The Anti-Slavery Examiner Volume I Part 45

The Const.i.tution of Mississippi gives the General a.s.sembly power to make laws "to oblige the owners of slaves to _treat them with humanity_." The Const.i.tution of Missouri has the same clause, and an additional one making it the DUTY of the legislature to pa.s.s such laws as may be necessary to secure the _humane_ treatment of the slaves. This grant to those legislatures, empowers them to decide what _is_ and what is _not_ "humane treatment." Otherwise it gives no "power"--the clause is mere waste paper, and flouts in the face of a befooled legislature. A clause giving power to require "humane treatment" covers all the _particulars_ of such treatment--gives power to exact it in _all respects--requiring_ certain acts, and _prohibiting_ others--maiming, branding, chaining together, separating families, floggings for learning the alphabet, for reading the Bible, for wors.h.i.+ping G.o.d according to conscience--the legislature has power to specify each of these acts--declare that it is not "_humane_ treatment," and PROHIBIT it.--The legislature may also believe that driving men and women into the field, and forcing them to work without pay, is not "humane treatment," and being Const.i.tutionally bound "to _oblige_" masters to practise "humane treatment"--they have the power to _prohibit such_ treatment, and are bound to do it.

The law of Louisiana makes slaves real estate, prohibiting the holder, if he be also a _land_ holder, to separate them from the soil.[A] If it has power to prohibit the sale _without_ the soil, it can prohibit the sale _with_ it; and if it can prohibit the _sale_ as property, it can prohibit the _holding_ as property. Similar laws exist in the French, Spanish, and Portuguese colonies.

[Footnote A: Virginia made slaves real estate by a law pa.s.sed in 1705.

(_Beverly's Hist. of Va_., p. 98.) I do not find the precise time when this law was repealed, probably when Virginia became the chief slave breeder for the cotton-growing and sugar-planting country, and made young men and women "from fifteen to twenty-five" the main staple production of the State.]

The law of Louisiana requires the master to give his slaves a certain amount of food and clothing. If it can oblige the master to give the slave _one_ thing, it can oblige him to give him another: if food and clothing, then wages, liberty, his own body.

By the laws of Connecticut, slaves may receive and hold property, and prosecute suits in their own name as plaintiffs: [This last was also the law of Virginia in 1795. See Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery," p. 73.]

There were also laws making marriage contracts legal, in certain contingencies, and punis.h.i.+ng infringements of them, ["_Reeve's Law of Baron and Femme_," p. 340-1.] Each of the laws enumerated above, does, _in principle_, abolish slavery; and all of them together abolish it in fact. True, not as a _whole_, and at a _stroke_, nor all in one place; but in its _parts_, by piecemeal, at divers times and places; thus showing that the abolition of slavery is within the boundary of legislation.

5. THE COMPETENCY OF THE LAW-MAKING POWER TO ABOLISH SLAVERY, HAS BEEN RECOGNIZED BY ALL THE SLAVEHOLDING STATES, EITHER DIRECTLY OR BY IMPLICATION. Some States recognize it in their _Const.i.tutions_, by giving the legislature power to emanc.i.p.ate such slaves as may "have rendered the state some distinguished service, "and others by express prohibitory restrictions. The Const.i.tution of Mississippi, Arkansas, and other States, restrict the power of the legislature in this respect. Why this express prohibition, if the law-making power _cannot_ abolish slavery? A stately farce, indeed, to construct a special clause, and with appropriate rites induct it into the Const.i.tution, for the express purpose of restricting a nonent.i.ty!--to take from the law-making power what it _never had_, and what _cannot_ pertain to it! The legislatures of those States have no power to abolish slavery, simply because their Const.i.tutions have expressly _taken away_ that power. The people of Arkansas, Mississippi, &c., well knew the competency of the law-making power to abolish slavery, and hence their zeal to _restrict_ it.

