Essays on the Constitution of the United States Part 4

In the same section it is provided, (among other things which to argue upon would be unnecessary, as they are founded on the firmest principles of republicanism) that Congress shall determine the time for choosing electors, and the day of election shall be the same throughout the Union.

Can anything more strongly mark a liberal and free government than this clause? No one state will in the least be influenced in their choice by that of another; and Congress cannot have the least controul in regard to the appointment of any particular men for electors. This, among other things, proves that all requisite power will still remain in the hands of the people, and any insinuation to the contrary, must be a mere chicane to blind the judgments of the misinformed.

Ca.s.sIUS.

(_To be continued._)

Ca.s.sius, X.

The Ma.s.sachusetts Gazette, (Number 393)

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 21, 1787.

For the Ma.s.sachusetts Gazette.

TO THE INHABITANTS OF THIS STATE.

(_Continued from our last._)

Section I, of article II. further provides, That the president shall, previous to his entering upon the duties of his office, take the following oath or affirmation: I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of president of the United States, and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the const.i.tution of the United States. Thus we see that instead of the president's being vested with all the powers of a monarch, as has been a.s.serted, that he is under the immediate controul of the const.i.tution, which if he should presume to deviate from, he would be immediately arrested in his career and summoned to answer for his conduct before a federal court, where strict justice and equity would undoubtedly preside.

Section 3, of article II. provides, That the president of the United States shall, from time to time, give Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient-he may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses or either of them, and adjourn them to such time as he may think proper-he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all officers of the United States.

Very little more power is granted to the president of the United States, by the above section, than what is vested in the governours of the different states. The propriety of vesting such powers in a supreme executive cannot be doubted. What would it signify to appoint an executive officer, and immediately after to make laws which would be a barrier to the execution of his commission?

It would answer the same end that the nominal power which is vested in the different states answers, that is, it would answer the end of paying for the support of a shaddow, without reaping the benefit of the substance.

It is certainly requisite that proper powers should be vested in an executive (and certainly no more than necessary powers are vested in the executive of the United States by the new const.i.tution) or else the establishment of such a branch is needless.

Section 4, of article II. says, The president, vice-president, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.-Thus we see that no office, however exalted, can protect the miscreant, who dares invade the liberties of his country, or countenance in his crimes the impious villain who sacrilegiously attempts to trample upon the rights of freemen.

Who will be absurd enough to affirm, that the section alluded to, does not sufficiently prove that the federal convention have formed a government which provides that we shall be ruled by laws and not by men? None, surely, but an anti-federalist-and from them falsehood receives constant homage; for it is on the basis of falsehood and the summit of ignorance, that all opposition to the federal government is founded.

Section 1, of article III. provides, That the judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferiour courts as Congress may from time to time appoint.-It has been a.s.serted, that a federal court would be an engine of partiality in the government, a source of oppression and injustice to the poorer part of the community; but how far consistency influenced the conduct of the authors of such a.s.sertions, the publick must determine. The anti-federalists have said, that if a cause should come before one of state judicial courts, and judgment be given against the person who possessed most interest, that he would immediately appeal to the federal court, whose residence would be at the seat of government, and consequently at so great a distance that an inhabitant of the state of Georgia or New-Hamps.h.i.+re, if he was in low circ.u.mstances, would not be able to carry his cause before the federal court, and would, therefore, be obliged to give it up to his wealthier antagonist. The glaring improbability with which such insinuations abound, must be obvious to every one.

Can it be supposed, that any person would be so inconsistent, after a cause was given against him, in a court where judges presided whose characters, as honest and just men, were unrivalled, as to attempt to have the cause re-heard before the federal court?

Indeed if such a thing was to take place, the man in low circ.u.mstances would have nothing to fear, as the payment of all charges would fall upon the person who lost the cause, and there is not the shadow of a doubt, with respect to the person's losing the cause, who had lost it before in a court of justice in either of the states.

In regard to the equal administration of justice in all the states, a rattle brained anti-federalist, in the last Ma.s.s. Gazette, under the signature of Agrippa,(14) has a.s.serted, that the inequality of the administration of justice throughout the states, was a favourite argument in support of the new const.i.tution-an a.s.sertion founded on as impudent and barefaced a falsehood as ever was uttered, for the very reverse is the case. The equality of the administration of justice in the different states, has ever been dwelt upon as recommendatory of the new plan of government. I am induced to think that Agrippa is non compos, and this might proceed from his close application to study, while the library of a celebrated university was under his care(15)-he seems to be one of those whom Pope describes when he says,

"Some are bewilder'd in the maze of schools," &c.

I hope my readers will forgive this digression, when they consider that such scandalous lies, absurdities, and misrepresentations as the productions of Agrippa, that political Quixote, abound with, may have a tendency to prejudice the minds of the misinformed against the new const.i.tution, unless they are properly noticed.

