US Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933-1991 Part 16

11 Boudreau, 'Economic Sanctions', at p. 29.

12 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, pp. 289.

13 Johan Galtung, 'On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions: With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia', in Nincic and Wallensteen, Dilemmas of Economic Coercion, p. 19.

14 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, pp. 356.

15 Hufbauer and Schott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered.

16 Diane B.Kunz, 'When Money Counts and Doesn't: Economic Power and Diplomatic Objectives', Diplomatic History, 1994, 18 (4), pp. 45163.

17 Holsti, International Politics, p. 241.

18 Deese, in Nincic and Wallensteen, Dilemmas of Economic Coercion.

19 Rodman, Sanctions Beyond Borders.

20 The terminology of instrumental and expressive sanctions is Galtung's, from 'Effects of International Economic Sanctions', in Nincic and Wallensteen, Dilemmas of Economic Coercion. One notion of success in cases of sanctions, which has been used in this narrative, makes sense in terms of the reasoning of the actors who impose the sanctions. They are the ones who know what was intended. It is they who might change their expectations and goals over time, and who are in a position meaningfully to a.s.sess the results of the sanctions that they have imposed. One might see this, in the terms of Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, as a criterion of success drawn from inside understanding. The main problem of definition is from the external perspective, in its ambition to generalise, because it is difficult to establish a fixed criterion that captures the nature of success in sanctioning in different cases.

21 Ibid., p. 48.

22 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, p. 98.

23 Hegemonic decline is caused by the hegemon shouldering the costs of sustaining the system while others free-ride at its expense and improve their relative position in the system's hierarchy of power. See Kindleberger, World in Depression, and for further discussion and references Dobson, USA, Britain and the Question of Hegemony; on MNCs see Spero and Hart, Politics of International Economic Relations.

24 Kenneth A.Rodman, 'Multinational Corporations, and US Economic Sanctions Since the Pipeline Case', International Organization, 1995, 49 (i), pp. 10539; he develops this argument more elaborately and focuses on extraterritorial sanctions in his Sanctions Beyond Borders.

25 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, p. 218.

26 Martin, Coercive Cooperation, p. 240; Mastanduno in Economic Containment, p. 9, comes to a similar conclusion: 'This examination of the Western export control regime finds no simple causal relations.h.i.+p between the relative power of the United States and the maintenance of effective cooperation in CoCom. Although relative power matters, other factors-the interests of non-hegemonic states and the leaders.h.i.+p capacity of the United States-emerge as critical to determining the nature of cooperation.'

27 Nincic and Wallensteen, Dilemmas of Economic Coercion, p. 3.

28 Holsti, International Politics, p. 288.

29 Baldwin does not require this distinction, because he insists that economic statecraft only involves economic instruments, and thus he excludes strategic bombing of economic targets and naval blockades from the scope of economic warfare. Baldwin's ideas are discussed at greater length below.

30 Paul Einzig, Economic Warfare (Macmillan, London, 1941), p. 3.

31 Mastanduno, Economic Containment, p. 13, see also Sch.e.l.ling, International Economics, p. 488.

32 Tor Egil F0rland, 'Economic Warfare and Strategic Goods: A Conceptual Framework for a.n.a.lyzing COCOM', Journal of Peace Research, 28 (ii), 1991, pp. 191204; Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (Basic Books, New York, 1975). I also have had the benefit of being allowed to see Frland's, sadly unpublished, doctoral thesis, 'Cold Economic Warfare', from which I have greatly benefited. Developing the idea of cold economic warfare is an important theme in my argument here.

33 Quoted from Frland, 'Economic Warfare', pp. 199, 200; Michael Mastanduno, 'Strategies of Economic Containment: US Trade Relations with the Soviet Union', World Politics, 1985, 37 (iv), pp. 50331, citing pp. 509 and 51213.

34 A CFEP task force under chairmans.h.i.+p of Thorsten V.Kalijarvi, Deputy a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs reported in July 1955 that: 'The relative economic advantage of any East-West trade is greater for the Soviet bloc than for the Free World.' There is good reason to believe that this judgement was different to the US position in the early Cold War, when Western Europe was reconstructing its economy and needed many things from the non-dollar market of Eastern Europe. Also, Eisenhower was 'confident that the West has skill in trading such that a net advantage would probably lie with them', FRUS, 195557, vol. x, pp. 243, 338, memo Kalijarvi to Hoover 12 July 1955, and memo of conversation at the White House, 18 April 1956. Such divergent judgements were possible because the evidence was never conclusive.

