ISIS: The State of Terror Part 5

Some fighters might be lured by an offer of a deal for cooperation, but these almost always involved significant prison time. And while a fighter might be disillusioned with the cause or the experience, he might still dislike Western policies and be disinclined to turn on his former friends. Denmark launched a deradicalization initiative for former fighters, and other countries were considering similar programs, but such efforts were plagued by broad, unanswered questions about their effectiveness and the risks that they incurred.66 Additionally, there was a difficult question of accountability. Justice demanded that there be consequences for crimes, particularly the horrific war crimes and atrocities carried out under the banner of the so-called Islamic State. To incentivize defections, was it necessary to allow some crimes to go unanswered? Western policy makers were paralyzed by the complexity of these issues and a dearth of research on disengagement and deradicalization.67 And even on topics where research was available, such as the risk of terrorism among former foreign fighters, it was unclear whether past trends would continue in light of the new dynamics of ISIS.

A 2013 study by Thomas Hegghammer found that relatively few Western jihadist fighters had taken up terrorism upon leaving the battlefield, over the history of the movement.68 But the percentages were still significant enough to make foreign fighting one of the few reliable indicators of future terrorism risk, at least compared to any other criteria. And, Hegghammer found, the presence of former fighters in a terrorist plot increased the chance a plot would be successful and significantly increased the lethality of a terrorist attack.

The percentages, combined with the soaring numbers of foreign fighters in Syria generally, and in ISIS specifically, pointed to an increased risk of terrorism that could linger for years.

Another important variable raised the question of whether historical jihadist conflicts such as the 1990s war in Bosnia could serve as a barometer of future events. The 2014 surge in the number of jihadist foreign fighters and inspired lone-wolf attacks was attributable, at least in part, to a revolution in the style and content of messaging that ISIS had deliberately pursued.

ISIS was rewriting the rules of jihadist extremism using sophisticated tactics of manipulation and distribution. It was not just a splinter from al Qaeda, it was an evolution. ISIS was reinventing al Qaeda's model of terrorism and radicalization, and its new ideas were sending shock waves around the world.

CHAPTER FIVE.

THE MESSAGE.

Jihadists have been making "slick" propaganda for decades, but for a long time, these productions catered to an exclusive audience of potential recruits, never making the evening news or creeping into the collective consciousness of the West.

Since the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s, jihadist organizations have used video and print media in sophisticated ways. From full-color magazines to audio lectures on ca.s.sette and TV-style talk shows, the genre is overstuffed with decades of material that flew under the radar of Western media.

In a crowded field, there are some standouts. The Martyrs of Bosnia is a sweeping feature-length video doc.u.mentary released in English and Arabic versions that comprehensively describes the arc of the 1990s Balkans war from the perspective of the jihadist foreign fighters who took part.1 In 2001, al Qaeda released The State of the Ummah, nearly two hours of lavishly produced propaganda that came to define the group for footage-hungry Western media after September 11, providing now-ubiquitous images such as masked al Qaeda terrorists endlessly advancing along a set of monkey bars.

But The State of the Ummah was much more than simply B-roll for twenty-four-hour news networks. An ideological incitement, it served to define al Qaeda to potential recruits and apologists in the Muslim world.2 The movie is broken into parts, which boil down to "The Problem" and "The Solution." The problem, described at length, was the political weakness of Muslims and the corruption of Arab regimes, who were supported by the United States.

"This tape that you are viewing now are real-life scenes that portray, with blood and tears, the sorry state of the Muslim nation," said an unidentified narrator.

"The wounds of the Muslims are deep, very deep, in every place," Osama bin Laden reiterated a few minutes later.

The video continues in this vein for nearly forty-five minutes.

The solution was, of course, al Qaeda. Although the terrorist group is not named in the video, its chief leaders and ideologues are featured at length, discussing the need for Muslims to violently resist the conspiracies of the West and Israel.

"The Solution" was a carefully stage-managed affair. As the cameras rolled, often at interesting angles, a series of masked men went through a pantomime of military training in a desert backdrop identified as the al Farouq training camp, including running, jumping, diving, swimming, shooting, demolitions, motorcycle gymnastics, and, of course, monkey-barring.

The visuals were memorable and effective, yet they were notably contrived. The overall effect, likely intentional, made al Qaeda look like an adventure camp for young men.