Section 2, of Article III. provides, among other things, that the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the state where the crime shall have been committed; but when not committed within any state, the trial shall be at such place or places, as Congress may by law have directed. It has been frequently a.s.serted that the new const.i.tution deprived the subject of the right of trial by jury; on what grounds such an a.s.sertion could be founded, is to me a mystery; for the const.i.tution expressly says, that the trial shall be by jury, except in cases of impeachment. In our own state, if a civil officer is impeached he will not be tried by a jury, but by that branch of our legislature styled the senate. Tired, no doubt, with a repet.i.tion of arguments, upon parts of the const.i.tution which did not appear quite plain till investigated and rightly construed, the anti-federalists have taken upon them to a.s.sert things which the proposed system does not afford them the least grounds for. Presumptuous, indeed, must they be in the highest degree, if they suppose any will be so blind as to listen to the most palpable falsehoods, uttered by them. Their conduct seems to evince, that they harbour sentiments similar to those of the Romish priests, in countries where the common people have scarcely any knowledge of things wherein their interests are insuperably connected, and imbibe their principles wholly from what the priests think proper to inform them. But such artifices will not avail to practice upon the inhabitants of America; for here, almost all have some knowledge of government, derived from their own study and experience; and very few are so stupidly ignorant as to believe all that is circulated by minions and miscreants.

Section 3, of article III. provides, that Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.-This section is truly republican in every sense of the expression, and is of itself fully adequate to proving that the members of the federal convention were actuated by principles the most liberal and free-this single section alone is sufficient to enroll their proceedings on the records of immortal fame.

Contrast this section with the laws of England, in regard to treason, and, notwithstanding the boasted rights of the subject in that isle, we shall find our own in this, as well as almost every other particular, far to exceed them.

Section 1, of article IV. says, full faith and credit shall be given in each state, to the publick acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state. The benefit to be derived from such a regulation must be great, especially to those who are sometimes obliged to have recourse to law, for the settlement of their affairs.

Section 2, of article IV. provides, that the citizens of each state shall be int.i.tled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states. This section must also be a source of much advantage to the inhabitants of the different states, who may have business to transact in various parts of the continent, as being equally int.i.tled to the rights of citizens.h.i.+p in one as well as another.

They will find less difficulty in pursuing their various concerns than if it were otherwise.

In the same article, section 3, it is provided, That new states may be admitted into the Union; but no new state shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other state, nor any states be formed by the sanction of two or more states, or parts of states, without the consent of the legislatures of the states concerned, as well as of Congress. This section can be opposed by none who have the peace and happiness of the states at heart; for, by this section, the designs of those who wish to effect the disunion of the states, in order to get themselves established in posts of honour and profit, are entirely defeated. The majority of the citizens of Ma.s.sachusetts, in particular, will see the good effects to be derived from such a regulation.

Ca.s.sIUS.

(_To be Continued._)

Ca.s.sius, XI.

The Ma.s.sachusetts Gazette, (Number 394)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1787.

For the Ma.s.sachusetts Gazette.

TO THE INHABITANTS OF THIS STATE.

(_Concluded from our last._)

The 3d section, in article IV. also provides, that Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property of the United States; and nothing in this const.i.tution shall be construed as a prejudice to the claims of the United States, or any particular state.

There is not, certainly, anything contained in the aforementioned clause, which can be opposed on reasonable grounds. It is certainly necessary that Congress should have power to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the concerns of the Union; and if they exceed what is necessary, their regulations will be of no effect; for whatever is done by them, which the const.i.tution does not warrant, is null and void, and can be no more binding on the inhabitants of America, than the edicts of the grand signior of Turkey.

You will remember, my countrymen, that the words of the const.i.tution are, "All Powers Herein Granted."

Section 4, of article IV. says, The United States shall guarantee to every state in the Union a Republican Form of Government; and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence.-At the perusal of this clause, anti-federalism must blush, and opposition hide its head. Could anything have more openly, or more plainly evinced to the world, the n.o.ble motives which influenced the conduct of the delegates of America, than the clause aforementioned? it provides, that a republican form of government shall be guaranteed to each state in the Union. The inhabitants of America are surely acquainted with the principles of republicanism, and will certainly demand the establishment of them, in their fullest extent.

The section just mentioned, secures to us the full enjoyment of every thing which freemen hold dear, and provides for protecting us against every thing which they can dread.

This article, my countrymen, is sufficient to convince you of the excellency of that const.i.tution which the federal convention have formed; a const.i.tution founded on the broad basis of liberty, and, should the citizens of America happily concur in adopting it, its pillars may be as fixed as the foundations of created nature.

Say, ye mighty cavillers, ye inconsistent opposers of the new plan of government, of what avail, to the thinking part of the community, do you suppose will be all your clamours about a bill of rights? Does not the abovementioned section provide for the establishment of a free government in all the states? and if that freedom is encroached upon, will not the const.i.tution be violated? It certainly will; and its violators be hurled from the seat of power, and arraigned before a tribunal where impartial justice will no doubt preside, to answer for their high-handed crime.

Article V. of the new const.i.tution, says, That Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this const.i.tution; or on the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which in either case shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the const.i.tution, when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths thereof; as one or the other modes of ratification may be proposed by Congress; provided that no amendments which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article, and that no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the senate.-