35 HST Lib., PSF box 220, folder NSC Meetings, folder: memo for Presidential Meeting Discussions, notes on 12th meeting NSC, 3 June 1948.

36 CAB 128/27, 3(54)5, 18 Jan. 1954; Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain, the US and the Recognition of Communist China', Historical Journal, 26 (i), 1983, pp. 13958.

37 Frland, Economic Warfare, and Michael Mastanduno, 'Strategies of Economic Containment' and Economic Containment.

38 See the discussions about the sale of a steel blooming mill to Yugoslavia: HST Lib., Acheson Papers, box 64, folder: April 1949, memo of conversation between Defense Secretary Johnson, Under Secretary of Commerce Whitney, Secretary of State Acheson and their a.s.sistants, 21 July 1949.

39 As noted before, Baldwin avoids the need to distinguish between economic warfare and cold economic warfare by restricting the tools of economic warfare to economic instruments. However, it seems strange to exclude naval blockades (and, to a lesser extent, strategic bombing), when for most people these have traditionally encapsulated what is meant by economic warfare.

40 Wu, Economic Warfare; Sch.e.l.ling, International Economics.

41 Harold D.La.s.swell, World Politics Faces Economics (McGraw Hill, New York, 1945), p. 9.

42 Power as an explanatory concept appears to me to be somewhat nebulous, unless it is used in an ex post facto descriptive sense. By this I mean that it is not possible to go from a.s.sessing potential power to predicting actual outcomes: if it were, then how could one explain the outcome of the Vietnam conflict? If the reply to this is that I am failing to give weight to the subjective element of power, will-power, resolve, and so on, then this simply makes the case for me, for we are then in the realm of reasoning and reason-giving explanation, not a theoretical, conceptual explanation cast at a higher level of generalisation than reason-giving. The problem with power is partly to do with the fact that we know that some situations result from the successful application of power, but to jump from that to invoking power theory to explain that outcome is circular or tauto-logical. Thus power theory as explanation, seems to be reduced to something like the following. The question of why the Americans lost in Vietnam is answered by the observation that they did not apply sufficient power. The question of why they prevailed in the Gulf War is answered by the observation that they applied sufficient power. This is hardly an adequate form of explanation. However, this is not to deny the fact that notions of power are used by policy-makers; they are-but bedded in practical reasoning in attempts to apply means to achieving ends, not to produce explanations. Whether such means succeed and why can be accounted for in a reason-giving historical narrative, but not, I fear, by power theory. I am grateful to my long-standing mentor and friend Charles Reynolds for prompting some of these thoughts, though I take full responsibility for the formulation of the actual argument here.

43 Baldwin, Economic Statecraft, p. 25.

44 Dobson, 'Kennedy Administration'.

45 Baldwin, Economic Warfare., pp. 21415.

46 This appears to be the view of Philip Hanson, Western Economic Statecraft, pp. 8 9. 47 Baldwin, Economic Warfare, p. 224. 48 Hanson, Western Economic Statecraft, pp. 89, drawing on Peter J.D.Wiles, Communist International Economics (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1968).

49 Ibid.

50 A good example of this is the US grain embargo imposed by the Carter Administration in order to punish the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan. In the first few months of its operation it hurt the Soviets economically. Thereafter, alternative sources of supply (notably from Argentina), combined with a good Soviet harvest in 1980, meant that the embargo then cost the USA more than it cost the Soviet Union, but it was continued for political reasons. See Carter Lib., Staff Offices: Counsel Cutler box 77, folder: Grain memo 3/80. Memo for the President, 'Suspension of Grain Exports to the USSR', 25 March 1980.

12 Concluding thoughts 1 On 17 January 1917 British Intelligence intercepted a telegram from German Foreign Minister, Arthur Zimmermann, to the German amba.s.sador in Mexico, suggesting a war alliance against the USA. Once the war was won, Mexico could retake all the territory lost to the USA in the Mexican War of the 1840s. This telegram was pa.s.sed on by the British to the USA.

2 William Doyle, Inside the Oval Office: The White House Tapes from FDR to Clinton (London House, London, 1999), pp. 312.