The slaveholding States have recognised this power in their _laws_. The Virginia Legislature pa.s.sed a law in 1786 to prevent the further importation of Slaves, of which the following is an extract: "And be it further enacted that every slave imported into this commonwealth contrary to the true intent and meaning of this act, shall upon such importation become _free_." By a law of Virginia, pa.s.sed Dec. 17, 1792, a slave brought into the state and kept _there a year_, was _free_. The Maryland Court of Appeals at the December term 1813 [case of Stewart _vs._ Oakes,] decided that a slave owned in Maryland, and sent by his master into Virginia to work at different periods, making one year in the whole, became _free_, being _emanc.i.p.ated_ by the law of Virginia quoted above. North Carolina and Georgia in their acts of cession, transferring to the United States the territory now const.i.tuting the States of Tennessee, Alabama and Mississippi, made it a condition of the grant, that the provisions of the ordinance of '87, should be secured to the inhabitants _with the exception of the sixth article which prohibits slavery_; thus conceding, both the competency of law to abolish slavery, and the power of Congress to do it, within its jurisdiction. (These acts show the prevalent belief at that time, in the slaveholding States, that the general government had adopted a line of policy aiming at the exclusion of slavery from the entire territory of the United States, not included within the original States, and that this policy would be pursued unless prevented by specific and formal stipulation.)

Slaveholding states have a.s.serted this power _in their judicial decisions_. In numerous cases their highest courts have decided that if the legal owner of slaves takes them into those States where slavery has been abolished either by law or by the const.i.tution, such removal emanc.i.p.ates them, such law or const.i.tution abolis.h.i.+ng their slavery.

This principle is a.s.serted in the decision of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, in the case of Lunsford _vs._ Coquillon, 14 Martin's La.

Reps. 401. Also by the Supreme Court of Virginia, in the case of Hunter _vs._ Fulcher, 1 Leigh's Reps. 172. The same doctrine was laid down by Judge Was.h.i.+ngton, of the United States Supreme Court, in the case of Butler _vs._ Hopper, Was.h.i.+ngton's Circuit Court Reps. 508. This principle was also decided by the Court of Appeals in Kentucky; case of Rankin _vs._ Lydia, 2 Marshall's Reps. 407; see also, Wilson _vs._ Isbell, 5 Call's Reps. 425, Spotts _vs._ Gillespie, 6 Randolph's Reps.

566. The State _vs._ La.s.selle, 1 Blackford's Reps. 60, Marie Louise _vs._ Mariot, 8 La. Reps. 475. In this case, which was tried in 1836, the slave had been taken by her master to France and brought back; Judge Mathews, of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, decided that "residence for one moment" under the laws of France emanc.i.p.ated her.

6. EMINENT STATESMEN, THEMSELVES SLAVEHOLDERS, HAVE CONCEDED THIS POWER.

Was.h.i.+ngton, in a letter to Robert Morris, dated April 12, 1786, says: "There is not a man living, who wishes more sincerely than I do, to see a plan adopted for the abolition of slavery; but there is only one proper and effectual mode by which it can be accomplished, and that is by _legislative_ authority." In a letter to Lafayette, dated May 10, 1786, he says: "It (the abolition of slavery) certainly might, and a.s.suredly ought to be effected, and that too by _legislative_ authority." In a letter to John Fenton Mercer, dated Sept. 9, 1786, he says: "It is among my first wishes to see some plan adopted by which slavery in this country may be abolished by _law_." In a letter to Sir John Sinclair, he says: "There are in Pennsylvania, _laws_ for the gradual abolition of slavery, which neither Maryland nor Virginia have at present, but which nothing is more certain than that they _must have_, and at a period not remote." Speaking of movements in the Virginia Legislature in 1777, for the pa.s.sage of a law emanc.i.p.ating the slaves, Mr. Jefferson says: "The principles of the amendment were agreed on, that is to say, the freedom of all born after a certain day; but it was found that the public mind would not bear the proposition, yet the day is not far distant, when _it must bear and adopt it_."--Jefferson's Memoirs, v. 1, p. 35. It is well known that Jefferson, Pendleton, Mason, Wythe and Lee, while acting as a committee of the Virginia House of Delegates to revise the State Laws, prepared a plan for the gradual emanc.i.p.ation of the slaves by law. These men were the great lights of Virginia. Mason, the author of the Virginia Const.i.tution; Pendleton, the President of the memorable Virginia Convention in 1787, and President of the Virginia Court of Appeals; Wythe was the Blackstone of the Virginia bench, for a quarter of a century Chancellor of the State, the professor of law in the University of William and Mary, and the preceptor of Jefferson, Madison, and Chief Justice Marshall. He was author of the celebrated remonstrance to the English House of Commons on the subject of the stamp act. As to Jefferson, his _name_ is his biography.

