US Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933-1991 Part 13

87 Bell, Diplomacy of Detente, pp. 489.

88 Nixon Project, Whitman Papers, box 9, US Moscow Emba.s.sy to Secretary of State, 27 May 1972.

89 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1133.

90 Nixon Project, Ezra Solomon Papers, box 5, folder: CIEP Task Force Draft Report, 22 Nov. 1971. Study memo 3 prepared by Robert McLellan, Department of Commerce. See also ibid., folder: CIEP 1, W.De Vier Pierson memo on Task Force Report, 3 Jan. 1972, which indicates that it embodies established view of the Commerce Department.

91 Kissinger, White House Tears, p. 1134.

92 Hersh, Price of Power, p. 348. Nixon Project, Ezra Solomon Papers, box 5, CIEP Task Force Draft Report, 22 Nov. 1971, De Vier Pierson memo on Task Force Report, 3 Jan. 1972. Secretary of State Rogers suggested that Lend-Lease should be linked to trade and that Willis Armstrong, a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, be put in overall charge of negotiations. In the margin, in longhand, the word 'no' was underlined, several times, in response to these suggestions, ibid., Flanigan Papers, box 10, folder: President's Moscow visit April 1970June 1972 (2), Roger's to Nixon, 10 March 1972 responding to NSDM-151/CIEP-6.

93 Ibid., undated paper 'Pre-Moscow Visit' prepared by CIEP and Kissinger.

94 Ibid., Flanigan memo for the files, subject US-USSR negotiations, 29 March 1972.

95 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1134.

96 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 97.

97 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 11512. Hersh, Price of Power, pp. 5314, 563, convincingly argues that by this time Kissinger must have known of the severe Russian crop failure in the winter of 1971/2, despite denials in his memoirs. Hersh then argues that the possibility of grain sales was used to try to retrieve the situation announced in the May 1971 SALT breakthrough, when the Americans had not included SLBM or modernisation (i.e. MIRVing of ICBMs) in the vague commitment that an ABM treaty would go forward with negotiations about restrictions on offensive weapons. But, of course, if this were the case, matters would have been very sensitive because of the commitments to a grain sale and other trade liberalisa-tions, which had already secretly been given by the Americans. In fact, the argument in this study suggests that those commitments were by no means as clear and definite as Hersh contends and also that the evidence for grain playing such a key role in the post-May 1971 SALT talks is flimsy.

98 Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 1152.

99 Nixon Project, Peter Flanigan Papers, box 10, folder: President's Moscow Visit April 1970June 1972, Flanigan memo for the files, subject US-USSR negotiations, 29 March 1972. In May 1972 Connally resigned and was succeeded by George Shultz.

100 Nixon Project, WHSF WHCF CF, box 9, folder: CO 158 USSR 197174, Flanigan to Nixon, 26 April 1972, Status of Commercial Negotiations with the Russians Preparatory to Moscow Visit.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.

104 Ibid.

105 Nixon, Memoirs, p. 595.

106 One persuasive reason why the Soviets did not want to lose the summit was the fear of adverse consequences that this might have had on detente with West Germany; Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, pp. 1589.

107 Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1202.

108 Nixon Project, box 17, folder: FG 620 CIEP, 197174, Flanigan to Haldeman, 13 April 1972.

109 WHSF WHCF CF box 9, folder: CO 158 USSR 197174, Flanigan to Haig, 12 June 1973.

110 WHCF CO box 72, folder: [EX] CO 158, 5/11/725/3/72, Peterson to Kissinger re discussion with Patolichev, 17 May 1972.

111 Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence: Moscow's Amba.s.sador to America's Six Cold War Presidents 19621986 (Times Books, New York, 1995), p. 253.

112 Hersh, Price of Power, p. 531, quoting source, Joseph Alsop, A View of the Summit', Was.h.i.+ngton Post, 24 May 1972.

113 Clayton Yeutter of the Campaign to Re-elect the President identified the adverse effects of the grain deal, along with early worries about Watergate, as the only two adverse factors in public opinion. Nixon Project, Whitacker papers, box 22, Folder: USDA-Russia Wheat Deal, Yeutter to Whitacker, 4 Oct. 1972.

