Recollections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet Part 40

I quote my view of the action of the President:

"Was not this act willfully violated by the President during the session of the Senate?

"It appears, from the letter of the President to General Grant, from his conversation with General Sherman, and from his answer, that he had formed a fixed resolve to get rid of Mr. Stanton, and fill the vacancy without the advice of the Senate. He might have secured a new Secretary of War by sending a proper nomination to the Senate. This he neglected and refused to do. He cannot allege that the Senate refused to relieve him from an obnoxious minister.

He could not say that the Senate refused to confirm a proper appointee, for he would make no appointment to them. The Senate had declared that the reasons a.s.signed for suspending Mr. Stanton did not make the case required by the tenure of office act, but I affirm as my conviction that the Senate would have confirmed any one of a great number of patriotic citizens if nominated to the Senate. I cannot resist the conclusion, from the evidence before us, that he was resolved to obtain a vacancy in the department of war in such a way that he might fill the vacancy by an appointment without the consent of the Senate, and in violation of the const.i.tution and the law. This was the purpose of the offer to General Sherman.

This was the purpose of the appointment of General Thomas. If he had succeeded as he hoped, he could have changed his temporary appointment at pleasure, and thus have defied the authority of the Senate and the mandatory provisions of the const.i.tution and the law. I cannot in any other way account for his refusal to send a nomination to the Senate until after the appointment of General Thomas. The removal of Mr. Stanton by a new appointment, confirmed by the Senate, would have complied with the const.i.tution. The absolute removal of Mr. Stanton would have created a temporary vacancy, but the Senate was in session to share in the appointment of another. An _ad interim_ appointment, without authority of law, during the session of the Senate, would place the department of war at his control in defiance fo the Senate and the law, and would have set an evil example, dangerous to the public safety--one which, if allowed to pa.s.s unchallenged, would place the President above and beyond the law.

"The claim now made, that it was the sole desire of the President to test the const.i.tutionality of the tenure of office act, is not supported by reason or by proof. He might, in August last, or at any time since, without an _ad interim_ appointment, have tested this law by a writ of _quo warranto_. He might have done so by an order of removal, and a refusal of Mr. Stanton's requisitions. He might have done so by a.s.signing a head of department to the place made vacant by the order of removal. Such was not his purpose or expectation. He expected by the appointment of General Sherman at once to get possession of the war department, so when General Thomas was appointed there was no suggestion of a suit at law, until the unexpected resistance of Mr. Stanton, supported by the action of the Senate, indicated that as the only way left."

It is difficult to convey, by extracts, a correct idea of a carefully prepared opinion, but this statement shows my view of the case, and, entertaining it, I felt bound, with much regret, to vote "guilty" in response to my name, but I was entirely satisfied with the result of the vote, brought about by the action of several Republican Senators. There was some disposition to arraign these Senators and to attribute their action to corrupt motives, but there was not the slightest ground for the imputations. Johnson was allowed to serve out his term, but there was a sense of relief when General Grant was sworn into office as President of the United States.

CHAPTER XX.

THE FORTIETH CONGRESS.

Legislation During the Two Years--Further Reduction of the Currency by the Secretary Prohibited--Report of the Committee of Conference --Bill for Refunding the National Debt--Amounted to $2,639,382,572.68 on December 1, 1867--Resumption of Specie Payments Recommended-- Refunding Bill in the Senate--Change in My Views--Debate Partic.i.p.ated in by Nearly Every Senator--Why the Bill Failed to Become a Law-- Breach Between Congress and the President Paralyzes Legislation-- Nomination and Election of Grant for President--His Correspondence with General Sherman.

During the 40th Congress, extending from the 4th of March, 1867, to the 4th of March, 1869, the chief subjects of debate were the contraction of the currency, the refunding of the public debt, the payment of United States notes in coin, and a revision of the laws imposing internal taxation and duties on imported goods.

Early in the first session of this Congress, the opposition of the people to the policy of contraction, constantly pressed by Secretary McCulloch, became so imperative that both Houses determined to take from him all power to diminish the volume of currency then in circulation. On the 5th of December, 1867, Robert C. Schenck, chairman of the committee of ways and means, reported a bill in the following words:

"_Be it enacted, etc._, That so much of an act ent.i.tled 'An act to amend an act to provide ways and means to support the government,'

approved April 12, 1866, as authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to retire United States notes to an amount not exceeding $4,000,000 in any one month, is hereby repealed.

