History of Dogma Volume II Part 20

[Footnote 521: See Iren, II. 26. 1, 13. 4: "Sic et in reliquis omnibus nulli similis erit omnium pater hominum pusillitati: et dicitur quidem secundum haec propter delectionem, sent.i.tur autem super haec secundum magnitudinem." Irenaeus expressly says that G.o.d cannot be known as regards his greatness, i.e. absolutely, but that he can be known as regards his love, IV. 20. 1: "Igitur secundum magnitudem non est cognoscere deum, impossibile est enim mensurari patrem; secundum autem dilectionem eius--haec est enim quae nos per verb.u.m eius perducit ad deum--obedientes ei semper discimus quoniam est tantus deus etc."; in IV. 20. 4 the knowledge of G.o.d "secundum dilectionem" is more closely defined by the words "per verb.u.m eius Iesum Christum." The statements in ---- 5 and 6 are, however, specially important: they who are pure in heart will see G.o.d. G.o.d's omnipotence and goodness remove the impossibility of man knowing him. Man comes to know him gradually, in proportion as he is revealed and through love, until he beholds him in a state of perfection. He must be in G.o.d in order to know G.o.d: [Greek: hosper hoi blepontes to phos entos eisi tou photos kai tes lamprotetos autou metechousin, houtos hoi blepontes ton Theon entos eisi tou Theou, metechontes autou tes lamprotetos. Kai dia touto ho ach.o.r.etos kai akataleptos kai aoratos horomenon heauton ... tois pistois pareschen, hina zoopoiese tous chorountas kai blepontas auton dia pisteos]. See also what follows down to the words: [Greek: metoche Theou esti to ginoskein Theon kai apolauein tes chrestotetos autou], et homines igitur videbunt deum, ut vivant, per visionem immortales facti et pertingentes usque in deum. Sentences of this kind where rationalism is neutralised by mysticism we seek for in Tertullian in vain.]

[Footnote 522: See Iren., IV. 6. 4: [Greek: Edidaxen hemas ho kurios, hoti Theon eidenai oudeis dunatai, me ouchi Theou didaxantos, toutestin, aneu Theou me ginoskesthai ton Theon; auto de to ginoskesthai ton Theon thelema einai tou patros, Gnosontai gar auton hois an apokalupse ho huios].]

[Footnote 523: Iren. II. 6. 1, 9. 1, 27. 2: III. 25. 1: "Providentiam habet deus omnium propter hoc et consilium dat: consilium autem dans adest his, qui morum providentiam habent. Necesse est igitur ea quae providentur et gubernantur cognoscere suum directorem; quae quidem non sunt irrationalia neque vana, sed habent sensibilitatem perceptam de providentia dei. Et propter hoc ethnicorum quidam, qui minus illecebris ac voluptatibus servierunt, et non in tantum superst.i.tione idolorum coabducti sunt, providentia eius moti licet tenuiter, tamen conversi sunt, ut dicererit fabricatorem huiuss universitatis patrem omnium providentem et disponentem secundum nos mundum." Tertull., de testim.

animae; Apolog. 17.]

[Footnote 524: See Iren., IV. 6. 2; Tertull., adv. Marc. I, II.]

[Footnote 525: See Iren., V. 26. 2.]

[Footnote 526: See Iren., II. 1. I and the Hymn II. 30. 9.]

[Footnote 527: See Iren., III. 8. 3. Very pregnant are Irenaeus'

utterances in II. 34. 4 and II. 30. 9: "Princ.i.p.ari enim debet in omnibus et dominari voluntas dei, reliqua autem omnia huic cedere et subdita esse et in servitium dedita" ... "substantia omnium voluntas dei;" see also the fragment V. in Harvey, Iren., Opp. II. p. 477 sq. Because everything originates with G.o.d and the existence of eternal metaphysical contrasts is therefore impossible the following proposition (IV. 2, 4), which is proved from the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, holds, good: "ex una substantia esse omnia, id est Abraham et Moysem et prophetas, etiam ipsum dominum."]

[Footnote 528: See Iren. II. 28. 4, 5: IV. 11. 2.]

[Footnote 529: Tertullian also makes the same demand (e.g. adv. Marc.

