Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet Part 37

On the 25th of November, 1867, a majority of the committee on the judiciary reported a resolution of impeachment, as follows:

"_Resolved_, That Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors."

This resolution was accompanied by a long report and the testimony, all of which was ordered to be printed, and made the special order for Wednesday, December 4, 1867. James F. Wilson, of Iowa, made a minority report against the resolution of impeachment, signed by himself and Frederick E. Woodbridge, of Vermont. Samuel S. Marshall, of Illinois, also made a minority report in behalf of himself and Charles A. Eldridge, of Wisconsin.

On the 7th of December, the resolution of impeachment reported by the committee on the judiciary at the previous session was disagreed to by a vote of 57 yeas and 108 nays. This decision of the House of Representatives against an impeachment on the charges then made was entirely justified. This imposing process was not authorized for misconduct, immorality, intoxication or neglect of duties, such as were alleged in the report of the committee, but only for high crimes or misdemeanors. The House properly made this distinction, and here the accusations against the President would have ended, but for his attempt, in violation of the const.i.tution and law, to place General Lorenzo Thomas in an important office without the advice and consent of the Senate, then in session.

In the latter part of 1867, and the early part of 1868, I became involved in a controversy, between President Johnson, General Grant and General Sherman, which caused the last-named serious embarra.s.sment.

As much of the correspondence between these parties has been published in the "Sherman Letters," I at first thought it best not to make any reference to the matter, but upon reflection, and to explain subsequent events, I insert the letters in their order.

General Sherman was summoned to Was.h.i.+ngton, by the President, and upon his arrival there wrote me the following letter:

"Was.h.i.+ngton, October 11, 1867.

"Dear Brother:--I have no doubt that you have been duly concerned about my being summoned to Was.h.i.+ngton.

"It was imprudently done by the President without going through Grant. But I think I have smoothed it over so that Grant does not feel hurt. I cannot place myself in a situation even partially antagonistic with Grant. We must work together. Mr. Johnson has not offered me anything, only has talked over every subject, and because I listen to him patiently, and make short and decisive answers, he says he would like to have me here. Still he does not oppose my going back home. . . .

"On Monday I will start for St. Louis by the Atlantic and G. W.

road, and pa.s.s Mansfield Tuesday. Can't you meet me and ride some miles? I have been away from home so much, and must go right along to Fort Laramie, that I cannot well stop at Cleveland or Mansfield, and would like to see you for an hour or so to hear your views of the coming events. . . .

"Yours affectionately, "W. T. Sherman."

And on his return to St. Louis he continues:

. . . "I have always talked kindly to the President, and have advised Grant to do so. I do think that it is best for all hands that his administration be allowed to run out its course without threatened or attempted violence. Whoever begins violent proceedings will lose in the long run. Johnson is not a man of action but of theory, and so long as your party is in doubt as to the true mode of procedure, it would be at great risk that an attempt be made to displease the President by a simple law of Congress. This is as much as I have ever said to anybody. I have never, by word or inference, given anybody the right to cla.s.s me in opposition to, or in support of, Congress. On the contrary, I told Mr. Johnson that from the nature of things he could not dispense with a Congress to make laws and appropriate money, and suggested to him to receive and make overtures to such men as Fessenden, Trumbull, Sherman, Morgan, and Morton, who, though differing with him in abstract views of const.i.tutional law and practice, were not destructive.

That if the congressional plan of reconstruction succeeded, he could do nothing, and if it failed or led to confusion, the future developed results in his favor, etc.; and that is pretty much all I have ever said or done. At the meeting of the society of the army of the Tennessee on the 13th inst., I will be forced to speak, if here, and though I can confine myself purely to the military events of the past, I can make the opportunity of stating that in no event will I be drawn into the complications of the civil politics of this country.

"If Congress could meet and confine itself to current and committee business, I feel certain that everything will work along quietly till the nominations are made, and a new presidential election will likely settle the principle if negroes are to be voters in the states without the consent of the whites. This is more a question of prejudice than principle, but a voter has as much right to his prejudices as to his vote. . . ."

I answered:

"Mansfield, Ohio, November 1, 1867.

"Dear Brother:-- . . . I see no real occasion for trouble with Johnson. The great error of his life was in not acquiescing in and supporting the 14th amendment of the const.i.tution in the 39th Congress. This he could easily have carried. It referred the suffrage question to each state, and if adopted long ago the whole controversy would have culminated; or, if further opposed by the extreme radicals, they would have been easily beaten. Now I see nothing short of universal suffrage and universal amnesty as the basis. When you come on, I suggest that you give out that you go on to make your annual report and settle Indian affairs. Give us notice when you will be on, and come directly to my house, where we will make you one of the family.

