Armageddon--And After Part 2

DIPLOMATIC CRITICISM

But just because it bound its signatories to act on certain vague principles for no well-defined ends, it was bound to become the mockery of diplomatists trained in an older school. Metternich, for instance, called it a "loud sounding nothing"; Castlereagh "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," while Canning declared that for his part he wanted no more of "Areopagus and the like of that." What happened on this occasion is what ordinarily happens with well-intentioned idealists who happen also to be amateur statesmen. Trying to regulate practical politics, the Holy Alliance was deflected from its original purpose because its chief author, Alexander I, came under the influence of Metternich and was frightened by revolutionary movements in Italy and within his own dominions. Thus the instrument originally intended to preserve nationalities and secure the const.i.tutional rights of people was converted into a weapon for the use of autocrats only anxious to preserve their own thrones. Nevertheless, though it may have been a failure, the Holy Alliance did not leave itself without witness in the modern world. It tried to regulate ordinary diplomacy in accordance with ethical and spiritual principles; and the dreaming mind of its first founder was reproduced in that later descendant of his who initiated the Hague propaganda of peace.

FAILURE

"These things were written for our ensamples," and we should be foolish indeed if we did not take stock of them with an anxious eye to the future.

The main and startling fact is that with every apparent desire for the re-establishment of Europe on better lines, Europe, as a matter of fact, drifted back into the old welter of conflicting nationalities, while the very instrument of peace--the Holy Alliance--was used by autocratic governments for the subjection of smaller nationalities and the destruction of popular freedom. It is accordingly very necessary that we should study the conditions under which so startling a transformation took place. Even in England herself it cannot be said that the people were in any sense benefited by the conclusions of the war. They had borne its burdens, but at its end found themselves hampered as before in the free development of a democracy. Meanwhile, Europe at large presented a spectacle of despotism tempered by occasional popular outbreaks, while in the majority of cases the old fetters were riveted anew by cunning and by no means disinterested hands.

A DECEPTIVE PARALLEL

What we have to ask ourselves is whether the conditions a hundred years ago have any real similarity with those likely to obtain when Europe begins anew to set its house in order. To this, fortunately, we can return a decided negative. We have already shown that the general outlines present a certain similarity, but the parallelism is at most superficial, and in many respects deceptive. A despot has to be overthrown, an end has to be put to a particular form of autocratic regime, and smaller states have to be protected against the exactions of their stronger neighbours--that is the extent of the a.n.a.logy. But it is to be hoped that we shall commence our labours under much better auspices. The personal forces involved, for instance, are wholly different. Amongst those who took upon themselves to solve the problems of the time is to be found the widest possible divergence in character and aims. On the one side we have a sheer mystic and idealist in the person of Alexander I, with all kinds of visionary characters at his side--La Harpe, who was his tutor, a Jacobin pure and simple, and a fervent apostle of the teachings of Jean Jacques Rousseau; Czartoryski, a Pole, sincerely anxious for the regeneration of his kingdom; and Capo d'Istria, a champion of Greek nationality. To these we have to add the curious figure of the Baroness von Krudener, an admirable representative of the religious sickliness of the age. "I have immense things to say to him," she said, referring to the Emperor, "the Lord alone can prepare his heart to receive them." She had, indeed, many things to say to him, but her influence was evanescent and his Imperial heart was hardened eventually to quite different issues.

METTERNICH

Absolutely at the other extreme was a man like Metternich, trained in the old school of politics, wily with the wiliness of a practised diplomatic training, naturally impatient of speculative dreamers, thoroughly practical in the only sense in which he understood the term, that is to say, determined to preserve Austrian supremacy. To a reactionary of this kind the Holy Alliance represented nothing but words. He knew, with the cynicism bred of long experience of mankind, that the rivalries and jealousies between different states would prevent their union in any common purpose, and in the long run the intensity with which he pursued his objects, narrow and limited as it was, prevailed over the large and vague generosity of Alexander's nature. To the same type belonged both Talleyrand and Richelieu, who concentrated themselves on the single task of winning back for France her older position in the European commonwealth--a laudable aim for patriots to espouse, but one which was not likely to help the cause of the Holy Alliance.

