A Political History of the State of New York Volume III Part 46

The cordial relations apparently existing until then between the President and the Senator encouraged the hope that confirmation of the nomination might not be opposed. Because of this feeling the New York Legislature, by a formal resolution, endorsed it, and Republicans generally spoke not unkindly of it. But Conkling, knowing that though the voice was Garfield's, the hand was Blaine's, quickly precipitated a contest in which the interest of the whole country centred. It recalled the Arthur controversy, renewed the feverish energy of Stalwart and Half-breed, and furnished glimpses of the dramatic discord which stirred restlessly behind the curtains of Senate secrecy. Under the rules of the Senate, Robertson's nomination went to the Committee on Commerce, of which Conkling was chairman and in control. Here the matter could be held in abeyance, at least until the Stalwarts marshalled their influence to have it withdrawn. For this purpose Vice-President Arthur and Postmaster-General James called at the White House. Governor Cornell, through a personal friend, sent a message to the President, declaring the nomination a great mistake and urging its withdrawal.[1751] Other distinguished men, including Senator Allison of Iowa, visited the President on a similar mission. When these overtures failed compromises were suggested, such as making Robertson a Federal judge, a district attorney, a foreign minister, or the solicitor general.

[Footnote 1751: Alfred R. Conkling, _Life of Conkling_, p. 637.]

Meanwhile a.s.suring messages and comforting letters from Blaine's New York friends stimulated Garfield's courage. On March 27, four days after the nomination, Whitelaw Reid, the accomplished editor of the _Tribune_, telegraphed John Hay, in part, as follows: "From indications here and at Albany we have concluded that the Conkling plan is: First, to make tremendous pressure on the President for withdrawal of Robertson's name under threats from Conkling and persuasion from James. Second, if this fail, then to make their indignation useful by extorting from the President, as a means of placating them, the surveyors.h.i.+p and naval office. With these two they think they could largely neutralise Robertson. Cornell is believed willing to acquiesce in Robertson, hoping to get other offices.

"I wish to say to the President in my judgment this is the turning point of his whole administration--the crisis of his fate. If he surrenders now Conkling is president for the rest of the term and Garfield becomes a laughing stock. On the other hand, he has only to stand firm to succeed. With the unanimous action of the New York Legislature, Conkling cannot make an effectual fight. That action came solely from the belief that Garfield, unlike Hayes, meant to defend his own administration. The a.s.sembly is overwhelmingly Conkling, but they did not dare go on the record against Robertson so long as they thought the Administration meant business. Robertson should be held firm. Boldness and tenacity now insure victory. The least wavering would be fatal."[1752]

[Footnote 1752: For full text of telegram see New York _Tribune_, January 7, 1882. This confidential despatch found its way into the public press. "It must have been stolen from the wires," wrote Hay.

"n.o.body but myself has ever seen it--not even Garfield. I read it to him. It has been under lock and key ever since."--Mrs. James G.

Blaine, _Letters_, Vol. 1, p. 286.]

When Hay read this message to Garfield, the latter said, "They may take him out of the Senate head first or feet first; I will never withdraw him."[1753] That the President might not weaken, Depew and other Independents spent much time in Was.h.i.+ngton during the controversy. "The party standing of Blaine's New York supporters at Chicago absolutely depended upon Robertson's confirmation," declared Depew.[1754]

[Footnote 1753: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 1754: Conversation with the author, March 28, 1909.]

Conkling had not been idle. As usual he cast an anchor to the windward by coquetting with Democratic senators and soothing his Republican colleagues.[1755] He knew how to control in caucus as well as in committee, and on May 2, the Republican senators appointed a Committee of Safety, which recommended that a majority decide the order of executive business including "uncontested nominations." These nominations, it was explained, embraced such as were favourably reported by a committee or accepted by the Republican senators of the State from which the nominee hailed. In other words, the caucus action practically notified the President that no nomination would be confirmed that did not please a senator, if a Republican. To exclude Robertson under such a rule it was only necessary that the New York senators object to his confirmation. Immediately the press of the country teemed with protests. The Const.i.tution, it declared, imposed a moral obligation upon senators to confirm a nomination which was not personally unfit or improper, or which did not imperil the public interest, and it was puerile for a majority to agree in advance to refuse to consider any nomination to which any member, for any reason whatever, saw fit to object. Such a rule substantially transferred the Executive power to one branch of Congress, making the President the agent of the Senate. It was "senatorial courtesy" run mad.