114 Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, p. 307, suggests that Kissinger concluded the final terms for Lend-Lease during his September trip to Moscow. In the light of Dobrynin's memoirs, In Confidence, p. 253, it looks as if this is inaccurate, at least insofar as the financial terms had been agreed by Kosygin and Nixon in May.

Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Little Brown, Boston, 1982), p. 249, credits Peterson with negotiating Lend-Lease.

115 WHSF WHCF CF box 9, folder: CO 158 USSR 197174, 14 Oct. memo re conclusion of Maritime Agreement reports Nixon: 'We are grateful that the Soviets are so understanding of our position-and we will make it worth your while in the years ahead.'

116 Porter, Presidential Decision Making, p. 128.

117 Nixon Project, Flanigan Papers, box 10, folder: Presidential Meetings Agenda and Briefs Memos to file April 1971July 1974, Flanigan memo 18 Oct. 1972.

118 Ibid., WHCF CO box 73, folder. [EX] CO 158 9/1/729/30/72, Flanigan to Kissinger, 20 Sept. 1972.

119 Both Jentleson and Elliott show that the Nixon Administration made positive moves towards energy trade with the Soviets soon after the 1972 summit, and at the June 1973 US-USSR summit Nixon urged US firms to push ahead with this trade. However, it was the Yom Kippur War, when the Soviets, despite their ties with radical Arab states, supplied the USA with $76.2 million of oil in 1973, up from $7.5 million the previous year, and the October 1973 OPEC price hike that pushed the Americans into closer co-operation for alternative oil supplies from the Soviets. Also, such supplies now did not appear so costly. Substantial contracts were signed, but the 1975 rejection of the US-USSR trade agreement by the Soviets then pushed away the Americans and landed the bulk of Soviet energy contracts on the tables of European and j.a.panese companies. This was to cause problems in the 1980s. See Bruce W.Jentleson, 'From Consensus to Conflict: The Domestic Political Economy of East-West Trade', International Organization, 38 (4), 1984, pp. 62560; Steven Elliott, 'The Distribution of Power and the US Politics of East-West Energy Trade', in Bertsch (ed.), Controlling East-West Trade.

120 Nixon Project, WHSF WHCF CF, box 9, folder: CO 158 USSR 197174, Richard K.Cook to W.H.Timmons, 19 April 1973: see also ibid., Haig to Colson, 12 Sept. 1972, and Larry Brady to Flanigan, 22 Sept. 1972.

121 Ibid., box 21, folder FG 311, Legislative Leaders.h.i.+p Meetings, 197173, Flanigan to Nixon via Haig, 24 Oct. 1973.

122 Ibid, box 61, folder: TA Trade 197174, memo by Kissinger for Nixon, meeting with Secretaries Shultz and Kissinger, 3 Dec. 1973.

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid.

125 Stern, Water's Edge, p. 94. And see Stern generally for the fullest account of the domestic political opposition to MFN and detente in general.

126 Schlesinger took over from Elliot Richardson as Secretary of Defense in 1973, shortly after he had taken over from Laird.

127 Litwak, Detente and the Nixon Doctrine, pp. 15669.

9 Ford and Carter: the decline of detente and the approach of the second Cold War 19749 1 Gerald R.Ford, A Time to Heal: The Autobiography of Gerald R.Ford (W.H.Alien, London, 1979), p. 346.

2 Samuel P.Huntington, 'Trade, Technology, and Leverage: Economic Diplomacy', Foreign Policy, 32 (fall), 1978, pp. 6380, at p. 71.

3 Reading Ford's memoirs, A Time to Heal, clearly ill.u.s.trates the central concern he had with the economic difficulties that afflicted the USA.

4 Crockatt, Fifty Years War, p. 254.

5 Ford, Time to Heal, p. 128.

6 According to British Prime Minister, James Callaghan, after the Bonn Summit, these meetings deteriorated into 'media events', James Callaghan, Time and Chance (Collins, London, 1987), p. 497.