CASTLEREAGH AND CANNING

Half-way between these two extremes of unpractical idealists and extremely practical but narrow-minded reactionaries come the English statesmen, Castlereagh, Wellington, and Canning. Much injustice has been done to the first of these. For many critics have been misled by Byron's denunciation of Castlereagh, just as others have spoken lightly of the stubborn conservatism of Wellington, or the easy and half-cynical insouciance of the author of the _Anti-Jacobin_. As a matter of fact, Castlereagh was by no means an opponent of the principles of the Holy Alliance. He joined with Russia, Austria, and Prussia as a not unwilling member of the successive Congresses, but both he and Wellington, true to their national instincts, sought to subordinate all proposals to the interests of Great Britain, and to confine discussions to immediate objects, such as the limitation of French power and the suppression of dangerous revolutionary ideas. They were not, it is true, idealists in the sense in which Alexander I understood the term. And yet, on the whole, both Castlereagh and Canning did more for the principle of nationality than any of the other diplomatists of the time. The reason why Canning broke with the Holy Alliance, after Troppau, Laibach, and Verona, was because he discerned something more than a tendency on the part of Continental States to crush the free development of peoples, especially in reference to the Latin-American States of South America. It is true that in these matters he and his successor were guided by a shrewd notion of British interest, but it would be hardly just to blame them on this account. "You know my politics well enough," wrote Canning in 1822 to the British Amba.s.sador in St. Petersburg, "to know what I mean when I say that for Europe I should be desirous now and then to read England." Castlereagh was, no doubt, more conciliatory than Canning, but he saw the fundamental difficulty of organising an international system and yet holding the balance between conflicting nations. And thus we get to a result such as seems to have rejoiced the heart of Canning, when he said in 1823 that "the issue of Verona has split the one and indivisible alliance into three parts as distinct as the const.i.tutions of England, France, and Muscovy." "Things are getting back," he added, "to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and G.o.d for us all. Only bid your Emperor (Alexander I) be quiet, for the time for Areopagus and the like of that is gone by."[8]

[8] _The Confederation of Europe_, by W.A. Phillips, p. 280.

EARTHEN VESSELS

If, then, the ardent hopes of a regenerated Europe in the early years of the nineteenth century failed, the result was due in large measure to the fact that the business was committed to wrong hands. The organs for working the change were for the most part autocratic monarchs and old-world diplomatists--the last people in the world likely to bring about a workable millennium. A great crisis demands very careful manipulation.

Cynicism must not be allowed to play any part in it. Traditional watchwords are not of much use. Theoretical idealism itself may turn out to be a most formidable stumbling-block. Yet no one can doubt that a solution of the problem, whenever it is arrived at, must come along the path of idealism. Long ago a man of the world was defined as a man who in every serious crisis is invariably wrong. He is wrong because he applies old-fas.h.i.+oned experience to a novel situation--old wine in new bottles--and because he has no faith in generous aspirations, having noted their continuous failure in the past. Yet, after all, it is only faith which can move mountains, and the Holy Alliance itself was not so much wrong in the principles to which it appealed as it was in the personages who signed it. We have noticed already that, like all other great ideas, it did not wholly die. The propaganda of peace, however futile may be some of the discussions of pacifists, is the heritage which even so wrong-headed a man as Alexander I has left to the world. The idea of arbitration between nations, the solution of difficulties by arguments rather than by swords, the power which democracies hold in their hands for guiding the future destinies of the world--all these in their various forms remain with us as legacies of that splendid, though ineffective, idealism which lay at the root of the Holy Alliance.

SMALL NATIONALITIES

And now after this digression, which has been necessary to clear the ground, and also to suggest apt parallels, let us return to what Mr.

Asquith said in Dublin on the ultimate objects of the present war. He borrowed from Mr. Gladstone the phrase "the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics," and in developing it as applicable to the present situation he pointed out that for us three definite objects are involved. The first, a.s.sented to by every publicist of the day, apart from those educated in Germany, is the wholesale obliteration of the notion that states exist simply for the sake of going to war. This kind of militarism, in all its different aspects, will have to be abolished. The next point brings us at once to the heart of some of the controversies raised in 1815 and onwards. "Room," said Mr.

