The peace negotiations between the governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State Part 23

He said: "We have nothing more to lose and everything to gain. Let us thus go on." No ground for perseverance were then given or asked. And to say now that we are not going a step further without grounds and facts before us is in conflict with what we have hitherto done. We have seen how in the past relief was always at hand. When Pretoria fell the outlook was darker than now, but there was then a spirit which animated the people. There was faith and a trust that we must persevere. And there is no one now who has been put to shame because he maintained the struggle. I can state no definite grounds upon which we can build, but when I consider the past, I can say to my burghers that we can still continue the struggle, and we will do that too.

There is nothing more for us to lose, whereas we have the opportunity of persevering with our arms in our hands till better days dawn.

General DE LA REY: I must remark that I never misled anyone at any meeting. Every doc.u.ment that was handed to me by the Government I caused to be read out at every meeting, and on that the people had to decide. The last speaker asks whether the responsibility rests on him to-day to decide on the question of independence. My answer is: "Yes, and not only on him, but on every one of you." The responsibility rests upon you generally. You do not represent a certain village or district, but the whole country, and it is the duty of everyone to decide according to the general condition of circ.u.mstances all over the country.

Mr. NAUDe: I am not indifferent in this matter, and I do not wish to s.h.i.+rk my responsibility; on the contrary, I will gladly bear it. But I am not here in the same position as a member of the Volksraad, who is entrusted to deal with all matters. I have a definite commission to submit the views of my burghers, and do not feel myself justified to take upon myself the responsibility of deciding upon the surrender of our independence.

General HERTZOG: Although I am not a delegate, I wish to state which course I would pursue if I were one. The Delegate is here for the people, and what he should ask himself is: Suppose that that portion of the people which has delegated me was fully acquainted with the situation in both Republics, how would that portion decide? That appears to me to be the point upon which the Delegates must decide.

As regards the great question before us, I wish to be fair and view it as clearly as possible from both sides. The one party says: "Stop the war," and they continually ask on what grounds can the struggle be continued? But I think it is for you, who say: "Stop the war," to state your grounds. Those who wish to go on say: "We are at war; show us why we are to stop." It is also asked what prospects have we if we go on. This would have been a very good question when we commenced the war. It is argued: We have grown weaker. On that I ask: "Has the enemy not grown weaker too?" That is clearly the case, especially financially. England has already spent over 200 million pounds, and she can spend another 100 million. Yes, if the people wish it. But how long will the people wish it? Have we not the right to a.s.sume that England is already in difficulties financially? No one who is acquainted with English history can do otherwise than feel the significance of an imposition of a tax on wheat. That is not done unless matters are serious. In 1831 there was a revolution over this tax. It presses very severely on the people, and the people are beginning to feel that they are incurring debt for which they will have to suffer later.

With reference to the Deputation it is said: "They have been away two years now, and have effected nothing yet; how can we still hope that they will be able to effect something for our good?" But I say just because they have already been two years in Europe, we are nearer the time when a great war must break out. It is a known fact that the nations are arming themselves more and more and building s.h.i.+ps of war, which is all done in preparation for the day when war will break out in Europe. A year ago the Deputation sent us a telegram which amounted to this: "Keep on." Why will the enemy not allow us to hear from our Deputation? It would have taken the members of the Deputation only a fortnight to come out and be with us. It is said that it would const.i.tute an irregular military procedure. But is this meeting not also an irregular military procedure? I am thus forced to the conclusion that there is something behind this refusal. We know who the three members of the Deputation are. Mr. Fischer is a man who fought against the war up to the last. He even went to the South African Republic for that object. So is Mr. Wessels. They are both men in whom you can place your full confidence; and have all their interests, and large interests, in this country. Mr. Wolmarans I do not know personally, but it is generally known that he is a man upon whom you can depend. I am convinced of it, that these men will give the fullest attention to our interests. If they saw that we were being ruined by holding out, they would inform us to that effect. But they let us continue. What their reasons are for doing so I do not know, but I depend upon them.

I am open to conviction, and if I can be convinced that our struggle is hopeless, I shall side with those who wish to give it up. There is another aspect to the question; but let me first say that it grieves me that on every public meeting the question of religion is touched upon. It is continually said that this or that is G.o.d's finger. Now, although I also have my belief, I say that neither you nor I know in the least what is the finger of G.o.d! G.o.d has given each one of us reason and a conscience, and if these lead us we need not follow anything else.