Every slaveholding member of Congress from the States of Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Georgia, voted for the celebrated ordinance of 1787, which _abolished_ the slavery then existing in the Northwest Territory. Patrick Henry, in his well known letter to Robert Pleasants, of Virginia, January 18, 1773, says: "I believe a time will come when an opportunity will be offered to _abolish_ this lamentable evil." William Pinkney, of Maryland, advocated the abolition of slavery by law, in the legislature of that State, in 1789. Luther Martin urged the same measure both in the Federal Convention, and in his report to the Legislature of Maryland. In 1796, St. George Tucker, of Virginia, professor of law in the University of William and Mary, and Judge of the General Court, published an elaborate dissertation on slavery, addressed to the General a.s.sembly of the State, and urging upon them the abolition of slavery by _law_.

John Jay, while New York was yet a slave State, and himself in law a slaveholder, said in a letter from Spain, in 1786, "An excellent law might be made out of the Pennsylvania one, for the gradual abolition of slavery. Were I in your legislature, I would present a bill for the purpose, drawn up with great care, and I would never cease moving it till it became a law, or I ceased to be a member."

Daniel D. Tompkins, in a message to the Legislature of New-York January 8, 1812, said: "To devise the means for the gradual and ultimate _extermination_ from amongst us of slavery, is a work worthy the representatives of a polished and enlightened nation."

The Virginia Legislature a.s.serted this power in 1832. At the close of a month's debate, the following proceedings were had. I extract from an editorial article of the Richmond Whig, of January 26, 1832.

"The report of the Select Committee, adverse to legislation on the subject of Abolition, was in these words: _Resolved_, as the opinion of this Committee, that it is INEXPEDIENT FOR THE PRESENT, to make any _legislative enactments for the abolition of Slavery_." This Report Mr. Preston moved to reverse, and thus to declare that it _was_ expedient, _now_ to make legislative enactments for the abolition of slavery. This was meeting the question in its strongest form. It demanded action, and immediate action. On this proposition the vote was 58 to 73.

Many of the most decided friends of abolition voted against the amendment; because they thought public opinion not sufficiently prepared for it, and that it might prejudice the cause to move too rapidly. The vote on Mr. Witcher's motion to postpone the whole subject indefinitely, indicates the true state of opinion in the House.--That was the test question, and was so intended and proclaimed by its mover. That motion was _negatived_, 71 to 60; showing a majority of 11, who by that vote, declared their belief that "at the proper time, and in the proper mode, Virginia ought to commence a system of gradual abolition."

7. THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE a.s.sERTED THIS POWER. The ordinance of '87, declaring that there should be "neither slavery nor involuntary servitude," in the North Western territory, abolished the slavery then existing there. The Supreme Court of Mississippi, in its decision in the case of Harvey vs. Decker, Walker's Mi. Reps. 36, declared that the ordinance emanc.i.p.ated the slaves then held there. In this decision the question is argued ably and at great length. The Supreme Court of La. made the same decision in the case of Forsyth vs.

Nash, 4 Martin's La. Reps. 395. The same doctrine was laid down by Judge Porter, (late United States Senator from La.,) in his decision at the March term of the La. Supreme Court, 1830, in the case of Merry vs.

Chexnaider, 20 Martin's Reps. 699.

That the ordinance abolished the slavery then existing there is also shown by the fact, that persons holding slaves in the territory pet.i.tioned for the repeal of the article abolis.h.i.+ng slavery, a.s.signing _that_ as a reason. "The pet.i.tion of the citizens of Randolph and St.