II. 27); for his a.s.sertion "deum corpus esse" (adv. Prax. 7: "Quis enim negabil, deum corpus esse, etsi deus spiritus est? spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie") must be compared with his realistic doctrine of the soul (de anima 6) as well as with the proposition formulated in de carne 11: "omne quod est, corpus est sui generis; nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est." Tertullian here followed a principle of Stoic philosophy, and in this case by no means wished to teach that the Deity has a human form, since he recognised that man's likeness to G.o.d consists merely in his spiritual qualities. On the contrary _Melito_ ascribed to G.o.d a corporeal existence of a higher type (Eusebius mentions a work of this bishop under the t.i.tle "[Greek: ho peri ensomatou Theou logos],") and Origen reckoned him among the teachers who recognised that man had also a likeness to G.o.d in form (in body); see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1. 2, pp. 243, 248. In the second century the realistic eschatological ideas no doubt continued to foster in wide circles the popular idea that G.o.d had a form and a kind of corporeal existence. A middle position between these ideas and that of Tertullian and the Stoics seems to have been taken up by Lactantius (_Inst.i.t. div._ VII. 9, 21; de ira dei 2. 18.).]

[Footnote 530: See Iren., III. 25. 2; Tertull., adv. Marc. I. 23-28: II.

11 sq. Hippolytus briefly defined his doctrine of G.o.d in Phil. X. 32.

The advance beyond the Apologists' idea of G.o.d consists not only in the thorough discussion of G.o.d's attributes of goodness and righteousness, but also in the view, which is now much more vigorously worked out, that the Almighty Creator has no other purpose in his world than the salvation of mankind. See the 10th Greek fragment of Irenaeus (Harvey, II. p. 480); Tertull., de orat. 4: "Summa est voluntatis dei salus eorum, quos adoptavit"; de paenit. 2: "Bonorum dei unus est t.i.tulus, salus hominum"; adv. Marc. II. 27: "Nihil tam dignum deo quam salus hominis." They had here undeniably learned from Marcion; see adv. Marc.

I. 17. In the first chapters of the work de orat., however, in which Tertullian expounds the Lord's Prayer, he succeeded in unfolding the meaning of the Gospel in a way such as was never possible for him elsewhere. The like remark may be made of Origen's work de orat., and, in general, in the case of most authors who interpreted the Lord's Prayer in the succeeding period. This prayer kept alive the knowledge of the deepest meaning of the Gospel.]

[Footnote 531: Apol. 21: "Necesse et igitur pauca de Christo ut deo ...

Jam ediximus deum universitatem hanc mundi verbo et ratione et virtute molitum. Apud vestros quoque sapientes [Greek: Logon], id est sermonem et rationem, constat artificem videri universitatis." (An appeal to Zeno and Cleanthes follows). "Et nos autem sermoni atque rationi itemque virtuti, per quae omnia molitum deum ediximus, propriam substantiam spiritum inscribimus, cui et sermo insit p.r.o.nuntianti et ratio adsit disponenti et virtus praesit perficienti. Hunc ex deo prolatum didicimus et prolatione generatum et idcirco filium dei et deum dictum ex unitate substantiae, nam et deus spiritus (that is, the antemundane Logos is the Son of G.o.d). Et c.u.m radius ex sole porrigitur, portio ex summa; sed sol erit in radio, quia solis est radius nec separatur substantia sed extenditur (cf. adv. Prax. 8). Ita de spiritu spiritus et deo deus ut lumen de lumine accensum. Manet integra et indefecta materiae matrix, etsi plures inde traduces qualitatis mutueris: ita et quod de deo profectum est, deus est et dei filius et unus ambo. Ita et de spiritu spiritus et de deo deus modulo alternum numerum, gradu non statu fecit, et a matrice non necessit sed excessit. Iste igitur dei radius, ut retro semper praedicabatur, delapsus in virginem quandam et in utero eius caro figuratus nascitur h.o.m.o deo mixtus. Caro spiritu instructa nutritur, adolescit, adfatur, docet, operatur et Christus est." Tertullian adds: "Recipite interim hanc fabulam, similis est vestris." As a matter of fact the heathen must have viewed this statement as a philosophical speculation with a mythological conclusion. It is very instructive to ascertain that in Hippolytus' book against Noetus "the setting forth of the truth" (c. 10 ff.) he begins with the proposition: [Greek: Theos eboulethe kosmon ktisai]. The Logos whose essence and working are described merely went forth to realise this intention.]

