The peace negotiations between the governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State Part 11

Difference of opinion, however, need not cause any division. We have commenced this war together and prosecuted it with unanimity. There should, therefore, be no mention of discord. It is my duty and the duty of everyone to bow to the decision of the majority. Even though I may differ in opinion, the decision of the majority is my decision.

Some of the speakers have said that they, as delegates, are tied by the instructions received from their burghers, notwithstanding the legal advice given us here, that such an instruction is not binding.

If we should adhere to an instruction given to us by a portion of the people, that was not acquainted with the position of affairs over the whole country, then we should not be acting honestly towards that people in general. We stand here before the question whether our people shall die a national death, or whether they shall live, and I am of opinion that no one can judge as to what course we should pursue unless the facts as to the true conditions obtaining over the entire country are laid before him, and only in this meeting will these facts come before us. Let us therefore not say that we are tied by an instruction.

On the great question before us, I would first ask: How are we now situated? For more than two and a half years we have fought for our just rights, and what do we see if we take a retrospective view? Are we making progress, or are we gradually going down the precipice? I have been in correspondence with my officers in all parts of the country, and have received information from them as to the condition of affairs, but I must tell you that from all that information there is nothing to show me that our cause is progressing, not even by the smallest stride. Instead of the large fighting force we had last year, we have now only 10,000 men. In the course of the last year we have lost 6,000 men either through death or capture.

When I consider our decline during the past ten months, I must say that the enemy has in that time learnt to fight better against us, and to do our people more damage. Ten months ago there was not a single blockhouse in my division; now lines of blockhouses intersect the entire division. You can cross these lines only at night, and then only with difficulty. The whole division is cut up into large areas.

We are now obliged to split up our forces into small groups, so that the enemy may not be able to ascertain where the commando really is.

Through being so intersected by these lines of blockhouses, which we cannot cross by daylight, we run a great risk of being captured, and, indeed, many burghers are captured.

It has been remarked that we can still obtain provisions here and there. Meat is almost our only food now, and everyone knows what it means to cross a blockhouse line with cattle. Latterly the commandos have been supporting themselves princ.i.p.ally on cattle looted from the enemy, but recently the enemy has sent almost all their loot cattle down to Natal. The cattle, for instance, that was at Ladysmith has been removed to Estcourt, so that there is now very little opportunity for looting. To a large extent also we have lived on cattle purchased from the Kaffirs, but the enemy has now removed even the Kaffirs with their cattle. The danger is that these districts, forced thereto by hunger, will later be obliged to say, that however bitter, they must conclude peace on any terms. We have tried to obtain cattle from other districts, but that has been proved to be no longer possible. Our position has thus in this respect become much worse. The blockhouses are not the only cause of this, but the decline is also to be attributed to the weakening of our horses, which are driven about so by the overwhelming force of the enemy, that they are in a very poor condition and weak, the more so because we have no more forage for them.

They are so poor that it is difficult, almost impossible, to travel any distance with them. Another reason is also, that most of the burghers have now only one horse which must always do service, so that there is no chance to let it have a proper rest. It has been suggested that those commandos that can no longer exist in their own districts should proceed to other parts of the country, but I may say that the majority of our horses are not able to cover a long distance. If that is attempted many burghers will be captured on account of their horses giving up.

I always heard that the Cape Colony is waiting for a suitable opportunity to rise in great numbers, but according to information now obtained by me from General s.m.u.ts, I am convinced that the cause is hopeless there. General s.m.u.ts also says, after having seen our horses, that it is absolutely impossible for us to reach the Cape Colony, as our idea was. We cannot, therefore, rely on the Cape Colony any more.

Our cause has been a failure there. Colonials are also so harshly treated that they have not the chance or desire to rise. There are not many Colonists under arms, and it appears to me that lately there are more Africanders against us, than fighting for us.

In the beginning of the war I hoped and believed that the other European Powers would not allow one Power to become master of the Goldfields. But we cherished a false hope. In the letters received from our Deputation last year they wrote us, that we should not hope for intervention, because there was for the time being no prospect of it. From the correspondence between the British and Netherlands Governments it appears that our Deputation was accredited only to the Netherlands Government, and therefore that Government alone was in a position to take upon itself to procure the termination of the war.

The Deputation was accredited by both Republics to all the European Powers. It appears, however, that only to the Netherlands Government did they hand in their credentials. This fact has a particularly great significance for me. It proves that they were advised not to present their credentials to other Powers. We know that the Deputation would have left no stone unturned to help us, but after they have been in Europe for two years they had had to inform us that they had obtained no help for us, and further, that they could hold out no prospect of help. We must therefore cherish no hope whatever of help from Europe.

