on the other side of the question. It is argued, however, that certain acts of moral agents, even those acts for which they are held responsible, are, according to the Scriptures, the results of G.o.d's predetermination, and therefore it is reasonable to infer that all are.

This general conclusion, however, is not contained in the premises; nevertheless, if the premises are true, if it can be proved from Scripture that G.o.d holds his creatures responsible for the results of his own decrees, such Scripture proofs would be strong arguments to ward off the objections that are brought against this system. For if it is consistent with a righteous G.o.d to make a moral agent responsible for one event which was the result of a Divine decree, upon the same principle, perhaps, he might make him responsible for all, though all were decreed. Let us then look at those scriptures, "As for you," says Joseph to his brethren, speaking of their injustice to him, "ye thought evil against me, but G.o.d meant it for good." Now without stopping here to inquire whether Joseph was inspired to utter this sentiment, we are ready to acknowledge, that there are a number of similar scriptures which teach that, in the results of the wicked acts of wicked men, G.o.d had a design and a controlling influence, and thereby made them subservient to his own purposes. He hath wisdom and power "to make the wrath of man praise him, and to restrain the remainder of wrath." But does he therefore decree the wrath itself? And is this wrath necessary to the accomplishment of his purposes? As well might it be said, that because a government, in quelling a rebellion, replenished its exchequer from the confiscated estates of the rebels, therefore that government decreed the rebellion, and was dependent upon it for the prosperity of the nation. Let it be distinctly understood then, that to overrule and control the _results_ of an act is altogether different from making the act itself the result of an overruling and controlling power.

Again it is said, "The Lord hath made all things for himself, yea, even the wicked for the day of evil." That the Lord hath made all things for his own glory, is a proposition easily understood, and doubted, I trust, by none; and this is evidently the meaning of the former member of this pa.s.sage. The latter clause, if it helps the cause for which it is quoted at all, must mean, that the Lord has predestinated men to be wicked, that he might make them miserable. But it is not necessary to make the text speak this shocking sentiment. We should do the text no violence to explain it thus--The Lord hath destined the wicked for the day of evil, and this shall be for his glory.

But there is another cla.s.s of pa.s.sages like the following:--"He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth." "He worketh all things after the counsel of his will." "I will do all my pleasure." But these pa.s.sages establish nothing, in opposition to our views, unless it should first be proved, by other pa.s.sages, or in some other way, that it is G.o.d's will and pleasure to work _all things_, even wickedness, in the wicked. These scriptures prove that all _G.o.d's works_ are in accordance with his own will and pleasure; and that he will accomplish them in spite of the opposition of sinners. If it pleases him to form his moral government, so as to leave the responsible acts of his subjects unnecessitated by his decree, this he will do, for "he will do all his pleasure."

But there is still another cla.s.s of texts, which are supposed to favour the doctrine we are opposing, more than any others, viz. those pa.s.sages which seem to represent G.o.d as bringing about and procuring the wickedness of the wicked. Like the following:--"And I will harden Pharaoh's heart, that he should not let the people go." "Now therefore the Lord hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets." "He hath blinded their eyes and hardened their hearts." "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of G.o.d, ye have taken, and by wicked hands ye have crucified and slain." On these and similar pa.s.sages it may be remarked, that G.o.d blinds men and hardens their hearts judicially, as a just punishment for their abuse of their agency. And for this act of his, in blinding and hardening them, he does not make them responsible. But he holds them responsible for that degree of wickedness which made it just and necessary to give them over to this hardness of heart and blindness of mind. And since there are wicked men and lying spirits, they become fit instruments in deceiving and tormenting each other; and therefore G.o.d gives them power and liberty to go abroad, "deceiving and being deceived." But how does this prove that G.o.d hath decreed sin? The idea that G.o.d hath made sin and wicked spirits the instruments of hardening and tormenting the incorrigible sinner, and finally of shutting the door of hope against him, has no kind of affinity to the idea, that he decreed the sin which occasioned this hardness, or ordained the wickedness of this lying spirit.