[Footnote 532: See Hagemann, Die romische Kirche (1864), p. 172 ff.]

[Footnote 533: See my detailed exposition of the _orthodox_ side of Tertullian's doctrine of the Trinity ("orthodox" in the later sense of the word), in Vol. IV. There it is also shown that these formulae were due to Tertullian's _juristic_ bias. The formulae, "una _substantia_, tres _personae_", never alternates in his case with the others, "una _natura_, tres _personae_"; and so it remained for a long time in the West; they did not speak of "natures" but of "substances" ("nature" in this connection is very rare down to the 5th century). What makes this remarkable is the fact that Tertullian always uses "substance" in the concrete sense "individual substance" and has even expressed himself precisely on the point. He says in de anima 32: "aliud est substantia, aliud natura substantiae; siquidem substantia propria est rei cuiusque, natura vero potest esse communis. Suscipe exemplum: substantia est lapis, ferrum; duritia lapidis et ferri natura substantiae est. Duritia (natura) communicat, substantia discordat. Mollitia lanae, mollitia plumae pariant naturalia eorum, substantiva non pariant ... Et tune naturae similitudo notatur, c.u.m substantiae dissimilitudo conspicitur. Men and animals are similar _natura_, but not _substantia_." We see that Tertullian in so far as he designated Father, Son, and Spirit as one substance expressed their _unity_ as strongly as possible. The only idea intelligible to the majority was a juristic and political notion, viz., that the Father, who is the _tota substantia_, sends forth officials whom he entrusts with the administration of the monarchy. The legal fiction attached to the concept "person" aided in the matter here.]

[Footnote 534: See adv. Prax. 3: "Igitur si et monarchia divina per tot legiones et exercitus angelorum administratur, sicut scriptum est: Milies centies centena milia adsistebant ei, et milies centena milia apparebant ei, nec ideo unius esse desiit, ut desinat monarchia esse, quia per tanta milia virtutum procuratur: quale est ut deus divisionem et dispersionem pati videatur in filio et spiritu sancto, secundum et tertium sort.i.tis loc.u.m, tam consortibus substantiae patris, quam non pat.i.tur in tot angelorum numero?" (!!) c. 4: "Videmus igitur non obesse monarchiae filium, etsi hodie apud filium est, quia et in suo statu est apud filium, et c.u.m suo statu rest.i.tuetur patri a filio." L.c.: "Monarchia in tot nominibus const.i.tuta est, in quot deus voluit."]

[Footnote 535: See Hippol., c. Noetum II. According to these doctrines the unity is sufficiently preserved (1) if the separate persons have one and the same substance, (2) if there is one possessor of the whole substance, _i.e._, if everything proceeds from him. That this is a remnant of polytheism ought not to be disputed.]

[Footnote 536: Adv. Prax. 8: "Hoc si qui putaverit, me [Greek: probolen]

aliquam introducere id est prolationem rei alterius ex altera, quod facit Valentinus, primo quidem dicam tibi, non ideo non utatur et veritas vocabulo isto et re ac censu eius, quia et haeresis ut.i.tur; immo haeresis potius ex veritate accepit quod ad mendacium suum strueret"; cf.

also what follows. Thus far then theologians had got already: "The economy is founded on as many names as G.o.d willed" (c. 4).]

[Footnote 537: See adv. Prax. 5.]

[Footnote 538: Tertull., adv. Hermog. 3: "fuit tempus, c.u.m ei filius non fuit."]

[Footnote 539: Novatian (de trin. 23) distinguishes very decidedly between "factum esse" and "procedere".]

[Footnote 540: Adv. Prax. 2: "Custodiatur [Greek: oikonomias]

sacramentum, quae unitatem in trinitatem disponit, tres dirigens, tres autem non statu, sed gradu, nec substantia, sed forma, nec potestate, sed specie, unius autem substantiae et unius status et potestatis."]

[Footnote 541: See the discussions adv. Prax. 16 ff.]

