The Anti-Slavery Examiner Volume II Part 3

In the debate, at the same session, May 13th, 1789, on the pet.i.tion of the society of Friends respecting the slave trade, Mr. Parker, of Virginia, said, "He hoped Congress would do all that lay in their power _to restore to human nature its inherent privileges_. The inconsistency in our principles, with which we are justly charged _should be done away_."

Mr. Jackson, of Georgia, said, "IT WAS THE FAs.h.i.+ON OF THE DAY TO FAVOR THE LIBERTY OF THE SLAVES. * * * * * Will Virginia set her negroes free? _When this practice comes to be tried, then the sound of liberty will lose those charms which make it grateful to the ravished ear_."

Mr. Madison of Virginia,--"The dictates of humanity, the principles of the people, the national safety and happiness, and prudent policy, require it of us. * * * * * * * I conceive the const.i.tution in this particular was formed in order that the Government, whilst it was restrained from laying a total prohibition, might be able to _give some testimony of the sense of America_, with respect to the African trade. * * * * * * It is to be hoped, that by expressing a national disapprobation of this trade, we may destroy it, and save ourselves from reproaches, AND OUR PROSPERITY THE IMBECILITY EVER ATTENDANT ON A COUNTRY FILLED WITH SLAVES."

Mr. Gerry, of Ma.s.sachusetts, said, "he highly commended the part the Society of Friends had taken; it was the cause of humanity they had interested themselves in."--Cong. Reg. v. 1, p. 308-12.

A writer in the "Gazette of the Unites States," Feb. 20th, 1790, (then the government paper,) who opposes the abolition of slavery, and avows himself a _slaveholder_, says, "I have seen in the papers accounts of _large a.s.sociations_, and applications to Government for _the abolition of slavery_. Religion, humanity, and the generosity natural to a free people, are the _n.o.ble principles which dictate those measures_. SUCH MOTIVES COMMAND RESPECT, AND ARE ABOVE ANY EULOGIUM WORDS CAN BESTOW."

In the convention that formed the const.i.tution of Kentucky in 1790, the effort to prohibit slavery was nearly successful. A decided majority of that body would undoubtedly have voted for its exclusion, but for the great efforts and influence of two large slaveholders--men of commanding talents and sway--Messrs. Breckenridge and Nicholas. The following extract from a speech made in that convention by a member of it, Mr.

Rice a native Virginian, is a specimen of the _free discussion_ that prevailed on that "delicate subject." Said Mr. Rice: "I do a man greater injury, when I deprive him of his liberty, than when I deprive him of his property. It is vain for me to plead that I have the sanction of law; for this makes the injury the greater--it arms the community against him, and makes his case desperate. The owners of such slaves then are _licensed robbers_, and not the just proprietors of what they claim. Freeing them is not depriving them of property, but _restoring it to the right owner_. The master is the enemy of the slave; he _has made open war upon him_, AND IS DAILY CARRYING IT ON in unremitted efforts.

Can any one imagine, then, that the slave is indebted to his master, and _bound to serve him?_ Whence can the obligation arise? What is it founded upon? What is my duty to an enemy that is carrying on war against me? I do not deny, but in some circ.u.mstances, it is the duty of the slave to serve; but it is a duty he owes himself, and not his master."

President Edwards, the younger, said, in a sermon preached before the Connecticut Abolition Society, Sept. 15, 1791: "Thirty years ago, scarcely a man in this country thought either the slave trade or the slavery of negroes to be wrong; but now how many and able advocates in private life, in our legislatures, in Congress, have appeared, and have openly and irrefragably pleaded the rights of humanity in this as well as other instances? And if we judge of the future by the past, _within fifty years from this time, it will be as shameful for a man to hold a negro slave, as to be guilty of common robbery or theft_."

In 1794, the General a.s.sembly of the Presbyterian church adopted its "Scripture proofs," notes, and comments. Among these was the following:

"1 Tim. i. 10. The law is made for manstealers. This crime among the Jews exposed the perpetrators of it to capital punishment. Exodus xxi.

16. And the apostle here cla.s.ses them with _sinners of the first rank_.

The word he uses, in its original import comprehends all who are concerned in bringing any of the human race into slavery, or in _retaining_ them in it. _Stealers of men_ are all those who bring off slaves or freemen, and _keep_, sell, or buy them."

In 1794, Dr. Rush declared: "Domestic slavery is repugnant to the principles of Christianity. It prostrates every benevolent and just principle of action in the human heart. It is rebellion against the authority of a common Father. It is a practical denial of the extent and efficacy of the death of a common Saviour. It is an usurpation of the prerogative of the great Sovereign of the universe, who has solemnly claimed an exclusive property in the souls of men."

In 1795, Mr. Fiske, then an officer of Dartmouth College, afterward a Judge in Tennessee, said, in an oration published that year, speaking of slaves: "I steadfastly maintain, that we must bring them to _an equal standing, in point of privileges, with the whites!_ They must enjoy all the rights belonging to human nature."

When the pet.i.tion on the abolition of the slave trade was under discussion in the Congress of '89, Mr. Brown, of North Carolina, said, "The emanc.i.p.ation of the slaves _will be effected_ in time; it ought to be a gradual business, but he hoped that Congress would not _precipitate_ it to the great injury of the southern States." Mr.

Hartley, of Pennsylvania, said, in the same debate, "_He was not a little surprised to hear the cause of slavery advocated in that house_."

WAs.h.i.+NGTON, in a letter to Sir John Sinclair, says, "There are, in Pennsylvania, laws for the gradual abolition of slavery which neither Maryland nor Virginia have at present, but which _nothing is more certain_ than that they _must have_, and at a period NOT REMOTE." In 1782, Virginia pa.s.sed her celebrated manumission act. Within nine years from that time nearly eleven thousand slaves were voluntarily emanc.i.p.ated by their masters. [Judge Tucker's "Dissertation on Slavery,"

p. 72.] In 1787, Maryland pa.s.sed an act legalizing manumission. Mr.

Dorsey, of Maryland, in a speech in Congress, December 27th, 1826, speaking of manumissions under that act, said, that "_The progress of emanc.i.p.ation was astonis.h.i.+ng_, the State became crowded with a free black population."

The celebrated William Pinkney, in a speech before the Maryland House of Delegates, in 1789, on the emanc.i.p.ation of slaves, said, "Sir, by the eternal principles of natural justice, _no master in the state has a right to hold his slave in bandage for a single hour_... Are we apprehensive that these men will become more dangerous by becoming freemen? Are we alarmed, lest by being admitted into the enjoyment of civil rights, they will be inspired with a deadly enmity against the rights of others? Strange, unaccountable paradox! How much more rational would it be, to argue that the natural enemy of the privileges of a freeman, is he who is robbed of them himself!"

Hon. James Campbell, in an address before the Pennsylvania Society of Cincinnati, July 4, 1787, said, "Our separation from Great Britain has extended the empire of _humanity_. The time _is not far distant_ when our sister states, in imitation of our example, _shall turn their va.s.sals into freemen_." The Convention that formed the United States'

const.i.tution being then in session, attended on the delivery of this oration with General Was.h.i.+ngton at their head.

A Baltimore paper of September 8th, 1780, contains the following notice of Major General Gates: "A few days ago pa.s.sed through this town the Hon. General Gates and lady. The General, previous to leaving Virginia, summoned his numerous family of slaves about him, and amidst their tears of affection and grat.i.tude, gave them their FREEDOM."

In 1791, the university of William and Mary, in Virginia, conferred upon Granville Sharpe the degree of Doctor of Laws. Sharpe was at that time the acknowledged head of British abolitionists. His indefatigable exertions, prosecuted for years in the case of Somerset, procured that memorable decision in the Court of King's Bench, which settled the principle that no slave could be held in England. He was most uncompromising in his opposition to slavery, and for twenty years previous he had spoken, written, and accomplished more against it than any man living.

In the "Memoirs of the Revolutionary War in the Southern Department," by Gen. Lee, of Va., Commandant of the Partizan Legion, is the following: "The Const.i.tution of the United States, adopted lately with so much difficulty, has effectually provided against this evil (by importation) after a few years. It is much to be lamented that having done so much in this way, _a provision had not been made for the gradual abolition of slavery_."--pp. 233, 4.

Mr. Tucker, of Virginia, Judge of the Supreme Court of that state, and professor of law in the University of William and Mary, addressed a letter to the General a.s.sembly of that state, in 1796, urging the abolition of slavery, from which the following is an extract. Speaking of the slaves in Virginia, he says: "Should we not, at the time of the revolution, have broken their fetters? Is it not our duty _to embrace the first moment_ of const.i.tutional health and vigor to effectuate so desirable an object, and to remove from us a stigma with which our enemies will never fail to upbraid us, nor our consciences to reproach us?"

Mr. Faulkner, in a speech before the Virginia House of Delegates, Jan.

20, 1832, said: "The idea of a gradual emanc.i.p.ation and removal of the slaves from this commonwealth, is coeval with the declaration of our independence from the British yoke. When Virginia stood sustained in her legislation by the pure and philosophic intellect of Pendleton, by the patriotism of Mason and Lee, by the searching vigor and sagacity of Wythe, and by the all-embracing, all-comprehensive genius of Thomas Jefferson! Sir, it was a committee composed of those five ill.u.s.trious men, who, in 1777, submitted to the general a.s.sembly of this state, then in session, _a plan for the gradual emanc.i.p.ation of the slaves of this commonwealth_."

Hon. Benjamin Watkins Leigh, late United States' senator from Virginia, in his letters to the people of Virginia, in 1832, signed Appomattox, p.

43, says: "I thought, till very lately, that it was known to every body that during the revolution, _and for many years after, the abolition of slavery was a favorite topic with many of our ablest statesmen_, who entertained, with respect, all the schemes which wisdom or ingenuity could suggest for accomplis.h.i.+ng the object. Mr. Wythe, to the day of his death, _was for a simple abolition, considering the objection to color as founded in prejudice_. By degrees, all projects of the kind were abandoned. Mr. Jefferson _retained_ his opinion, and now we have these projects revived."

Governor Barbour, of Virginia, in his speech in the U.S. Senate, on the Missouri question, Jan. 1820, said: "We are asked why has Virginia changed her policy in reference to slavery? That the sentiments of our most distinguished men, for thirty years _entirely corresponded_ with the course which the friends of the restriction (of slavery in Missouri) now advocated; and that the Virginia delegation, one of whom was the late President of the United States, voted for the restriction (of slavery) in the northwestern territory, and that Mr. Jefferson has delineated a gloomy picture of the baneful effects of slavery. When it is recollected that the Notes of Mr. Jefferson were written during the progress of the revolution, it is no matter of surprise that the writer should have imbibed a large portion of that enthusiasm which such an occasion was so well calculated to produce. As to the consent of the Virginia delegation to the restriction in question, whether the result of a disposition to restrain the slave-trade indirectly, or the influence of that enthusiasm to which I have just alluded, * * * * it is not now important to decide. We have witnessed its effects. The liberality of Virginia, or, as the result may prove, her folly, which submitted to, or, if you will, PROPOSED _this measure_ (abolition of slavery in the N.W. territory) has eventuated in effects which speak a monitory lesson. _How is the representation from this quarter on the present question_?"

Mr. Imlay, in his early history of Kentucky, p. 185, says: "We have disgraced the fair face of humanity, and trampled upon the sacred privileges of man, at the very moment that we were exclaiming against the tyranny of your (the English) ministry. But in contending for the birthright of freedom, we have learned to feel _for the bondage of others_, and in the libations we offer to the G.o.ddess of liberty, we contemplate an _emanc.i.p.ation of the slaves of this country_, as honorable to themselves as it will be glorious to us."

In the debate in Congress, Jan. 20, 1806, on Mr. Sloan's motion to lay a tax on the importation of slaves, Mr. Clark of Va. said: "He was no advocate for a system of slavery." Mr. Marion, of S. Carolina, said: "He never had purchased, nor should he ever purchase a slave." Mr. Southard said: "Not revenue, but an expression of the _national sentiment_ is the princ.i.p.al object." Mr. Smilie--"I rejoice that the word (slave) is not in the const.i.tution; its not being there does honor to the worthies who would not suffer it to become a _part_ of it." Mr. Alston, of N.

Carolina--"In two years we shall have the power to prohibit the trade altogether. Then this House will be unanimous. No one will object to our exercising our full const.i.tutional powers." National Intelligencer, Jan. 24, 1806.

These witnesses need no vouchers to ent.i.tle them to credit; nor their testimony comments to make it intelligible--their _names_ are their _endorsers_, and their strong words their own interpreters. We waive all comments. Our readers are of age. Whosoever hath ears to _hear_, let him HEAR. And whosoever will not hear the fathers of the revolution, the founders of the government, its chief magistrates, judges, legislators and sages, who dared and perilled all under the burdens, and in the heat of the day that tried men's souls--then "neither will he be persuaded though THEY rose from the dead."

Some of the points established by this testimony are--The universal expectation that Congress, state legislatures, seminaries of learning, churches, ministers of religion, and public sentiment widely embodied in abolition societies, would act against slavery, calling forth the moral sense of the nation, and creating a power of opinion that would abolish the system throughout the Union. In a word, that free speech and a free press would be wielded against it without ceasing and without restriction. Full well did the South know, not only that the national government would probably legislate against slavery wherever the const.i.tution placed it within its reach, but she knew also that Congress had already marked out the line of national policy to be pursued on the subject--had committed itself before the world to a course of action against slavery, wherever she could move upon it without encountering a conflicting jurisdiction--that the nation had established by solemn ordinance a memorable precedent for subsequent action, by abolis.h.i.+ng slavery in the northwest territory, and by declaring that it should never thenceforward exist there; and this too, as soon as by cession of Virginia and other states, the territory came under congressional control. The South knew also that the sixth article in the ordinance prohibiting slavery, was first proposed by the largest slaveholding state in the confederacy--that in the Congress of '84, Mr. Jefferson, as chairman of the committee on the N.W. territory, reported a resolution abolis.h.i.+ng slavery there--that the chairman of the committee that reported the ordinance of '87 was also a slaveholder--that the ordinance was enacted by Congress during the session of the convention that formed the United States' Const.i.tution--that the provisions of the ordinance were, both while in prospect and when under discussion, matters of universal notoriety and _approval_ with all parties, and when finally pa.s.sed, received the vote of _every member of Congress from each of the slaveholding states_. The South also had every reason for believing that the first Congress under the const.i.tution would _ratify_ that ordinance--as it did unanimously.

A crowd of reflections, suggested by the preceding testimony, presses for utterance. The right of pet.i.tion ravished and trampled by its const.i.tutional guardians, and insult and defiance hurled in the faces of the SOVEREIGN PEOPLE while calmly remonstrating _with their_ SERVANTS for violence committed on the nation's charter and their own dearest rights! Added to this "the right of peaceably a.s.sembling" violently wrested--the rights of minorities, _rights_ no longer--free speech struck dumb--free _men_ outlawed and murdered--free presses cast into the streets and their fragments strewed with shoutings, or flourished in triumph before the gaze of approving crowds as proud mementos of prostrate law! The spirit and power of our fathers, where are they?

Their deep homage always and every where rendered to FREE THOUGHT, with its _inseparable signs--free speech and a free press_--their reverence for justice, liberty, _rights_ and all-pervading law, where are they?

But we turn from these considerations--though the times on which we have fallen, and those toward which we are borne with headlong haste, call for their discussion as with the voices of departing life--and proceed to topics relevant to the argument before us.

The seventh article of the amendments to the const.i.tution is alleged to withhold from Congress the power to abolish slavery in the District. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." All the slaves in the District have been "deprived of liberty" by legislative acts. Now, these legislative acts "depriving"

them "of liberty," were either "due process of law," or they were _not_.

If they _were_, then a legislative act, taking from the master that "property" which is the identical "liberty" previously taken from the slave, would be "due process of law" _also_, and of course a _const.i.tutional_ act; but if the legislative acts "depriving" them of "liberty" were _not_ "due process of law," then the slaves were deprived of liberty _unconst.i.tutionally_, and these acts are _void_. In that case the _const.i.tution emanc.i.p.ates them_.

If the objector reply, by saying that the import of the phrase "due process of law," is _judicial_ process solely, it is granted, and that fact is our rejoinder; for no slave in the District _has_ been deprived of his liberty by "a judicial process," or, in other words, by "due process of law;" consequently, upon the objector's own admission, every slave in the District has been deprived of liberty _unconst.i.tutionally_, and is therefore _free by the const.i.tution_. This is a.s.serted only of the slaves under the "exclusive legislation" of Congress.

The last clause of the article under consideration is quoted for the same purpose: "Nor shall private property he taken for public use without just compensation." Each of the state const.i.tutions has a clause of similar purport. The abolition of slavery in the District by Congress, would not, as we shall presently show; violate this clause either directly or by implication. Granting for argument's sake, that slaves are "private property," and that to emanc.i.p.ate them, would be to "take private property" for "public use," the objector admits the power of Congress to do _this_, provided it will do something _else_, that is, _pay_ for them. Thus, instead of denying the _power_, the objector not only admits, but _affirms_ it, as the ground of the inference that compensation must accompany it. So far from disproving the existence of _one_ power, he a.s.serts the existence of _two_--one, the power to take the slaves from their masters, the other, the power to take the property of the United States to pay for them.

If Congress cannot const.i.tutionally impair the right of private property, or take it without compensation, it cannot const.i.tutionally, _legalize_ the perpetration of such acts, by _others_, nor _protect_ those who commit them. Does the power to rob a man of his earnings, rob the earner of his _right_ to them? Who has a better right to the _product_ than the producer?--to the _interest_, than the owner of the _princ.i.p.al_?--to the hands and arms, than he from whose shoulders they swing?--to the body and soul, than he whose they are? Congress not only impairs but annihilates the right of private property, while it withholds from the slaves of the District their t.i.tle to _themselves_.

What! Congress powerless to protect a man's right to _himself_, when it can make inviolable the right to a _dog_! But, waiving this, I deny that the abolition of slavery in the District would violate this clause. What does the clause prohibit? The "taking" of "private property" for "public use." Suppose Congress should emanc.i.p.ate the slaves in the District, what would it "_take_?" Nothing. What would it _hold_? Nothing. What would it put to "public use?" Nothing. Instead of _taking_ "private property," Congress, by abolis.h.i.+ng slavery, would say "_private property_ shall not be taken; and those who have been robbed of it already, shall be kept out of it no longer; and every man's right to his own body shall be protected." True, Congress may not arbitrarily take property, _as_ property, from one man and give it to another--and in the abolition of slavery no such thing is done. A legislative act changes the _condition_ of the slave--makes him his own _proprietor_, instead of the property of another. It determines a question of _original right_ between two cla.s.ses of persons--doing an act of justice to one, and restraining the other from acts of injustice; or, in other words, preventing one from robbing the other, by granting to the injured party the protection of just and equitable laws.

Congress, by an act of abolition, would change the condition of seven thousand "persons" in the District, but would "take" nothing. To construe this provision so as to enable the citizens of the District to hold as property, and in perpetuity, whatever they please, or to hold it as property in all circ.u.mstances--all necessity, public welfare, and the will and power of the government to the contrary notwithstanding--is a total perversion of its whole _intent_. The _design_ of the provision, was to throw up a barrier against Governmental aggrandizement. The right to "take property" for _State uses_ is one thing;--the right so to adjust the _tenures_ by which property is held, that _each may have his own secured to him_, is another thing, and clearly within the scope of legislation. Besides, if Congress were to "take" the slaves in the District, it would be _adopting_, not abolis.h.i.+ng slavery--becoming a slaveholder itself, instead of requiring others to be such no longer.

The clause in question, prohibits the "taking" of individual property for public use, to be employed or disposed of _as_ property for governmental purposes. Congress, by abolis.h.i.+ng slavery in the District, would do no such thing. It would merely change the _condition_ of that which has been recognized as a qualified property by congressional acts, though previously declared "persons" by the const.i.tution. More than this is done continually by Congress and every other Legislature. Property the most absolute and unqualified, is annihilated by legislative acts.

The embargo and non-intercourse act, levelled at a stroke a forest of s.h.i.+pping, and sunk millions of capital. To say nothing of the power of Congress to take hundreds of millions from the people by direct taxation, who doubts its power to abolish at once the whole tariff system, change the seat of Government, arrest the progress of national works, prohibit any branch of commerce with the Indian tribes or with foreign nations, change the locality of forts, a.r.s.enals, magazines and dock yards; abolish the Post Office system, and the privilege of patents and copyrights? By such acts Congress might, in the exercise of its acknowledged powers, annihilate property to an incalculable amount, and that without becoming liable to claims for compensation.

Finally, this clause prohibits the taking for public use of "_property_." The const.i.tution of the United States does not recognize slaves as "PROPERTY" any where, and it does not recognize them in _any sense_ in the District of Columbia. All allusions to them in the const.i.tution recognize them as "persons." Every reference to them points _solely_ to the element of _personality_; and thus, by the strongest implication, declares that the const.i.tution _knows_ them only as "persons," and _will_ not recognize them in any other light. If they escape into free States, the const.i.tution authorizes their being taken back. But how? Not as the property of an "owner," but as "persons;" and the peculiarity of the expression is a marked recognition of their _personality_--a refusal to recognize them as chattels--"persons _held_ to service." Are _oxen "held_ to service?" That can be affirmed only of _persons_. Again, slaves give political power as "persons." The const.i.tution, in settling the principle of representation, requires their enumeration in the census. How? As property? Then why not include race horses and game c.o.c.ks? Slaves, like other inhabitants, are enumerated as "persons." So by the const.i.tution, the government was pledged to non-interference with "the migration or importation of such _persons_" as the States might think proper to admit until 1808, and authorized the laying of a tax on each "person" so admitted. Further, slaves are recognized as _persons_ by the exaction of their _allegiance_ to the government. For offences against the government slaves are tried as _persons_; as persons they are ent.i.tled to counsel for their defence, to the rules of evidence, and to "due process of law," and as _persons_ they are punished. True, they are loaded with cruel disabilities in courts of law, such as greatly obstruct and often inevitably defeat the ends of justice, yet they are still recognized as _persons_. Even in the legislation of Congress, and in the diplomacy of the general government, notwithstanding the frequent and wide departures from the integrity of the const.i.tution on this subject, slaves are not recognized as _property_ without qualification. Congress has always refused to grant compensation for slaves killed or taken by the enemy, even when these slaves had been impressed into the United States' service. In half a score of cases since the last war, Congress has rejected such applications for compensation. Besides, both in Congressional acts, and in our national diplomacy, slaves and property are not used as convertible terms. When mentioned in treaties and state papers it is in such a way as to distinguish them from mere property, and generally by a recognition of their _personality_. In the invariable recognition of slaves as _persons_, the United States' const.i.tution caught the mantle of the glorious Declaration, and most worthily wears it. It recognizes all human beings as "men," "persons," and thus as "equals." In the original draft of the Declaration, as it came from the hand of Jefferson, it is alleged that Great Britain had "waged a cruel war against _human_ nature itself, violating its most sacred rights of life and liberty in the persons of a distant people, carrying them into slavery, * * determined to keep up a market where MEN should be bought and sold,"--thus disdaining to make the charter of freedom a warrant for the arrest of _men_, that they might be shorn both of liberty and humanity.

