History of Dogma Volume II Part 26

See 22 (Lomm. I. p. 43): [Greek: kai makarioi ge hosoi deomenoi tou huiou tou Theou toioutoi gegonasin, hos meketi autou chrazein iatrou tous kakos hechontas therapeuontos, mede poimenos, mede apolutroseos, alla sophias kai logou kai dikaiosunes, he ei ti allo tois dia teleioteta ch.o.r.ein autou ta kallista dunamenois.] Read also c. Cels. II.

66, 69: IV. 15, 18: VI. 68. These pa.s.sages show that the crucified Christ is no longer of any account to the Gnostic, and that he therefore allegorises all the incidents described in the Gospels. Clement, too, really regards Christ as of no importance to Gnostics except as a teacher.]

[Footnote 705: Comment, in Joh. I. 9, Lomm. I. p, 20. The "mysteries" of Christ is the technical term for this theology and, at bottom, for all theology. For, in respect of the form given to it, revelation always appears as a problem that theology has to solve. What is revealed is therefore either to be taken as immediate authority (by the believer) or as a soluble problem. One thing, accordingly, it is not, namely, something in itself evident and intelligible.]

[Footnote 706: See Nitzsch, Dogmengeschichte, p. 136.]

[Footnote 707: To Origen the problem of evil was one of the most important; see Book III. of [Greek: peri archon] and c. Cels. VI. 53-59.

He is convinced (1) that the world is not the work of a second, hostile G.o.d; (2) that virtues and the works arising from them are alone good in the proper sense of the word, and that nothing but the opposite of these is bad; (3) that evil in the proper sense of the word is only evil will (see c. Cels. IV. 66: VI. 54). Accordingly he makes a very decided distinction between that which is bad and evils. As for the latter he admits that they partly originate from G.o.d, in which case they are designed as means of training and punishment. But he saw that this conception is insufficient, both in view of individual pa.s.sages of Holy Scripture and of natural experience. There are evils in the world that can be understood neither as the result of sin nor as means of training.

Here then his relative, rational view of things comes in, even with respect to the power of G.o.d. There are evils which are a necessary consequence of carrying out even the best intentions (c. Cels. VI. 53: [Greek: ta kaka ek parakoloutheseos gegenetai tes pros ta proegoumena]): "Evils, in the strict sense, are not created by G.o.d; yet some, though but few in comparison with the great, well-ordered whole of the world, have of necessity adhered to the objects realised; as the carpenter who executes the plan of a building does not manage without chips and similar rubbish, or as architects cannot be made responsible for the dirty heaps of broken stones and filth one sees at the sites of buildings;" (l.c., c. 55). Celsus also might have written in this strain. The religious, absolute view is here replaced by a rational, and the world is therefore not the best absolutely, but the best possible.

See the Theodicy in [Greek: peri archon] III. 17-22. (Here, and also in other parts, Origen's Theodicy reminds us of that of Leibnitz; see Denis, l.c., p. 626 sq. The two great thinkers have a very great deal in common, because their philosophy was not of a radical kind, but an attempt to give a rational interpretation to tradition.) But "for the great ma.s.s it is sufficient when they are told that evil has not its origin in G.o.d" (IV. 66). The case is similar with that which is really bad. It is sufficient for the mult.i.tude to know that that which is bad springs from the freedom of the creature, and that matter which is inseparable from things mortal is not the source and cause of sin (IV.

66, see also III, 42: [Greek: to kurios miaron apo kakias toiouton esti.

Phusis de somatos ou miara ou gar he phusis somatos esti, to gennetikon tes miarotetos echei ten kakian]); but a closer examination shows that there can be no man without sin (III. 6l) because error is inseparable from growth and because the const.i.tution of man in the flesh makes evil unavoidable (VII. 50). Sinfulness is therefore natural and it is the necessary _prius_. This thought, which is also not foreign to Irenaeus, is developed by Origen with the utmost clearness. He was not content with proving it, however, but in order to justify G.o.d's ways proceeded to the a.s.sumption of a Fall before time began (see below).]

[Footnote 708: See Mehlhorn, Die Lehre von der menschlichen Freiheit nach Origenes (Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. II., p. 234 ff.)]