Asquith--agreeing in this matter with Mr. Winston Churchill--"room must be found, and kept, for the independent existence and the free development of the smaller nationalities, each with a corporate consciousness of its own." Now this is a plain issue which every one can understand. Not only did we go to war in order to help a small nationality--Belgium--but the very principle of nationality is one of the familiar phrases which have characterised British policy through the greater part of the nineteenth century. Our principle is to live and let live, to allow smaller states to exist and thrive by the side of their large neighbours without undue interference on the part of the latter. Each distinct nationality is to have its voice, at all events, in the free direction of its own future.

And, above all, its present and future position must be determined not by the interests of the big Powers, but by a sort of plebiscite of the whole nationality.

SOME PLAIN ISSUES

Applying such principles to Europe as it exists to-day, and as it is likely to exist to-morrow, we arrive at certain very definite conclusions.

The independence of Belgium must be secured, so also must the independence of Holland and Denmark. Alsace and Lorraine must, if the inhabitants so wish, be restored to France, and there can be little doubt that Alsace at all events will be only too glad to resume her old allegiance to the French nation. The Duchies of Schleswig-Holstein must also decide whether they would like to be reunited to Denmark. And we are already aware that the Tsar has promised to give independence to the country of Poland--a point which forms a curious a.n.a.logy with the same offer originally proposed by the Tsar's ancestor, Alexander I. Of course, these do not exhaust by any means the changes that must be forthcoming. Finland will have to be liberated; those portions of Transylvania which are akin to Roumania must be allowed to gravitate towards their own stock. Italy must arrogate to herself--if she is wise enough to join her forces with those of the Triple Entente--those territories which come under the general t.i.tle of "unredeemed Italy"--the Trentino and Trieste, to say nothing of what Italy claims on the Adriatic littoral. Possibly the greatest changes of all will take place in reference to the Slavs. Servia and Montenegro will clearly wish to incorporate in a great Slav kingdom a great many of their kinsmen who at present are held in uneasy subjection by Austria.[9]

Nor must we forget how these same principles apply to the Teutonic States.

If the principle of nationality is to guide us, we must preserve the German nation, even though we desire to reduce its dangerous elements to impotence. Prussia must remain the home of all those Germans who accept the hegemony of Berlin, but it does not follow that the southern states of the German Empire--who have not been particularly fond of their northern neighbours--should have to endure any longer the Prussian yoke. Lastly, the German colonies can hardly be permitted to remain under the dominion of the Kaiser.[10] Here are only a few of the changes which may metamorphose the face of Europe as a direct result of enforcing the principle of nationalities.

[9] The entrance of Turkey into the quarrel of course brings new factors into the ultimate settlement.

[10] Cf. _Who is Responsible?_ by Cloudesley Brereton (Harrap), Chapter IV, "The Settlement."

EUROPEAN PARTNERs.h.i.+P

But there is a further point to which Mr. Asquith referred, one which is more important than anything else, because it represents the far-off ideal of European peace and the peace of the world. "We have got to subst.i.tute by a slow and gradual process," said Mr. Asquith, "instead of force, instead of the clash of compelling ambition, instead of groupings and alliances, a real European partners.h.i.+p, based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a common will." There we have the whole crux of the situation, and, unfortunately, we are forced to add, its main difficulty. For if we desire to summarise in a single sentence the rock on which European negotiations from 1815 to 1829 ultimately split, it was the union of two such contradictory things as independent nationalities and an international committee or system of public law.