"So it is inc.u.mbent on the Muslims, especially those in leaders.h.i.+p positions from among the faithful scholars, honest businessmen, and heads of the tribes to migrate for the cause of Allah and find a place where they can raise the banner of jihad and revitalize the ummah to safeguard their religion and life," bin Laden intoned professorially near the end of the video. "Otherwise they will lose everything."

The State of the Ummah was the last major release by al Qaeda prior to September 11. After the United States invaded Afghanistan and rousted the organization from its fixed bases, it took time for the media arm to regroup. It began to recover in 2002 and 2003, with the help of Adam Gadahn, a California native, mentioned earlier, also known as Azzam the American.3 Gadahn helped modernize the media operation. He embraced digital recording and editing, and online methods of distribution. With his involvement, al Qaeda produced a doc.u.mentary/dramatization of the planning for the 9/11 attacks called The 19 Martyrs and a faux news program, Voice of the Caliphate, which lasted only one episode.4 Gadahn had a knack for what the television industry refers to as "high concept" ideas-a two-sentence pitch that sounds novel and exciting-but his execution was not especially memorable. Most of his overproduced videos disappeared like rocks thrown into a pond, their ripples fading quickly. The lack of traction and the toll of avoiding ongoing counterterrorism activity in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region resulted in a steady decline in the quality of al Qaeda's propaganda releases.

By the time Osama bin Laden was killed in 2011, al Qaeda's media output largely consisted of tedious position papers delivered by a succession of ideologues staring straight into a camera, sometimes for an hour or more. Sometimes the media branch provided high-tech computer-generated backdrops in a desperate bid to add some visual interest. Raw videos captured when bin Laden was killed showed him delivering speeches in front of a closet in his house, which was later digitally replaced with a neutral backdrop.5 In the early days, al Qaeda in Iraq hewed closely to traditional jihadist propaganda, but it did not take long to distinguish itself. Echoing videos from Soviet-era Afghanistan and later Bosnia, AQI put a premium on combat scenes, releasing clip after clip of IED explosions, mortar fire, and sniper attacks. The quality of the footage was frequently terrible, much of it shot on cheap handheld digital cameras. But the quant.i.ty was remarkable.

The combat clips were distributed individually, then collected by technically proficient online supporters, who strung them together into lengthy montages with a sound track of anasheed (Islamic a capella religious songs; simply nasheed when referring to just one), bookended by computer animated t.i.tle sequences. Sometimes they added clips from the news to frame the mayhem.

Soon there were more ambitious efforts, such as "The Expedition of Shaykh Umar Hadid." In these early productions, AQI's media department had found the germ of an idea-storytelling. Although the videos were still often bloated with exposition and rambling religious lectures, more examples began to emerge with self-contained narratives that fit within the broader story of the war.

But most of all, al Qaeda in Iraq differentiated itself with graphic violence. Starting in 2004, with the videotaped execution of American contractor Nicholas Berg, AQI released a seemingly unending series of videos showing the execution of hostages and prisoners, often by decapitation (or near decapitation). At least eighty such videos were released during the AQI era, many featuring multiple victims. They came in a remarkable variety, from nearly anonymous snuff films to at least three videos showing public executions in front of sometimes-cheering spectators on Iraqi city streets.6 The pace and quality of these productions ebbed and flowed with the strength of al Qaeda in Iraq. Although its output was voluminous, the quality was spotty and with a few rare exceptions, most of its videos would have been forgettable if not for the shocking brutality, which came to define the group so completely that even the leaders of al Qaeda Central objected.

"Among the things which the feelings of the Muslim populace who love and support you will never find palatable . . . are the scenes of slaughtering the hostages," wrote Ayman al Zawahiri, then al Qaeda's second in command, to AQI's emir, Abu Musab Zarqawi, in 2005. "You shouldn't be deceived by the praise of some of the zealous young men and their description of you as the shaykh of the slaughterers. . . . We are in a battle, and more than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media."7 Al Qaeda in Iraq tempered, but did not stop, its doc.u.mentation of atrocities. But its successor group would eventually take Zawahiri's last point to heart.

In 2010, as the rechristened Islamic State in Iraq was reaching new lows, control of the organization pa.s.sed to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. While terrorist groups are often shrouded in secrecy, Baghdadi took his anonymity to extraordinary heights, forgoing al Qaedastyle communiques and functioning largely in the shadows.

