The True Story of my Parliamentary Struggle Part 4

103. Pray object if you do not wish to answer this question: By virtue of what do you regard that a.s.sertion which you make within the Oath as binding?--I have not caught your question, if you will pardon me for saying so.

104. By virtue of what portion of what is contained in the Oath do you feel that your conscience is bound; is it by the mere fact that you repeat the words therein contained, or is it by that which is contained in the form of the Oath?--Those words, "I do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law," are to me, binding in the most full and complete and thorough degree on my conscience.

105. If you read a promise out of any book or paper, and said, "I promise so to do," is there more binding effect in those words that you have read than in the mere ordinary a.s.sertion of a promise?--Yes, because this reading is by law, and by the decision of your Committee intended to be the form in which I pledge my allegiance as a Member.

106. Then if it were a form sanctioned by law, as in the case of an affirmation, is there any more effect upon your mind if you take it in the form of what we call an oath than if you took it simply by words of affirmation or promise?--If the form sanctioned by law ran "I affirm," or "I declare and affirm," or "I solemnly and sincerely declare and affirm that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to her Majesty Queen Victoria, her heirs and successors, according to law," that would be equally binding upon my conscience.

107. Do you attach any express or particular meaning to the words "I swear"?--The meaning that I attach to them is that they are a pledge upon my conscience to the truth of the declaration which I am making.

108. But a pledge given, may I ask, to whom?--A pledge given to the properly const.i.tuted authorities, whomsoever they may be, who are ent.i.tled to receive it from me.

109. Do you attribute any more meaning to those words than a pledge to human beings around you?--I attach no more meaning to those words than I do to a pledge to human beings authorised by law to take such a pledge from me under similar solemn circ.u.mstances.

110. But the solemn circ.u.mstances, I suppose, are the mere mundane circ.u.mstances?--The statutory circ.u.mstances. I meant "solemn" simply in the sense of being the statutory circ.u.mstances; I meant to distinguish between that and mere conversation.

111. I think we understand from your answers that you do not attribute any more weight to the use of the words "I swear," and to the words "So help me G.o.d," than you would to an ordinary promise if it were given under the same circ.u.mstances as those under which you gave that promise in the House of Commons?--I conceive myself ent.i.tled by law to distinguish, and I beg therefore to object to so much of the question as deals with the words "So help me G.o.d," my objection being founded on the case of Miller _v._ Salomons, in the 17th Jurist, and the case of the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company _v._ Heaton in the 4th Jurist, new series.

112. I presume by that answer you mean that "So help me, G.o.d" is no part of the oath or promise, but merely the form in which it is taken?--That is so; it is merely a form of a.s.severation.

113. Will you confine yourself, then, to the words "I swear"?--I will.

114. Do you attribute any greater weight or any meaning to the words "I swear," and to the fact of kissing the book, beyond the words of ordinary promise?--Not beyond the words of ordinary promise made under statutory obligation.

115. Then what greater weight do you attach to a promise made under statutory obligation than to an ordinary promise?--I would prefer not making any promise that I did not intend to keep; but the law has attached a weight to statutory promises, and a penalty and disgrace on the breaking of them.

116. That is a consequence resulting from human action; you do not attribute any other weight to such a promise beyond what results from such penalties?--I object to that question.

117. I will now go to another point. How lately is it that you have claimed a right to affirm in a court of law?--In a superior court or in an inferior court?

118. In any court where you have taken an oath?--Recently in an inferior court, within a few days.

119. How lately prior to your claim in the House of Commons?--Prior to my claim in the House of Commons, about 12 months.

120. You had made a claim on several occasions, I suppose, prior to the period which you have just mentioned?--Yes.

121. What steps, if any, were taken by the judge on such occasions to arrive at the conclusion that the oath would have no binding effect:--On the last occasion, by Mr. Justice Lindley, none. I presume he thought my claim to affirm well founded, and he simply bowed his head, and the clerk administered the affirmation after looking to him.