Clair counties in the Illinois country, stating that they were in possession of slaves, and praying the repeal of that act (the 6th article of the ordinance of '87) and the pa.s.sage of a law legalizing slavery there." [Am. State papers, Public Lands, v. 1. p. 69.] Congress pa.s.sed this ordinance before the United States Const.i.tution was adopted, when it derived all its authority from the articles of Confederation, which conferred powers of legislation far more restricted than those conferred on Congress over the District and Territories by the United States Const.i.tution. Now, we ask, how does the Const.i.tution _abridge_ the powers which Congress possessed under the articles of confederation?

The abolition of the slave trade by Congress, in 1808, is another ill.u.s.tration of the competency of legislative power to abolish slavery.

The African slave trade has become such a mere _technic_, in common parlance, that the fact of its being _proper slavery_ is overlooked. The buying and selling, the transportation, and the horrors of the middle pa.s.sage, were mere _incidents_ of the slavery in which the victims were held. Let things be called by their own names. When Congress abolished the African slave trade, it abolished SLAVERY--supreme slavery--power frantic with license, trampling a whole hemisphere scathed with its fires, and running down with blood. True, Congress did not, in the abolition of the slave trade, abolish _all_ the slavery within its jurisdiction, but it did abolish all the slavery in _one_ part of its jurisdiction. What has rifled it of power to abolish slavery in _another_ part of its jurisdiction, especially in that part where it has "exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever?"

8. THE CONSt.i.tUTION OF THE UNITED STATES RECOGNISES THIS POWER BY THE MOST CONCLUSIVE IMPLICATION. In Art. 1, sec. 3, clause 1, it prohibits the abolition of the slave trade previous to 1808: thus implying the power of Congress to do it at once, but for the restriction; and its power to do it _unconditionally_, when that restriction ceased. Again; In Art. 4, sec. 2, "No person held to service or labor in one state under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from said service or labor." This clause was inserted, as all admit, to prevent the runaway slave from being emanc.i.p.ated by the _laws_ of the free states. If these laws had _no power_ to emanc.i.p.ate, why this const.i.tutional guard to prevent it?

The insertion of the clause, was the testimony of the eminent jurists that framed the Const.i.tution, to the existence of the _power_, and their public proclamation, that the abolition of slavery was within the appropriate sphere of legislation. The right of the owner to that which is rightfully property, is founded on a principle of _universal law_, and is recognised and protected by all civilized nations; property in slaves is, by general consent, an _exception_; hence slaveholders insisted upon the insertion of this clause in the United States Const.i.tution, that they might secure by an _express provision_, that from which protection is withheld, by the acknowledged principles of universal law.[A] By demanding this provision, slaveholders consented that their slaves should not be recognised as property by the United States Const.i.tution, and hence they found their claim, on the fact of their being "_persons_, and _held_ to service."

[Footnote A: The fact, that under the articles of Confederation, slaveholders, whose slaves had escaped into free states, had no legal power to force them back,--that _now_ they have no power to recover, by process of law, their slaves who escape to Canada, the South American States, or to Europe--the case already cited, in which the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided, that residence "_for one moment_," under the laws of France emanc.i.p.ated an American slave--the case of Fulton _vs._.

Lewis, 3 Har. and John's Reps., 56, where the slave of a St. Domingo slaveholder, who brought him to Maryland in '93, was p.r.o.nounced free by the Maryland Court of Appeals--are ill.u.s.trations of the acknowledged truth here a.s.serted, that by the consent of the civilized world, and on the principles of universal law, slaves are not "_property_," and that whenever held as property under _law_, it is only by _positive legislative acts_, forcibly setting aside the law of nature, the common law, and the principles of universal justice and right between man and man,--principles paramount to all law, and from which alone law, derives its intrinsic authoritative sanction.]

9. CONGRESS HAS UNQUESTIONABLE POWER TO ADOPT THE COMMON LAW, AS THE LEGAL SYSTEM, WITHIN ITS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION.--This has been done, with certain restrictions, in most of the States, either by legislative acts or by const.i.tutional implication. THE COMMON LAW KNOWS NO SLAVES.