The burden of communicating ISI's message and agenda fell instead on the group's spokesman, Abu Muhammad al Adnani. Born in Syria under the name Taha Sobhi Falaha, Adnani articulated ISI's talking points in a series of audio statements.

In 2011, one of his speeches proved to be a defining moment. t.i.tled "The Islamic State Will Remain," it acknowledged the group's setbacks but set a defiant tone. Predicting a return to the glory days, he vowed that ISI would fight on despite any setback.8 "How powerful you are!" Adnani told ISI's supporters, over and over again. "How good you are!" And to its enemies, his message was also clear: "The Islamic State will remain," he said, using the Arabic word baqiyyah, which can also be read as "survive."

"The Islamic State will survive despite your sects, alliances, armies, and weapons," he proclaimed. "It will survive despite your plots and conspiracies."

The contrast between Adnani's speech and the besieged att.i.tude emanating from al Qaeda Central could hardly be starker. AQC's messaging felt increasingly disconnected from the battle. One of Osama bin Laden's final speeches focused on climate change. Zawahiri, his successor, had launched into an hours-long series of commentaries on the Arab Spring that seemed to emerge in slow motion, sometimes referencing events months past, in which he seemed to grope for relevance.9 Adnani's words were electrifying to the supporters of ISI, who transformed baqiyyah into a slogan and battle cry. In subsequent videos, fighters shouted it defiantly. On jihadist Internet forums and social media outlets, they adopted it as a marker of loyalty. It also set a tone that ISIS would, over time, refine and propagate throughout its messaging.

The prodigious propaganda output of ISIS in all its incarnations could fill a book by itself, spanning books, lectures, magazines, audio, video, tweets, and Facebook posts (for more on social media, see Chapters 6 and 7).

THE CLANGING OF THE SWORDS.

One series perhaps best ill.u.s.trates the dramatic transformation that made the nearly extinguished al Qaeda affiliate into a powerful independent force.

Salil as-Sawarim (The Clanging/Clash of the Swords) launched in June 2012.10 Its opening installment was billed as the first in an ongoing series, a tactic increasingly favored by the group's propagandists. Those watching The Clanging of the Swords Part 1 would have seen few clues about what was to come.

A little more than an hour long, it was a fairly typical piece of jihadi agitprop for the late 2000s, if slightly more violent. Its author mashed together static clips of jihadi ideologues lecturing, talking-head segments lifted from Middle Eastern news broadcasts, and a number of unevenly filmed guerrilla-style combat scenes. Most of the malice in the video was directed against Iraqi s.h.i.+'a politicians, whom it described (not entirely inaccurately) as being under the influence of Iran. The video waxed on about the atrocities Muslims were suffering at the hands of the s.h.i.+'a in Iraq.

There is a well-known saying of unknown origin, "War is long periods of boredom punctuated by moments of sheer terror." The Clanging of the Swords consisted of long periods of boredom punctuated by distant explosions and images of dead bodies.

In July, ISI's notoriously anonymous emir Abu Bakr al Baghdadi released his first audio lecture, a defiant speech full of fire and seemingly irrational optimism. The thirty-three-minute speech used some variation of the word "victory" twenty-one times. "Allah promised us victory, triumph, and power," he said. "Allah will keep His promise at all times." He also announced a new initiative, "Breaking Down the Walls," an ambitious strategy to free the many jihadist prisoners languis.h.i.+ng in Iraqi jails.11 A few weeks later, in August, The Clanging of the Swords Part 2 was released.12 It was significantly different than its predecessor. Gone were the polemics. Instead, the new video consisted almost entirely of combat footage. But that too was different. The quality of the video and the camera work were significantly better. In places, the quality was comparable to a professional television program, telling a story in narrative form.

It's possible that the creator of Part 1 was a quick study, but the huge improvement suggests Part 2 was the work of a different filmmaker.

Where the first film had strung together many small combat clips with little context, the forty-nine-minute sequel followed a single operation, an a.s.sault on Haditha, Iraq, from training to the death of two fighters in a friendly fire incident, all presented in a cinema verite style.

In the video, ISI fighters attack checkpoints outside the city, then storm the homes of men identified as the local counterterrorism officials. At least eight prisoners are taken during the operation and executed.

While past jihadi videos had followed specific operations in some detail, The Clanging of the Swords Part 2 was a remarkable leap forward, thanks to its combination of tight editing, technical quality, attention to detail, and graphic violence.