As to the pa.s.sage from the Acts, none of us deny but that Jesus Christ was delivered up to suffer and die, by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of G.o.d; but it is most emphatically denied, that this or any other scripture proves, that the taking and slaying of Jesus Christ by wicked hands, was the result of the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of G.o.d. If any think otherwise, let them prove it.

Having stated and, as our time would permit, examined the arguments in favour of the sentiment we are opposing, we are prepared to urge against this doctrine, not only that its arguments are unsound and insufficient, but also that the system itself is liable to the most serious and formidable objections.

1. This doctrine of predestination makes G.o.d the author of sin. Some acknowledge this, and expressly a.s.sert, that G.o.d is the "_efficient_ cause" of sin. Others affirm it in fact, while they deny it in word.

Take for instance the words of Calvin. "I will not scruple to own," he says, "that the will of G.o.d lays a necessity on all things, and that every thing he wills, necessarily comes to pa.s.s." In accordance with this, Piscator, Dr. Twiss, Peter Martyr and others tell us, that "G.o.d procures adultery, cursings, and lyings"--"G.o.d is the author of that act, which is evil"--"G.o.d, by his working on the hearts of the wicked, binds them and stirs them to do evil." They deny, however, that G.o.d is the author of sin, because they say, "G.o.d necessitates them to the _act_, and not to the _depravity_ of sin:" or, that "G.o.d does not sin when he makes men sin, because _he_ is under no law, and therefore cannot sin." But these are miserable s.h.i.+fts. Has not the _deformity_ of sin come to pa.s.s? Then G.o.d has decreed this deformity. To deny this, is to give up the doctrine. But to acknowledge it, is to own that G.o.d is as much the author of the deformity, as he is of the act. Again, G.o.d doubtless decreed that sin should be _sin_, and not _holiness;_ and it came to pa.s.s as sin, because it was so decreed. Is he not then the direct procuring cause? A thousand turns of this kind, therefore, are nothing but evasions. The _fiat_ of G.o.d brought forth sin as certainly as it made the world.

We are often told, when we quote Calvin and his contemporaries, that these are old authors; that modern Calvinists do not hold thus, and that they ought not to be accountable for these writers. But the fact is, we make them accountable only for the logical consequences of their own doctrine. The whole system turns on this hinge, "G.o.d foreordains whatsoever comes to pa.s.s." For he that, by his will and decree, produces and causes sin, that makes sin a necessary part of his plan, and is the author of the very elements and materials of his own plan, must be the proper and sole cause of sin, or we have yet to learn the definition of common words, and the meaning of plain propositions. The distinction therefore, of _ancient_ and _modern_, of _rigid_ and _moderate_ Calvinists, is more in word, than in reality. And it would add much to the consistency of this system, if all its advocates would acknowledge, what is evidently deducible from the premises, that G.o.d is the efficient cause of sin.

2. This doctrine of predestination destroys the free agency, and of course the accountability of man. That it destroys free will was seen and acknowledged by many predestinarians of the old school. And the opposers of Mr. Wesley and Mr. Fletcher violently a.s.sailed them on this subject. Mr. Southey informs us, in his Life of Wesley, that the Calvinists called this doctrine of free will, "a cursed doctrine"--"the most G.o.d-dishonouring and soul-destroying doctrine of the day"--"one of the prominent features of the beast"--"the enemy of G.o.d"--"the offspring of the wicked one"--"the insolent brat of h.e.l.l." Others, and the greater part of the Calvinists of the present day, endeavour to reconcile the ideas of _necessity_ and _free agency_. Man, they say, sins voluntarily, because he chooses or wills to sin; therefore he is a free agent. Hence they exhort sinners to repent, and tell them they can repent if they will. By which they mean, the only impossibility of their repenting, is in their will--their _cannot_ is their _will not_. This has led many to think that there is no difference, between their preachers and the Arminians. But let us look at this subject a little, and see if there is not some sophistry concealed in this dexterous coil of words. G.o.d, according to this doctrine, secures the end as well as the means, by his decree of predestination. And therefore, as Calvin says, "every action and motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of G.o.d."