[Footnote 542: Tertull., adv. Marc. III. 6: "filius portio plenitudinis." In another pa.s.sage Tertullian has ironically remarked in opposition to Marcion (IV. 39): "Nisi Marcion Christum non subiectum patri infert."]

[Footnote 543: Adv. Prax. 9.]

[Footnote 544: See the whole 14th chap. adv. Prax. especially the words: "I am ergo alius erit qui videbatur, quia non potest idem invisibilis definiri qui videbatur, et consequens erit, ut invisibilem patrem intellegamus pro plenitudine maiestatis, visibilem vero filium agnoscamus pro modulo derivationis." One cannot look at the sun itself, but, "toleramus radium eius pro temperatura portionis, quae in terram inde porrigitur." The chapter also shows how the Old Testament theophanies must have given an impetus to the distinction between the Deity as transcendent and the Deity as making himself visible. Adv.

Marc. II. 27: "Quaecunque exigitis deo digna, habebuntur in patre invisibili incongressibilique et placido et, ut ita dixerim, philosophorum deo. Quaecunque autem ut indigna reprehenditis, deputabuntur in filio et viso et audito et congresso, arbitro patris et ministro, miscente in semetipso hominem et deum in virtutibus deum, in pusillitatibus hominem, ut tantum homini conferat quantum deo detrahit."

In adv. Prax. 29 Tertullian showed in very precise terms that the Father is by nature impa.s.sible, but the Son is capable of suffering. Hippolytus does not share this opinion; to him the Logos in himself is likewise [Greek: apathes] (see c. Noetum 15).]

[Footnote 545: According to Tertullian it is certainly an _essential part of the Son's nature_ to appear, teach, and thus come into connection with men; but he neither a.s.serted the necessity of the incarnation apart from the faulty development of mankind, nor can this view be inferred from his premises.]

[Footnote 546: See adv. Prax. 4. the only pa.s.sage, however, containing this idea, which is derived from 1 Cor. XV.]

[Footnote 547: Cf. specially the attempts of Plotinus to reconcile the abstract unity which is conceived as the principle of the universe with the manifoldness and fulness of the real and the particular (Ennead.

lib. III.-V.). Plotinus employs the subsidiary notion [Greek: merismos]

in the same way as Tertullian; see Hagemann l.c. p. 186 f. Plotinus would have agreed with Tertullian's proposition in adv. Marc. III. 15: "Dei nomen quasi naturale divinitatis potest in omnes communicari quibus divinitas vindicatur." Plotinus' idea of hypostasis is also important, and this notion requires exact examination.]

[Footnote 548: Following the baptismal confession, Tertullian merely treated the Holy Ghost according to the scheme of the Logos doctrine without any trace of independent interest. In accordance with this, however, the Spirit possesses his own "numerus"--"tertium numen divinitatis et tertium nomen maiestatis",--and he is a person in the same sense as the Son, to whom, however, he is subordinate, for the subordination is a necessary result of his later origin. See cc. 2, 8: "tertius est spiritus a deo et filio, sicut tertius a radice fructus a frutice, et tertius a fonte rivus a flumine et tertius a sole apex ex radio. Nihil tamen a matrice alienatur a qua proprietates suas ducit.