It had also subtly dropped a key element of al Qaeda propaganda.

In many ways, al Qaeda's ideology and strategy were explicitly predicated on a.s.sumptions of weakness.

In its worldview and favored ideological justifications, jihad was an act of defense, or at least that was the line they sold to the world. Self-defense was easier to rationalize-and sell-than an improbable vision of global domination. So al Qaeda's recruitment materials and fund-raising activities brimmed over with talk of "the plight of Muslims," steeped in pathos.13 According to al Qaeda's ideologues, this urgent and existential danger was the entire reason for the organization's existence.

The concept of weakness also figured heavily in strategy. Tactically, weakness justified asymmetrical warfare in the form of terrorist attacks on soft civilian targets, on the premise that al Qaeda was too weak to militarily confront its enemies.14 Weakness also factored into the choice of enemy. Over time, al Qaeda had adopted the view that "apostate" Arab regimes-al Qaeda's real enemy-dominated the Middle East thanks to American military and economic support. As bin Laden famously put it, the United States was "the head of the snake," which must be cut off before the day could be won.

Jihadists commonly characterized this as a distinction between the "near enemy" (Middle East regimes) and the "far enemy" (Western governments). Because of the far enemy's support, direct opposition to the near enemy was believed to be impossible.

The tumult of the Arab Spring, along with the growth of al Qaeda's affiliate system (Chapters 3 and 8), had already begun to undercut this concept, and ISI was poised to directly challenge it.

The Clanging of the Swords Part 2 sent a clear message, video proof that the near enemy was vulnerable. It wasted no time on justifications and dropped the theme of persecution and oppression that had been present in the first installment just weeks earlier.

Instead, the sequel depicted ISI as a strong force meting out rough justice against deserving enemies. Although there had been examples of jihadist propaganda before that combined many of these elements, The Clanging of the Swords Part 2 had a special power, thanks to the combination of technical prowess and aggressive tone.

Part 3 was released in January 2013. The new release was a doc.u.mentary about "Breaking Down the Walls," delivering on the campaign Baghdadi had promised in July.15 With much of the action recorded in high definition, Clanging 3 showed distinct signs of being filmed with professional video equipment by experienced cameramen. Some scenes were shot with multiple cameras, allowing the action to unfold from different angles. Others continued the verite style of Part 2, with handheld footage of live combat operations.

Several operations were labeled "Breaking Down the Walls." The filmmakers also filmed discussions among masked ISI fighters and interviewed prisoners who had been freed by ISI or escaped of their own accord.

At one point, the video displayed a sly and unexpected sense of humor, showing ISI members' efforts to rescue a camel that had fallen into a pit. A caption described it as an operation to "liberate a prisoner in the desert."

It was an even grander affair than the previous installment, but less dramatic and effective, clocking in at an overstuffed eighty minutes. Although Part 3 was another step forward in ambition and technical execution, it was a step backward in terms of focus and storytelling, to some extent lapsing into the earlier model of ISI propaganda, which resembled a laundry list of armed confrontations.

The through-line of "Breaking Down the Walls" was not strong enough to hold the video together as a unified narrative. Even the greatly escalated body count could not compensate for the repet.i.tive nature of the footage.

The propagandists were still learning.

In May 2014, The Clanging of the Swords Part 4 premiered on the Internet. The release marked a graduation of sorts. The members of ISIS's media team could no longer be considered students; they were now fully professional.

The sixty-two-minute video opened with aerial footage of Fallujah filmed by a drone. The ISIS drone was little more than a hobbyist's toy, a flying camera remote controlled by radio, but the symbolism was powerful and clear: The enemy's most feared and hated weapon was now part of ISIS's a.r.s.enal.

What followed was an untrammeled show of strength. As the narrator boasted of the vast area controlled by ISIS, masked jihadis paraded in armored columns through the streets, with apparently admiring throngs gathered to watch. After a rousing speech, a nasheed played over gripping scenes of car-to-car combat, incongruously framed by a Native American dream catcher ornament swinging from the driver's rearview mirror.

Captions claimed the victims were s.h.i.+'a soldiers on their way to join Iraqi military units, but to all appearances, the ISIS fighters were driving around shooting at whatever random cars they pa.s.sed and even pedestrians. When the camera panned over the dead occupants of one beat-up old vehicle, the victims were young men dressed in shorts and T-s.h.i.+rts. Most of their targets were visibly unarmed. Only the captions differentiated the scene from an indiscriminate ma.s.sacre.