"Grant, I think, is inevitably the candidate. He allows himself to drift into a position where he can't decline if he would, and I feel sure he don't want to decline. My judgment is that Chase is better for the country and for Grant himself, but I will not quarrel with what I cannot control.

"John Sherman."

And later I wrote:--

"If you can keep free from committals to Johnson, you will surely as you live be called upon to act as President. The danger now is that the mistakes of the Republicans may drift the Democratic party into power. If so, the Rebellion is triumphant, and no man active in suppressing it will be treated or honored. Grant is not injured by his correspondence with Johnson, but no doubt feels annoyed. . . ."

At this time President Johnson had come to open disagreement with Mr. Stanton, his Secretary of War, and wished to force him from the cabinet. Mr. Stanton had refused to resign and had been upheld by Congress. The President then turned for help in his difficulties to General Grant, commanding the army; but the latter found that any interference on his part would be illegal and impossible.

Mr. Johnson then planned to create a new office for General Sherman, that of brevet general of the army, in order to bring him to Was.h.i.+ngton.

The following letters and telegrams refer to this difficulty:

"(Confidential.) "Library Room, War Department, } "Was.h.i.+ngton, D. C., January 31, 1868.} "To the President:--Since our interview of yesterday I have given the subject of our conversation all my thoughts, and I beg you will pardon my reducing the result to writing.

"My personal preferences, if expressed, were to be allowed to return to St. Louis to resume my present command, because my command was important, large, suited to my rank and inclination, and because my family was well provided for there, in house facilities, schools, living, and agreeable society.

"Whilst, on the other hand, Was.h.i.+ngton was for many (to me) good reasons highly objectionable. Especially because it is the political capital of the country and focus of intrigue, gossip, and slander.

Your personal preferences were, as expressed, to make a new department east adequate to my rank, with headquarters at Was.h.i.+ngton, and to a.s.sign me to its command--to remove my family here, and to avail myself of its schools, etc.; to remove Mr. Stanton from his office as Secretary of War, and have me to discharge the duties.

"To effect this removal two modes were indicated: To simply cause him to quit the war office building and notify the treasury department and the army staff departments no longer to respect him as Secretary or War; or to remove him, and submit my name to the Senate for confirmation. Permit me to discuss these points a little, and I will premise by saying that I have spoken to no one on the subject, and have not even seen Mr. Ewing, Mr. Stanbery, or General Grant since I was with you.

"It has been the rule and custom of our army, since the organization of the government, that the officer of the army second in rank should be in command at the second place in importance, and remote from general headquarters. To bring me to Was.h.i.+ngton would put three heads to an army,--yourself, General Grant, and myself,--and we would be more than human if we were not to differ. In my judgment it would ruin the army, and would be fatal to one or two of us.

"Generals Scott and Taylor proved themselves soldiers and patriots in the field, but Was.h.i.+ngton was fatal to them both. This city and the influences that centered here defeated every army that had its head here from 1861 to 1865, and would have overwhelmed General Grant at Spottsylvania and Petersburg, had he not been fortified by a strong reputation already hard earned, and because no one then living coveted the place. Whereas in the west we made progress from the start, because there was no political capital near enough to poison our minds and kindle into light that craving itching for fame which has killed more good men than battles. I have been with General Grant in the midst of death and slaughter--when the howls of people reached him after s.h.i.+loh; when messengers were speeding to and fro, between his army and Was.h.i.+ngton, bearing slanders to induce his removal before he took Vicksburg; in Chattanooga, when the soldiers were stealing the corn of the starving mules to satisfy their own hunger; at Nashville, when he was ordered to the 'forlorn hope' to command the army of the Potomac, so often defeated--and yet I never saw him more troubled than since he has been in Was.h.i.+ngton, and has been compelled to read himself a 'sneak and deceiver,' based on reports of four of the cabinet, and apparently with your knowledge. If this political atmosphere can disturb the equanimity of one so guarded and so prudent as he is, what will be the result with one so careless, so outspoken, as I am? Therefore, with my consent, Was.h.i.+ngton never.

