Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816 Part 18

_Sir John Narbrough, Knight, admiral of his majesty's fleet in the Mediterranean seas for this expedition.

Instructions for all commanders to place their s.h.i.+ps for their better fighting and securing the whole fleet if a powerful enemy sets upon us_.

When I hoist my union flag at the mizen peak, I would have every commander in this fleet place himself in order of sailing and battle as prescribed, observing his starboard and larboard s.h.i.+p and leader, either sailing before or by the wind, and so continue sailing in order so long as the signal is abroad.

In case a powerful squadron of s.h.i.+ps falls with our fleet, and will fight us, and we see it most convenient to fight before the wind, and the enemy follow us, I would have every commander place his s.h.i.+ps in this order of sailing prescribed as followeth, and so continue sailing and fighting, doing his utmost to annoy the enemy, so long as shall be required for defence of himself and whole fleet.

_Larboard side_. Portsmouth frigate.

Newcastle frigate.

Samuel and Henry 30 Advice 20 Diamond.

Friends.h.i.+p 12 Lion 20 Bonaventure. 11 John and Joseph 10 Pearl frigate.

Return 10 Benjamin and Elizabeth 14 Concord 26 Fountain 8 Leopard 20 Boneto sloop, Baltam^r.[1]

Plymouth, Admiral.

Spragge frigate, Batchelor.[1]

St. Lucar Merchant 20 Prosperous 30 Sapphire frigate Mary and Martha 30 Delight 9 Olive Branch 10 Italian Merchant 30 Tiger 30 James galley Dragon 18 Samuel and Mary 24 Mediterranean 16 James Merchant 20 King-fisher frigate.

_Starboard side_. Portland frigate.

In case the enemy be to leeward of us, and force us to fight by the wind, then I would have each s.h.i.+p in this fleet to follow each other in a line as afore prescribed, either wing leading the van as the occasion shall require.

In case I would have the van to tack first (in time of service) I will spread the union flag at the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, and if I would have the rear of the fleet to tack first I will spread the union flag at the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, each commander being [ready] to take notice of the said signals, and to act accordingly, following each other as prescribed, and be careful to a.s.sist and relieve any that is in necessity.

In case of separation by foul weather, or by any inevitable accident, and the wind blows hard westerly, then Zante Road is the place appointed for rendezvous.

Given under my hand and on board his majesty's s.h.i.+p Plymouth, at an anchor in Zante Road.

This 4th of May, 1678.

JOHN NARBROUGH.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] Neither Baltimore nor Batchelor nor any similar names of commissioned officers occur in Pepys's Navy List, 1660-88. Tanner, _op.

cit._

III

THE LAST STUART ORDERS

INTRODUCTORY

The next set of orders we have are those drawn up by George Legge, first Lord Dartmouth, for the fleet with which he was entrusted by James II, to prevent the landing of William of Orange in 1688. The only known copy of them is in the _Sloane MSS._ 3650. It is unfortunately not complete, the last few articles with the date and signature being missing, so that there is no direct evidence that it related to this fleet. There can however be no doubt about the matter. For it is followed by the battle order of a fleet in which both s.h.i.+ps and captains correspond exactly with that which Dartmouth commanded in 1688. The only other fleet which he commanded was that which in 1683 proceeded to the Straits to carry out the evacuation of Tangier, and it was not large enough to require such a set of instructions.

We know moreover that in this year he did actually draw up some Fighting Instructions, shortly after September 24, the day his commission was signed, and that he submitted them to King James for approval. On October 14 Pepys, in the course of a long official letter to him from the admiralty, writes: 'His majesty, upon a very deliberate perusal of your two papers, one of the divisions of your fleet and the other touching your line of battle, does extremely approve the same, commanding me to tell you so.[1]

Lord Dartmouth's articles follow those which James had last drawn up in 1673 almost word for word, and the only alterations of any importance all refer to the handling of the line in action. There can be practically no doubt therefore that we here have the instructions which Pepys refers to, and that the new matter relating to the line of battle originated with Dartmouth, as the result of a considerable experience of naval warfare. After leaving Cambridge he joined, at the age of 17, the s.h.i.+p of his cousin, Sir Edward Spragge, and served with him as a volunteer and lieutenant throughout the Second Dutch War. In 1667, before he was 20, he commanded the Pembroke, and in 1671 the Fairfax, in Sir Robert Holmes's action with the Dutch Smyrna fleet, and in the battle of Solebay. In 1673 he commanded the Royal Catherine (84), and served throughout Rupert's campaign with distinction. Since then, as has been said, he had successfully conducted the evacuation of Tangier. If on this occasion he needed advice he had at hand some of the best, in the person of his flag officers, Sir Roger Strickland and Sir John Berry, two of the most seasoned old 'tarpaulins' in the service, and both in high estimation as naval experts with James.

