The Boys of '98 Part 35

The issue of July 5th is of greater interest:

"Mention of the presence of the torpedo-boat _Ericsson_, on the third instant, was unfortunately omitted. She was in company with a flag-s.h.i.+p, and turned at once upon sighting the enemy. As she was drawing away from the _New York_ she signalled, asking permission to continue in chase, but she was directed to pick up two men in the water, which she did, and on reaching the _Vizcaya_ she was directed by the _Iowa_, the flag-s.h.i.+p having gone ahead, to a.s.sist in the rescue of the _Vizcaya's_ crew. She took off eleven officers and ninety men. The guns of the _Vizcaya_ during the operation were going off from the heat, and explosions were frequent, so that the work was trying and perilous for the boats of the two vessels (_Iowa_ and _Ericsson_) engaged.

"The former report from the army, which was official, regarding General Pando's entry into Santiago, was an error. General Shafter thought that he had been enabled to form a junction, but some few of his men only had been able to do so; the general himself and his remaining force, it is thought, will not be able.

"The day was an uneventful one from a naval standpoint. The flag-s.h.i.+p went to the wrecks of the _Infanta Maria Teresa_ and the _Almirante_. The former lies in an easy position on sand, and with almost her normal draught of water. She is, of course, completely burned out inside above her protective deck, but the sh.e.l.l of her hull seems very good, and her machinery is probably not seriously injured.

"It looks very much as if she were salvable. The _Almirante_ was much worse off. She had been subjected to a much heavier gun fire, being racked and torn in every part; she is much more out of water, and the forward part is much distorted and torn by the explosion of her magazine and torpedoes. The loss of life was very great. Charred bodies are strewn everywhere, the vicinity of the port forward torpedo-room, particularly, was almost covered. The torpedo exploded in the tube; it may be by a shot.

This is a question which it is hoped may be conclusively decided. The fact of so many bodies being about would seem to bear this out, but two of her crew, taken off the beach this afternoon, were questioned, and both stated that it was the result of fire, and that the number of bodies is to be accounted for by the fact that the operating-room is just below, and that many wounded came up that far and were suffocated. The two men were intelligent young fellows, and talked freely. They said that the gun fire was such that it was impossible to keep the men at the guns. One was a powder pa.s.ser, the other at a 57-mm gun. In the forward turret were two officers and five men, evidently killed by the entry of a 6-pounder sh.e.l.l between the top of the turret and the gun s.h.i.+eld. Altogether the s.h.i.+p was a most striking instance of what rapid and well-directed gun fire may accomplish. She was terribly battered about.

"While the flag-s.h.i.+p was lying near the _Almirante_, and her steam cutter was alongside, and a small boat from the press tug _Hercules_ lying on the starboard quarter, a sh.e.l.l exploded in a 15-centimetre gun, and a piece went through the tug's boat, cutting it in two; the man in the boat was not hurt. It is somewhat extraordinary that this sh.e.l.l should have waited so long to act, as the after part of the s.h.i.+p was generally well cooled off. There was still much heat and some flames about the bow. One extraordinary fact is the survival, in proper shape, of many powder grains, baked hard; several of these were picked up about the deck.

"A board has been ordered by the commander-in-chief to report in detail upon the stranded s.h.i.+ps."

On the fifteenth of July Admiral Sampson made his official report, which is given in full:

"U. S. FLAGs.h.i.+P NEW YORK, FIRST RATE, OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, July 15, 1898.

"_Sir_:-I have the honour to make the following report upon the battle with and the destruction of the Spanish squadron, commanded by Admiral Cervera, off Santiago de Cuba, on Sunday, July 3, 1898:

"2. The enemy's vessels came out of the harbour between 9.35 and 10 A. M., the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9.31, and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later.

"3. The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that moment were as follows: The flag-s.h.i.+p _New York_ was four miles east of her blockading station and about seven miles from the harbour entrance. She had started for Siboney, where I had intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go to the front to consult with General Shafter.

A discussion of the situation, and a more definite understanding between us of the operations proposed, had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison at Santiago.

"I had sent my chief of staff on sh.o.r.e the day before to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flag-s.h.i.+p was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel.

"The remaining vessels were in or near their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semicircle about the harbour entrance, counting from the eastward to the westward in the following order: The _Indiana_, about a mile and a half from sh.o.r.e, the _Oregon_,-the _New York's_ place between these two,-the _Iowa_, _Texas_, and _Brooklyn_, the latter two miles from the sh.o.r.e west of Santiago.

"The distance of the vessels from the harbour entrance was two and a half to four miles,-the latter being the limit of day blockading distance. The length of the arc formed by the s.h.i.+ps was about eight miles.

"The _Ma.s.sachusetts_ had left at four A. M. for Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the _Iowa_ and _Texas_. The auxiliaries, _Gloucester_ and _Vixen_, lay close to the land and nearer the harbour entrance than the large vessels, the _Gloucester_ to the eastward and the _Vixen_ to the westward.

"The torpedo-boat _Ericsson_ was in company with the flag-s.h.i.+p, and remained with her during the chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient service in rescuing prisoners from the burning _Vizcaya_. I enclose a diagram showing approximately the positions of the vessels as described above.

"4. The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbour, at a speed estimated at from eight to ten knots, and in the following order: _Infanta Maria Teresa_ (flag-s.h.i.+p), _Vizcaya_, _Cristobal Colon_, and the _Almirante Oquendo_.

"The distance between these s.h.i.+ps was about eight hundred yards, which means that, from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last one was out of the harbour, an interval of only about twelve minutes elapsed.