I must further say that we are undeniably in a pitiful condition. Food is scarce. We are exhausted, but still we all live. Almost all our horses have been taken, so that what we require we have to take from the enemy. Thousands of our people are prisoners-of-war. We have some thousands of our own people, who are in arms against us. Our women and children have been cooped up for almost two years in the Concentration Camps, where they die by thousands. Not only do they die, but they are exposed to destructive moral influences. The Kaffirs are armed against us, and only recently 56 burghers were murdered by Kaffirs. Truly, our prospects are not bright. In how far all this must weigh with the Delegates, I leave to you. As far as I am concerned, I must confess that all these things have made a tremendous impression on me. No one with a heart can feel differently. I shall always respect Commandant General Botha, because he has proved to have a heart that feels all these matters, and because he has had the courage to lay before his people and before us with great honesty precisely how matters stand.

We are here under exceptional circ.u.mstances. Awful wars have already been fought, but I do not believe that a war has ever been waged in which the people have proportionally suffered so much and sacrificed so much as our people have done in this war. In the American War of Independence the people did not suffer a third of what we have suffered. But all this has not yet turned the scales as far as I am concerned. We consider all these matters, but we must consider particularly what awaits us if we give up our country. What will our future be? Will there then be such satisfaction in the Orange Free State and in the South African Republic that we shall be able to say: We will await the day of deliverance from G.o.d's hand? If I knew that there would be a rising in a few years, I would rather fight on till I am dead. If I conclude peace I want a lasting peace.

There is a matter that weighs more heavily with me than all this, and that is the holding of this meeting. I regret from the bottom of my heart that it ever took place. This meeting gives us a death blow. I also experienced hard times, when my burghers surrendered in hundreds, but I always found comfort in the thought that I was not fighting alone, and I knew that when I had a hard time of it, my comrades in the struggle elsewhere had an easy time. However, I do not wish to blame anyone for the holding of this meeting, because I am convinced that everything was done with the best intentions. Now, what has been the result of this meeting? The Commandant General has had to express his views, and expose the situation, and this has had the effect of disheartening some of our burghers. If we now decide to continue, hundreds and thousands will go over to the enemy who would otherwise have remained with us. I would have suggested that the discouraged ones leave us, but now those who were not discouraged have also become so.

Although all these facts have made me dubious, I am not yet convinced that we should stop the war. If I were a delegate, I should say: "Go on," because I think that if we are in doubt we should lay down this as an axiom: "Proceed on the road we are on." In the proposal before us we get nothing at all of what we have the right to lay claim to.

General L. J. MEYER (Member of the S.A.R. Government) said: According to General Hertzog, the persons who went to the various commandos to have delegates elected explained the situation of the country to the people. But that was not done. We said to the burghers: "You must elect someone whom you can trust as a delegate to the meeting at Vereeniging. To him the situation of the country as a whole will be laid bare, and then he must act according to circ.u.mstances."

Now I want to express my views also. The question of independence is so dear to every Africander that this word can hardly be spoken. Our condition, however, has now become such that we must express our opinions on this matter. I am well acquainted with the condition of the commandos north of the Eastern Railway to the other side of the Sabi River, and I can a.s.sure you that every commando finds it very difficult to obtain food. All officers complain that clothing, horses, and food are scarce. All burghers long for peace, if they can retain their flag and their Mauser, but after the accounts which have been given us here, every responsible person must feel that a great portion, if not the half, of the South African Republic is not able to continue the war. Now if half of the South African Republic must be abandoned, the burghers must move from there to the other districts, and it is clear that those districts which still have food have only barely sufficient for their own commandos. What will happen if the burghers from the other parts of the Transvaal resort to those districts also?

Our burghers have done what almost no other nation has ever done. Our bitterest enemies acknowledge this. Then we still have to contend with the large hordes of Kaffirs who go about to murder and plunder. The people expect from us that we will save what can still be saved.

Everyone takes the matter up seriously, and it is so serious that if we pa.s.s an ill-considered resolution we shall exterminate the Africander people. It has rightly been remarked that everything is dark. If I was sure what to do I would be very glad. The Lord, however, has given us reason, and in my opinion we have now got to such a stage that we must do what we can to keep the head of the Africander people above water, so that later on they can develop again.