The amendments introduced into these instructions, although not extensive, point to a continued development. We note first that James's Articles 3 and 4 are combined in Dartmouth's Article 3, so as to ensure the close-hauled line being formed before any attempt is made to divide the enemy's fleet. No such provision existed in the previous instructions. Another noteworthy change under the new article is that, whether by intention or not, any commander of a s.h.i.+p is given the initiative in weathering a part of the enemy's fleet if he sees an opportunity. If this was seriously intended it seems to point to a reaction to the school of Monck and Rupert, perhaps under Spragge's influence. Dartmouth's next new article, No. 5, for reforming line of battle as convenient, regardless of the prescribed order of battle, points in the same direction.

The only other change of importance is the note inserted in the sixth article, in which Dartmouth lays his finger on one of the weak points in James's method of attack from windward by bearing down all together, and suggests a means by which the danger of being raked as the s.h.i.+ps come down may be minimised.

FOOTNOTE:

[1] _Dartmouth MSS. (Historical MSS. Commission_, XI. v. 160.)

_LORD DARTMOUTH, Oct._ 1688.

[+Sloane MSS. 3650, ff. 7-11+.]

_George, Lord Dartmouth, admiral of his majesty's fleet for the present expedition_.

_Instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in fighting_.

1 and 2. _[Same as in Duke of York's_, 1673.]

3. If the enemy have the wind of his majesty's fleet, and come to fight them, the commanders of his majesty's s.h.i.+ps shall endeavour to put themselves into one line as close upon a wind as they can lie, according to the order of battle given, until such time as they shall see an opportunity by gaining their wakes to divide the enemy's fleet, &c. _[rest as in Article 3 of_ 1673].

4. [_Same as_ 5 _of_ 1673.] [1]

5. If the admiral should have the wind of the enemy, when other s.h.i.+ps of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard or mizen topmast, every such s.h.i.+p is to bear up into his wake or grain upon pain of severe punishment. In this case, whether the line hath been broke or disordered by the s.h.i.+fting of the wind, or otherwise, each s.h.i.+p or division are not unreasonably to strive for their proper places in the first line of battle given, but they are to form a line, the best that may be with the admiral, and with all the expedition that can be, not regarding what place or division they fall into or between.

If the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, &c. [_rest as in 6 of 1673_].

6. In case his majesty's fleet have the wind of the enemy, and that the enemy stands towards them and they towards the enemy, then the van of his majesty's fleet shall keep the wind, and when they are come at a convenient distance from the enemy's rear they shall stay until their own whole line is come up within the same distance from the enemy's van; and then the whole line is to tack, every s.h.i.+p in his own place, and to bear down upon them so nigh as they can without endangering the loss of the wind--[Note that they are not to bear down all at once, but to observe the working of the admiral and to bring to as often as he thinks fit, the better to bring his fleet to fight in good order; and at last only to lask away[2] when they come near within shot towards the enemy as much as may be, and not bringing their heads to bear against the enemy's broadsides]--and to stand along with them the same tacks on board, still keeping the enemy to leeward, and not suffering them to tack in their van. And in case the enemy tack in the rear first, he who is in the rear of his majesty's fleet is to tack first with as many s.h.i.+ps or divisions as are those of the enemy's, and if all the enemy's s.h.i.+ps tack, their whole line is to follow, standing along with the same tacks aboard as the enemy doth.

7 to 9. [_Same as 8 to 10 of 1673_.]

10. [_Same as 11 of 1673, but with yellow flag instead of red_.]

11. When the admiral would have the other divisions to make more sail, though himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall be put on the ensign staff for the vice-admiral, a blue for the rear, and for both a striped.

12. As soon as the fleet shall see the admiral engage or make a signal by putting out a red flag on the fore topmast-head, each division shall take the best advantage they can to engage the enemy, according to such order of battle as shall be given them, and no s.h.i.+p or division whatsoever is upon any pretence to lie by to fight or engage the enemy whereby to endanger parting the main body of the fleet till such time as the whole line be brought to fight by this signal.

13 to 18. [_Same as 14 to 19 of 1673_.]

18. The several commanders in the fleet are to take special care, upon pain of severe punishment, that they fire not over any of their own s.h.i.+ps.

19. [_Same as 20 of 1673_.]

20. The fires.h.i.+ps in their several divisions are to endeavour to keep the wind, and they with the small frigates to be as near the great s.h.i.+ps as they can, attending the signal and acting accordingly.