Intrinsically the two ideas are opposed, for one suggests absolute freedom, and the other suggests control, superintendence, interference. If the one recognises the entire independence of a nationality within its own limits, the other seeks to enforce something of the nature of a European police to see that every nation does its duty. It is true, of course, that this public will of Europe must be incorporated in a kind of parliament, to which the separate nations must send their representatives, and that thus in a fas.h.i.+on each nation will have its proper say in any of the conclusions arrived at. But here the difficulty starts anew owing to the relative size, and therefore the relative importance of the different states const.i.tuting the union. If all alike are given an equivalent vote, it is rather hard on the big states, which represent larger numbers and therefore control larger destinies. If, on the other hand, we adopt the principle of proportional representation, we may be pretty certain that the larger states will press somewhat heavily on the smaller. For instance, suppose that some state violates, or threatens to violate, the public law of the world. In that case the Universal Union must, of course, try to bring it to reason by peaceful means first, but if that should fail, the only other alternative is by force of arms. If once we admit the right of the world-organisation to coerce its recalcitrant members, what becomes of the sovereign independence of nations? That, as we have said, was the main difficulty confronting the European peace-maker of a hundred years ago, and, however we may choose to regard it, it remains a difficulty, we will not say insuperable, but at all events exceedingly formidable, for the European peace-makers of the twentieth century. The ant.i.thesis is the old ant.i.thesis between order and progress; between coercion and independence; between the public voice, or, if we like to phrase it so, the public conscience, and the arbitrariness and irresponsibility of individual units. Or we might put the problem in a still wider form. A patriot is a man who believes intensely in the rights of his own nationality. But if we have to form a United States of Europe we shall have gradually to soften, diminish, or perhaps even destroy the narrower conceptions of patriotism. The ultimate evolution of democracy in the various peoples means the mutual recognition of their common interests, as against despotism and autocracy. It is clear that such a process must gradually wipe out the distinction between the different peoples, and subst.i.tute for particularism something of universal import.

In such a process what, we ask once more, becomes of the principle of nationality, which is one of our immediate aims? In point of fact, it is obvious that, from a strictly logical standpoint, the will of Europe, or the public right of Europe, and the free independence of nationalities are ant.i.thetical terms, and will continue to remain so, however cunningly, by a series of compromises, we may conceal their essential divergence. That is the real problem which confronts us quite as obstinately as it did our forefathers after the destruction of the Napoleonic power. And it will have to be faced by all reformers, whether they are pacifists or idealists, on ethical or political grounds.

A MORAL FOR PACIFISTS

What is the outcome of the foregoing considerations? The only moral at present which I am disposed to draw is one which may be addressed to pacifists in general, and to all those who avail themselves of large and generous phrases, such as "the public will of Europe," or "the common consciousness of civilised states." The solution of the problem before us is not to be gained by the use of abstract terms, but by very definite and concrete experience used in the most practical way to secure immediate reforms. We demand, for instance, the creation of what is to all intents and purposes an international federal system applied to Europe at large.

Now it is obvious that a federal system can be created amongst nations more or less at the same level of civilisation, inspired by much the same ideals, acknowledging the same end of their political and social activity.

But in what sense is this true of Europe as we know it? There is every kind of diversity between the const.i.tuent elements of the suggested federation. There is no real uniformity of political inst.i.tutions and ideals. But in order that our object may be realised it is precisely this uniformity of political inst.i.tutions and ideals amongst the nations which we require. How is a public opinion formed in any given state? It comes into being owing to a certain community of sentiments, opinions, and prejudices, and without such community it cannot develop. The same thing holds true of international affairs. If we desiderate the public voice of Europe, or the public conscience of Europe, Europe must grow to be far more concordant than it is at present, both in actual political inst.i.tutions and in those inspiring ideals which form the life-blood of inst.i.tutions. How many states, for instance, recognise or put into practice a really representative system of government?

COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

If we turn to the programme of the pacifists, we shall be confronted by similar difficulties. Pacifism, as such, involves an appeal to all the democracies, asking them to come into line, as it were, for the execution of certain definite projects intended to seek peace and ensure it. The first stage of the peace movement is the general recognition of the principle of arbitration between states. That first period has, we may take it, been already realised. The second stage is the recognition of compulsory arbitration. When, in 1907, the second Hague Conference was held, this principle was supported by thirty-two different states, representing more than a thousand million human beings. Something like three or four hundred millions remained not yet prepared to admit the principle in its entirety. I may remark in pa.s.sing that the verbal acceptance of a general principle is one thing, the application, as we have lately had much reason to discover, is quite another. We may recognise, however, that this second stage of the pacifist programme has, undoubtedly, made large advances. But of course it must necessarily be followed by its consequence, a third stage which shall ensure respect for, and obedience to arbitration verdicts. Recalcitrant states will have to be coerced, and the one thing that can coerce them is an international police administered by an international executive power. That is to say, we must have a parliament of parliaments, a universal parliament, the representatives of which must be selected by the different const.i.tuent members of the United States of Europe. When this has been done, and only when this has been done, can we arrive at a fourth stage, that of a general disarmament. In the millennium that is to be it is only the international police which shall be allowed to use weapons of war in order to execute the decrees of the central parliament representing the common European will.