The position of our families is a very tender point with me. They are dying out in the Concentration Camps, and must submit to much misery.

We have already sacrificed much blood, and if we had hopes and ground for a favourable result we could sacrifice still more. My blood, which is no better than the blood of so many others that has been shed, can also be shed, but my conscience tells me that we may not allow one more man to be shot, if there is no hope for us.

If we were to decide now to go on, we should never get the opportunity to negotiate again. The end would be that we should all be dead or captured or shall have surrendered to the enemy. It is asked what will future generations say, if they read that we decided to make peace and to give up our independence? My reply is: We do not fight for name and honour, but for our people. What will future generations say, if we do not save what can still be saved? They will say that we fought bravely, but without wisdom.

With reference to the terms offered, I must say that I expected more.

The three millions are nothing, but yet there is a promise that our people will later have a vote again, and be allowed to govern themselves, and further--G.o.d will help us. Some are of opinion that we must show our manliness by continuing the struggle. It may, however, be more manly to conclude peace. In the Volksraad I was in favour of granting the franchise, after a five years' residence, but that proposal was rejected by twenty-one votes to seven, and three of those seven persons are now here with us. We did not vote as we did because we were afraid, but because we did not wish to drench the soil with blood, and we knew that England sought cause for war. Shall we now continue to shed blood?

Before Lord Roberts entered Pretoria the Government considered whether the time had not arrived to put an end to the war. That was, of course, a secret. But the Orange Free State would not agree, and I am convinced that we would have obtained better terms then than now. The people were then not so ruined and exterminated. The Government in its wisdom decided to continue the war. A year later the two Governments met each other again at Waterval, in the Standerton district. It was again resolved to go on with the war. Later we again suggested that we should make peace proposals to the British. President Steyn agreed, but no agreement had yet been arrived at with reference to the time and conditions, and the enemy operated against us with such great forces that we could not make any progress in the matter. Now, as far as human judgment goes, there is no chance for us to continue the war.

There is no hope of intervention, for the big Powers do not make war so easily. We have now come to such a pa.s.s that we must save the seedling, otherwise I fear it is all over with the Africander people.

It is argued that we must go on because so many have already given their lives for their country, but everyone must admit that unless a miracle is worked, we shall not get the enemy out of our country by force of arms. We have taught the British how to wage war. Our own people are with them, and show them how to trek in the night, and where the footpaths are.

Much reference is made to the American War of Independence, but this war cannot be compared to that one. The enemy had only 40,000 troops in America, whereas they have 240,000 here. And then Americans a large country, and had harbours through which to import, and had in addition the a.s.sistance of France. I am convinced that our struggle cannot be maintained.

Commandant VAN NIEKERK (Kroonstad): With reference to the Cape Colonists, I wish to say that we expected much help from them, and they did a.s.sist us largely. Must we now jump out of the door and leave them in the lurch? Many of them have already been banished, some shot, and others hanged. It is sad to think of laying down our arms. The promise that landed proprietors can retain their arms is more of a comfort than a reality. If I consider everything I must say--let us rather offer pa.s.sive resistance, but concede nothing.

General BOTHA was the next speaker. He first explained his att.i.tude at the various meetings of the people, and said that he had caused them to elect Delegates with power to act. He continued: When the war began, we had about 60,000 burghers, and we further relied upon help from the Cape Colony. We expected that that Colony would not allow her railways to be used to convey troops to fight against us. I also hoped that the Powers would interfere, but they were silent spectators of how Britain waged war against us, and how she introduced all kinds of new methods into that warfare--methods contrary to international law.

Further, we had provisions in abundance, and commandos could be supported for weeks in the same place. However, matters have now so changed that a man must consider himself fortunate if his family is away. It is argued that to save the families still with us, the husbands of such families can surrender with their families. The husbands, however, of most are unfortunately already in the hands of the enemy. Whom can I send to care for those whose natural protectors are already prisoners of war? These families are thus thrown upon us, and we must care for them. As long as we had plenty of food, the enemy gladly received our families into their Camps, but now that they are in want, and they (the enemy) can do something for them, their kindness has come to an end. What shall we now do with these families?

That is the great difficulty.

It is stated that we do not rely on help through the medium of the Deputation in Europe, but when the enemy refuses to let the Members of the Deputation come out to see us, it is at once said that that is a proof that the Deputation are doing something to our advantage.