The will, therefore, in all its operations, is governed and irresistibly controlled by some secret impulse, some fixed and all-controlling arrangement. It is altogether futile, then, to talk about free agency under such a const.i.tution; the very spring of motion to the whole intellectual machinery is under the influence of a secret, invincible power. And it _must_ move as that power directs, or it is the hand of Omnipotence that urges it on. He _can_ act as he _wills_, it is true, but the whole responsibility consists in the volition, and this is the result of G.o.d's propelling power. He wills as he is _made_ to will--he chooses as he _must_ choose, for the immutable decree of Jehovah is upon him. And can a man, upon the known and universally acknowledged principles of responsibility, be accountable for such a volition? It is argued, I know, that man is responsible, because he _feels_ that he acts freely, and that he might have done otherwise. To this I reply, that this is a good argument, on our principles, to prove that men are free--but on the Calvinistic ground, it only proves that G.o.d hath deceived us. He has made us _feel_ that we might do otherwise, but _he knows_ we _cannot_--he has _determined_ we _shall not_. So that, in fact, this argument makes the system more objectionable. While it does not change the fact in the case, it attributes deception to the Almighty. It is logically true, therefore, from this doctrine, that man is not a free agent, and therefore not responsible. A moral agent, to be free, must be possessed of a self-determining principle. Make the will any thing short of this, and you put all the volitions, and of course the whole moral man, under foreign and irresistible influences.

3. Another strong objection to the doctrine we oppose, is, it arrays G.o.d's secret decrees against his revealed word. G.o.d commands men not to sin, and yet ordains that they shall sin, In his word, he sets before them, in striking relief, motives of fear and of hope, for the express purpose, as he informs us, "that they sin not;" but by his predestination and secret counsel, he irresistibly impels them in an opposite course, for the express purpose, as this doctrine informs us, to secure their transgression. _His_ rule of action is in direct opposition to _our_ rule of duty. And yet he is the author of both! Is G.o.d at war with himself, or is he sporting and trifling with his creatures? Or is it not more probable than either, that the premises are false? When or where has G.o.d ever taught us, that he has two opposing wills? A character so suspicious, to say the least of it, ought not, without the most unequivocal evidence, to be attributed to the adorable Jehovah. In his word, we are taught, that he is "of _one_ mind"--that his "ways are equal;" and who can doubt it? We are told, it is true, to relieve the difficulty, that this seeming contradiction is one of the mysteries of G.o.d's incomprehensible nature. But it is not a _seeming_ contradiction, it is a _real_ one; not an insolvable mystery, but a palpable absurdity. _G.o.d prohibits the sinful act--G.o.d ordains and procures the sinful act--G.o.d wills the salvation of the reprobate, whom he has from all eternity irreversibly ordained to eternal death!_ When I can embrace such opposite propositions by calling them mysteries, I can believe that two and two are more than four, that all the parts are less than the whole, and that a thing may be made to exist and not exist at the same time and explain them by a reference to the mystery of G.o.d's incomprehensible nature.

4. In close connection with the foregoing objection, it may be added, that this system mars, if it does not destroy, the moral attributes of G.o.d. If he holds men responsible for what is unavoidable--if he makes laws and then impels men to break them, and finally punishes them for their transgressions--if he mourns over the evils of the world, and expostulates with sinners, saying, "How can I give thee up--my heart is melted within me, my repentings are kindled together,"--"O Jerusalem!

Jerusalem! how oft would I have gathered you, and ye would not,"--and still he himself "impels the will of men," to all this wickedness--if I say G.o.d does all this, where is his veracity? Where is his mercy? Where is his justice? What more could be said of the most merciless tyrant?

What, of the most arrant hypocrite? What, of Satan himself? What does this doctrine make of our heavenly Father? I shudder to follow it out into its legitimate bearings. It seems to me, a belief of it is enough to drive one to infidelity, to madness, and to death. If the supporters of this system _must_ adhere to it, I rejoice that they can close their eyes against its logical consequences, otherwise it would make them wretched in the extreme, or drive them into other dangerous theoretical and practical errors. Indeed, in many instances it has done this--which leads to another objection to this doctrine.