[Footnote 1755: "If any Democratic senator is thinking only of New York politics, and of the mere party relations of the pending question of Presidential nominations, the Democrats of New York must frankly tell him that nothing but injury to the Democracy of New York has come or can come of coalitions with Senator Conkling. The past is eloquent on the subject. Whether set on foot by Mr. Tilden in 1873, or by Mr.

Kelly at a later date, Democratic coalitions with Mr. Conkling have benefited only the Republicans. Mr. Tilden finally came to grief through them, and so did Mr. Kelly; and, what is more important, so did the Democratic party.... It is high time that the false lights which Senator Conkling displayed to certain Democratic senators, and with the help of whom the nominations of President Hayes were thwarted, should be understood. The chequered career of Senator Conkling should compel cautious people to inquire carefully into the evidence for any declaration which may be made by him as to President Garfield and his undertaking."--New York _World_, April 1, 1881.]

As the days pa.s.sed senators exhibited, under pressure from the country as well as from the White House, a growing desire to have the matter settled, and as a final effort in the interest of harmony the Committee of Safety itself called upon the President, proposing that he withdraw Robertson's name and have the others confirmed. To this Garfield emphatically declined to accede. A few days later (May 5) Vice-President Arthur and Senator Platt suggested that he withdraw all the New York nominations. The President replied that he would willingly withdraw all except Robertson's, and if the latter failed an entire new slate could then be made up. This did not satisfy, but within an hour after his visitors had departed, the President, to prevent the confirmation of some while Robertson's was left tied up in committee, put his suggestion into a message, withdrawing the names of the five Stalwarts. This was another surprise, more alarming than the first, since it showed the Administration's readiness to fight.

Meantime the Republican majority exhibited signs of disintegration.

The session was running into hot weather, Democrats had demonstrated their power to prevent a reorganisation of the Senate, and discord in Republican States threatened disaster. Until recently Conkling had felt sure of victory. But now, appreciating the delicacy of the situation, he opened the caucus (May 9) with an earnest, conciliatory speech. He disclaimed desiring any conflict with the President, against whom he made no accusations of bad faith; described the impracticability of his sustaining any relations with Robertson, in whose way, however, he would place no obstacle to any office other than that of collector; discussed the danger to which a lack of political harmony would expose the party in New York; and in almost pathetic tones urged that the courtesy of the Senate be not withheld from him in this hour of his extreme need.

It was plain that he had won the sympathy of his colleagues, but succeeding caucuses, now held daily, lined his pathway with portents and warnings. The iron-clad rule ceased to be operative; a resolution to postpone action until the next session avoided defeat because hastily withdrawn; and a compromise, the last to be suggested, proposing confirmation on condition that Robertson then decline the office, met with no favour. It was plain that at last the stress had reached a climax. Senators no longer exchanged their impressions, or asked "How long?" or "What next?" In their opinion either Garfield or Conkling must recede, and they had learned that the President would not. Moreover, it was rumored, after the caucus of May 13, that Conkling had talked harshly, with much of the temper of a spoiled child. As senators separated on that eventful Friday they declared without hesitation, though not without misgiving, that the last caucus had been held and the last obstacle to Robertson's confirmation removed.

The position of Platt had at last become intolerable. Mindful of the promise to Depew and his friends he had tactfully and patiently sought to avoid a contest by satisfactorily arranging matters between the President and Conkling. Now the end of compromises had come and a vote impended. At this critical if not desperate moment he suggested resignation.[1756] The Legislature that chose him in January was still in session, and the combined votes of the Stalwarts would be sufficient to re-elect them. This would liberate him from a promise and strengthen both with a legislative endors.e.m.e.nt. It was neither an intrepid nor an exalted proposition, but Conkling accepted it.

Perhaps his nature required a relief from its high-strung irritability in some sort of violence, and resignation backed by the a.s.surance that he would soon be restored to office and to greater power on the shoulders of the party offered the seductive form which that violence could take.