7 For these, other figures about the US economy and the general impact of the oil crises of 19734 and 1978, see Spero and Hart, Politics of International Economic Relations.

8 President Ford, August 1974, Presidential Doc.u.ments vol. 10, p. 1033, General Services Administration, US National Archives, cited from David Howard Davis, 'Energy Policy and the Ford Administration: The First Year', in David A.Caputo (ed.), The Politics of Policy Making in America (H.Freeman, San Francisco, 1977), p. 39. 9 Gerald R.Ford Library (hereafter Ford Lib.), Papers of William Seidman, box 53, folder: CIEP (6), Evers to Parker, 17 Dec. 1975.

10 Ford, Time to Heal, p. 128.

11 Albert Wohlstetter, 'Is there a Strategic Arms Race' and 'Rivals But No Race', Foreign Policy, (15) 1974, pp. 320, and (16) 1974, pp. 4881.

12 Paul Nitze, a.s.suring Strategic Stability in An Era of Detente', Foreign Affairs, (54) 1976, pp. 20732. 13 Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 622. 14 Bell, Diplomacy of Detente, p. 213. For Ford's account see Time to Heal, pp. 297 15 For contrasting views of this see Ford, Time to Heal, pp. 32230; Isaacson, Kissinger, 66972; Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, pp. 4401; and W.G.Hyland, Mortal Rivals: Superpower Relations From Nixon to Reagan (Random House, New York, 1987), pp. 14855.

16 Peter G.Boyle, American-Soviet Relations: From the Russian Revolution to the Fall of Communism (Routledge, London, 1993), pp. 1845. Boyle provides a clear chronological account of US-Soviet relations for the uninitiated.

17 Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 161. 18 Ibid.19 Ford, Time to Heal, p. 358.

20 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 369.

21 S.J.Ball, The Cold War, 19471991 (Arnold, London, 1998) has some good general points to make about the Ford presidency and its foreign policy.

22 Executive Order 11808, 30 September 1974.

23 US 1974 Trade Act, PL 93618, sect. 411.

24 East-West Trade Policy Committee was established 1973. It was succeeded in 1974 by the President's Committee on East-West Trade Policy, and it was from this that new EWFTB was derived. Sometimes the Board was referred to simply as 'the East-West Trade Board'.

25 Seidman, box 55, folder: East-West Foreign Trade Board 1, meetings 28 Jan, and 18 March 1975, Evans to Dunn re working group meetings, 24 Jan. and 17 March 1975.

26 Seidman, box 318, folder: International Economic Summit 6/2728/76, Briefing Papers, East-West Economic Relations.

27 Michael Mastanduno, 'The Management of Alliance Export Control Policy', in Bertsch, Controlling East-West Trade; Shahid Alan, 'Russia and Western Technology Control', International Relations, 11 (5), 1993, pp. 46991.

28 Stern, Water's Edge, p. 146, quoting J.F.ter Horst, Ford's press secretary as source.

29 Isaacson, Kissinger, p. 616; and Ford, Time to Heal, p. 139.

30 Text is quoted from Stern, Water's Edge, pp. 1699. Other details of this episode can be found in Isaacson, Kissinger, Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation; Hyland, Mortal Rivals; and Kissinger, Years of Upheaval 31 Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 337.

32 Daniel Yergin, 'Politics and Soviet-American Trade: The Three Questions', Foreign Affairs, 55, 1977, pp. 51738, at p. 532.

33 Seidman, box 55, folder: East-West Trade Board 1, subject Working Group Meeting 20 May 1975. See also ibid., 2, Parsky to members of EWFTB and EWFTB meeting 11 July 1975, Summary Record.

34 He was certainly enamoured by this idea by July, Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 125.

35 Seidman, box 57, folder: EPB CIEP full Board meetings, record 15 May 1975 of the 14 May meeting; ibid., box 72, folder: International Economic Policy Review 1975(2), Simon and Seidman to Ford, 27 May 1975.

36 Ibid., box 55, folder: East-West Trade Board 2, Parsky to members of EWFTB distributing 'Possible Legislative Changes to Normalize East-West Trade', 3 June 1975.