And it is apparent that if no nation came to our a.s.sistance when the enemy introduced a new principle into warfare, namely, to remove women and children by force, crowd them in camps, and let them die in thousands, then we need not ever expect any help from other nations.

Their inaction makes me think that they do not care what becomes of us, even though we all die. They ought to have known that if the British were tacitly allowed to introduce such a new principle into warfare, that principle would establish a precedent. We have only the sympathy of the European Powers, and that sympathy threatens to smother us, and there the matter remains.

I now come to another matter which lies very near to the heart of each one of us, namely, our families. If this meeting should decide to continue the war, then some provision or other must be made for them.

We shall have to decide what to do with them. When I think over this matter my mind is at a standstill. Their condition is most pitiable, and they are exposed to all kinds of danger. I have lately tried to send them in to the British, but without success, because the British would not receive them. The position has now become such that I am beginning to think that the fathers of these families must accompany them into the British lines, because then the enemy receives them. But even this suggestion offers a great difficulty, namely this, that we have with us many wives of prisoners-of-war, and what can we do with them? Where could we find men to "hands up" with them? These families are in a terrible condition, and something must be done for them.

It has been said that we must fight "to the bitter end," but no one tells us where that bitter end is. Is it there where everyone lies in his grave or is banished? In my opinion we must not consider the time when everyone lies in his grave as the "bitter end." If we do so, and act upon that view, we become the cause of the death of our people. Is the bitter end not there, where the people have struggled till they can struggle no more? Personally, there is nothing that hinders me to prosecute the war still further. My family is well provided for. I have good horses, and when I consider what the enemy has done, then I say: "Rather die than surrender," and that is also my inclination. But I must not regard myself, but my people and the other men who must fight.

I a.s.sure you that our position is serious, and when I lay matters bare to you, I do not do so to discourage you, but to give you a clear insight into them, as it is my duty to do, because you must take a very important decision here. I have always thought that when matters came to such a pa.s.s with us, that we were driven by hunger to surrender we should, before going under, and while we were still a nation, accept terms. We cannot wait until our numbers are reduced to a few thousand men and then try to negotiate. It would then be too late. If we wish to negotiate, now is the time. If the Lord G.o.d wills it, then, however bitter, we must come to terms. We cannot simply go on blindly and say that we trust in G.o.d. Miracles can happen, but it is not for me or for you to say what G.o.d's will is with us, or that the Lord will allow us to retain our independence. If we proceed, it will be a bitter cup for us to see that the one commando after the other is forced to surrender. Our responsibility will only be the greater if we go on and ultimately yet lose. We hear continually of the death of this one or that one, and it is asked who will care for the widows if we make peace now? But does not this question remain if we prosecute the war?

If we have to give up eleven districts--and that means the half of the South African Republic--then as far as I can see the war must end disastrously for our people. If a great victory is gained over us we shall not be able to stand it. All will immediately be over with us.

There is a military reason why we have been able to carry on such a great war for such a long time against such overwhelming forces, and that is, because we have commandos in each district, which compels the British to divide their forces. But if we abandon eleven districts, as we shall have to do shortly, that will mean the concentration of our forces, which will give the enemy an opportunity of concentrating their troops against us, and the consequences thereof will be fatal for us.

In only one portion of our country, namely, in Zoutpansberg, is there still food, but how do we obtain our provisions there? It must be taken, and thereby we create more enemies. Our safety in Zoutpansberg lay in this: that hitherto the Kaffirs were divided, but if the enemy were to pour into that district the Kaffirs will join them against us.

I therefore foresee danger for our commandos if they proceed to Zoutpansberg.

I feel that our people have defended themselves and have fought better than any people in the world. Our little nation has already sacrificed proportionately more in this struggle than any other nation known in history, and I should regret it bitterly if this people should be destroyed, or have to fight till all are dead or captured, and the independence lost. If we become convinced that it is impossible for us to proceed, that it is impossible for us to retain our independence, then we must inform the people to that effect, and they can then decide what they wish to do. By continuing blindly we shall certainly fall. During the last year more than 20,000 women and children died in the concentration camps, and their suffering there was terrible. Then there are also some of our own people, who have taken up arms against us, and if matters go on as at present there will shortly be more Africanders fighting against us than for us.