Ita trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a patre decurrens et monarchiae nihil obstrepit et [Greek: oikonomias] statum protegit"; de pudic. 21. In de praescr. 13 the Spirit in relation to the Son is called "vicaria vis". The element of personality in the Spirit is with Tertullian merely a result arising from logical deduction; see his successor Novatian de trin. 29. Hippolytus did not attribute personality to the Spirit, for he says (adv. Noet. 14): [Greek: Hena Theon ero, prosopa de duo, oikonomia de triten ten charin tou hagiou pneumatos; pater men gar eis, prosopa de duo, hoti kai ho huios, to de triton to hagion pneuma]. In his Logos doctrine apart from the express emphasis he lays on the creatureliness of the Logos (see Philos. X. 33: [Greek: Ei gar Theon se ethelese poiesai ho Theos, edunato; echeis tou logou to paradeigma]) he quite agrees with Tertullian. See ibid.; here the Logos is called before his coming forth "[Greek: endiathetos tou pantos logismos]"; he is produced [Greek: ek ton onton], i.e., from the Father who then alone existed; his essence is "that he bears in himself the will of him who has begotten him" or "that he comprehends in himself the ideas previously conceived by and resting in the Father." Cyprian in no part of his writings took occasion to set forth the Logos doctrine in a didactic way; he simply kept to the formula: "Christus deus et h.o.m.o", and to the Biblical expressions which were understood in the sense of divinity and preexistence; see Testim. II. 1-10. Lactantius was still quite confused in his Trinitarian doctrine and, in particular, conceived the Holy Ghost not as a person but as "sanctificatio" proceeding from the Father or from the Son. On the contrary, Novatian, in his work _de trinitate_ reproduced Tertullian's views. For details see Dorner Entwickelungsgeschichte I. pp. 563-634, Kahnis, Lehre vom heiligen Geiste; Hagemann, l.c., p. 371 ff. It is noteworthy that Tertullian still very frequently called the preexistent Christ _dei spiritus_; see de oral. I: "Dei spiritus et dei sermo et dei ratio, sermo rationis et ratio sermonis et spiritus, utrumque Iesus Christus." Apol. 21: adv.

Prax. 26; adv. Marc. I. 10: III. 6, 16: IV. 21.]

[Footnote 549: See Zahn, Marcellus of Ancyra, pp. 235-244. Duncker, Des heiligen Irenaus Christologie, 1843.]

[Footnote 550: Zahn, l.c., p. 238.]

[Footnote 551: See Iren., II. 13. 8: II. 28. 4-9: II. 12. 2: II. 13. 2, and also the important pa.s.sage II. 29. 3 fin.]

[Footnote 552: A great many pa.s.sages clearly show that Irenaeus decidedly distinguished the Son from the Father, so that it is absolutely incorrect to attribute modalistic ideas to him. See III. 6. 1 and all the other pa.s.sages where Irenaeus refers to the Old Testament theophanies. Such are III. 6. 2: IV. 5. 2 fin.: IV. 7. 4, where the distinction is particularly plain: IV. 17. 6: II. 28. 6.]

[Footnote 553: The Logos (Son) is the administrator and bestower of the divine grace as regards humanity, because he is the revealer of this grace, see IV. 6 (-- 7: "agnitio patris filius, agnitio autem filii in patre et per filium revelata"): IV. 5: IV. 16. 7: IV. 20. 7. He has been the revealer of G.o.d from the beginning and always remains so, III. 16.

6: IV. 13. 4 etc.: he is the antemundane revealer to the angel world, see II. 30. 9: "semper autem coexsistens filius patri, olim et ab initio semper revelat patrem et angelis et archangelis et potestatibus et virtutibus et omnibus, quibus vult revelari deus;" he has always existed with the Father, see II. 30. 9: III. 18. 1: "non tunc coepit filius dei, exsistens semper apud patrem"; IV. 20. 3, 7, 14. 1: II. 25. 3: "non enim infectus es, o h.o.m.o, neque semper coexsistebas deo, sicut proprium eius verb.u.m." The Logos is G.o.d as G.o.d, nay, for us he is G.o.d himself, in so far as his work is the work of G.o.d. Thus, and not in a modalistic sense, we must understand pa.s.sages like II. 30. 9: "fabricator qui fecit mundum per semitipsum, hoc est per verb.u.m et per sapientiam suam," or hymnlike statements such as III. 16. 6: "et hominem ergo in semetipsum recapitulans est, invisibilis visibilis factus, et incomprehensibilis factus comprehensibilis et impa.s.sibilis pa.s.sibilis et verb.u.m h.o.m.o" (see something similar in Ignatius and Melito, Otto, Corp. Apolog. IX, p. 419 sq.). Irenaeus also says in III. 6. 2: "filius est in patre et habet in se patrem," III. 6. 1.: "utrosque dei appellatione signavit spiritus, et eum qui ungitur filium et eum, qui ungit, id est patrem." He not only says that the Son has revealed the Father, but that the Father has revealed the Son (IV. 6. 3: IV. 7. 7). He applies Old Testament pa.s.sages sometimes to Christ, sometimes to G.o.d, and hence in some cases calls the Father the creator, and in others the Son ("pater generis humani verb.u.m dei", IV. 31. 2). Irenaeus (IV. 4. 2) appropriated the expression of an ancient "immensum patrem in filio mensuratum; mensura enim patris filius, quoniam et capit eum." This expression is by no means intended to denote a diminution, but rather to signify the ident.i.ty of Father and Son. In all this Irenaeus adhered to an ancient tradition; but these propositions do not admit of being incorporated with a rational system.]