[Footnote 1756: "I walked over to Conkling and said, 'I shall send my resignation to Governor Cornell to-night.' Conkling turned to me and replied: 'Don't be too hasty about this matter, young man.' We then went to the rear of the Senate Chamber and talked it over. Conkling insisted that we should wait, and fight it out in Committee. I replied, 'We have been so humiliated that there is but one thing for us to do--rebuke the President by immediately turning in our resignations and then appeal to the Legislature to sustain us.' I induced Conkling to join me in offering our joint resignations, and that night the papers were forwarded to Cornell by special messenger."

Platt's Reminiscences.--_Cosmopolitan Magazine_, April, 1909, p. 516.

It was at this time that Platt's opponents gave him the sobriquet of "Me Too," meaning that he merely followed Conkling's lead. This was unjust to the junior Senator, who at least took the lead in suggesting and insisting upon resigning.]

Before the Senate reconvened on Monday (May 16) the resignation of Conkling and Platt was in the hands of Governor Cornell. It came with the suddenness of Robertson's nomination. Neither Vice-President Arthur shared their intention, nor did Cornell suspect it. The first intimation came in two brief notes, read by the clerk, informing the Senate of their action. But the crash--the consternation, if any were antic.i.p.ated, did not appear.[1757] No doubt many senators sincerely regretted the manner of Conkling's going, but that all were weary of his restless predominance soon became an open secret.[1758] Nor did his reasons appeal to any one except as regarded his own personality and power, since the Senator's statement showed a deliberate, personal choice, not based on a question of public policy.

[Footnote 1757: "The sensational resignations of Conkling and Platt produce no excitement here (Was.h.i.+ngton), and I have yet to hear one criticism complimentary of Conkling, though I have seen all sorts of people and of every shade of cowardice."--Mrs. James G. Blaine, _Letters_ (May 17, 1881), Vol. 1, p. 199.

Robertson and Merritt were promptly and unanimously confirmed on May 18. Two days afterward the names of the five Stalwarts, which had been withdrawn, were resubmitted, except those of Payn and Tyler.]

[Footnote 1758: "Conkling was unrelenting in his enmities. He used to get angry with men simply because they voted against him on questions in which he took an interest. Once he did not for months speak to Justin S. Morrill, one of the wisest and kindliest of men, because of his pique at one of Merrill's votes."--George F. h.o.a.r, _Autobiography_, Vol. 2, p. 55.]

Stripped of its rhetoric and historicity the letter of Conkling and Platt presented but two causes of complaint, one that the President, in withdrawing some of the New York nominations, tried to coerce the Senate to vote for Robertson; second, that Robertson, in voting and procuring others to vote against Grant at Chicago, was guilty of "a dishonest and dishonourable act."[1759] The poverty of these reasons excited more surprise than the folly of their resignation.[1760] Every one knew that in urging senators to say by their vote whether William H. Robertson was a fit person to be collector, the President kept strictly within his const.i.tutional prerogative, and that in withdrawing the earlier nominations he exercised his undoubted right to determine the order in which he should ask the Senate's advice.

Moreover, if any doubt ever existed as to Robertson's right to represent the sentiment of his district instead of the decree of the State convention, the national convention had settled it in his favour.

[Footnote 1759: The full text of the letter is published in the New York papers of May 17, 1881.]

[Footnote 1760: "I was very much surprised at Senator Conkling's action," said Senator Frye of Maine, "because of Judge Robertson's personal hostility to him and not on account of his lack of fitness.

During President Hayes' administration not an important appointment was made in Maine to which Senators Blaine and Hamlin were not bitterly opposed. One man was appointed after Mr. Blaine had stated that he was probably the only prominent Republican in the State personally hostile to him. Yet, with a single exception, all were confirmed, notwithstanding the opposition of the Maine Senators. But neither of them resigned. They were too good Republicans for that."--New York _Tribune_, May 17, 1881.]