122. I suppose you made a claim to affirm?--When the clerk brought the Testament to the witness-box I said, "I desire to affirm," and the clerk looked at Mr. Justice Lindley, who just bowed his head (he happened to be the presiding judge), and I did affirm.

123. Had you reason to think that Mr. Justice Lindley was acquainted with any previous applications by you to affirm?--I should think it possible, because the claim to affirm has been the subject of considerable litigation by myself in the courts.

124. Upon any occasion upon which the judge did make inquiry, what was the nature of the inquiry?--The present Lord Justice Brett, whom I remember distinctly challenging me upon it when he was Mr. Justice Brett, said: "Why do you claim, Mr. Bradlaugh?" and I perfectly remember my answer, but I am just thinking whether I am not ent.i.tled to say this: that happened seven years ago; I do not intend to imply that there is any change or anything since, but I think I am ent.i.tled to say to this Committee that it is hardly within the limits of their reference to inquire into something that happened in a law court between myself and a judge seven years ago.

125. I should not have asked the question, but you have stated in the House of Commons yourself, in order to support your claim to make affirmation, that you have frequently been permitted to affirm?--That is so.

126. And I think you gave the last nine or ten years?--Yes, and Mr.

Justice Brett's question came within that time. I hope you will not consider that I am putting the objection unfairly. What I want to put is this: that the conversation which took place on the occasion of my having affirmed (and I repeat that I have affirmed before different judges) being more or less informal, ought not to be the subject of inquiry by this Committee. The fact is of record. Those were all at _Nisi Prius_.

127. It was before a judge who would have to administer an oath?--Quite so.

128. If you state that you really entertain an objection to the question, I do not wish to press it myself personally?--I have no objection to answering, except that I have purposely tried to keep out of this discussion any question of my views; otherwise I am quite in the hands of the Committee, and if the Committee are disposed to press the question I will give the answer, having made my objection.

129. I do not wish to go into the views generally entertained by you, except so far as expressed by you that the Testimony Oath had no binding effect upon your conscience?--My answer applied to the a.s.sertory or Testimony Oath.

130. I am asking you what you stated when a Testimony Oath was being administered to you; but if you desire not to answer the question, so far as I, an individual member of the Committee, am concerned, I do not wish to put it to you?--I take the objection.

131. Mr. GIBSON: Can you recall whether within any time since your right to affirm was first recognised in courts of justice, you have taken the Oath?--Never; that is to say, the oath as a witness.

132. Have you ever taken any oath since your right to affirm was first admitted in courts of justice?--It only has been my right to affirm as a witness that has been admitted in a court of justice; I have under cover of that Act, but I think illegally, affirmed as foreman of a special jury, but I have considerable doubt whether the Act covered my affirmation as a juryman.

133. With that knowledge now present to your mind, is it the fact that the oath which you seek to take at the table of the House is, if you are permitted to take it, the first oath that you will have taken since you were permitted to affirm in courts of justice?--It is the first occasion upon which there has been any reason for my taking or not taking the Oath of Allegiance since I have been permitted to affirm.

134. Or any other form of oath?--My memory is not quite clear upon that; I am not sure. There was a case in which I took evidence as a Commissioner from America, and I am not at all sure whether the completion of that Commission was before or after the pa.s.sing of the Affirmation Act.

135. But since the pa.s.sing of the Act?--I cannot quite pledge my mind as to that; but except in that case in which I was a Commissioner for taking some evidence in relation to an American process, in which I may have done so, I certainly have not.

136. Then am I to understand that you seek now to take this oath with exactly the same meaning in your mind as you would take the affirmation?--Which affirmation?

137. The affirmation which you originally sought to take at the table of the House, the Promissory Affirmation?--I seek to take the Oath of Allegiance just as I should seek to take the Affirmation of Allegiance.

138. And do you attach in your mind no different meaning to the word "swear" than you would to the word "affirm?"--The law does not.