Its principles annihilate slavery wherever they touch it. It is a universal, unconditional, abolition act. Wherever slavery is a legal system, it is so only by _statute_ law, and in violation of the common law. The declaration of Lord Chief Justice Holt, that, "by the common law, no man can have property in another," is an acknowledged axiom, and based upon the well known common law definition of property. "The subjects of dominion or property are _things_, as contra-distinguished from _persons_." Let Congress adopt the common law in the District of Columbia, and slavery there is at once abolished. Congress may well be at home in common law legislation, for the common law is the grand element of the United States Const.i.tution. All its _fundamental_ provisions are instinct with its spirit; and its existence, principles, and paramount authority, are presupposed and a.s.sumed throughout the whole. The preamble of the Const.i.tution plants the standard of the Common Law immovably in its foreground. "We, the people of the United States, in order to ESTABLISH JUSTICE, &c., do ordain and establish this Const.i.tution;" thus proclaiming _devotion to_ JUSTICE, as the controlling motive in the organization of the Government, and its secure establishment the chief object of its aims. By this most solemn recognition, the common law, that grand legal embodyment of "_justice_"

and fundamental right--was made the Groundwork of the Const.i.tution, and intrenched behind its strongest munitions. The second clause of Sec. 9, Art. 1; Sec. 4, Art. 2, and the last clause of Sec. 2, Art. 3, with Articles 7, 8, 9, and 13 of the Amendments, are also express recognitions of the common law as the presiding Genius of the Const.i.tution.

By adopting the common law within its exclusive jurisdiction Congress would carry out the principles of our glorious Declaration, and follow the highest precedents in our national history and jurisprudence. It is a political maxim as old as civil legislation, that laws should be strictly h.o.m.ogeneous with the principles of the government whose will they express, embodying and carrying them out--being indeed the _principles themselves_, in preceptive form--representatives alike of the nature and the power of the Government--standing ill.u.s.trations of its genius and spirit, while they proclaim and enforce its authority.

Who needs be told that slavery makes war upon the principles of the Declaration, and the spirit of the Const.i.tution, and that these and the principles of the common law gravitate toward each other with irrepressible affinities, and mingle into one? The common law came hither with our pilgrim fathers; it was their birthright, their panoply, their glory, and their song of rejoicing in the house of their pilgrimage. It covered them in the day of their calamity, and their trust was under the shadow of its wings. From the first settlement of the country, the genius of our inst.i.tutions and our national spirit have claimed it as a common possession, and exulted in it with a common pride. A century ago, Governor Pownall, one of the most eminent const.i.tutional jurists of colonial times, said of the common law, "In all the colonies the common law is received as the foundation and main body of their law." In the Declaration of Rights, made by the Continental Congress at its first session in '74, there was the following resolution: "Resolved, That the respective colonies are ent.i.tled to the common law of England, and especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage according to the course of that law." Soon after the organization of the general government, Chief Justice Ellsworth, in one of his decisions on the bench of the United States Supreme Court, said: "The common law of this country remains the same as it was before the revolution." Chief Justice Marshall, in his decision in the case of Livingston _vs._ Jefferson, said: "When our ancestors migrated to America, they brought with them the common law of their native country, so far as it was applicable to their new situation, and I do not conceive that the revolution in any degree changed the relations of man to man, or the law which regulates them. In breaking our political connection with the parent state, we did not break our connection with each other." [_Hall's Law Journal, new series._] Mr. Duponceau, in his "Dissertation on the Jurisdiction of Courts in the United States," says, "I consider the common law of England the _jus commune_ of the United States. I think I can lay it down as a correct principle, that the common law of England, as it was at the time of the Declaration of Independence, still continues to be the national law of this country, so far as it is applicable to our present state, and subject to the modifications it has received here in the course of nearly half a century." Chief Justice Taylor of North Carolina, in his decision in the case of the State _vs._ Reed, in 1823, Hawkes' N.C. Reps. 454, says, "a law of _paramount obligation to the statute_, was violated by the offence--COMMON LAW founded upon the law of nature, and confirmed by revelation." The legislation of the United States abounds in recognitions of the principles of the common law, a.s.serting their paramount binding power.

Sparing details, of which our national state papers are full, we ill.u.s.trate by a single instance. It was made a condition of the admission of Louisiana into the Union, that the right of trial by jury should be secured to all her citizens,--the United States government thus employing its power to enlarge the jurisdiction of the common law in this its great representative.