"Sec. 2. _And be it further enacted_, That from and after the pa.s.sage of this act the further reduction of the currency by retiring or canceling United States notes shall be, and hereby is, prohibited."

This bill was taken up for consideration on the 7th of December, and, after a brief debate, with little opposition, pa.s.sed the House by the vote of 127 yeas and 32 nays. It was sent to the Senate, referred to the committee on finance, and was carefully considered.

That committee, with but two dissenting voices, directed me to report the bill to the Senate with a single amendment. On the 9th of January, 1868, I called up the bill for consideration, and made a brief explanation, in which I said the committee, after full reflection, had thought proper to recommend the pa.s.sage of the bill of the House of Representatives, in substance as it was sent to us, only changing the phraseology. I said that the bill contemplated further legislation during that session. It was understood by all that some more comprehensive measures must be adopted during that session, but until further legislation there should be no more contraction of the currency. I thus stated the reasons which, in my opinion, justified the pa.s.sage of the bill:

"_First_. It will satisfy the public mind that no further contraction will be made when industry is in a measure paralyzed. We hear the complaint from all parts of the country, from all branches of industry, from every state in the Union, that industry for some reason is paralyzed, and that trade and enterprise are not so well rewarded as they were. Many, perhaps erroneous, attribute all this to the contraction of the currency--a contraction that I believe is unexampled in the history of any nation. $140,000,000 has been withdrawn out of $737,000,000 in less than two years. There is no example, that I know of, of such rapid contraction. It may be wise, it may be beneficial, but still it has been so rapid as to excite a stringency that is causing complaint, and I think the people have a right to be relieved from that.

"_Second_. This bill will restore to the legislature their power over the currency, a power too important to be delegated to any single officer of the government. I do not wish to renew the discussion that occurred here two years ago on the pa.s.sage of the law of April 12, 1866; but it is still my opinion, as it has been always, that the question of the amount of currency ought to be fixed by Congress. We have the power to coin money, and to regulate the value thereof. We have coined money in the form of paper money, and certainly the power of Congress in this respect ought not to be delegated to any single officer. If contraction ought to be established as a policy it should be by Congress, not by the Secretary of the Treasury, and it is not wise to confer upon any officer of the government a power of this kind, which can be and may be properly controlled and limited by Congress.

"_Third_. This will strongly impress upon Congress the imperative duty of acting wisely upon financial measures, for the responsibility will then rest entirely upon Congress, and will not be shared with them by the Secretary of the Treasury.

"_Fourth_. It will encourage business men to continue old, and embark in new, enterprises, when they are a.s.sured that no change will be made in the measure of value without the open and deliberate consent of their representatives.

"These considerations are amply sufficient to justify this measure, but it is only preliminary to others of far greater importance that must command our attention. These involve--

"1. The existence of the banking system of the United States.

"2. The time and manner of resuming specie payments.

"3. The mode of redeeming the debt of the United States and the kind of money in which it may be redeemed; and, in this connection, the taxes, if any, that may be levied upon the public creditors.

"4. Such a reduction of our expenditures and taxes as will relieve our const.i.tuents, as far as practicable, from the burdens resulting from the recent war."

This led to a long debate, which continued until the 15th of January, when the bill, as amended, pa.s.sed by a vote of 33 years and 4 nays.

These decisive votes against contraction definitely settled the policy of the government to retain in circulation the then existing volume of United States notes. The disagreement between the two Houses was referred to a committee of conference, and the conferees reported the bill in the following form:

"_Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress a.s.sembled_,

"That, from and after the pa.s.sage of this act, the authority of the Secretary of the Treasury to make any reduction of the currency, by retiring or canceling United States notes, shall be, and is hereby, suspended; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the cancellation and destruction of mutilated United States notes, and the replacing of the same with notes of the same character and amount."

This bill was sent to the President, and, not having been returned by him within ten days, it became a law without his approval, under the const.i.tution of the United States.