"The clash of swords is the song of the defiant," singers chanted in Arabic over the slaughter, "and the path of fighting is the path of life."

Following this brutal carnage, the tone changed. In a public meeting, ISIS fighters offered clemency to anyone who had fought them in the past if they would only renounce the errors of their ways. One man after another stepped up, publicly recanted, and received warm embraces.

A considerable amount of combat followed, this time against visibly armed, military targets, followed by a suicide bombing and a checkpoint operation. Foreign fighters were shown burning their pa.s.sports and renouncing the citizens.h.i.+p of their native lands. Unlike the previous installments in the series, the clips were shorter and punchier. The s.h.i.+ft between fighting scenes, executions, and noncombat events helped elevate the ultraviolent video, giving a sense that while ISIS was unapologetically brutal, it had more to offer than just violence.

"Oh our people, Ahlus Sunna [adherents to the traditions of Islam], indeed the Islamic State exists only to defend you, and protect your rights, and stand in the face of your enemies," a narrator said, using the name the group had not yet formally adopted. "Indeed, the Islamic State is your one true hope, after Allah."

About halfway into the hourlong video, the executions of prisoners began, followed by scenes of sniper killings. The body count at this point reached into the dozens, and ISIS wasn't finished yet. At the thirty-seven-minute mark, a cameraman interviewed captured Iraqi soldiers who were being forced to dig their own graves. More combat and ambushes followed, periodically interspersed with scenes of ISIS's mercy toward those who would disavow their previous opposition.

"We don't want you to come to this place and repent out of fear of us, because if you fear us, there's no good in you," a masked speaker told one gathering. "We want your repentance and return to be due to the fear of Allah."

"Oh my ummah, a new dawn has emerged, so witness the clear victory," the singers chanted. "The Islamic State has been established by the blood of the truthful. No one will ever stand between the mujahideen and their people in Iraq after this day."

"The Islamic State has attacked, and surrounded the tyrants," they sang.

Over the final scene of a mujahid slowly walking, carrying the black ISIS flag, a narrator closed out the film with reference to an apocalyptic prophecy.

"And so the flame was started in Iraq, and its heat will increase by the will of Allah until it burns the crusaders in Dabiq," a town in Syria that ISIS adherents believed would be the location of a decisive battle with the "Crusaders." (See Chapter 10.) The Clanging of the Swords Part 4 was wildly successful. It racked up millions of views on video-sharing platforms, although the numbers were almost certainly inflated (perhaps exponentially) by ISIS's deceptive social media techniques. Regardless of the total number of viewers, the video created vast excitement among those who followed ISIS online and many who were vulnerable to its message. The overarching theme of ISIS propaganda had been condensed and purified, and the message was "We are strong, and we are winning."

RACE TO THE CALIPHATE.

While the quality of ISIS video releases would continue to fluctuate, overall the media team improved steadily over time, even as the quant.i.ty of its output increased. The growing focus on the packaging of the message corresponded to a new emphasis on its content. While ISIS made gains on the ground in Iraq, it was also expanding the definition of both the war and the organization itself. The media efforts fertilized the ground where ISIS would plant its next bold claim to religious authority-the declaration of the caliphate.

The precise composition of the ISIS media team was unknown (or more accurately, it was the subject of conflicting reports with uncertain sourcing), but some elements became clear over time. Many regional hubs where ISIS operated had their own media departments, including Raqqa and Deir Ez-zoor in Syria, and Diyala, Saladin, Mosul, and Kirkuk in Iraq. Their Twitter accounts routinely published photos, videos, and text updates about ISIS activities, creating a remarkably robust (if carefully manipulated) record of ISIS's activities.16 A number of Westerners were involved in the media project. In May 2014, ISIS debuted an outlet dedicated to disseminating material in English and European languages. The Al Hayat (Arabic for "Life") Media Center ramped up at a critical time for ISIS, just weeks before the dramatic military offensive and caliphate proclamation that would put it on the front pages. Al Hayat translated ISIS's Arabic propaganda into English, including The Clanging of the Swords Part 4, but it also produced original content that revealed the complexity of the organization's media strategy.17 In May and June, Al Hayat rolled out multiple English-language magazines, some of which recycled content from social media, and others that included original reporting from areas ISIS controlled. The stories included coverage of battles but also devoted many pages to ISIS's efforts to govern, such as the execution of a "sorcerer" and religious training for imams. One issue spotlighted ISIS's consumer protection bureau in Raqqa, which held merchants responsible for the quality of goods they sold.18, 19 More issues of the magazines came out in quick succession, seven issues by mid-June. After their initial release in English, most of the issues were also distributed in French and German editions.