Having shown that the abolition of slavery is within the competency of the law-making power, when unrestricted by const.i.tutional provisions, and that the legislation of Congress over the District is thus unrestricted, its power to abolish slavery there is established.

We argue it further, from the fact, that slavery exists there _now_ by an act of Congress. In the act of 16th July, 1790, Congress accepted portions of territory offered by the states of Maryland and Virginia, and enacted that the laws, as they then were, should continue in force, "until Congress shall otherwise by law provide." Under these laws, adopted by Congress, and in effect re-enacted and made laws of the District, the slaves there are now held.

Is Congress so impotent in its own "exclusive jurisdiction" that it _cannot_ "otherwise by law provide?" If it can say, what _shall_ be considered property, it can say what shall _not_ be considered property.

Suppose a legislature should enact that marriage contracts shall be mere bills of sale, making a husband the proprietor of his wife, as his _bona fide_ property; and suppose husbands should herd their wives in droves for the market as beasts of burden, or for the brothel as victims of l.u.s.t, and then prate about their inviolable legal property, and deny the power of the legislature, which stamped them "property," to undo its own wrong, and secure to wives by law the rights of human beings. Would such cant about "legal rights" be heeded where reason and justice held sway, and where law, based upon fundamental morality, received homage? If a frantic legislature p.r.o.nounces woman a chattel, has it no power, with returning reason, to take back the blasphemy? Is the impious edict irrepealable? Be it, that with legal forms it has stamped wives "wares."

Can no legislation blot out the brand? Must the handwriting of Deity on human nature be expunged for ever? Has law no power to stay the erasing pen, and tear off the scrawled label that covers up the IMAGE OF G.o.d?

II. THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO ABOLISH SLAVERY IN THE DISTRICT HAS BEEN, TILL RECENTLY, UNIVERSALLY CONCEDED.

1. IT HAS BEEN a.s.sUMED BY CONGRESS ITSELF. The following record stands on the journals of the House of Representatives for 1804, p. 225: "On motion made and seconded that the House do come to the following resolution: 'Resolved, That from and after the 4th day of July, 1805, all blacks and people of color that shall be born within the District of Columbia, or whose mothers shall be the property of any person residing within said District, shall be free, the males at the age of ----, and the females at the age of ----. The main question being taken that the house do agree to said motion as originally proposed, it was negatived by a majority of 46.'" Though the motion was lost, it was on the ground of its alleged _inexpediency_ alone. In the debate which preceded the vote, the _power_ of Congress was conceded. In March, 1816, the House of Representatives pa.s.sed the following resolution:--"Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the existence of an inhuman and illegal traffic in slaves, carried on in and through the District of Columbia, and to report whether any and what measures are necessary for _putting a stop to the same_."

On the 9th of January, 1829, the House of Representatives pa.s.sed the following resolution by a vote of 114 to 66: "Resolved, That the Committee on the District of Columbia, be instructed to inquire into the _expediency_ of providing by _law_ for the gradual abolition of slavery within the District, in such manner that the interests of no individual shall be injured thereby." Among those who voted in the affirmative were Messrs. Barney of Md., Armstrong of Va., A.H. Shepperd of N.C., Blair of Tenn., Chilton and Lyon of Ky., Johns of Del., and others from slave states.

2. IT HAS BEES CONCEDED BY COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS, OF THE DISTRICT of COLUMBIA.--In a report of the committee on the District, Jan. 11, 1837, by their chairman, Mr. Powell of Va., there is the following declaration:--"The Congress of the United States, has by the const.i.tution exclusive jurisdiction over the District, and has power upon this subject, (_slavery_,) as upon all other subjects of legislation, to exercise _unlimited discretion_." Reps. of Comms. 2d Sess. 19th Cong. v. iv. No. 43. In December, 1831, the committee on the District, Dr. Doddridge of Va., Chairman, reported, "That until the adjoining states act on the subject, (slavery) it would be (not _unconst.i.tutional_ but) unwise and impolitic, if not unjust, for Congress to interfere." In April, 1836, a special committee on abolition memorials reported the following resolutions by their Chairman, Mr.