Reliance is thus placed upon the Deputation, because they can only tell us that there is hope of intervention. The Deputation have already been in Europe for more than two years, and our State President is there too, and up to this day the Deputation have not yet succeeded in getting itself acknowledged by any other Power than the Netherlands Government. They were accredited by us to all the Powers, but it appears that they did not consider it advisable to hand in their credentials to any Power except to Holland, naturally because they were given to understand that they would not be acknowledged.

Now, if a Power refuses to acknowledge our Deputation, what help can we as a nation expect from such a Power? There is another point.

Before President Kruger left us we received letters from the Deputation, from which it clearly appeared that they could do nothing for us, and in which they informed us that they would return and land in Delagoa Bay. The Government, however, in consultation with President Steyn, who was with us then, decided to ask the Deputation not to return, even though they could effect nothing, because, if they came back, it would be a death blow to our people, who were always still expecting something good from the efforts of the Deputation. I say these things, so that the people may not be misled. In my opinion, we have nothing else than the sympathy of the European nations, and than that we shall get nothing else, but that will not save us. A year ago we were in communication with the Deputation, and all they could then tell us was that we should persevere, on the ground of all the personal and material sacrifices which had already been made, until all means of resistance were exhausted. Well, we have done that, and it is very plain to me that there is no hope of any help from the Deputation. But I wish to go further. We know that there is one friendly Power, and that it wishes to help us as much as possible.

That Power is the Netherlands Government. What did the Netherlands Minister write to the British Government on the 1st of January, 1902?

He wrote as follows:--

"The Government of her Majesty the Queen is of opinion that the exceptional circ.u.mstances, in which one of the belligerent parties in South Africa is situated, and which prevents it from putting itself into communication with the other party by direct means, const.i.tutes one of the causes of the prolongation of the war, which continuously, without interruption or termination, hara.s.ses that country, and is the cause of so much misery."

Thus wrote the Power in Europe who is best disposed towards us, a few months ago; and in that same letter they suggested that our Deputation should come out here with the object of meeting the leaders of the people, in order to bring about peace. It was certainly never the intention that peace would be concluded on the basis of the independence of the Republics. Can we thus cherish any hopes of a.s.sistance from European nations? I am convinced that we can arrive at a decision in this matter without worrying ourselves for a moment with the idea that we shall obtain help elsewhere. A war in Europe is, of course, possible, but the war we are engaged in has opened the eyes of all the Powers, so that every European Government now avoids war as much as possible. I will even go so far as to say that it is in the interest of more than one Power that this war continues.

A great difficulty is also the unfaithfulness of our own burghers, and much injury is done us by those who lay down their arms. A year ago we took a resolution at Waterval, in the Standerton district, to continue the war vigorously. We kept it up for a year, and fought and sacrificed. What have we gained by it? I say we are now so broken up and weakened that if matters go on like this a little longer we shall no more be able to a.s.sert ourselves as a party. It is maintained that this proposal goes further than the proposal made to us at Middelburg in March, 1901, but I do not think that that argument is correct, because we did not negotiate on that proposal. We simply replied that we could not negotiate on the basis proposed. If we had negotiated then we might perhaps have obtained better terms than now. But even granted that the present proposals are more favourable, what have we not sacrificed for such improvement? Twenty thousand women and children have been laid in their graves in the Concentration Camps.

Almost the half of our burghers are prisoners of war; we have had to bury hundreds of our comrades. When I review the past year, I must say that we have lost ground tremendously. We can only gauge the future by the past. We now stand face to face with the fact that we shall have to abandon a large tract of our country, and I do not see any chance of retaining our independence in that way. We commenced with 60,000 men, and now we have only 15,000 in the field. Our Information-bureau in Pretoria informs me that the enemy has already 31,400 of our burghers as prisoners of war, and that 600 have already died in the prisoner-of-war camps. Three thousand eight hundred of our burghers have fallen during the war. Is it not a serious matter that so many fell in the course of two and a half years? What must not the sufferings of our women and children in the Concentration Camps have been at the death of so many of their number?

The question is asked, and rightly too: What about the Cape Colonists who have thrown in their lot with us? I have always said that if we lose our independence it will be our first and foremost duty to care for them because they have got into trouble through us. I was always prepared to say: "Banish me, but give terms to the Cape Colonists."