The publications continued to present the society that ISIS was building, including reports on agriculture and the ISIS police force. One issue was devoted to the dramatic capture of Mosul in early June. Concurrently, another spotlighted the violent side of ISIS, with page after page of graphic images showing the execution of criminals and prisoners, some with their brains splattered on the ground, others cut to pieces.20 The strange dichotomy of ultraviolence and civil order was echoed throughout ISIS's many streams of propaganda. Although the image was to some extent contrived, the overall package represented something new and different in the world of jihadism. ISIS was projecting its vision of a comprehensive society that went beyond the nihilistic destruction a.s.sociated with the jihadist movement. This society, ISIS argued, existed in the here and now, and the organization approached the project with clear enthusiasm.21 The concept of governing had been circulating through al Qaeda for years, and its affiliates in Mali and Yemen had both made efforts to seize territory and build out social services. But neither had been able to hold its ground for long. Furthermore, they seemed uninterested in the work based on its own merits, acting instead out of a cynically manipulative impulse.

"Try to win them over through the conveniences of life and by taking care of their daily needs like food, electricity and water," the emir of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (in Yemen) wrote to the emir of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (in North Africa). "Providing these necessities will have a great effect on people, and will make them sympathize with us and feel that their fate is tied to ours."22 Unlike its counterparts in Yemen and North Africa, ISIS seemed to relish providing services, rather than simply seeing it as a PR strategy (although the sustainability of these efforts was an open question). When it took control of an area, ISIS wasted no time outfitting police cars, ambulances, and bureaucracies with its ubiquitous black flag emblem. ISIS put traffic cops at intersections; in addition to its law enforcement and consumer protection bureau, it opened a complaints desk and nursing homes. Its members radiated enthusiasm for these projects.23 AQAP had also advised AQIM to refrain from immediately inst.i.tuting the jihadists' harsh interpretation of Islamic law. "You can't beat people for drinking alcohol when they don't even know the basics of how to pray," one letter stated.

ISIS had other ideas. Not only did it implement a draconian regime of crime and punishment, which its members believed to be divinely ordained, but it celebrated and painstakingly doc.u.mented the process in its propaganda, publicizing everything from the destruction of cigarettes and drug stashes to the amputation of thieves' hands "under the supervision of trained doctors" to the genocidal extermination and enslavement of Iraqi minorities.24 In many ways, the combination of elements was unprecedented. n.a.z.i Germany, whose parallels in propaganda and brutality often invited comparisons to ISIS, had produced masterful propaganda while carrying out a painstakingly doc.u.mented program of genocide, but these were separate efforts. Its propaganda did not celebrate the genocide; rather it served to justify an imperative to act in the name of national and racial purity without sharing the gruesome reality. The n.a.z.is did not broadcast their atrocities to the world.

In stark contrast, ISIS presented its vision of a demented utopia in which children played with severed heads and ran laughing down streets lined with mangled bodies instead of trees. A seemingly endless procession of atrocities was captured in photographs and videos, and distributed through both official and unofficial channels on social media.25 To some extent, the shocking violence seen in these messages owed a debt to The Management of Savagery, the jihadist tract that heavily influenced ISIS's strategy across multiple fronts.26 Al Naji wrote of the necessity of violence, in all its "crudeness and coa.r.s.eness," in order to awaken potential recruits to the reality of the jihadis' war and to intimidate enemies by showing the price they would pay for their involvement. But, he wrote, "we find that every stage of our battle needs methods that are soft and the like in order to counterbalance that (violence) so that the situation will be in good order."27 While much of the propaganda was intended for a Western audience, it also served audiences in Syria and Iraq, where for many sectarian hatred equaled or trumped dreams of caliphate building.