On the 17th of December, 1867, I reported from the committee on finance a bill for refunding the national debt and for a conversion of the notes of the United States. This bill was accompanied by an elaborate report. This report was carefully prepared by me, and met, I believe, the general approval of the committee on finance.

In that Congress there were but five Democratic Senators, and it so happened that all the members of the committee on finance were Republicans, but these represented widely different opinions on financial subjects. I undertook, in this report, to deal in a general way with these topics. Upon a careful reading of it now I find but little that I do not approve. The general policy set out in this report was subsequently embodied into laws, but the measures relating to refunding the debt and the resumption of specie payments were not adopted until several years after the date of the report.

The ascertained debt on the first day of December, 1867, as stated by the Secretary of the Treasury, was $2,639,382,572.68, divided as follows:

Debt bearing coin interest.

5 per cent. bonds, 10-40's, and old fives $205,532,580.00 6 per cent. bonds of 1867 and 1868 . . . . 14,690,941.80 6 per cent. bonds, 1881 . . . . . . . . . 282,731,550.00 6 per cent. 5-20 bonds . . . . . . . . . . 1,324,412,550.00 Navy pension fund . . . . . . . . . . . . 13,000,000.00 ---------------- $1,840,367,891.80 Debt bearing currency interest.

6 per cent. bonds . . . . . . . . . . . . $18,601,000.00 3-year compound interest notes . . . . . . 62,249,360.00 3-year 7-30 notes . . . . . . . . . . . . 285,587,100.00 3 per cent. certificates . . . . . . . . . 12,855,000.00 ---------------- $379,292,460.00 Matured debt not presented for payment.

3 year 7-30 notes, due August 15, 1867 . . $2,855,400.00 Compound interest notes, matured June 10, July 15, August 15, and October 15, 1867 7,065,750.00 Bonds, Texas indemnity . . . . . . . . . . 260,000.00 Treasury notes, acts July 17, 1861 and prior thereto . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163,011.64 Bonds, April 15, 1842 . . . . . . . . . . 54,061.64 Treasury notes, March 3, 1863 . . . . . . 868,240.00 Temporary loan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,880,900.55 Certificates of indebtedness . . . . . . . 31,000.00 ---------------- $14,178,363.83 Debt bearing no interest.

United States notes . . . . . . . . . . . $356,212,473.00 Fractional currency . . . . . . . . . . . 30,929,984.05 Gold certificates of deposit . . . . . . . 18,401,400.00 ---------------- $405,543,857.05 Total debt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$2,639,382,572.68 Amount in treasury, coin . . . . . . . . . $100,690,645.69 Amount in treasury, currency . . . . . . . 37,486,175.24 Amount of debt less cash in treasury . . . . . . . . . . .

$2,501,205,751.75

Besides the amounts thus stated there were large balances due to loyal states, upon accounts not then rendered or ascertained, and to individuals for losses sustained during the war.

The ascertained debt consisted of twenty different forms of liability, some payable in coin and some in lawful money. Much of this debt was due on demand, but the great body of it was payable in from one to twenty years, while the unascertained debt was being stated from time to time and had to be met from accruing revenues. Nearly $300,000,000 of debt had been paid out of current revenue since the close of the war. The first recommendation of the committee was that the debt should be refunded as rapidly as practicable into bonds bearing as low a rate of interest as possible, payable in twenty or thirty years, but redeemable at the pleasure of the United States in five or ten years. This recommendation was based on the fixed policy of the government to limit the duration of a bond within its lifetime, and thus leave it to the option of the government to pay its indebtedness and to reduce the rate of interest after a brief period, if the condition of the public revenues and of the money market should enable it to do so.

Here the question arose whether the bonds known as the 5-20 bonds could be paid in lawful money after the period of five years, when, by their terms, they were redeemable. These bonds promised to pay so many dollars. Other bonds were specifically payable in coin, and still other bonds were payable in lawful money; that is, in United States notes. These notes were then at a discount, being worth in the market about 88 cents in coin. But the notes were obligations of the United States, and it was the duty, and then within the power of the United States, to advance these notes to par in coin.