The question now is: What must we do? There are only a few courses open to us. If we can retain our independence by the surrender of a portion of our territory, then, however hard it may be, let us do so.

The State Secretary has made a few suggestions in this respect, and however detrimental it may be to us to have a Government within a Government in the country, it would nevertheless be better than to lose everything, for humanly speaking it is impossible for us to retain our independence by force of arms. Swazieland is a great country, and yet it is of no value to us, and we can well give it up.

And let us also surrender the Wit.w.a.tersrand--that cancer in our country--if we can save ourselves thereby. If by these means we do not succeed in our object it is for you to say whether the war must still be continued or not. The conditions show me plainly that we are going backward. In the Orange Free State we have only 6,000 men under arms, and in the South African Republic only 10,000. Compare these with the numbers with which we commenced. Are we not going down the precipice?

Let us not co-operate to that end. Let us rather do what we can to save our people if we must lose our independence. If we must give up the struggle, are we then to say to the enemy: "We have fought for our independence only, and since we cannot get that, here we are, do with us as you please." That we can do for ourselves as leaders, but we cannot say that for our people. We must interpose for our people. We must try to get for them what we can, because they are absolutely ruined, and if we make no terms we place them unconditionally in the hands of their bitterest enemies. Would that be desirable? If we cannot retain our independence, let us try to get responsible Government. Then we will be governed by leaders from amongst ourselves who can keep their hands over the heads of the people. Let us also try to secure the rights of our language, the Dutch language. You know how long it took before the rights of that language were in a measure acknowledged in the Cape Colony. Shall we not try to get those rights acknowledged here now we have the chance? Let us stand firm for these two points, and for the payment of all direct debts, as is done in the Cape Colony and Natal. We need not trouble ourselves about smaller matters for they are of such a nature that a Government must attend to them in the interests of the people.

Some argue that we must accept no terms, because we would thereby bind ourselves for the future, but that we should go over into a condition of pa.s.sive resistance. But can we do that? It is a fact that when the war ceases there will be famine in the country, and what will be easier for the British Government than to supply the people with food on condition that the men take the oath of allegiance? Therefore I think that it is much better for us, the leaders, to try and stipulate certain terms for our people. Should we not now co-operate to that end, or should we wait until we are entirely overpowered and then have to wait some thirty years before we can be on our legs again. In my opinion there can be no question of unconditional surrender. You cannot say that you will accept no terms. We may not say: "Do with us what you please." If we do that, then our children will be a standing protest against us. Let us respect each other's opinions. I cannot, and may not, on account of your opinions, suspect anyone here to-night, who hitherto in spite of all hards.h.i.+p and bitterness, has faithfully stood under arms, of being afraid. Only by standing firmly together and taking one another by the hand can we extricate ourselves from the deep abyss in which we now stand. Believe me, it is bitter for me to have to speak as I do, and if you can remove my difficulties I shall be sincerely thankful.

General de la Rey said: I shall be brief and only touch upon a few points. You can understand that after the success that has crowned our arms lately, I have a definite instruction from the burghers in my division to stand by our independence. And they have grounds for such an instruction. The burghers have, indeed, lost over 300 men from deaths and captures, but they have performed deeds of heroism. I do not say this to boast, but to make the position of myself and of my fellow delegates clear to you. These victories have naturally had a particularly good effect on the burghers and also upon the enemy. I do not wish to convey that these victories have such an effect upon the enemy that they will cause the scales in this struggle to turn in our favour, but I say it to show that no one can take it amiss in the burghers if they give such instructions as they have done.

However, since my arrival, and since I have learnt how matters are situated in other districts, I feel the difficulties that are brought forward against the continuance of the war. Under my command I have also districts, such as Potchefstroom and Krugersdorp, where the burghers cannot maintain the struggle, but they have the opportunity there of withdrawing to other parts where they can exist. I have always been of opinion that I may not lay down my arms as long as I have any food, even though that food consists of nothing else but mealies. But it appears to me that certain districts will be compelled by hunger to surrender. Therefore I am pleased that leaders speak openly here, and do not arrogantly say: "We can still continue," and then, when we return, lay down their arms, and put everything upon the shoulders of only some of us.

Referring to intervention, I may say that the Commandant General and other members of the Government know what my views have always been on that matter. I was certain of it that there would never be any intervention for us, and said so before the war. If Britain becomes the owner of the Republics, then South Africa would be owned partly by Germany and partly by England. If Britain becomes the owner of a portion, then the German possession was guaranteed. That would not be the case if the Republics won the struggle. The German possessions would then also be in danger. Will German statesmen therefore intervene to check England to their own detriment? We need not, therefore, give intervention even a thought.