"As to the Secretary of War, his office is twofold. As cabinet officer he should not be there without your hearty, cheerful consent, and I believe that is the judgment and opinion of every fair-minded man. As the holder of a civil office, having the supervision of money appropriated by Congress, and of contracts for army supplies, I do think Congress, or the Senate by delegation from Congress, has a lawful right to be consulted. At all events, I would not risk a suit or contest on that phase of the question. The law of Congress of March 2, 1867, prescribing the manner in which orders and instructions relating to 'military movements' shall reach the army, gives you, as const.i.tutional commander in chief, the very power you want to exercise, and enables you to prevent the secretary from making any such orders and instructions, and consequently he cannot control the army, but is limited and restricted to a duty that an auditor of the treasury could perform. You certainly can afford to await the result. The executive power is not weakened, but, rather, strengthened. Surely he is not such an obstruction as would warrant violence or even a show of force which could produce the very reaction and clamor that he hopes for, to save him from the absurdity of holding an empty office 'for the safety of the country.'

"With great respect, yours truly, "W. T. Sherman."

"Headquarters Military Division of the Missouri,} "St. Louis, Mo., February 14, 1868. } "To the President:

"Dear Sir:--It is hard for me to conceive you would purposely do me an unkindness, unless under the pressure of a sense of public duty, or because you do not believe me sincere.

"I was in hopes, since my letter to you of the 31st of January, that you had concluded to pa.s.s over that purpose of yours, expressed more than once in conversation, to organize a new command for me in the east, with headquarters in Was.h.i.+ngton; but a telegram, from General Grant, of yesterday, says that 'the order was issued ordering you' (me) 'to Atlantic division;' and the newspapers of this morning contain the same information, with the addition that I have been nominated as 'brevet general.' I have telegraphed to my own brother in the Senate to oppose my nomination, on the ground that the two higher grades in the army ought not to be complicated with brevets, and I trust you will conceive my motives aright. If I could see my way clear to maintain my family, I should not hesitate a moment to resign my present commission and seek some business wherein I would be free from those unhappy complications that seem to be closing about me, in spite of my earnest efforts to avoid them; but necessity ties my hands, and I submit with the best grace I can, till I make other arrangements.

"In Was.h.i.+ngton are already the headquarters of a department, and of the army itself, and it is hard for me to see wherein I can render military service there. Any staff officer with the rank of major could surely fill any gap left between those two military offices; and by being placed at Was.h.i.+ngton I shall be universally construed as a rival to the general in chief, a position damaging to me in the highest degree. Our relations have always been most confidential and friendly, and if, unhappily, any cloud of difficulty should arise between us, my sense of personal dignity and duty would leave me no alternative but resignation. For this I am not yet prepared, but I shall proceed to arrange for it as rapidly as possible, that when the time does come (as it surely will if this plan is carried into effect), I may act promptly.

"Inasmuch as the order is now issued, I cannot expect a full revocation of it, but I beg the privilege of taking post at New York, or at any point you may name, within the new military division, other than Was.h.i.+ngton.

"This privilege is generally granted to all military commanders, and I can see no good reasons why I, too, may not ask for it; and this simple concession, involving no public interest, will much soften the blow which, right or wrong, I construe as one of the hardest I have sustained in a life somewhat checkered with adversity.

"With great respect, yours truly, (Signed) "W. T. Sherman, Lieutenant General."

"Headquarters Military Division of Missouri,} "St. Louis, February 14, 1868. } "Dear Brother:-- . . . I am again in the midst of trouble, occasioned by a telegram from Grant saying that the order is out for me to come to the command of the military division of the Atlantic, headquarters at Was.h.i.+ngton. The President repeatedly asked me to accept of some such position, but I thought I had fought it off successfully, though he again and again reverted to it.

"Now, it seems, he has ordered it, and it is full of trouble for me. I wrote him one or two letters in Was.h.i.+ngton, which I though positive enough, but have now written another, and if it fails in its object I might as well cast about for new employment. The result would be certain conflict, resulting in Grant's violent deposition, mine, or the President's.

"There is not room on board of one s.h.i.+p for more than one captain.

"If Grant intends to run for President I should be willing to come on, because my duties would then be so clearly defined that I think I could steer clear of the breakers--but now it would be impossible.

The President would make use of me to beget violence, a condition of things that ought not to exist now.

"He has no right to use us for such purposes, though he is commander in chief. I did suppose his pa.s.sage with Grant would end there, but now it seems he will fight him as he has been doing Congress.

I don't object if he does so himself and don't rope me in. . . .

"If the President forces me into a false position out of seeming favor, I must defend myself. It is mortifying, but none the less inevitable.

"Affectionately, "W. T. Sherman."