And now there is a chance for us to-day to save those comrades. Would it therefore be advisable to miss that chance, and simply to say that we must persevere in the struggle? I say it is not advisable. The other members of our Commission and I did our best at Pretoria for those Colonists. Let us now take what we can get. If we decide to continue, it would only be honest to these Colonists to say that they must stop fighting and accept these terms. A few thousand men become free with the temporary loss of the franchise. If we can get no better terms for them they cannot blame us, nor will they do so if the facts are put before them.

I am referred to what I said about a year ago at the Warmbaths, but let me remind you that, when I spoke there, the commando of that division was 2,000 men strong. What is the situation there to-day? The commando consists of only 480 men. I said then that the war must continue till famine stared us in the face. Now I do not stand here to dishearten anyone, but I must acquaint you fully with all circ.u.mstances, and I tell you that there are districts in our country where famine truly and actually stares the commandos in the face, and many of the Delegates can testify to this. Our great strength always lay in this, that we could keep a commando, however small, in each district, which compelled the enemy to divide its enormous armies over the entire country. But if we must give up portions of our country we must trek to other parts; in other words, we must concentrate, and therein lies great danger for us, because that will enable the enemy to concentrate their large forces against us, and our fall will speedily follow. Some say we can go to the Cape Colony. I also know something about that. Chief Commandant de Wet could not get into the Cape Colony in good times with good horses and with a large force. How shall we get there, now that winter is approaching and our horses are so poor that we can only ride at a walk, and the distance for most of us is so much further? I tell you we shall not get there. On the way there, most of the commandos will dwindle away.

The question is asked: "What will the future bring us if we surrender?" Well, that is a most vital question, and for every Africander who has done his duty, surrender is a terribly bitter cup.

But we must take the situation as it is, and, however bitter, we must choose the better of two bad roads. It is maintained that we must persevere, but unless we can do so for ten or twelve years, I do not see any grounds for hoping that we shall be able to retain our independence, and I do not see any chance whatever of keeping up the struggle so long. What chance have we of persevering so long? If in two years' time we have been reduced from 60,000 men to a fourth of that number, to what number shall we have sunk in another two years? A hopeless perseverance may also later bring us to a forced surrender, which will be very fatal to us. Let us use our reason, and not stand in relation to each other as two parties. Let us try to find a common way. I shall remain in the field as long as fighting goes on.

Personally, I have no objection to persevere.

It is further asked: What will become of our widows and orphans if we make peace? But I in turn ask: Who will care for them if we are later forced to surrender? Even though we conclude peace now we remain in existence as a people, though under the British flag, and if we in surrendering stand by each other we can, after the surrender, also stand by each other, and devise means to a.s.sist the widows and orphans. If, on the other hand, we entirely cease to exist, we can do nothing more. We cannot, for instance, even send people to Europe to seek financial help to build up the fortunes of our people again.

There are three ways open to us, and I shall submit to the decision of the majority, but I shall feel it keenly if we are not unanimous in our decision. I must say I can see no salvation for us in the continuance of the war, but only the extermination of our people. The other two ways are: Surrender _with_, and surrender _without_ conditions.

I always held the opinion that when the day dawned that we could not maintain the struggle any longer, it would be best to stop without making any terms, and to say to the enemy: "Here we are. We cannot go on any longer. Banish the leaders, deal with the people as you wish; we refuse to submit." But the question is whether we can to-day adopt that course and act accordingly. I think we cannot. Our people have been totally ruined, and will therefore be entirely exposed to the mercy of the enemy. They must be financially a.s.sisted, and if the enemy do so they can stipulate what they like and demand an oath to their taste from every one they help. The enemy will then also be able to carry out all their proclamations, and so destroy our national existence. They can banish all the leaders, and further, they can refuse to let the prisoners of war return until such time as it suits them. In these terms the return of all prisoners of war is at least stipulated, and all the enemy's proclamations against our persons and property nullified. I am thus of opinion that it will be better for us to accept these terms than to surrender unconditionally. Our cup is bitter, but do not let us make it more bitter still. If we are convinced that our cause is hopeless, it is a question whether we have the right to allow one more burgher to be shot. Our object must be to act in the interest of our people.