5. It puts a plea into the mouth of sinners to justify themselves in their sins, and leads to Universalism and infidelity. They reason thus: Whatever G.o.d decrees is according to his will, and therefore right. And G.o.d will not punish his creatures for doing right. Whatever G.o.d decrees is unavoidable, and G.o.d will not punish his creatures for what is unavoidable. But "every action and motion of every creature is governed by the hidden counsel of G.o.d." Therefore G.o.d will not punish any of his creatures for any of their acts. Now, who can point out any fallacy in this reasoning? If therefore predestination be true, Universalism is true, according to the universally acknowledged principles of justice.

And it is a notorious fact, that modern Universalism, which is prevailing so generally through the country, rests for its chief support on the doctrine of predestination. Others having seen, as they thought, that the Scriptures would not support the doctrine of Universalism, and that matter of fact seemed to contradict the above reasoning, inasmuch as men are made to suffer, even in this life, for their sins, have leaped over all Scriptural bounds into infidelity and philosophical necessity. I have personally known numbers who have been driven, by the doctrine we object to, into open infidelity. And it is well known, that the doctrine of fate, which is closely allied to Calvinian predestination, is the element in which infidelity "lives and moves and has its being." And can this be the doctrine of the Bible? How much is it to be regretted, that our worthy pilgrim fathers should have sowed this Geneva seed in our happy country! The evils done to the Church are incalculable.

These, candid hearers, are some of the objections we have to this doctrine--objections so serious, and, as we think, so obvious, that you may well ask, What has induced good men to advocate it so long? It is, doubtless, because it stands connected intimately with the doctrine of unconditional election, and what have been called by Calvinists "the doctrines of grace." But for unconditional election, predestination would not be desired, even by those who now hold to it; and but for predestination, unconditional election could not be maintained. Hence these have very properly been called "twin doctrines," and must stand or fall together. Let us pa.s.s then to the next proposition.

II. We come to examine predestination in its particular relation to election.

Several kinds of election are spoken of in the Scriptures. There is an election of individuals, to perform certain duties appointed by G.o.d:--thus Christ was G.o.d's elect, for the redemption of the world; and Cyrus was elected by him to rebuild the temple. There is an election of whole communities and nations to the enjoyment of certain peculiar privileges, political and ecclesiastical, relating of course to this life:--thus Jacob and his descendants were G.o.d's chosen people, to the enjoyment of religious and national privileges, from which Esau and his descendants, together with the whole Gentile world, were excluded; and thus, too, subsequently, the middle wall of part.i.tion, made by the former decree of election between Jew and Gentile, being broken down, the Gentiles became equal sharers with the Jews in the privileges of the new covenant, called the "election of grace." This election is unconditional, and is believed to be the one spoken of in our text, and many other pa.s.sages of Scripture. Of these, however, I shall speak more particularly in another place.

There is a third election--an election unto eternal life, and this is the one which has given rise to the great controversy in the Church.--Those who contend for predestination, as objected to by us, maintain that, "By the decree of G.o.d, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death. Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, G.o.d, before the foundation of the world, hath chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, _without any foresight of faith or good works_." Others, and this also is our doctrine, hold that "G.o.d did decree from the beginning, to elect, or choose in Christ, all that should believe unto salvation, and this decree proceeds from his own goodness, and is not built on any goodness of the creature; and that G.o.d did from the beginning decree to reprobate all who should finally and obstinately continue in unbelief." Thus it is seen, from the statement of the two doctrines, that ours is an election of character, and so far as it relates to individuals, it relates to them only as they are foreseen to possess that character; whereas the other relates directly to individuals, without any reference to character. It is an absolute act of sovereignty--G.o.d elects them for no other reason or condition than because he chooses. He makes no account of man's agency or responsibility in this decree of election, but it precedes and is entirely independent of any knowledge of the character of the elect. Our views of election, on the contrary, make it conditionally dependent on the responsible agency of man. In the one case, the sinner is made to receive Christ, because he is elected; and in the other, he is elected, because he receives Christ. From this difference, too, proceed other differences. The Calvinistic election, to be consistent with itself, requires that, as the end is arbitrarily fixed, so the means must be also--hence the doctrines of irresistible grace, effectual calling, and infallible perseverance. Calvinian election, therefore, stands intimately allied to Calvinian predestination; and the whole forms a chain of doctrines differing materially from ours. And here we acknowledge we have a position to prove as well as our opponents. We a.s.sert that election to eternal life is conditional; they, that it is unconditional. We will first attempt to prove our position--then state and answer the arguments in favour of unconditional election--and finally, urge some objections against unconditional election and reprobation.