[Footnote 554: Logos and Sophia are the hands of G.o.d (III. 21. 10: IV.

20): also IV. 6. 6: "Invisibile filii pater, visibile autem patris filius." Judging from this pa.s.sage, it is always doubtful whether Irenaeus, like Tertullian, a.s.sumed that transcendency belonged to the Father in a still higher sense than to the Son, and that the nature of the Son was more adapted for entering the finite than that of the Father (on the contrary see IV. 20. 7 and especially IV. 24. 2: "verb.u.m naturaliter quidem invisibile"). But it ought not to have been denied that there are pa.s.sages, in which Irenaeus hints at a subordination of the Son, and deduces this from his origin. See II. 28. 8 (the knowledge of the Father reaches further than that of the Son and the Father is greater than the Son); III. 6. 1 (the Son _receives_ from the Father the sovereignty); IV. 17. 6 (a very important pa.s.sage: the Father owns the name of Jesus Christ as his, first, because it is the name of his Son, and, secondly, because he gave it himself); V. 18. 21, 3 ("pater conditionem simul et verb.u.m suum portans"--"verb.u.m portatum a patre"--"et sic unus deus pater ostenditur, qui est super omnia et per omnia et in omnibus; super omnia pater quidem et ipse est caput Christi"--"verb.u.m universorum potestatem habet a patre"). "This is not a subordination founded on the nature of the second person, but an inequality that has arisen historically," says Zahn (l.c., p. 241); but it is doubtful whether such a distinction can be imputed to Irenaeus. We have rather simply to recognise the contradiction, which was not felt by Irenaeus because, in his religious belief, he places Christ on a level with G.o.d, but, as a theologian, merely touched on the problem. So also he shows remarkable unconcern as to the proof of the unity of G.o.d in view of the distinction between Father and Son.]

[Footnote 555: Irenaeus very frequently emphasises the idea that the whole economy of G.o.d refers to mankind, see, e.g., I. 10. 3: [Greek: ekdiegeisthai ten pragmateian kai oikonomian tou Theou ten epi te anthropoteti genomenen], IV, 20. 7: "Verb.u.m dispensator paternae gratiae factus est ad utilitatem hominum, propter quos fecit tantas dispositiones." G.o.d became a creator out of goodness and love; see the beautiful expression in IV. 20. 7: "Gloria dei vivens h.o.m.o, vita autem hominis visio dei," or III. 20. 2: "Gloria hominis deus, operationes vero dei et omnis sapientias eius et virtutis receptaculum h.o.m.o." V. 29.

1: "Non h.o.m.o propter conditionem, sed conditio facta est propter hominem."]

[Footnote 556: Irenaeus speaks about the Holy Spirit in numerous pa.s.sages. No doubt he firmly believes in the distinction of the Spirit (Holy Spirit, Spirit of G.o.d, Spirit of the Father, Spirit of the Son, prophetic Spirit, Wisdom) from the Father and Son, and in a particular significance belonging to the Spirit, as these doctrines are found in the _regula_. In general the same attributes as are a.s.signed to the Son are everywhere applicable to him; he was always with the Father before there was any creation (IV. 20. 3; Irenaeus applies Prov. III. 19: VIII.

22 to the Spirit and not to the Son); like the Son he was the instrument and hand of the Father (IV. pref. 4, 20. 1: V. 6. 1.). That Logos and Wisdom are to be distinguished is clear from IV. 20. 1-12 and particularly from -- 12: IV. 7. 4: III. 17. 3 (the host in the parable of the Good Samaritan is the Spirit). Irenaeus also tried by reference to Scripture to distinguish the work of the Spirit from that of the Logos.