DEMOCRATIC UNANIMITY

Here we have all the old difficulties starting anew, and especially the main one--democratic unanimity. How far the democracies of the European Commonwealth can work in unison is one of the problems which the future will have to solve. At present they, obviously, do not do so. The Social Democrats of Germany agreed to make war on the democrats of other countries. Old instincts were too strong for them. For it must always be remembered that only so far as a cosmopolitan spirit takes the place of narrow national prejudices can we hope to reach the level of a common conscience, or a common will of Europe. And are we prepared to say that national prejudices _ought_ to be obliterated and ignored? The very principle of nationality forbids it.

I do not wish, however, to end on a note of pessimism. The mistake of the pacifist has all along been the a.s.sumption that bellicose impulses have died away. They have done nothing of the kind, and are not likely to do so. But, happily, all past experience in the world's history shows us that ideas in a real sense govern the world, and that a logical difficulty is not necessarily a practical impossibility. In this case, as in others, a n.o.ble and generous idea of European peace will gradually work its own fulfilment, if we are not in too much of a hurry to force the pace, or imagine that the ideal has been reached even before the preliminary foundations have been laid.

CHAPTER III

SOME SUGGESTED REFORMS

It is an obvious criticism on the considerations which have been occupying us in the preceding chapters that they are too purely theoretical to be of any value. They are indeed speculative, and, perhaps, from one point of view come under the edge of the usual condemnation of prophecy. Prophecy is, of course, if one of the most interesting, also one of the most dangerous of human ingenuities, and the usual fate of prophets is, in nine cases out of ten, to be proved wrong. Moreover, it is possible that there may come an issue to the present war which would be by far the worst which the human mind can conceive. It may end in a deadlock, a stalemate, an impa.s.se, because the two opposing forces are so equal that neither side can get the better of the other. If peace has to be made because of such a balance between the opposing forces as this, it would be a calamity almost worse than the original war. German militarism would still be unsubdued, the Kaiser's pretensions to universal sovereignty, although clipped, would not be wiped out, and we should find remaining in all the nations of the earth a sort of sullen resentment which could not possibly lead to anything else than a purely temporary truce. The only logical object of war is to make war impossible, and if merely an indecisive result were achieved in the present war, it would be as certain as anything human can be that a fresh war would soon arise. At the present moment we confess that there is an ugly possibility of this kind, and that it is one of the most formidable perils of future civilisation.

AN IGn.o.bLE PACIFICATION

It is so immensely important, however, that the cause of the Allies should prevail not for their own sakes alone, but for the sake of the world, that it is difficult to imagine their consenting to an ign.o.ble pacification.

The Allies have signed an important doc.u.ment, in order to prove their solidarity, that no one of them will sign peace without the sanction of the other partners. Let us suppose that the rival armies have fought each other to a standstill; let us suppose that France is exhausted; let us further suppose that the German troops, by their mobility and their tactical skill, are able to hold the Russians in the eastern sphere of war. We can suppose all these things, but what we cannot imagine even for a moment is that Great Britain--to confine ourselves only to our own case--will ever consent to stop until she has achieved her object. America may strive to make the combatants desist from hostilities, partly because she is a great pacific power herself, and partly because it is a practical object with her as a commercial nation to secure tranquil conditions. Yet, even so, there would be no answer to the question which most thoughtful minds would propound: Why did we go to war, and what have we gained by the war? If we went to war for large cosmic purposes, then we cannot consent to a peace which leaves those ultimate purposes unfulfilled. I think, therefore, we can put aside this extremely uncomfortable suggestion that the war may possibly end in a deadlock, because, in the last resort, Great Britain, with her fleet, her sister dominions over the seas, her colonies, and her eastern ally j.a.pan, will always, to use the familiar phrase, have "something up her sleeve," even though continental nations should reach a pitch of absolute exhaustion.

A NEW EUROPE