1. Our first argument in favour of conditional election to eternal life, is drawn from the position already established, that the decrees of G.o.d are predicated on his foreknowledge. And especially, that the decree of election to salvation, according to the Scriptures, is founded on the Divine prescience. "Elect according to the foreknowledge of G.o.d, through sanctification of the Spirit unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ." "Whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate, to be conformed to the image of his Son." These scriptures seem to us decisive, that the decree of election rests on foreknowledge, and that this election is made, not according to the arbitrary act of G.o.d, but on the ground of sanctification and obedience. The doctrine, therefore, that men are predestinated to eternal life, "without any foresight of faith or good works," must be false.

2. The rewardableness of obedience, or the demerit of disobedience, can only exist in connection with the unnecessitated volitions of a free moral agent. The Scriptures abundantly teach, that to be saved, man must believe and obey; and hence they command and exhort men to believe and obey, and promise them the reward of eternal life if they do this, and criminate them, if they neglect it. But, according to the doctrine of free agency already explained, man's obedience or disobedience, if it has any just relation to rewards and punishments, must rest, in its responsible character, upon the self-determining principle of the will.

And if this view of the will be correct, there is an _utter impossibility_ of an unconditional election. For the very act of G.o.d, imparting this self-determining principle to man, renders it impossible, in the nature of things, for the Almighty himself to elect a moral agent, unconditionally. The argument stands thus--The Scriptures make man a responsible moral agent; but this he cannot be, if his will be controlled by foreign and unavoidable influences, therefore it is not so controlled: that is, man has within himself a self-determining principle, in the exercise of which he becomes responsible. This being established, we argue again--The doctrine of unconditional election necessarily implies irresistible grace, absolutely impelling and controlling the will. But this would be to counteract G.o.d's own work, and to destroy man's accountability; therefore there is no such irresistible grace, and, of course, no such unconditional election. And since there is an election to eternal life, spoken of in the Scriptures, it follows conclusively, if the foregoing reasoning be sound, that this election is conditional.--Hence we may bring forward, in one overwhelming argument, all the numerous and various Bible conditions of salvation, as so many Scripture proofs of a conditional election.

3. The cautions to the elect, and the intimations of their danger, and the possibility of their being lost, are so many Scripture proofs of a conditional election. Why should the saints be exhorted "to take heed lest they fall?" "lest there be in them an evil heart of unbelief, in departing from the living G.o.d?" "lest a promise being left of entering into rest, any should come short?" lest _they_ should "also be cut off?"

Why should St. Paul fear lest, after having preached to others, he should be a castaway? Either there is, or is not, danger of the elect's being lost. If not, then all these pa.s.sages are not only without meaning, but savour very strongly of deception. They are false colours held out to the elect, for the purposes of alarm and fear, where no fear is. Will it be said, that possibly some of those addressed were not of the elect, and were therefore deceiving themselves, and needed to be cautioned and warned? I answer, they had then nothing to fall from, and no promise of which to come short. Besides, to warn such to _stand fast_, seems to imply, that the Holy Spirit cautioned the reprobates against the danger of becoming the elect, which idea, while it intimates a very ungracious work for the "Spirit of grace" to be engaged in, clearly indicates, that there was danger of breaking the decree of reprobation! We ask again, therefore, What do these scriptures mean?