37 Ibid., W.J.Casey to members of EWFTB, 16 June 1975.

38 Ford Lib., Papers of James E.Connor, box 36, folder: June 1975 (2), Connor for the record, 25 June 1975; Seidman, box 55, folder: East-West Trade Board 2, Ford to Ullman, 27 June 1975.

39 Ibid., Meeting 11 July 1975, Summary Record.

40 Ibid., box 53, folder: CIEP (5), East-West Trade Board working group, 13 Aug. 1975, Evans for Seidman and Dunn, 'Report on Economic Aspects of the President's Trip to Helsinki'. As we shall see in the next section, however, the idea of a grain for oil deal was discussed. This was not mentioned in the report.

41 Ibid., folder: CIEP (6), Evans to Dunn, subject East-West trade, 12 Sept. 1975.

42 Ibid., folder: CIEP (8), Summary Status Report, International Economic Policy Issues, 12 March 1976.

43 For this section, I have drawn liberally from Porter, Presidential Decision Making, ch. 5.

44 Ford Lib. box 56, folder: East-West Trade Comptroller General's Report 1. Summary Statement: the Government's Role in East-West Trade Problems and Issues.

45 Porter, Presidential Decision Making, p. 128.

46 Robert Paarlberg, Director of Economics, Department of Agriculture, has written that George Meany, the President of the AFL-CIO, negotiated the suspension with Dunlop and the CEA, but it would appear that there were other grounds for imposing the suspension and a wider responsibility involved: Robert L.Paarlberg, 'Using Food Power: Opportunities, Appearances, and Damage Control', in Miroslav Nincic and Peter Wallensteen (eds) Dilemmas of Economic Coercion: Sanctions in World Politics (Praeger, New York, 1983), p. 141.

47 Ibid., p. 127.

48 Ibid., p. 128.

49 Hyland, Mortal Rivals, p. 125.

50 Porter, Presidential Decision Making, p. 130.

51 Ibid., p. 131.

52 Ibid., p. 142.

53 Ibid., p. 144.

54 Ibid., p. 155.

55 Murphy Commission Report on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (GAO, Was.h.i.+ngton DC, June 1975); The Government's Role in East-West Trade-Problems and Issues (GAO, Was.h.i.+ngton DC, 4 Feb. 1976).

56 Seidman box 53, folder: CIEP (4), Dunn to Executive Committee EPB, 3 July 1975, 'Highlights from Murphy Commission on the Organisation of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy', ch. 5, made recommendations about foreign economic policy. See also Porter, Presidential Decision Making, p. 56.

57 Quoted from Long, US Export Control Policy, p. 63, citing source J.Kenneth Fasick, Director International Division of GAO, in Senate Hearings, 1976, pp. 35.

58 Seidman box 56, folder: East-West Trade Comptroller General's Report 1, 'Summary Statement: The Government's Role in East-West Trade-Problems and Issues'.

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid., folder: EWFTB Background Material, July 1976, undated Executive Summary.

61 Ibid., folder: East-West Trade Comptroller Generals Report 1, Summary Statement: The Government's Role in East-West Trade-Problems and Issues.

62 Ibid., box 55, folder: EWFTB 2, 11 July 1975 meeting.

63 Ibid., box 56, folder: EWFTB 3, Long to Simon, 18 September 1975, and Parsky to members of the EWFTB 30 Sept. 1975, and ibid., box 53, folder: CIEP 6, Evers to economic policy making staff EWFTB, 12 Dec. 1975.

64 Ford Lib., WHCF, box 209 FG409, folder: East-West Trade Board 8/9/741/5/75, 3 Jan. 1976, Executive Order 11894. On 1 October the Secretary of Labor and the NSA were also added to full members.h.i.+p of the Board, ibid., box 210, FG 409, folder: FG 409/A.

65 Defense Science Task Force on Export of US Technology, An a.n.a.lysis of Export Control of US Technology-A Department of Defense Perspective (Was.h.i.+ngton DC, 4 Feb. 1976).