Conkling's friends are credited with having overborne his purpose, expressed soon after the election of Garfield, to leave the Senate and engage in the practice of his profession.[1761] But that such intention did not influence his resignation was evidenced by the fact that immediately afterward he bivouacked at Albany and sought a re-election. With his faithful lieutenants he constantly conferred, while the faithless ones, scarcely less conspicuous, who openly refused their support, he stigmatised. From the first Cornell was an object of distrust. He had wired Conkling advising Robertson's confirmation, and the Senator crushed the telegram in his hand. This put the Governor into the disloyal cla.s.s.[1762] It added to Conkling's irritation also that Cornell remained silent. The Governor's friends expressed some surprise that the Senator did not suggest an interview.

It would have been much more surprising if he had, for it is doubtful if Conkling ever suggested an interview in his life. On the other hand, Cornell, unwilling to use the machinery of his great office to force Conkling's return, did not care to approach the Senator. It was not unknown, however, that he refused to become a candidate for United States senator, and that, although ten or fifteen members continued to vote for him, he steadily encouraged his Stalwart friends not to desert Conkling.

[Footnote 1761: A.R. Conkling, _Life of Conkling_, p. 632.]

[Footnote 1762: Conkling spoke of Cornell as "The lizard on the hill."]

Although the Legislature which elected Platt on January 18 was still in session, the sentiment dominating it had radically changed. The party was deeply stirred. The Senator's sudden resignation had added to the indignation aroused by his opposition to the Administration, and members had heard from their const.i.tuents. Besides, a once powerful Senator was now a private citizen. At the outset Independents and several Stalwarts refused to enter a caucus, and early in the contest the Democrats, marshalled by Manning, refused to come to the rescue. Thus, without organisation, Republicans began voting on May 31. Seven weeks and four days later (July 22), after fifty-six ballots, their work was concluded. The first ballot marked the highest score for Conkling and Platt, the former receiving 39 and the latter 29 out of 105 Republican votes.[1763] This severe comment upon their course plainly reflected the general sentiment of the party. It showed especially the dissatisfaction existing toward Conkling. Yet a few Stalwarts remained steadfast to the end. On the morning of July 1, when Platt, to the surprise of his friends, suddenly withdrew, he had 28 votes. On July 22 Conkling had the same.

[Footnote 1763: The ballot resulted as follows: To succeed Platt (long term), Thomas C. Platt, 29; Chauncey M. Depew, 21; Alonzo B. Cornell, 12; Elbridge G. Lapham, 8; Warner Miller, 5; Richard Crowley, 3; scattering, 25. Francis Kernan (Dem.), 54. Total, 157.

To succeed Conkling (short term), Roscoe Conkling, 39; William A.

Wheeler, 19; Alonzo B. Cornell, 9; Richard Crowley, 5; Warner Miller, 1; scattering 37. John C. Jacobs (Dem.), 53. Total, 159.]

The act of the a.s.sa.s.sin of President Garfield on the morning of July 2 had a visible effect upon the proceedings at Albany.[1764] Although for a time conditions indicated that the distinguished sufferer might recover, legislators evinced a great desire to conclude the disagreeable work, and on July 5, sixty-six Republicans held a conference. Up to this time Depew had been the favourite for the long term, registering fifty-five votes on the fourteenth ballot (June 14), but in the interest of harmony he now withdrew his name.[1765]

[Footnote 1764: "Suddenly the adherents of the murdered President saw the powers of government about to be transferred to the leader of their defeated adversaries, and that transfer effected by the act of an a.s.sa.s.sin. Many of them could not instantly accept the truth that it was the act solely of a half-crazed and disappointed seeker for office; many of them questioned whether the men who were to profit by the act were not the instigators of it."--From address of Elihu Root, delivered at the unveiling of President Arthur's statue in Madison Square, New York, June 13, 1899.]

[Footnote 1765: On June 9, S.H. Bradley of Cattaraugus, made a personal explanation in the a.s.sembly, charging Loren B. Sessions, of the Senate, with offering him $2,000 to cast his vote for Depew.

Sessions denied the charge. Investigation proved nothing, and an indictment, subsequently returned against Sessions, resulted in a trial and an acquittal.]

This opened the way for Warner Miller, who received in caucus on the fifth ballot sixty-two of the sixty-six votes cast for the long term.