Pinckney of South Carolina: "Resolved, That Congress possesses no const.i.tutional authority to interfere in any way with the inst.i.tution of slavery in any of the states of this confederacy."

"Resolved, That Congress _ought not to interfere_ in any way with slavery in the District of Columbia." "Ought not to interfere,"

carefully avoiding the phraseology of the first resolution, and thus in effect conceding the const.i.tutional power. In a widely circulated "Address to the electors of the Charleston District," Mr. Pinkney is thus denounced by his own const.i.tuents: "He has proposed a resolution which is received by the plain common sense of the whole country as a concession that Congress has authority to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia."

3. IT HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY THE CITIZENS OF THE DISTRICT. A pet.i.tion for the gradual abolition of slavery in the District, signed by nearly eleven hundred of its citizens, was presented to Congress, March 24, 1827. Among the signers to this pet.i.tion, were Chief Justice Cranch, Judge Van Ness, Judge Morsel, Prof. J.M. Staughton, and a large number of the most influential inhabitants of the District. Mr. d.i.c.kson, of New York, a.s.serted on the floor of Congress in 1835, that the signers of this pet.i.tion owned more than half of the property in the District. The accuracy of this statement has never been questioned.

THIS POWER HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY GRAND JURIES OF THE DISTRICT. The Grand jury of the county of Alexandria, at the March term, 1802, presented the domestic slave trade as a grievance, and said, "We consider these grievances demanding _legislative_ redress." Jan. 19, 1829, Mr.

Alexander, of Virginia, presented a representation of the grand jury in the city of Was.h.i.+ngton, remonstrating against "any measure for the abolition of slavery within said District, unless accompanied by measures for the removal of the emanc.i.p.ated from the same;" thus, not only conceding the power to emanc.i.p.ate slaves, but affirming an additional power, that of _excluding them when free_. Journal H.R.

1828-9, p. 174.

4. THIS POWER HAS BEEN CONCEDED BY STATE LEGISLATURES. In 1828 the Legislature of Pennsylvania instructed their Senators in Congress "to procure, if practicable, the pa.s.sage of a law to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia." Jan. 28, 1829, the House of a.s.sembly of New-York pa.s.sed a resolution, that their "Senators in Congress be instructed to make every possible exertion to effect the pa.s.sage of a law for the abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia." In February, 1837, the Senate of Ma.s.sachusetts "Resolved, That Congress having exclusive legislation in the District of Columbia, possess the right to abolish slavery and the slave trade therein." The House of Representatives pa.s.sed the following resolution at the same session: "Resolved, That Congress having exclusive legislation in the District of Columbia, possess the right to abolish slavery in said District."

November 1, 1837, the Legislature of Vermont, "Resolved, that Congress have the full power by the const.i.tution to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and in the territories."

May 30, 1836, a committee of the Pennsylvania Legislature reported the following resolution: "Resolved, That Congress does possess the const.i.tutional power, and it is expedient to abolish slavery and the slave trade within the District of Columbia."

In January, 1836, the Legislature of South Carolina "Resolved, That we should consider the abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia as a violation of the rights of the citizens of that District derived from the _implied_ conditions on which that territory was ceded to the General Government." Instead of denying the const.i.tutional power, they virtually admit its existence, by striving to smother it under an _implication_. In February, 1836, the Legislature of North Carolina "Resolved, That, although by the Const.i.tution _all legislative power_ over the District of Columbia is vested in the Congress of the United States, yet we would deprecate any legislative action on the part of that body towards liberating the slaves of that District, as a breach of faith towards those States by whom the territory was originally ceded.

Here is a full concession of the _power_. February 2, 1836, the Virginia Legislature pa.s.sed unanimously the following resolution: "Resolved, by the General a.s.sembly of Virginia, that the following article be proposed to the several states of this Union, and to Congress, as an amendment of the Const.i.tution of the United States: "The powers of Congress shall not be so construed as to authorize the pa.s.sage of any law for the emanc.i.p.ation of slaves in the District of Columbia, without the consent of the individual proprietors thereof, unless by the sanction of the Legislatures of Virginia and Maryland, and under such conditions as they shall by law prescribe."