[Footnote 709: The distinction between Valentinus and Origen consists in the fact that the former makes an aeon or, in other words, a part of the divine _pleroma_, itself fall, and that he does not utilise the idea of freedom. The outline of Origen's system cannot be made out with complete clearness from the work [Greek: peri archon], because he endeavoured to treat each of the first three parts as a whole. Origen's four principles are G.o.d, the World, Freedom, Revelation (Holy Scripture). Each principle, however, is brought into relation with Christ. The first part treats of G.o.d and the spirits, and follows the history of the latter down to their restoration. The second part treats of the world and humanity, and likewise closes with the prospect of the resurrection, punishment in h.e.l.l, and eternal life. Here Origen makes a magnificent attempt to give a conception of bliss and yet to exclude all sensuous joys. The third book treats of sin and redemption, that is, of freedom of will, temptation, the struggle with the powers of evil, internal struggles, the moral aim of the world, and the restoration of all things. A special book on Christ is wanting, for Christ is no "principle"; but the incarnation is treated of in II. 6. The teachers of Valentinus' school accordingly appear more Christian when contrasted with Origen. If we read the great work [Greek: peri archon], or the treatise against Celsus, or the commentaries connectedly, we never cease to wonder how a mind so clear, so sure of the ultimate aim of all knowledge, and occupying such a high standpoint, has admitted in details all possible views down to the most naive myths, and how he on the one hand believes in holy magic, sacramental vehicles and the like, and on the other, in spite of all his rational and even empirical views, betrays no doubt of his abstract creations. But the problem that confronts us in Origen is that presented by his age. This we realise on reading Celsus or Porphyry (see Denis l.c., p. 613: "Toutes les theories d'Origene, meme les plus imaginaires, represent l'etat intellectuel et moral du siecle ou il a paru"). Moreover, Origen is not a teacher who, like Augustine, was in advance of his time, though he no doubt antic.i.p.ated the course of ecclesiastical development. This age, as represented by its greatest men, sought to gain a substructure for something new, not by a critical examination of the old ideas, but by incorporating them all into one whole. People were anxious to have a.s.surance, and, in the endeavour to find this, they were nervous about giving up any article of tradition. The boldness of Origen, judged as a Greek philosopher, lies in his rejection of all polytheistic religions.

This made him all the more conservative in his endeavours to protect and incorporate everything else. This conservatism welded together ecclesiastical Christianity and Greek culture into a system of theology which was indeed completely heterodox.]

[Footnote 710: The proof from prophecy was reckoned by Origen among the articles belonging to faith, but not to Gnosis (see for ex. c. Cels. II.

37); but, like the Apologists, he found it of great value. As far as the philosophers are concerned, Origen always bore in mind the principle expressed in c. Cels. VII. 46: [Greek: pros tauta d'emeis phesomen hoi meletesantes medeni apechthanesthai ton kalos legomenon; kan hoi hexo tes pisteos legousi kalos.] In that same place it is a.s.serted that G.o.d in his love has not only revealed himself to such as entirely consecrate themselves to his service, but also to such as do not know the true adoration and reverence which he requires. But as remarked above, p.

338, Origen's att.i.tude to the Greek philosophers is much more reserved than that of Clement.]

[Footnote 711: See, for ex., c. Cels. VI. 6, Comment in Johann. XIII.

59, Lomm. II., p. 9 sq.]

[Footnote 712: [Greek: Peri archon] preface.]

[Footnote 713: On Origen's exegetical method see Kihn, Theodor v. Mopsu.

p. 20 ff., Bigg, l.c. p. 131 ff. On the distinction between his application of the allegorical method and that of Clement see specially p. 134 f. of the latter work.]

[Footnote 714: Origen noted several such pa.s.sages in the very first chapter of Genesis. Examples are given in Bigg, p. 137 f.]

[Footnote 715: Bigg, l.c., has very appropriately named Origen's allegorism "Biblical alchemy".]

[Footnote 716: To ascertain the pneumatic sense, Origen frequently drew a.n.a.logies between the domain of the cosmic and that of the spiritual. He is thus a forerunner of modern idealistic philosophers, for example, Drummond: "To Origen allegorism is only one manifestation of the sacramental mystery of nature" (Bigg, p. 134).]

[Footnote 717: See Hom in Luc. XXIX., Lomm. V., p. 193 sq.]