In its publications and in countless videos, ISIS extolled the virtues of killing the rafidah (a derogatory term for s.h.i.+'a Muslims) and the nusayri (a derogatory term for Alawites, members of a sect of s.h.i.+'a Islam practiced by members of the Syrian regime). ISIS videos doc.u.mented the grisly killing of unarmed s.h.i.+'a prisoners by the hundreds, compared to the relative handful of Westerners who captured the attention of the media. Away from the cameras, the blood flowed even more freely, with reports of thousands of sectarian killings, often of unarmed prisoners.

The flood of propaganda in May and June was a deliberate prequel to the June 30 proclamation that ISIS had reestablished the "caliphate" and renamed itself simply "The Islamic State," dropping the limiting geographic identifiers of Iraq and Syria. ISIS had been telegraphing the audacious move for months, and the flurry of new publications in the weeks before the announcement were branded simply with the "Islamic State" name. Although many users still referred to it by the acronym ISIS, the shortened name had been heard in numerous propaganda videos for months.28 The announcement came on June 29, the start of Ramadan, in the form of an audio message from ISIS spokesman al Adnani, t.i.tled "This Is the Promise of Allah." In addition to the Arabic audio, translations of the statement were released in English, French, German, and Russian.29 In the speech, Adnani argued that ISIS was obliged to declare the return of the caliphate, and that Muslims everywhere were obliged to pledge loyalty to the new caliph, Ibrahim, formerly known as Abu Bakr al Baghdadi. In addition, he said, "all emirates, groups, states, and organizations" were now null and void.

This specifically included all other jihadist groups, Adnani explained. "We do not find any (Islamic legal) excuse for you justifying holding back from supporting this state," he said, adding ominously, "And if you forsake the State or wage war against it, you will not harm it. You will only harm yourselves."

Adnani urged Muslims from around the world to come to the Islamic State, again dispensing with the narrative of the weakness of the Muslim world and reinforcing months of messaging about the organization's strength and purpose, using the word "victory" fifteen times in the course of thirty-four minutes.

"We fight for an ummah to which Allah has given honor, esteem, and leaders.h.i.+p, promising it with empowerment and strength on the earth," he said. "Come O Muslims to your honor, to your victory. By Allah, if you disbelieve in democracy, secularism, nationalism, as well as all the other garbage and ideas from the West, and rush to your religion and creed, then by Allah, you will own the earth, and the east and west will submit to you. This is the promise of Allah to you. This is the promise of Allah to you."

The refrain of victory again reflected the advice of the jihadist tract The Management of Savagery. However ISIS took a page from the playbook of the enemy, at least as it was understood by Abu Bakr al Naji, the tract's author. Al Naji opined that the world's superpowers had created a "deceptive media halo which portrays these powers as non-coercive and world-encompa.s.sing," projecting an "aura of invincibility."30 As ISIS took full form, refining its media output carefully at each stage, it adopted its own halo. Victory was not only near, it was here. Regardless of how tenuous or risky its actions might appear to an objective observer, ISIS put a halo on its actions at every step, co-opting the very approach al Naji attributed to enemy powers.

Although ISIS was continually honing its messaging machine, the reaction to the announcement was mixed at best, exciting those who were already fully in ISIS's camp but leaving other jihadists incredulous. ISIS adherents who expected a groundswell of support from ordinary Muslims everywhere were destined to be sorely disappointed.

ISIS's online supporters rushed to celebrate the few pledges that trickled in during the early days, which came almost exclusively from small groups that had previously pledged allegiance to ISIS. Many supporters on social media seemed baffled and hurt that the announcement was being greeted with derision by Muslims of all persuasions around the world. Wild rumors erupted that everyone from the Taliban to al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula had pledged loyalty to ISIS, only to deflate days or hours later.31 But their slogan, repeated by Adnani in the announcement, was "The Islamic State will remain," and the core supporters continued to work at selling the audacious idea of the caliphate, as the messaging machine ramped up. As recent months had shown, ISIS's media machine was increasingly organized and sophisticated, but the quality was often wildly inconsistent.

Just days after the announcement, the new "caliph" showed his face for the first time. In a carefully staged ISIS propaganda video, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi was seen climbing to the pulpit of a mosque in Mosul, where he delivered a perfunctory speech to a subdued crowd.32 Will McCants, a scholar with the Brookings Inst.i.tution and expert on Islamist politics, commented that the speech was "jihadi catnip."33 While the words were powerful, the man was distant. The speech hit many cla.s.sic jihadi tropes, but Baghdadi's delivery was flat and unexciting. Nevertheless, it continued to build on the now-prevalent theme that ISIS was powerful and already victorious.