The majority of the committee, I among them, believed that the United States should not take advantage of its own wrong, in not redeeming its notes in coin, but should either advance these notes to par in coin, or pay its bonds in coin. The committee, therefore, recommended that both the notes and bonds should be received in exchange for the funding bonds, and that the notes should be reissued and maintained at par with coin, and be supported by a reserve of coin ample to maintain the notes at par with coin. In other words, the United States would resume specie payments. The committee expressed the opinion that, with the system of taxation then in existence, this policy of refunding and resumption could be maintained, and that the rate of interest then paid could be reduced to four or five per cent., and the money then in circulation would be kept at par with coin at the cost only of the interest on the bullion and coin held to meet any notes presented for redemption.

The committee also recommended that the internal and tariff taxes be revised to correct irregularities or defects, and to repeal such as were oppressive.

While the committee opposed any contraction of the currency it also opposed any increase of it. The general theory of the report was to advance both bonds and notes to par in coin, and to issue bonds in such form and terms that the government could redeem them, or renew them at lower rates of interest.

The report states:

"Your committee are therefore of opinion that no legal tender notes, beyond the amount now limited by law, should be issued under any pressure of financial or political necessity until they are convertible into gold and silver. Our duty is to elevate the 'greenback,' the standard of national credit, to the standard of gold, the money of the world. Until then we are not on a substantial foundation. Let us make the dollar of our promise in the pocket of a laboring man equal to the dollar of our mint. The rapidity of the process is a question of public policy. It may be by gradually diminis.h.i.+ng the volume of currency, or be left at its present amount until increased business or improved credit bring it up to the specie standard."

The refunding bill was taken up by the Senate on the 27th of February, 1868, and was fully discussed by me. After stating its general objects I said:

"It is with this view, and actuated by this principle, that the committee on finance have endeavored to make this a bill of relief, reducing, if possible, consistent with the public faith, the interest of the public debt, and giving increased value to United States notes. We have endeavored in this bill to accomplish three results: First, to reduce the rate of interest with the voluntary consent of the holders of our securities; second, to make a distinct provision for the payment of the public debt; and third, to give increased value to United States notes, and to provide for a gradual resumption of specie payments. All these are objects admitted to be of the highest importance. The only question is, whether the measure proposed tends to accomplish them."

I then quoted the example of the United States and Great Britain in reducing the rate of interest on public securities. I do not approve all I said in that speech. It has been frequently quoted as being inconsistent with my opinions and action at a later period.

It is more important to be right than to be consistent. I then proposed to use the doubt expressed by many people as to the right of the government to redeem the 5-20 bonds in the legal tender money in circulation when the bonds were sold, as an inducement to the holders of bonds to convert them into securities bearing a less rate of interest but specifically payable in coin. Upon this policy I changed my opinion. I became convinced that it was neither right nor expedient to pay these bonds in money less valuable than coin, that the government ought not to take advantage of its neglect to resume specie payments after the war was over, by refusing the payment of the bonds with coin. I acted on this conviction when years afterwards the resumption act was adopted, and the beneficial results from this action fully justified my change of opinion.

The debate on this bill was partic.i.p.ated in by nearly every Senator, and was conceded to be the most comprehensive and instructive debate on financial questions for many years.

The bill, as it then stood, authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to issue registered or coupon bonds of the United States, in such form and of such denominations as he might prescribe, payable, princ.i.p.al and interest, in coin, and bearing interest at the rate of five per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually, such bonds to be payable forty years from date and to be redeemable in coin after ten years.

It authorized the exchange of the bonds commonly known as the 5-20 bonds for the bonds authorized by that bill. It also authorized the holders of United States notes to the amount of $1,000, or any multiple of that sum, to convert them into the five per cent. bonds provided for by the bill. This bill pa.s.sed the Senate on the 14th of July, 1868. It pa.s.sed the House of Representatives soon after, with amendments that were disagreed to by the Senate. The bill and amendments were referred to a conference committee which reported a modified bill which pa.s.sed both Houses and was sent to President Johnson, but at so late a period of the session that it was not approved by him and thus failed to become a law.

The committee on finance at the next and closing session of that Congress deemed it useless to report another funding bill, and on the 16th of December, 1868, I reported, by direction of that committee, the following resolution: