Elements of Debating Part 13

A fourth cause of evils is that of state interference in purely local affairs.

In the United States the city may not act except where authorized expressly and especially by the state. In Europe the city may do anything it is not forbidden to do, and munic.i.p.al success there is based on this greater freedom. The European city, though subject to general state law, makes its own local laws, not in conflict with, but in addition to, state law. But in the United States the state legislature, accustomed to interfere in matters of interest to the state government, failed to distinguish between such matters and those of exclusive interest to the cities themselves. To ill.u.s.trate: The Cleveland Munic.i.p.al a.s.sociation reported in 1900 that legislators from an outside county had introduced radical changes in almost every department of their city government. In Ma.s.sachusetts the police, water works, and park systems are directly under the state, and the only part the cities have is to pay the bills. In Pennsylvania for thirty-one years the state kept upon the statute books an act imposing upon Philadelphia a self-perpetuating commission, appointed without reference to the city's wishes, and with all power to erect a city hall and levy taxes to collect the twenty-million-dollar cost.

State and national political parties, controlling the legislature, have meddled in the private affairs of the city, resulting in the decay of the city council and the destruction of the local autonomy.

Professor Goodnow says that under these conditions a scientific solution of the vexed question of munic.i.p.al organization has been impossible.

The remedy lies in restoring to the city its proper field of legislation. Already thirty states have pa.s.sed const.i.tutional amendments granting greater legislative powers to the cities. Five states now allow cities to amend their own charters. But in direct opposition to this movement for munic.i.p.al home rule, the commission form takes the last step in the destruction of the city's legislative body and fosters continued state interference. President Eliot says that the functions of the commissioners will be defined and enumerated by the state.

Now, Honorable Judges, the basic principle of city government the world over is division of functions. It is the principle that the commission form attempts to annihilate. But we have pointed out the real causes of munic.i.p.al evils and have shown they are to be remedied without tampering with the fundamental principles which time and experience have shown to be correct in every instance of successful city organization. The Affirmative say: change the fundamental principle; all changes in form and other remedies are insufficient. The Negative say: retain the principle of distinct legislative and administrative bodies, but observe a proper correlation between them which is done in countless instances as we have shown. We would remedy bad social and economic conditions, introduce better business methods, and, most important of all, give the city greater freedom in powers of local self-government.

Mr. Clyde Robbins, the second speaker of the Affirmative, said:

It should be understood at the outset that the Affirmative desire all the local self-government for American cities that the Negative can induce the state legislatures to give them. But just what is home rule for cities? It is simply granting additional functions to the city by the state legislature. The only possible way home rule can affect the question under discussion is a consideration of which form of government is best suited to perform additional functions granted by the government. We maintain that the commission form can do this better because, first, it furnishes superior legislation, and second, it furnishes superior administration.

The gentleman blandly a.s.sumes that the commission form is fundamentally wrong, because it fails to provide a separate legislative body as do the governments of the state and nation. An isolated legislative body is desirable for state and national governments. Is that a reason for applying it to city government?

Here, social, economic, and political conditions are entirely different from those of either state or nation. The city is not a sovereign body. Its powers are exclusively those delegated to it by the state legislature. They are confined wholly to matters of local concern. Furthermore, we do not deny the legislative functions of the city, nor does the plan we advocate contemplate the destruction of the city's legislative body. It simply means that in place of the present notoriously inefficient, isolated council, we establish a commission council composed of the heads of the various administrative departments. The question at issue is not whether we shall have a city council, either system provides for that; but whether a commission council, or an isolated council will furnish better ordinances. We are contending that the commission council must furnish superior measures, because in the making of city ordinances there are at least three great essentials for which this commission council alone makes adequate provision.

First the legislative and administrative work of the city must be unalterably connected;

Second, the councilmen must have a direct and technical knowledge of the city affairs;

Third, the councilman must be representative of the whole city.

Consider, first, how the legislative and administrative work are connected. State and national legislation are general in their nature and scope. The extent of territory, and the variety in local needs have naturally created a separate law-making body. But in the city such conditions do not exist. The legislative acts of the council are specific in their nature. The very name reveals their distinctive character. They are ordinances as distinguished from other laws, and are designed to meet a particular kind of administration. The specific act and the particular administration of it go hand in hand. Hence, satisfactory measures can be enacted only when they come from the hands of a commission council.

President Eliot recognized this fact when he said that the work of the city council is not concerned with far-reaching policies of legislation. There is no occasion for two or even one separate legislative body. Dr. Albert Shaw writes, that so indistinguishably blended are the legislative and administrative departments of the city, that it is impossible to separate one from the other.

Second, a commission council is more effective because it furnishes a direct and technical knowledge of city affairs. An investigation in Des Moines showed that out of 370 acts performed by the council, 32 were granting of saloon licenses and similar permits; 338 concerned matters demanding technical knowledge. To have a street paved, shall one body legislate; a second group administer; and a third pa.s.s upon the validity of the whole thing? Rather the councilmen should know good paving; they should know how to draw up and enforce a business contract. These are the vital necessities.

The commission council secures such results. Its members.h.i.+p is comparatively small. Its sessions are held daily. Its members have a direct knowledge of the city's needs for each one serves as the head of a department. Satisfactory legislation then becomes a mere business proposition. It is but carrying forward the work of each commissioner, for successful administration is impossible without competent legislation. Hence, a city commissioner would no more think of pa.s.sing improper legislation than a bank director would think of advising unsound loans.

The Cedar Rapids commission met to legislate on replacing an old bridge. The commissioner of public safety told in what respects the old structure was unsafe. The commissioner of public property knew how much land the city owned ab.u.t.ting the bridge. The commissioner of streets explained what alterations should be made in the approaches, and the commissioner of finance knew in just what way the city could best pay for the improvement. Honorable Judges, such men are in a position to legislate with thoroughness. They are a commission council, the very nature of which makes it inevitable that they act with intelligence and efficiency.

Contrast now, the commission council with the isolated council. Here we find positively no co-ordination between the legislative and administrative branches, while a century of experience with the scheme of checks and balances has proved conclusively that it can not prevent munic.i.p.al corruption. Moreover, legislation by the isolated council is not only chaotic in form but it is irresponsible, while in the case of the commission council the very fact that the head of each department possesses necessary information not only secures adequate legislation but fixes with certainty the entire responsibility.

The isolated council is a large and unwieldy body. Each member of it has his own private occupation. Without special preparation of any kind he attends council not oftener than once a week. Intelligent action under such conditions is simply impossible. The only way this council has of securing reliable information is from the heads of the administrative departments. But even then responsibility is still divided between the legislative and administrative branches.

This deplorable state of affairs has been synchronous with the growth of the isolated council in America.

Is it any wonder that the old Des Moines council voted to construct a bridge only to find when the work was completed that the city did not even own the approaches, or that the old Cedar Rapids council let a similar contract at an exorbitantly high price, only to find, when the work was completed, that the contract called for no protecting wings or abutments, and the city was compelled to spend many thousands of dollars additional in order to make the structure safe? Such nonsensical legislation is a direct result of the isolated council. It fails to provide information essential to intelligent action. It does not permit a proper co-ordination of departments so vitally necessary in successful city government.

Lastly, city legislation demands unbiased representation. In this respect a commission council is superior to an isolated council.

In the commission council each member represents the entire city.

Hence, there is no incentive to favor one ward at the expense of another. In fact, any such an attempt could result only in disaster to the commissioner himself. Furthermore, each commissioner is held individually responsible for his department. Consequently he is forced to insist upon an impartial representation of the entire city. This is well ill.u.s.trated by the present situation in New York City. The Bureau of Munic.i.p.al Research, admittedly the most practical organization of its kind in the country, is conducting its work along the line of effective competency in city departments. As a result of its investigations, the citizens of New York have been forced to the conclusion to which my colleague has already referred, namely, that the ultimate solution of their munic.i.p.al difficulties will be reached only when they have disposed of their present inefficient and useless ward council and created in its place a commission council.

Under the isolated council a member is elected to represent a certain section of the city. He must do this, no matter what may be the effect upon the rest of the city. For example, in legislating on the annual budget, each ward boss brings pressure to bear upon his own councilman to have certain levies reduced, and to secure stipulated appropriations for his own ward. In New York City last spring, Bird S. Coler, representing a part of Brooklyn, blocked every appropriation until he secured certain selfish measures for his own district. What is true of New York is an annual occurrence in practically every other ward-ruled American city.

Furthermore, councilmen from one ward are shamefully unresponsive to the needs and desires of citizens in other wards. Just this summer the council of Duluth, Minn., granted saloon licenses for a ward in which 90 per cent of its citizens signed a written protest against such action. The councilmen representing that district were helpless to prevent the legislation and the citizens themselves had no recourse whatsoever. The grand jury in St. Louis reported that the wards of that city were an actual menace to decency and good government.

With these instances before us it is well to remember that the scheme of ward representation is a necessary part of the practical operation of the separation of powers in government. This is exemplified in our national, state, and city organizations. In fact, the princ.i.p.al reason for an isolated legislative body is that the sentiments of the different localities may be expressed in legislation. The practical result is that 95 per cent of our city governments are based upon ward representation, nor can an instance be cited in all American political theory which shows the creation of a successful political organization based upon an isolated legislative body in which there has not been an accompanying representation by territorial districts. This principle is always the same no matter whether it be a congressional district of the national government or a ward of the city government. Hence, it is for this principle that the gentlemen must contend if they wish to argue for an isolated council in city government.

In conclusion, Honorable Judges, a commission council is superior to an isolated council, because the work of city legislation and administration must be unalterably connected; because the councilmen must have a direct and technical knowledge of city affairs; and, because the councilmen must be representative of the whole city.

Mr. Vincent Starzinger, the second speaker on the Negative, said:

The Affirmative continue to direct their attack against the "old form." Yet my colleague has suggested substantial changes in present city organization, changes which have brought about success wherever tried. Moreover, we wish to make it clear that we are not necessarily standing for a division of power. There may be separately const.i.tuted departments of government, one primarily for administration, the other primarily for legislation, yet a concentration of authority in one of them, as in the case under the cabinet system of Europe. The gentlemen of the opposition are advocating not only a concentration of power, but a fusion of functions as well. Their commission is at once the executive cabinet and the legislative body.

We have heard much about the practical working of the new plan. Upon this matter, the Negative shall have a few words to say before the close of the debate. But granting for the sake of argument that the commission form has operated with some degree of success in a few small towns, especially when compared with the admitted inefficient machinery of government in vogue before its adoption and when favored by an aroused civic interest, nevertheless, it does not follow that it is adapted to the needs of the typical American city.

There, administration is a matter of great complexity and of vital importance. Boston has pay-rolls including 12,000 and annual expenditure of $40,000,000. Successful administration under such conditions has necessitated the growth of city departments. The heads of the various departments const.i.tute an executive cabinet.

Under the commission form, this cabinet is established by popular election and made the single governmental body for the performance of both the legislative and the administrative functions.

Such a fusion of functions must necessarily result: in poor administration; in the sacrifice of legislation; and in the ultimate destruction of local self-government.

Consider the problem of administration.

An efficient cabinet cannot, as a rule, be secured by popular election. Men who possess the ability to direct a city department acquire such capacity only after years of preparation, and such men will not endure the uncertainties of a career dependent upon the favor of the public. The commissioner of finance who understands the intricate problems of accounting will not coddle the people to insure his election. Popular judgment, no matter how enlightened, cannot be entrusted with the selection of such men. The old board system proves this conclusively. Here, the choosing of the heads of the important city departments was placed in the hands of the people. The system stands condemned.

A commission form makes the additional blunder of uniting completely the two functions of legislation and administration in the same body. This makes the commissioners representative in character. But this condition is disastrous to successful administration. Whenever the people desire even the slightest change in their local policy, the stability and continuity of the city departments must be upset.

Representation is secured at the expense of efficiency.

Administration becomes saturated with politics.

Again, Honorable Judges, the management of a city should be subjected to the criticism and control of a reviewing body. Both the welfare of the people and the interests of good administration demand it. Administrators, no matter how valuable their technical knowledge, make poor legislators. Being interested in their work, they very naturally exalt and magnify their departments. Just a few years ago, the city of Cleveland found it necessary to take even the preparation of the budget from the heads of the departments concerned and to place it with a board which could view with impartiality the demands of the various department chiefs. Think of turning over all the functions of a city like St. Louis to an executive cabinet without even the oversight or criticism of an impartial body.

And, Honorable Judges, the whole experience of government proves the absolute necessity for a separate legislative department. Look where you will, and in each case there is an executive cabinet, based upon appointment, untrammelled by the burdens of legislation, and subjected to the criticism and control of a reviewing body. In Europe, the city councils are elected by the people, and the administrative departments are made up through a process of selection and appointment, together with the a.s.surance of reasonable permanence of tenure, responsibility, and adequate support. Likewise in America, the larger cities are already organizing their cabinets upon a somewhat similar basis. The six largest cities of New York, all of the cities of Indiana, Boston, Chicago, Baltimore, and many others are securing their important administrative officials through appointment by the mayor. This is the general plan advocated by the National Munic.i.p.al League. It centers responsibility for the administration in one man. On the other hand, some of the cities of Canada follow more closely to the German system. There the cabinet is selected by a representative council. In practically all of these instances, men of special ability have been obtained, the departments of administration have been properly correlated, responsibility has been concentrated, and the general principle, that successful administration depends upon a separately const.i.tuted legislative body, has been firmly established.

It is plain then that a commission form violates the fundamental principles of successful administration. It first attempts to secure a cabinet by popular vote. It then upsets the stability of the city departments by completely uniting both the legislative and the administrative functions. Finally, it destroys the responsibility of that prime essential of successful administration, namely, a proper reviewing body.

In the second place, Honorable Judges, the permanent adoption of a commission form must necessarily mean a sacrifice of legislation and the ultimate destruction of local self-government. Even though the city may be subordinate to the state, nevertheless, it has a broad field of independent action. Otherwise, why give it a separate personality and a separate organization? Cities are permitted to exercise vast powers of police and of taxation. It is idle to say that a few commissioners can give satisfactory legislation. They cannot represent community interests. Their executive functions will naturally bias their judgment. Moreover, each commissioner, knowing little of the needs of the other departments, will naturally take the word of its administrative head, especially since he desires the same freedom. This was actually the case in Sacramento, Cal., where the commission plan was tried for fifteen years and given up as an abject failure. Says the Hon. Clinton White of that city: "In almost every instance, the board soon came to the understanding that each man was to be let alone in the management of the department a.s.signed to him. This resulted in there being in fact no tribunals exercising a supervisory power over the executive of a particular department."

Honorable Judges, a reviewing and legislative body is indispensable in city government and a commission makes no such provision. Weak in administration, wholly lacking in matters of legislation, dangerous as a theory of government, it cannot help but result in the complete subjection of local government to the state. The inevitable result of its permanent adoption will be that the important local legislative functions will become a mere administrative board with discretionary power as in the case of Was.h.i.+ngton, D.C. In the words of Professor Goodnow: "The destruction of the city council has not destroyed council government. It has simply made local policy a matter of state legislative determination." If we wish to destroy the life of the city, make it impotent to discharge the functions for which it was organized, then, and then only, it might be feasible to place over it a commission.

But, Honorable Judges, authorities are agreed that cities must be allowed greater freedom of action in local affairs, that munic.i.p.al home rule is indispensable. The governments of our large cities have been dominated to such an extent by the state legislatures, usually partisan and irresponsible to the locality concerned, that in many cases self-government has become a term, hollow and without meaning.

The gentlemen condemn the city council, yet they pa.s.s over the real cause for its decay. Restore to the city its proper legislative powers, confine the work of the council to legislation instead of allowing it to go into details of administration, reduce the number of councilmen, if necessary, adjust the method of representation, introduce needed electoral and primary reform, establish responsibility by means of uniform munic.i.p.al accounting and publicity of proceedings, and we ask the gentlemen in all earnestness why American city councils will not take on new life just as the city councils of every other country have done in the past.

The two great problems of American city government are: first, administration; secondly, munic.i.p.al home rule. The solution of both depends upon the existence of two separately const.i.tuted departments of government. This principle is being emphasized by the leading scholars of political science, as ill.u.s.trated by the program of the National Munic.i.p.al League. In fact, Honorable Judges, every deep-seated reform in our large cities for the past quarter of a century has tended toward this cardinal doctrine of munic.i.p.al success. The Ohio Munic.i.p.al Code Commission, after two years of careful study and observation, presented a bill based upon the principles which we defend tonight, namely, a separation of administration from legislation, and secondly, munic.i.p.al home rule.

In direct opposition to this, the gentlemen present and advocate as a permanent scheme for the organization of American cities, both large and small, a commission form, a quasi-legislative and administrative board patterned to give mediocrity in the performance of both functions, success in neither; a form which destroys forever the possibility of developing an efficient executive cabinet and is entirely out of harmony with the advancing idea of munic.i.p.al home rule.

Mr. George Luxford, the third speaker on the Affirmative, said:

It has been made very clear by my colleagues that the present shameful condition of many of our American cities is due in large measure to the peculiar form of the government patterned after a scheme which is adapted to a sovereign government like the state or nation. The Negative demand an isolation which history shows, so far as our American cities are concerned, leads to a complete confusion of functions, with a consequent loss of responsibility. Knowing the inadequacy of the scheme they then demanded munic.i.p.al home rule; but we have shown that the Affirmative are thoroughly committed to munic.i.p.al home rule which under the commission form alone can be safely intrusted to cities. State interference in city government is the child of the form of government for which our friends of the Negative are sponsors. Thus far the gentlemen have failed to disprove the points which we have presented that the theory of checks and balances when applied to American cities has failed; that the plan of concentrating munic.i.p.al authority under one head as advocated by the commission plan is in complete harmony with modern industrial and social development, and that the plan is superior from a legislative standpoint. It shall be my purpose to show that it is superior from the standpoint of administration. We believe this because the commission lends itself to the application of business methods. The plan provides for a comparatively small body of men who meet in daily session and who give their whole time to the work of governing the city. At present, too often the real business of the officials is anything else. They give their spare time to the city and we have seen the results. Honorable judges, we claim that there is a special virtue in the very smallness of the number inasmuch as they are properly paid, devote all their time to their work, and are made in fact governors of the city. They have a great deal of work to do and they do it, while under our present systems the councilmen have comparatively little to do and they fail to do that little efficiently.

The reason why this small body can administer with dispatch and efficiency is seen at a glance. Each commissioner is the head of a department for which he is personally responsible. He is not hindered as is the executive at present by an inefficient and meddling council which has more power, often, than the executive himself. He knows the laws for he has helped to make them. It is his business to see that they are executed, and if they are not, he cannot escape blame. He cannot plead ignorance, lack of responsibility, or lack of power as do present administrative officers.

Moreover, this body is admirably const.i.tuted for effective carrying out of city business. It is larger than the single headed executive and possesses, therefore, a division of work which makes the administration far more effective. At the same time it is smaller than the old council and for that reason is more efficient in enacting the city's peculiar kind of legislation. In actual practice, and that seems to be the real test of city government, both administration and legislation are accomplished with accuracy and dispatch. For instance, every spring for the last decade carloads of "dagoes" with their dirt and disease have come to Cedar Rapids. Every year protests have gone up to both mayor and council, but without result. Cedar Rapids has adopted a commission form of government. Last spring when the "dagoes" came the same complaints went up as usual, that because of their insanitary methods these people carried with them filth and disease. But the pet.i.tioners did not go to the city council which met once in two weeks, nor were they referred to a committee which met less often. They went directly to the commissioners who had charge of the city health and in less than twenty-four hours the "dagoes" had been notified to either clean up or leave, and they left the city. But, say the opponents of this plan, this could have been done under the old system. To be sure, but the burning fact remains that in spite of the protests of the people, it was not done.

In Houston the government was both inefficient and dishonest. For years the annual expenditures had exceeded the income a hundred thousand dollars. The city adopted a commission form and a four hundred thousand dollar floating debt was paid off in one year out of the ordinary income of the city. At the same time the city's taxes were reduced ten per cent. In the health department alone there is a saving of from $100 to $150 per month, while a combination in the operation of the garbage crematory and pumping station saves the city $6,000 annually. These results have been accomplished under a commission plan by the application of common, everyday business principles.