[Footnote 718: Since Origen does not, as a rule, dispute the literal meaning of the Scriptures, he has also a much more favourable opinion of the Jewish people and of the observance of the law than the earlier Christian authors (but see Iren. and Tertull.). At bottom he places the observance of the law quite on the same level as the faith of the simple Christians. The Apostles also kept the law for a time, and it was only by degrees that they came to understand its spiritual meaning. They were also right to continue its observance during their mission among the Jews. On the other hand, he considers the New Testament a higher stage than the Old both in its literal and its spiritual sense. See c. Cels.

II. 1-4, 7, 75: IV. 31 sq: V. 10, 30, 31, 42 sq., 66: VII. 26.]

[Footnote 719: In opposition to the method for obtaining a knowledge of G.o.d, recommended by Alcinous (c. 12), Maximus Tyr. (XVII. 8), and Celsus (by a.n.a.lysis [apophat.], synthesis [kataphat.], and a.n.a.logy), Origen, c.

Cels. VII. 42, 44, appeals to the fact that the Christian knows G.o.d better, namely, in his incarnate Son. But he himself, nevertheless, also follows the synthetic method.]

[Footnote 720: In defining the superessential nature of the One, Origen did not go so far as the Basilidians (Philosoph. VII. 20, 21) or as Plotinus. No doubt he also regards the Deity as [Greek: epekeina tes ousias] (c. Cels. VII. 42-51; [Greek: peri archon] I. 1; Clement made a closer approach to the heretical abstractions of the Gnostics inasmuch as he still more expressly renounced any designation of G.o.d; see Strom.

V. 12, 13), but he is not [Greek: buthos] and [Greek: sige], being rather a self-comprehending Spirit, and therefore does not require a hypostasis (the [Greek: nous]) before he can come to himself.

Accordingly the human intellect is not incapable of soaring up to G.o.d as the later Neoplatonists a.s.sert; at least vision is by no means so decidedly opposed to thought, that is, elevated above it as something new, as is held by the Neoplatonists and Philo before them. Origen is no mystic. In accordance with this conception Origen and Clement say that the perfect knowledge of G.o.d can indeed be derived from the Logos alone (c. Cels VII. 48, 49: VI. 65-73; Strom. V. 12. 85: VI. 15. 122), but that a relative knowledge may be deduced from creation (c. Cels. VII.

46). Hence they also spoke of an innate knowledge of G.o.d (Protrept. VI.

68; Strom. V. 13. 78), and extended the teleological proof of G.o.d furnished by Philo ([Greek: peri archon] I. 1. 6; c. Cels I. 23). The relatively correct predicates of G.o.d to be determined from revelation are his unity (c. Cels I. 23), his absolute spirituality ([Greek: pneuma asomatos, aulos, aschematistos])--this is maintained both in opposition to Stoicism and anthropomorphism; see Orig. [Greek: peri archon] I. 1, Origen's polemic against Melito's conception of G.o.d, and Clem., Strom.

V. 11. 68: V. 12. 82,--his unbegottenness, his immortality (this is eternity conceived as enjoyment; the eternity of G.o.d itself, however, is to be conceived, according to Clement, as that which is above time; see Strom. II. 2. 6), and his absolute causality. All these concepts together const.i.tute the conception of perfection. See Fischer, De Orig.

theologia et cosmologia, 1840.]

[Footnote 721: Orig. [Greek: peri archon] II. 1. 3.]

[Footnote 722: C. Cels V. 23.]

[Footnote 723: L.c.]

[Footnote 724: [Greek: Peri archon] II. 9. 1: "Certum est, quippe quod praefinito aliquo apud se numero creaturas fecit: non enim, ut quidam volunt, finem putandum est non habere creaturas; quia ubi finis non est, nec comprehensio ulla nec circ.u.mscriptio esse potest. Quod si fuerit utique nee contineri vel dispensari a deo, quae facta sunt, poterunt.

Naturaliter nempe quicquid infinitum fuerit, et incomprehensibile erit."

In Matth., t. 13., c. 1 fin., Lomm. III., p. 209 sq.]

[Footnote 725: See above, p. 343, note 2.]

[Footnote 726: See c. Cels. II. 20.]

[Footnote 727: Clement also did so; see with respect to Origen [Greek: peri archon] II. 5, especially -- 3 sq.]

[Footnote 728: See Comment. in Johann. I. 40, Lomm. I. p. 77 sq. I cannot agree that this view is a _rapprochement_ to the Marcionites (contrary to Nitzsch's opinion, l.c., p. 285). The confused accounts in Epiph., H. 43. 13 are at any rate not to be taken into account.]