Thus in the creation, the guidance of the world, the Old Testament history, the incarnation, the baptism of Jesus, the Logos is the energy, the Spirit is wisdom. He also alluded to a specific ministry of the Spirit in the sphere of the new covenant. The Spirit is the principle of the new knowledge in IV. 33. 1, 7, Spirit of fellows.h.i.+p with G.o.d in V.

I. 1, pledge of immortality in V. 8. 1, Spirit of life in V. 18. 2. But not only does the function of the Spirit remain very obscure for all that, particularly in the incarnation, where Irenaeus was forced by the canon of the New Testament to unite what could not be united (Logos doctrine and descent of the Spirit upon Mary--where, moreover, the whole of the Fathers after Irenaeus launched forth into the most wonderful speculations), but even the personality of the Spirit vanishes with him, e.g., in III. 18. 3: "unguentem patrem et unctum filium et unctionem, qui est spiritus" (on Isaiah LXI. 1); there is also no mention of the Spirit in IV. pref. 4 fin., and IV. 1. 1, though he ought to have been named there. Father, Son, and Spirit, or G.o.d, Logos, and Sophia are frequently conjoined by Irenaeus, but he never uses the formula [Greek: trias], to say nothing of the abstract formulas of Tertullian. In two pa.s.sages (IV. 20. 5: V. 36. 2) Irenaeus unfolded a sublime speculation, which is inconsistent with his usual utterances. In the first pa.s.sage he says that G.o.d has shown himself prophetically through the Spirit (in the Old Testament), then adoptively through the Son, and will finally show himself paternally in the kingdom of heaven; the Spirit prepares man for the Son of G.o.d, the Son leads him to the Father, but the Father confers on him immortality. In the other pa.s.sage he adopts the saying of an old presbyter (Papias?) that we ascend gradually through the Spirit to the Son, and through the Son to the Father, and that in the end the Son will deliver up everything to the Father, and G.o.d will be all in all. It is remarkable that, as in the case of Tertullian (see above), it is 1 Cor.

XV. 23-28 that has produced this speculation. This is another clear proof, that in Irenaeus the equality of Father, Son, and Spirit is not unconditional and that the eternity of Son and Spirit is not absolute.

Here also we plainly perceive that the several disquisitions in Irenaeus were by no means part of a complete system. Thus, in IV. 38. 2, he inverts the relations.h.i.+p and says that we ascend from the Son to the Spirit: [Greek: Kai dia touto Paulos Korinthiois phesi: gala humas epotisa, ou Broma, oude gar edunasthe bastazein; toutesti, ten men kata anthropon parousian tou kuriou ematheteuthete, oudepou de to tou patros pneuma epanapauetai eph' humas dia ten humon astheneian]. Here one of Origen's thoughts appears.]

[Footnote 557: The opinions advanced here are, of course, adumbrations of the ideas about redemption. Noldechen (Zeitschrift fur wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1885, p. 462 ff): "Die Lehre vom ersten Menschen bei den christlichen Lehrern des 2 Jahrhunderts."]

[Footnote 558: Here the whole 38th chapter of the 4th Book is to be examined. The following sentences are perhaps the most important: [Greek: Ei de legei tis ouk edunato ho Theos ap' arches teleion anadeixai ton anthropon, Gnoto, hoti to men Theo, aei kata ta auta onti kai agenneto huparchonti, hos pros heauton, panta dunata; ta de gegonta, katho metepeita geneseos archen idian esche, kata touto kai hustereisthai dei auta tou pepoiekotos; ou gar edunanto agenneta einai ta neosti gegennemena. Katho de me estin agenneta, kata touto kai husterountai tou teleiou. Katho de neotera, kata touto kai nepia, kata touto kai asunethe kai agumnasta pros ten teleian agogen]. The mother can no doubt give strong food to the child at the very beginning, but the child cannot stand it: [Greek: anthropos adunatos labein auto; nepios gar en], see also -- 2-4: "Non ab initio dii facti sumus, sed primo quidem homines, tunc demum dii, quamvis deus secundum simplicitatem bonitatis suae hoc fecerit, nequis eum putet invidiosum aut impraestantem." "Ego," inquit, "dixi, dii estis et filii excelsi omnes, n.o.bis autem potestatem divinitatis baiulare non sustinentibus" ...