There is another point. It is argued that we must fight to the bitter end. The Commandant General has asked whether that bitter end has arrived. I think each one must decide that for himself. It must be borne in mind that everything--cattle, goods, money, man, woman and child--has been sacrificed. In my division many people go almost naked. There are men and women who wear nothing more than plain skins on the naked body. Is this not the bitter end? Only the fighting burghers are supplied with the necessary clothing, which they take from the enemy. Therefore I think that the time for negotiating has now arrived. If this opportunity is not availed of, the door will be closed. England will never again allow us to meet in this way, or give us an opportunity to conclude an agreement.

The question is: How shall we negotiate? I hardly know how to proceed.

It is the duty of this meeting to instruct the two Governments, and I advise you to be sensible. If we cannot obtain what we desire I am prepared to fight to the finish, whatever that may be.

The proposals made by the State Secretary and supported by the Commandant General, namely, to surrender the Gold Fields, I cannot favour, and for two reasons. The first is because I am convinced that even though we should offer the Gold Fields, the British will refuse to accept them, because by doing so they would prove to the whole world that they only wanted the Gold Fields. The second reason is that we would be parting with our biggest source of revenue, and how shall we materially rescue the people from the impoverished circ.u.mstances in which we now find ourselves? How shall we pay our debts? I think we should try to obtain other and better terms.

Chief Commandant de Wet addressed the meeting as follows: I intended to say nothing on this great matter, because my opinions on it are no secret. I still have the same opinion which I had when the war threatened us. In the Orange Free State you find the same critical conditions that existed in the South African Republic. There are nine districts which were entirely abandoned by us for a time, but which were later on again occupied by the burghers. The only food there was some corn which had been hidden. Meat had to be taken from the enemy.

I deeply respect the feelings of Commandant General Botha, although I differ from him and others, who are of opinion that we must stop the war. I believe what has been said about the general misery in so many districts of the South African Republic and about the difficulty in keeping up the struggle there, but you must not take it amiss in me if I point out that that unfortunate correspondence between our two Governments which fell into the hands of the British at Reitz, painted the conditions in more or less the same colours as those in which they are now represented. That was a year ago. I wish, however, to accept what has been said as true. Still the Free State does not wish to give up the war. I wish to speak openly, and let no one consider it as a reproach when I say that this is really a Transvaal war. I say this in a friendly and brotherly spirit, because, for me, the waters of the Vaal River never existed. I always was an advocate of closer union.

There are unfaithful burghers amongst us, too, unfaithful to the Compact between the two Republics, but I cling to that Compact, and say that the entire war is our common cause.

What is now the mood prevailing amongst the burghers of the Orange Free State? The meetings held there were attended by 6,000 burghers. I myself was present at various meetings at which altogether 5,000 attended, while General Hertzog met the remaining 1,000. At these meetings a voice as of thunder was given for the independence. The resolution was: "Continue. We have always been prepared to sacrifice everything for our independence, and are still prepared to do so." Not a single man spoke differently. There is thus only one course open to me. We must see what can be done for those parts of the country which are helpless. I do not wish to be the man to say what must be done, but I shall do everything I can to help. It would be very hard for me if we have to adopt the suggestion of General Botha to send men into the enemy's lines with their families. But we must continue the war.

Let us consider what our numbers were when we commenced. Let us a.s.sume that there were 60,000 burghers able to bear arms. We knew that England had an army of about 750,000 men. Of this she has sent about 250,000 here, namely, one-third. And experience teaches that she cannot send out much more than a third. Have we not also still got about a third of our fighting force?

I am also prepared to give up something for the sake of retaining our independence, but with reference to the suggestion of offering the Gold Fields, I agree with General de la Rey on that point. We can have no other Government, no English Colony, in the midst of our country.

That will cause friction. It is said that the Gold Fields have been a curse and a cancer for us. Well, they need not remain a curse. And then, how shall we materially rescue our people without the Gold Fields? Swazieland is not of much importance. That we can give up.

The war is a matter of faith. If I had not been able to do so in faith, I would never have taken up arms. Let us again renew our covenant with G.o.d. If we fix our eyes on the past we have more ground for our faith than I ever expected, and we have ground to continue in faith. The entire war has been a miracle, and without faith it would have been childish to commence the war. We must not think of intervention. That there has been no intervention is a proof that G.o.d does not will it, because through this war he wishes to form us into a people. Our help and our deliverance must come from Him alone, and then we shall not become proud. I cannot see into the future, but this I know, that behind me it is light. What lies before me I do not know.