Unlike its predecessors, ISIS did not seek a far-off dream of the caliphate. The caliphate was here and now. Echoing a phrase used by Adnani in the announcement, Baghdadi referred to the caliphate as the "abandoned obligation" of this era. It was another subtle but effective inversion of al Qaeda and other Islamist terrorist groups, whose messaging often spoke of jihad as the "forgotten duty."34 Strangely, ISIS's message was less nihilistic than the "less extreme" al Qaeda, whose scholars were known to argue that fighting was the only thing that mattered and could not end until the Day of Judgment, regardless of whether the jihadists were winning or losing. This was the argument of someone who expected to lose.35 Baghdadi and his minions were having none of it.

"Here the flag of the Islamic State, the flag of (monotheism), rises and flutters," he intoned. "Its shade covers land from Aleppo to Diyala. Beneath it, the walls of the (illegitimate rulers) have been demolished, their flags have fallen, and their borders have been destroyed. Their soldiers are either killed, imprisoned, or defeated. The Muslims are honored."

Despite the tepid response, ISIS continued to flood the Internet with more propaganda. Concurrent with the release of Baghdadi's speech, the Al Hayat Media Center published the first issue of Dabiq, a new English-language magazine (in an online format).36 It was subsequently released in several other languages.

Dabiq was a small town in Syria, near the border of Turkey, which figured heavily in an Islamic end times prophecy that predicted that Muslims would defeat "Rome," which jihadis had long reimagined as a reference to the Western powers, in the area of Dabiq, before going on to conquer Constantinople, present-day Istanbul.37 The prophecy was quoted at length in the opening pages of the magazine.38 The lead story, unsurprisingly, was the declaration of the caliphate, proclaimed in colorful banner headlines-"A new era has arrived of might and dignity for the Muslims," echoing Baghdadi's speech, which was excerpted at length.

The magazine was remarkable in several respects. It called for hijra, religious emigration inspired by the travels of the Prophet Muhammad, and not just for fighters. In an article in Dabiq, ISIS asked for "doctors, engineers, scholars" and "people with military, administrative and service expertise." Although jihadist groups were frequently bureaucratic, none had so publicly recruited middle managers before.

The fifty-page magazine also featured religious justifications for ISIS's ascension to caliphate status and reports on its military victories, including the now routine pictures of mangled enemy corpses. It borrowed a page from al Qaeda propaganda and quoted Western terrorism a.n.a.lysts to boost its credibility. Over the course of 2014, Al Hayat issued three more issues of the magazine.

As the summer gave way to fall, ISIS continued to flood the Internet with propaganda, and Western media outlets increasingly took note. "Slick" was the word of the hour, endlessly repeated in news stories and broadcasts. (A search for "slick," "video," and "ISIS" on Google yielded more than 5 million hits in November 2014.) The tipping point arrived in late summer.

THE BEHEADINGS.

On August 19, ISIS released a video t.i.tled "A Message to America." Clocking in at just under five minutes, it opened with a clip of President Obama announcing the administration's plans to carry out air strikes against ISIS.39 The scene cut to an image of James Foley, an American reporter who had been kidnapped in Syria in 2012. He had been transferred among various rebel groups, and ultimately ended up in the hands of ISIS. The United States had attempted to rescue him just a month earlier, unsuccessfully.40 Foley was kneeling in the desert sun, arms bound behind him, dressed in an orange jumpsuit meant to invoke the garb worn by jihadist prisoners of the United States in Guantanamo Bay and in Iraq during the American occupation. As with the drone imagery in Clanging of the Swords Part 4, it was yet another inversion by ISIS, usurping another powerful image a.s.sociated with American domination. A masked ISIS fighter in black stood next to him.

A small, black microphone, of the sort used in Western news broadcasts, was clipped to the collar of his s.h.i.+rt.

Foley began to speak in a clear, steady voice.

"I call on my friends, family, and loved ones to rise up against my real killers, the U.S. government," he said. The video had been filmed using multiple cameras and it cut seamlessly from one angle to the next. "For what will happen to me is only a result of their complacency and criminality."

Foley painfully reproached his family, including his brother, a member of the U.S. military, referencing U.S. strikes against ISIS.