The celebrated Roger Sherman, one of the committee of five appointed to draft the Declaration of Independence, and a member of the convention that formed the United States' const.i.tution, said, in the first Congress after its adoption: "The const.i.tution _does not consider these persons, (slaves,) as a species of property_."--[Lloyd's Cong. Reg. v. 1, p.

313.] That the United States' Const.i.tution does not make slaves "property," is shown in the fact, that no person, either as a citizen of the United States, or by having his domicile within the United States'

government, can hold slaves. He can hold them only by deriving his power from _state_ laws, or from the laws of Congress, if he hold slaves within the District. But no person resident within the United States'

jurisdiction, and _not_ within the District, nor within a state whose laws support slavery, nor "held to service" under the laws of such a state or district, having escaped therefrom, _can be held as a slave_.

Men can hold _property_ under the United States' government though residing beyond the bounds of any state, district, or territory. An inhabitant of the Iowa Territory can hold property there under the laws of the United States, but he cannot hold _slaves_ there under the United States' laws, nor by virtue of the United States' Const.i.tution, nor upon the ground of his United States' citizens.h.i.+p, nor by having his domicile within the United States' jurisdiction. The const.i.tution no where recognizes the right to "slave property," _but merely the fact that the states have jurisdiction each in its own limits, and that there are certain "persons" within their jurisdictions "held to service" by their own laws_.

Finally, in the clause under consideration "private property" is not to be taken "without just compensation." "JUST!" If justice is to be appealed to in determining the _amount_ of compensation, let her determine the _grounds_ also. If it be her province to say _how much_ compensation is "just," it is hers to say whether _any_ is "just,"--whether the slave is "just" property _at all_, rather than a "_person_". Then, if justice adjudges the slave to be "private property," it adjudges him to be _his own_ property, since the right to one's self is the first right--the source of all others--the original stock by which they are acc.u.mulated--the princ.i.p.al, of which they are the interest. And since the slave's "private property" has been "taken,"

and since "compensation" is impossible--there being no _equivalent_ for one's self--the least that can be done is to restore to him his original private property.

Having shown that in abolis.h.i.+ng slavery, "property" would not be "taken for public use," it may be added that, in those states where slavery has been abolished by law, no claim for compensation has been allowed.

Indeed the manifest absurdity of demanding it seems to have quite forestalled the _setting up_ of such a claim.

The abolition of slavery in the District instead of being a legislative anomaly, would proceed upon the principles of every day legislation. It has been shown already, that the United States' Const.i.tution does not recognize slaves as "property." Yet ordinary legislation is full of precedents, showing that even _absolute_ property is in many respects wholly subject to legislation. The repeal of the law of entailments--all those acts that control the alienation of property, its disposal by will, its pa.s.sing to heirs by descent, with the question, who shall be heirs, and what shall be the rule of distribution among them, or whether property shall be transmitted at all by descent, rather than escheat to the estate--these, with statutes of limitation, and various other cla.s.ses of legislative acts, serve to ill.u.s.trate the acknowledged scope of the law-making power, even where property _is in every sense absolute_. Persons whose property is thus affected by public laws, receive from the government no compensation for their losses; unless the state has been put in possession of the property taken from them.

The preamble of the United States' Const.i.tution declares it to be a fundamental object of the organization of the government "to ESTABLISH JUSTICE." Has Congress _no power_ to do that for which it was made the depository of power? CANNOT the United States' Government fulfil the purpose for which it was brought into being?