There it is dark, but we must go on trusting G.o.d, and then, when victory comes, we shall not be proud.

With reference to the Cape Colony, I may say that I am also disappointed, not with the reports from there, but because there has been no general rising. People who sent us information have not kept their word. We must accept the report of General s.m.u.ts, and he says we must not depend upon the Cape Colony; but he does not say that our cause is declining there. The Cape Colony has been of great a.s.sistance to us, because it compelled the enemy to withdraw about 50,000 troops from the Republics.

I feel for the poor families who are suffering so grievously, and also for our burghers in the camps. I think anxiously of their misery, but I have nothing to do with facts. The entire war is a matter of faith.

I have to do with a fact only when I have to remove it.

I must still make this one remark, that if we surrender, as vanquished, we shall be able to depend on small mercy from England. We shall then in any case have dug the grave of our independence. Well, then, what is the difference between going into our graves in reality, and digging the grave for our national existence?

Mr. C. Birkenstock (Vryheid) said: We must be careful how we deal with the Gold Fields. Our country is dreadfully impoverished, and I fail to see how we can give up that source of income.

The meeting was then adjourned, after prayer, to the following day.

SAt.u.r.dAY, MAY 17TH, 1902.

At the request of the Chairman the meeting was opened with prayer by Chief Commandant de Wet at 9.30 o'clock.

A private report from Mr. Schmorderer, who had brought the despatch from Europe from the deputation, was read, after which Landdrost BOSMAN (Wakkerstroom) said: We do not know what the future will bring us, but we can gauge the future by the past. The commando, of the district which I represent, namely, Wakkerstroom, had 600 men a year ago. Now that number has been reduced by more than 300. Then, we had more than sufficient horses. Everyone could simply catch a horse, and Vryheid got more than 400 horses from us. Now there are burghers of Wakkerstroom who have no horses, and it is impossible for them to obtain one. With regard to food, there were then 3,000 to 4,000 bags of mealies; now we have barely 300 to 400, and these are scarcely within our reach. If matters have proceeded thus in the course of a year, what will be our position twelve months hence? What will then become of the burghers who have no horses? We must also consider the condition of our families. They have no clothing. That, however, is not of great consequence. The princ.i.p.al matter is the want of food.

More than one woman has been obliged to live for weeks on fruit alone.

I myself have lived for days simply on mealie-pap (porridge). We must obtain mealies from the Kaffirs by using nice words. When the enemy operates in the district we must leave the families to the mercy of the British and the armed Kaffirs. If we supply them with provisions, the enemy simply removes those provisions, and they are left without a morsel of food. If we decide to continue the war some provision must be made for these families. Their husbands declare that if peace is not made now there is no other course open to them than to go over to the enemy, for they cannot any longer look on to see their families dying of hunger or being murdered.

Then we must also keep in view the condition of the families in the hands of the enemy. They have submitted to much anguish and suffering, but always in the belief that we had good hopes of deliverance. If they knew how matters were situated with us they would adopt other views. More than 2,000 women and children die per month in the camps, and if we prosecute the struggle without hope, we become accessory to their death.

The Kaffir question is also a serious matter.

Of intervention there is no hope. Some time ago I thought that we would get help from the British people, but that nation becomes more and more indifferent under all the occurrences of the war, and it appears to me that their Government will be able to prosecute the war to the finish.

What will now be the result if we decide to continue the struggle? We have seen how England has during the past year weakened us more and more; we have seen how many burghers have become unfaithful and strengthened the enemy. If it were not for those unfaithful people out of our midst we would never have had such a hard time of it. If we go on we shall ever become weaker and weaker, and ultimately dwindle away. What shall we then have gained by continuing the struggle?

To-day we are still in a position to obtain something from the enemy, and to stipulate for a.s.sistance for our ruined people, who cannot get on their legs again without help. The burghers are prepared to proceed and to suffer still more if there is any ground upon which we can continue the war. If we have no well-founded grounds then I must warn this meeting that we shall lose many Wakkerstroom burghers. We have this opportunity for negotiating, and now is the time that we can still obtain something from the enemy. We shall never have this opportunity again. If it is clear to us that our independence is lost then we have still our people to consider. If we simply dwindle away, our people will sink and become of no account.