"Following the _Oquendo_, at a distance of about twelve hundred yards, came the torpedo-boat destroyer _Pluton_, and after her came the _Furor_.

The armoured cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from their guns.

"5. The men of our s.h.i.+ps in front of the port were at Sunday 'quarters for inspection.' The signal was given simultaneously from several vessels, 'Enemy's s.h.i.+ps escaping,' and general quarters were sounded. The men cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened, probably within eight minutes, by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance.

"The _New York_ turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal, 'Close in toward harbour entrance and attack vessels,' and gradually increasing speed until toward the end of the chase she was making sixteen and one-half knots, and was rapidly closing on the _Cristobal Colon_.

[Ill.u.s.tration: U. S. S. OREGON.]

"She was not, at any time, within the range of the heavy Spanish s.h.i.+ps, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in pa.s.sing the harbour entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the _Gloucester_.

"6. The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbour, turned to the westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro, at the instant of the enemy's appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire, well sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish fire.

"The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the battle developed into a chase in which the _Brooklyn_ and _Texas_ had at the start the advantage of position. The _Brooklyn_ maintained this lead.

"The _Oregon_, steaming with amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place. The _Iowa_ and the _Indiana_ having done good work, and not having the speed of the other s.h.i.+ps, were directed by me, in succession, at about the time the _Vizcaya_ was beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These vessels rescued many prisoners. The _Vixen_, finding that the rush of the Spanish s.h.i.+ps would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column and remained there during the battle and chase.

"7. The skilful handling and gallant firing of the _Gloucester_ excited the admiration of every one who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel,-the yacht _Corsair_,-and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns.

"She was lying about two miles from the harbour entrance to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large s.h.i.+ps.

"Antic.i.p.ating the appearance of the _Pluton_ and _Furor_, the _Gloucester_ was slowed, thereby gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed and was able to close at short range, where her fire was accurate, deadly, and of great volume.

"During this fight the _Gloucester_ was under the fire of the Socapa battery. Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago Harbour the careers of the _Furor_ and the _Pluton_ were ended, and two-thirds of their people killed. The _Furor_ was beached and sunk in the surf; the _Pluton_ sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyer probably suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle-s.h.i.+ps _Iowa_, _Indiana_, and the _Texas_, yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the _Gloucester's_ battery.

"After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the _Gloucester_ did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the _Infanta Maria Teresa_.

"8. The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards-all steering in the same direction, and in formation-removed all practical doubts or difficulties, and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately engage and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done.

"As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading s.h.i.+ps, which could not immediately work up to their best speed, but they suffered heavily in pa.s.sing, and the _Infanta Maria Teresa_ and the _Oquendo_ were probably set on fire by the sh.e.l.ls fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement. It was afterward learned that the _Infanta Maria Teresa's_ fire main had been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish the fire.

"With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower deck aft these vessels gave up both fight and flight, and ran in on the beach, the _Infanta Maria Teresa_ at about 10.15 A. M., at Nima, nine and one-half miles from Santiago Harbour entrance, and the _Almirante Oquendo_ at about 10.30 A. M., at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.

"9. The _Vizcaya_ was still under the fire of the leading vessels. The _Cristobal Colon_ had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon pa.s.sed beyond the range of the guns of the leading American s.h.i.+ps. The _Viz__caya_ was soon set on fire, and at 11.15 she turned insh.o.r.e and was beached at Acerraderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely, and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode.

"When about ten miles west of Santiago the _Indiana_ had been signalled to go back to the harbour entrance, and at Acerraderos the _Iowa_ was signalled to 'resume blockading station.' The _Iowa_, a.s.sisted by the _Ericsson_ and the _Hist_, took off the crew of the _Vizcaya_, while the _Harvard_ and the _Gloucester_ rescued those of the _Infanta Maria Teresa_ and the _Almirante Oquendo_.

"This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded from the burning Spanish vessels, was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The s.h.i.+ps were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding, and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazine.

"In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside of the Spanish s.h.i.+ps. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete.

"10. There remained now of the Spanish s.h.i.+ps only the _Cristobal Colon_, but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed.

"When the _Vizcaya_ went ash.o.r.e the _Colon_ was about six miles ahead of the _Brooklyn_ and the _Oregon_, but her spurt was finished, and the American s.h.i.+ps were now gaining upon her. Behind the _Brooklyn_ and the _Oregon_ came the _Texas_, _Vixen_, and _New York_.

"It was evident from the bridge of the _New York_ that all the American s.h.i.+ps were gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12.50 the _Brooklyn_ and the _Oregon_ opened fire and got her range,-the _Oregon's_ heavy sh.e.l.ls striking beyond her,-and at 1.20 she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colours and ran ash.o.r.e at Rio Tarquino, forty-eight miles from Santiago.

"Captain Cook of the _Brooklyn_ went on board to receive the surrender.

While his boat was alongside I came up in the _New York_, receiving his report, and placed the _Oregon_ in charge of the wreck to save her, if possible, and directed the prisoners to be transferred to the _Resolute_, which had followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all their personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify.

"The _Cristobal Colon_ was not injured by our firing, and probably is not injured by beaching, though she ran ash.o.r.e at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her sea valves were opened or broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat she was pushed by the _New York_ bodily upon the beach, the _New York's_ stem being placed against her for this purpose, the s.h.i.+p being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment, and sank in shoal water, and may be saved. Had this not been done she would have gone down in deep water, and would have been to a certainty a complete loss.

"11. I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the _Cristobal Colon_.