General HERTZOG remarked that in his opinion the extract from the letter from the Netherlands Government to Lord Lansdowne read by General Botha had not been well translated. Instead of "... the war which raged in the country _without object or termination_," the translation should be: "... the war, which _without interruption or termination_ rages in that country," and that this made a difference.

The meeting was adjourned till two o'clock that afternoon.

At two o'clock the meeting resumed.

General MULLER (Boksburg) said: The burghers suspect something from Lord Kitchener's refusal to allow the Deputation to come out, and have instructed me to try and come into communication with the Deputation.

Some of my burghers commissioned me to stand for our independence, but others gave me a free hand, to act according to circ.u.mstances, and, if there was no other course, to accept the best possible terms. I have always pointed my burghers to the Lord, and told them that as we were at present situated it was impossible for us to succeed in the struggle in our own strength and by means of our own arms, but that we should trust in G.o.d, and that He would help us in His own way and in His own fas.h.i.+on. If I now return to my burghers and inform them that I have not been in communication with the Deputation, and that the proposal before us has been accepted, there will be awful dissension--I cannot think of surrender. It will be a painful matter for me, if I must vote for making peace on these terms, but, taking into consideration what I have heard here about the situation in the other districts and from the Commandant General, it will be difficult for me to go and continue the fight alone, although I and my burghers are still prepared to go on. They also have a hard time of it, and all necessaries are scarce, but provision is always forthcoming. If we cannot agree with reference to the terms before us, I can suggest only one course, and that is, that we all together make a compact with the Lord. Then we shall have something to stand on, which we can make clear to the people. We commenced the war with faith in the Lord.

Where then shall we stand with regard to Him if our faith now forsakes us?

I wish to say, further, that the three million pounds, which the enemy offers, will go only to the burghers who have remained in the field, and to the prisoners of war. What will become of all the other thousands of poor in the country? I represent some of the poorest in the land. They have lost everything in the war, and no provision is made for them. With the instructions I have and according to the dictates of my conscience I do not know whether I can vote for this proposal.

Commandant DE k.o.c.k (Vrede) pointed out that the 30 Free State Delegates represented 5,000 or 6,000 burghers, and the 30 Transvaal Delegates 10,000, and General s.m.u.ts' 3,000 burghers of the Cape Colony, and asked what the position would be if the 30 Free Staters, who represented a minority, decided to continue the war? Would those representing the majority have to submit?

The CHAIRMAN replied that although the Free State Delegates represented a smaller number of burghers, the Free State had an equal vote with the Transvaal in this matter.

General J. C. s.m.u.tS spoke as follows: Hitherto I have not taken part in the discussion, although my views are not unknown to my Government.

We have arrived at a dark stage in the development of the war, and our cause is all the darker and more painful to me because I, as a member of the Government of the South African Republic, was one of the persons who entered into the war with England. A man may, however, not shrink from the consequences of his acts, and on an occasion like this, we must restrain all private feelings, and decide only and exclusively with a view to the permanent interests of the Africander people. These are great moments for us, perhaps the last time when we meet as a free people, and a free Government. Let us thus rise to the magnitude of the opportunity and arrive at a decision for which the future Africander generation will bless and not curse us. The great danger before this meeting is, that it will come to a decision from a purely military point of view. Almost all the representatives here are officers who do not know fear, who have never been afraid, nor will ever become afraid of the overwhelming strength of the enemy, and who are prepared to give their last drop of blood for their country and their people. Now, if we view the matter merely from a military standpoint, if we consider it only as a military matter, then I must admit that we can still go on with the struggle. We are still an unvanquished military force. We have still 18,000 men in the field, veterans, with whom you can do almost any work. We can thus push our cause, from a military point of view, still further. But we are not here as an army, but as a people; we have not only a military question, but also a national matter to deal with. No one here represents his own commando. Everyone here represents the Africander people, and not only that portion which is still in the field, but also those who are already under the sod and those who will live after we have gone. We represent, not only ourselves, but also the thousands who are dead, and have made the last sacrifice for their people, the prisoners of war scattered all over the world, and the women and children who are dying out by thousands in the Concentration Camps of the enemy; we represent the blood and the tears of an entire nation.

They all call upon us, from the prisoner-of-war camps, from the Concentration Camps, from the grave, from the field, and from the womb of the future, to decide wisely and to avoid all measures which may lead to the decadence and extermination of the Africander people, and thus frustrate the objects for which they made all their sacrifices.