[Footnote 729: Clement's doctrine of the Logos, to judge from the Hypotyposes, was perhaps different from that of Origen. According to Photius (Biblioth. 109) Clement a.s.sumed two Logoi (Origen indeed was also reproached with the same; see Pamphili Apol., Routh, Reliq. S., IV., p. 367), and did not even allow the second and weaker one to make a real appearance on earth; but this is a misunderstanding (see Zahn, Forschungen III., p. 144). [Greek: Legetai men]--these are said to have been the words of a pa.s.sage in the Hypotyposes--[Greek: kai ho huios logos h.o.m.onumos to patriko logo, all' ouch outos estin ho sarx genomenos, oude men ho patroos logos, alla dynamis tis tou Theou, oion apporoia tou logou autou nous genomenos tas ton anthropon kardias diapephoiteke]. The distinction between an impersonal Logos-G.o.d and the Logos-Christ necessarily appeared as soon as the Logos was definitely hypostatised. In the so-called Monarchian struggles of the 3rd century the disputants made use of these two Logoi, who formed excellent material for sophistical discussions. In the Strom. Clement did not reject the distinction between a [Greek: logos endiathetos] and [Greek: prophorikos] (on Strom. V. 1. 6. see Zahn, l.c., p. 145 against Nitzsch), and in many pa.s.sages expresses himself in such a way that one can scarcely fail to notice a distinction between the Logos of the Father and that of the Son. "The Son-Logos is an emanation of the Reason of G.o.d, which unalterably remains in G.o.d and is the Logos proper." If the Adumbrationes are to be regarded as parts of the Hypotyposes, Clement used the expression [Greek: h.o.m.oousios] for the Logos, or at least an identical one (See Zahn, Forschungen III., pp. 87-138 f.). This is the more probable because Clement, Strom. 16. 74, expressly remarked that men are not [Greek: meros theou kai to Theo h.o.m.oousioi], and because he says in Strom. IV. 13. 91: [Greek: ei epi to katalusai thanaton aphikneitai to diapheron genos, ouch ho Christos ton thanaton katergesen, ei me kai autos autois h.o.m.oousios lechtheie]. One must a.s.sume from this that the word was really familiar to Clement as a designation of the community of nature, possessed by the Logos, both with G.o.d and with men. See Protrept. 10. 110: [Greek: ho theios logos, ho phanerotatos ontos Theos, ho to despote ton holon exisotheis]). In Strom. V. I. 1 Clement emphatically declared that the Son was equally eternal with the Father: [Greek: ou men oude ho pater aneu huiou hama gar to pater huiou pater] (see also Strom. IV. 7. 58: [Greek: hen men to agenneton ho pantokrator, en de kai to progennethen di' ou ta panta egeneto], and Adumbrat. in Zahn, l.c., p. 87, where 1 John I. 1 is explained: "principium generationis separatum ab opificis principio non est. c.u.m enim dicit 'quod erat ab initio' generationem tangit sine principio filii c.u.m patre simul exstantis." See besides the remarkable pa.s.sage, Quis dives salv. 37: [Greek: Theo ta tes agapes mysteria, kai tote epopteuseis ton kolpon tou patros, hon ho monogenes huios Theos monos exegesato esti de kai autos ho Theos agape kai di' agapen hemin anekrathe kai to men arreton autou pater, to de hemin sympathes gegone meter agapesas ho pater ethelunthe, kai toutou mega semeion, hon autos egennesen ex autou kai ho techtheis ex agapes karpos agape]. But that does not exclude the fact that he, like Origen, named the Son [Greek: ktisma] (Phot., l.c.). In the Adumbrat. (p. 88) Son and Spirit are called "primitivae virtutes ac primo creatae, immobiles exsistentes secundum substantiam". That is exactly Origen's doctrine, and Zahn (l.c., p. 99) has rightly compared Strom. V. 14. 89: VI. 7. 58; and Epit. ex Theod.

20. The Son stands at the head of the series of created beings (Strom.

VII. 2. 5; see also below), but he is nevertheless specifically different from them by reason of his origin. It may be said in general that the fine distinctions of the Logos doctrine in Clement and Origen are to be traced to the still more abstract conception of G.o.d found in the former. A sentence like Strom. IV. 25. 156 ([Greek: ho men oun Theos anapodeiktos on ouk estin epistemonikos, ho de huios sophia te esti kai episteme]) will hardly be found in Origen I think. Cf. Schultz, Gottheit Christi, p. 45 ff.]