Will it be said, as some have argued, that these warnings and cautions are all consistent, because they are the very means by which the decree of election is made sure? But let it be understood, that the end is fixed, before the means; because Calvinism tells us, that this election is "independent of any faith or good works foreseen," and that "G.o.d's decree lays a necessity on all things, so that every thing he wills necessarily comes to pa.s.s," and is therefore sure, "because he has decreed it." The moment, therefore, G.o.d decrees an event, it becomes sure, and to talk of danger of a failure in that event, implies either a falsehood, or that G.o.d's decree can be _broken_. But Calvinists, I presume, will not allow that there is any danger of counteracting or frustrating the plan of the Almighty. Hence there is no danger of the elect's coming short of salvation. All the exhortations, cautions, and warnings therefore, recorded in the Scriptures, are false colours and deceptive motives. They are like the attempts of some weak parents, who undertake to frighten their children into obedience, by superst.i.tious tales and groundless fears. G.o.d knows, when he is giving out these intimations of danger, that there is no such danger; his own eternal, unchangeable decree had secured their salvation before the means were planned--all this if election is unconditional. But far be this from a G.o.d of truth. If he exhorts his creatures to "make their election sure,"

_he_ has not made it sure.--If he teaches them to fear, lest they fail of the grace of G.o.d, there is doubtless real danger. The conclusion therefore is irresistible, that Cod hath suspended his decree of election to eternal life, on conditions; "He that believeth: shall be saved."

4. This accords also with Christian experience. What is it that produces much fear and trembling in the mind of the awakened sinner? Why does he feel that there is but a step between him and destruction? Is it fancy, or is it fact? If it is imagination merely, then all his alarm is founded in deception, and he has either deceived himself, or the Spirit of G.o.d hath deceived him. In either case, this alarm seems necessary, in order to lead him to Christ. That is, it is necessary for the conversion of one of the elect that he be made to believe a lie. But if it be said, that it is no lie, for he is really in danger, then we reply again, the decree of G.o.d hath not made his election sure, and of course, therefore, it is conditional.

5. Express pa.s.sages of Scripture teach a conditional election. We have time only to notice a few of them. Matt. xxii, 14, "For many are called, but few are chosen." This pa.s.sage, with the parable of the wedding that precedes it, teaches that the _choice_ was made subsequently to the call, and was grounded on the fact, that those chosen had actually and fully complied with the invitation, and had come to the wedding duly prepared. John xv, 19, "If ye were of the world, the world would love you, but because ye are not of the world, but I have chosen you out of the world, therefore the world hateth you." This pa.s.sage teaches that Christ's disciples were once of the world, and that he had chosen them out of the world, and this _choice_ evidently refers to that time when they became of a different character from the world; for then it was, and in consequence of that election, that the world hated them.--2 Thess. ii, 13, "Because G.o.d hath from the beginning, _chosen_ you to salvation, through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth." Here is a condition plainly expressed. This is not an election _unto_ sanctification, but an election _through_ or _by_ sanctification and faith unto salvation.

From the whole then it appears, that the Holy Scriptures, the Divine attributes and government, and the agency of man, stand opposed to an unconditional, and are in favour of a conditional election.

In opposition to these arguments, however, and in favour of unconditional election, our opponents urge various scriptures, which, as they think, are strong and incontrovertible arguments in favour of their system. And as these scriptures are their strong and only defence, it is proposed that they should be noticed. The limits of this discourse, however, will admit of but a short notice, and that not of individual texts, but of cla.s.ses of texts.