By previous agreement a Stalwart was ent.i.tled to the short term, and had Cornell allowed his Stalwart friends to enter the caucus he might have had the nomination. But he would not oppose Conkling. Moreover, the belief obtained that the Democrats and Stalwarts would yet unite and adjourn the session without day, thus giving the Senator time to elect other friends to a new Legislature, and the Governor would not disturb this hallucination. With Cornell out of the way Elbridge G.

Lapham easily won the nomination on the second ballot. Lapham had been the first to desert Conkling, who now exclaimed, not without the bitter herb of truth: "That man must not reap the reward of his perfidy."[1766]

[Footnote 1766: New York _Tribune_, July 7, 1881.]

The caucus did not at once bring union, but on July 12 Miller's vote reached seventy; on the 15th it registered seventy-four; and on the 16th, with the help of Speaker Sharpe, who had encouraged Conkling's going to Albany, Miller was elected.[1767] Lapham's vote, however, hung fire until July 22, when, during a brief and most exciting conference in the a.s.sembly Chamber, State Senator Halbert, the Conkling Gibraltar, exclaimed with the suddenness of a squall at sea: "We must come together or the party is divided in the State. I am willing to vote now."[1768] Reason and good nature being thus restored, each Republican present rose and voted his choice, Lapham receiving sixty-one, Conkling twenty-eight. In the general rejoicing State Senator Pitts, a leader of the Independents, no doubt voiced the feeling of all at that moment: "I am as happy as Mr. Halbert. This nomination has been made good-naturedly. It is an augury of good feeling in the future. New York proposes to stand by the Republican administration. I hope we shall never hear more the words Stalwart, Featherhead, Half-breed."[1769] When the joint convention again rea.s.sembled the fifty-sixth ballot gave Elbridge G. Lapham ninety-two, and Clarkson N. Potter, the new Democratic nominee, forty-two.[1770]

[Footnote 1767: "At a conference held on May 22, at the house of Chester A. Arthur, No. 123 Lexington Avenue, the following persons were present: Chester A. Arthur, Thomas C. Platt, Louis F. Payn, Charles M. Denison, George H. Sharpe, John F. Smyth, A.B. Johnson, and Roscoe Conkling. Each person was asked to pa.s.s judgment upon the future course of the two Senators. Each one spoke in turn. The sense of the meeting was that they should proceed to the State capital."--A.R. Conkling, _Life of Conkling_, pp. 642-643.

"Payn warned both Conkling and Platt that they would be defeated.

Speaker Sharpe admonished Payn that he was wrong. Payn predicted that while he and other friends were still battling for the organisation Sharpe would desert them. Payn proved himself a prophet. Sharpe went over to the opposition." Platt's Reminiscences.--_Cosmopolitan Magazine_, April, 1909, p. 517.]

[Footnote 1768: New York papers of July 23.]

[Footnote 1769: New York _Tribune_, July 23.]

[Footnote 1770: The candidacy of John C. Jacobs had been the subject of some criticism on the part of the Democrats because he was a member of the Legislature, and on June 22, after the twenty-third ballot, he withdrew. A caucus then subst.i.tuted the name of Potter.]

For Conkling it was worse than defeat. The humiliation of having gone to Albany, of being deserted by friend after friend, of enduring the taunts of an inhospitable press, and, finally, of having his place taken by one, who, in his opinion, had proven most faithless, was like the torture of an unquenchable fire. Lord Randolph Churchill, after his historic resignation as chancellor of the exchequer, declared that he would not live it over again for a million a year. It is likewise a matter of history that Senator Conkling never ceased to deplore his mistake.[1771]

[Footnote 1771: Conkling at once resumed the practice of law in New York City. The strain and exposure of making his way on foot through the snowdrifts of the historic blizzard which visited that city in the spring of 1888, resulted in an abscess in the inner ear, from which he died on April 18. A bronze statue, erected in his memory, is located in Madison Square.

"We have followed poor Conkling down to the gates of death and have been truly sorry to see them close upon him. I have never heard your father, in all the twenty-two years since he spoke hard words to him, say a syllable which he need regret, but his deathbed seemed hardly less inaccessible than his life."--Mrs. James G. Blaine, _Letters_, Vol. 2, p. 203. Dated, San Remo, May 1, 1888. Addressed to Walker Blaine.]