[Footnote 730: See Schultz, l.c., p. 51 ff. and Jahrbuch fur protestantische Theologie I. pp. 193 ff. 369 ff.]

[Footnote 731: It is very remarkable that Origen [Greek: peri archon] I.

2. 1 in his presentation of the Logos doctrine, started with the person of Christ, though he immediately abandoned this starting-point "Primo illud nos oportere scire", so this chapter begins, "Quod aliud est in Christo deitatis eius natura, quod est unigenitus filius patris, et alia humana natura, quam in novissimis temporibus pro dispensatione suscepit.

Propter quod videndum primo est, quid sit unigenitus filius dei."]

[Footnote 732: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 2. 2, 6.]

[Footnote 733: The expression was familiar to Origen as to Justin (see Dial. c. Tryph). See c. Cels. V. 39: [Greek: Kai deuteron oun legomen Theon istosan, hoti ton deuteron Theon ouk allo ti legomen, he ten periektiken pason areton areten kai ton periektikon pantos houtinosoun logou ton kata physin kai proegoumenos gegenemenon.]]

[Footnote 734: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 2. 13 has been much corrupted by Rufinus. The pa.s.sage must have been to the effect that the Son is indeed [Greek: agathos], but not, like the Father, [Greek: aparallaktos agathos].]

[Footnote 735: Selecta in Psalm., Lomm. XIII., p. 134; see also Fragm.

comm. in ep. ad Hebr., Lomm. V., p. 299 sq.]

[Footnote 736: L.c.: "Sic et sapientia ex deo procedens, ex ipsa substantia dei generatur. Sic nihilominus et secundum similitudinem corporalis aporrhoeae esse dicitur aporrhoea gloriae omnipotentis pura quaedam et sincera. Quae utraeque similitudines (see the beginning of the pa.s.sage) manifestissime ostendunt communionem substantiae esse filio c.u.m patre. Aporrhoea enim [Greek: h.o.m.oousios] videtur, id est, unius substantiae c.u.m illo corpore, ex quo est vel aporrhoea vel vapor." In opposition to Heracleon Origen argues (in Joh. XIII. 25., Lomm. II., p.

43 sq.) that _we_ are not h.o.m.ousios with G.o.d: [Greek: epistesomen de, ei me sphodra estin asebes h.o.m.oousios te agenneto physei kai pammakaria einai legein tous proskunountas en pneumati to Theo.] On the meaning of [Greek: h.o.m.oousios] see Zahn, Marcell., pp. 11-32. The conception decidedly excludes the possibility of the two subjects connected by it having a different essence; but it says nothing about how they came to have one essence and in what measure they possess it. On the other hand it abolishes the distinction of persons the moment the essence itself is identified with the one person. Here then is found the Unitarian danger, which could only be averted by a.s.sertions. In some of Origen's teachings a modalistic aspect is also not quite wanting. See Hom. VIII. in Jerem.

no. 2: [Greek: To men hupokeimenon hen esti, tais de epinoiais ta polla onomata epi diaphoron]. Conversely, it is also nothing but an appearance when Origen (for ex. in c. Cels. VIII. 12) merely traces the unity of Father and Son to unity in feeling and in will. The charge of Ebionitism made against him is quite unfounded (see Pamphili Apol., Routh IV. p.

367).]

[Footnote 737: [Greek: Ouk estin ote ouk en], de princip. I. 2. 9; in Rom. I. 5.]

[Footnote 738: [Greek: Peri archon] I. 2. 2-9. Comm. in ep. ad. Hebr.

Lomm. V., p. 296: "Nunquam est, quando filius non fuit. Erat autem non, sicut de aeterna luce diximus, innatus, ne duo principia lucis videamur inducere, sed sicut ingenitae lucis splendor, ipsam illam lucem initium habens ac fontem, natus quidem ex ipsa; sed non erat quando noa erat."

See the comprehensive disquisition in [Greek: peri archon] IV. 28, where we find the sentence: "hoc autem ipsum, quod dicimus, quia nunquam fuit, quando non fuit, c.u.m venia audiendum est" etc. See further in Jerem. IX.