1. The first cla.s.s of pa.s.sages that we will now examine, which are supposed to favour the idea of unconditional election, is those that speak of a predestination _unto_ holiness. Our text is one of the strongest instances of this kind, "He hath chosen us from the foundation of the world, that we should be holy--having predestinated us unto the adoption of sons," &c. See also Rom. viii, 29, "For whom he did foreknow, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son," and "whom he did predestinate--he called--justified--and sanctified." The argument upon these and similar pa.s.sages is, that the decree of predestination could not be founded on their faith or holiness; because they were predestinated to _become_ holy--the decree of predestination had their holiness for its object and end. But if these pa.s.sages had an allusion to a personal election to eternal life, they would not prove unconditional election, "because," to use the language of another, "it would admit of being questioned, whether the choosing in Christ, before the foundation of the world here mentioned, was a choice of certain persons _as men merely_, or as _believing_ men, which is certainly the most rational." This exposition must necessarily be given to the pa.s.sage from the Romans, since those who were the subjects of predestination, were first _foreknown_: foreknown, not merely as existing, for in this sense _all_ were foreknown, but foreknown, as possessing something which operated as a reason why _they_ should be elected, rather than others: foreknown doubtless as believers in Christ, and as such, according to the plan and decree of G.o.d, they were to be made conformable to the image of Christ's holiness here, and glory hereafter. And according to the same Divine plan, the order of this work was, 1. The call; 2. Justification; 3. Glorification. And this interpretation, which so obviously upon the face of it is the meaning of the pa.s.sage from Romans, would also be a good meaning to the pa.s.sage in Ephesians, if that pa.s.sage should be understood in reference to personal election. But I do not so understand it; and I think any unprejudiced reader, by looking at the context, and especially from the 9th to the 11th verses inclusive, in this chapter, and at most of the 2d chapter, will perceive that the apostle is here speaking of that general plan of G.o.d, which had been fixed from the beginning, of admitting the Gentiles as well as the Jews to the privileges of the covenant of grace, on equal terms and conditions. Thus the middle wall of part.i.tion was to be broken down between Jew and Gentile; and this was the mystery which was concealed for ages, not being understood even by the Jews themselves, but then by the Gospel was brought to light. According to this plan, the Ephesians and all other Gentiles were chosen or elected to these Christian privileges, the very design and purpose of which were to make them holy; and in the improvement of which, according to the prescribed conditions of faith in Christ, and repentance toward G.o.d, they should become his adopted children.

This fore appointing of the Gentiles to the privileges of the gracious covenant, is the election most spoken of in the New Testament.--And the reason why it was so often introduced, especially in the writings of Paul, who was the chief apostle to the Gentiles, was, because the Jews so uniformly and earnestly opposed this feature of Christianity. They could not be reconciled to the idea, that the peculiar and distinctive character of their theocracy and ecclesiastical policy should be so changed, or that the dealings of G.o.d with the world should be explained in such a manner as to give _them_ no superior claims, in the privileges of the Divine covenant, over the Gentiles. They considered themselves to be G.o.d's elect and favourite people, but the Gentiles were reprobates.

The apostles felt themselves under the strongest obligations to oppose these notions, not only because, if allowed, they would operate as a barrier to the diffusion of the Gospel among the heathens, and thus the designs of Divine mercy to the world would be thwarted, but also because these Jewish sentiments were in direct opposition to the grace of G.o.d.

They implied, that the original design of G.o.d in favouring the Jews, was founded, not upon his mere mercy and grace, but upon some goodness in them or their fathers. Hence they not only limited the blessings of the Gospel, but they also corrupted its gracious character, and thereby fed their own Pharisaic pride, and dishonoured G.o.d. This will open the way for explaining many other scriptures which the Calvinists press into their service.

2. Especially will it a.s.sist in explaining those pa.s.sages which speak of election as depending solely on the sovereign will of G.o.d. The strongest of these are in the ninth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. This portion of revelation is the strong hold, as is supposed, of Calvinism.

Whereas, we humbly conceive that _there is not one word_ in the whole chapter, of unconditional and personal election to eternal life. It is only necessary to read that epistle carefully, to see that the apostle is combatting that exclusive and Pharisaic doctrine of the Jews, already alluded to, and is proving in a forcible strain of argumentation, from reason and Scripture, that the foundation of the plan of salvation for sinners, was the goodness and unmerited love of G.o.d--that all, both Jews and Gentiles, were sinners, and therefore stood in the same relation to G.o.d--all equally eligible to salvation, and must, if saved at all, be saved on the same terms. To prove this, he argues strenuously, that G.o.d's favour to the Jews, as a nation, was not of any goodness in them, but of his own sovereign will and pleasure, so that his covenant of favour with the Hebrews, and his covenant of grace which embraced the Gentiles, was "not of works, lest any man should boast," "not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of G.o.d that showeth mercy."