139. Do you, in your own mind, attach any difference to the sanction?--I object that the question put to me asks me to make a distinguishment which the law does not make.

140. I do not wish to press anything to which you object; do you desire to tell the Committee that, in your own mind, there is no distinction drawn when you use the word "affirm" and when you use the word "swear"?--To me, on the Statute they have the same meaning; that is, they are a pledge that what I put after those words is binding upon me in the most complete degree.

141. I suppose you are aware of all the ordinary definitions of an oath contained in the law books?--I am afraid that would be saying more than I have any right to say. I am fairly well read, but not sufficiently to say that I know them all.

142. You know a great many of them, I suppose?--I have learnt a few.

143. You said to my honorable and learned friend, the Attorney General, that you regarded the word "swear" as a pledge given to a properly const.i.tuted authority, and that that was the meaning you attached to the word "swear"; what do you mean by the "properly const.i.tuted authority"

that you referred to in that answer?--Whatever may be the authority established by Statute for the purpose of taking such an oath.

144. A human authority?--All authorities established by Statute for the taking of oaths are human authorities Any authority outside a Statute is illegal, and any person administering such an oath is indictable.

145. You are aware of the meaning of the expression "sanction of an oath"; what do you consider would be the sanction of the Oath if you took it?--I am not sure that I apprehend the meaning that is in your mind when you use the words "sanction of an oath."

146. I will read the definition which is contained in Mr. Baron Martin's judgment in the case of Miller _v._ Salomon's, where it refers to the case of Omichund _v._ Barker, as reported in the "Law Journal": "The doctrine laid down by the Lord Chancellor (Hardwicke) (Omichund _v._ Barker), and all the other judges, was that the essence of an oath was an appeal to a Supreme Being in whose existence the person taking the oath believed, and whom he also believed to be a rewarder of truth and an avenger of falsehood, and that the form of taking an oath was a mere outward act, and not essential to the oath which might be administered to all persons according to their own peculiar religious opinions, and in such manner as most affected their consciences." You have listened to that statement?--Yes; and I have also read the judgment of the Court of Error in the following year, in which they say that the essential words of the oath are those without the appeal, and that the words "So help me, G.o.d" are words of a.s.severation, the manner of taking the oath; but the words preceding them are, it appears to me, an essential part of the oath; and in the case of the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company _v._ Heaton, it was held that the oath was completely taken without the addition of that appeal.

147. I am not at all upon the words "So help me, G.o.d," which are the words referred to in the last case to which you referred. I am now upon what contains a promise that an oath is being taken when a man uses the word "swear"; do you object to the definition which I have read?--I object to that definition as overruled by the Court of Error in its final decision in error, confirmed by a subsequent decision of Lord Campbell in the Lancaster and Carlisle Railway Company _v._ Heaton, when it was held that the appeal was not a part of the oath.

148. CHAIRMAN: In both those cases I think the judges in holding that view had reference simply to the words "So help me, G.o.d"?--Simply to the words "So help me, G.o.d."

149. I think we are a little misunderstanding each other?--I hope not; I want to be candid with the Committee.

150. Mr. GIBSON: I am not at all on the words which that case went on of "So help me, G.o.d," but I am on what must be the essential distinction between an oath and an affirmation; what, I ask you now, do you conceive to be the essential distinction between an oath and an affirmation?--Following the judgment of the Court of Error, repeated in the other judgment which I quoted, I regard the essential words of the oath as beginning with "I swear," and ending with "according to law." I submit that it is no part of my duty to draw any distinction, if distinction exists, between the value of that and the value of an affirmation, because the Statute has declared that they both have the same value.

151. Do you consider that the taking of an oath implies in the person taking it the existence of a belief in G.o.d, and that he will reward and punish us according to our deserts?--That depends upon the form of the oath; and since the decision you quoted very many forms of oath have been entirely changed by the Legislature.