The History of Cuba Volume I Part 13

His fears were presently realized in the coming of perhaps the most formidable of all the Frenchmen then scouring the seas; the famous Jacques Sores. This daring captain was not only a Frenchman and therefore hostile to Spaniards on racial and political grounds, but he was also a Huguenot, like many other French seamen of that day, and therefore hostile to them on religious grounds. He was supposed to be under the patronage of the great Conde, and also at one time to have received material aid from Queen Elizabeth of England. Indeed, he was at this time regarded as the foremost champion of the Protestant cause at sea. Although a privateer, he commanded not a single vessel but a squadron of three, which he handled with the skill of a master mariner.

Sores did not, however, deem it needful to bring his whole array against Havana. A single vessel, a brigantine, would be sufficient. So it came to pa.s.s that in the early morning of July 10, 1554, a signal came from the watchers on the Morro headland, that a strange sail, probably French, was approaching. A shot was fired from La Fuerza, to summon the men of Havana to arms. Lobera led his garrison of twelve men to their places within the fort. Angulo took command outside. For an hour or two there was uncertainty as to the ident.i.ty of the vessel, and hors.e.m.e.n were dispatched to the beach to watch its movements. They presently hastened back with the news that the brigantine had cast anchor off what is now San Lazaro and had sent ash.o.r.e two boatloads of armed men, who were now approaching the city through the jungle. This indicated treachery, for the jungle was impenetrable save by a certain secret path which no strangers could know, and indeed it was presently disclosed that the invaders were guided by two men who had formerly lived in Havana, one of whom had been a harbor pilot.

The governor unhesitatingly considered discretion to be the better part of valor, and betook himself to instant flight, conveying his family and such of his property as he could carry to the native village of Guanabacoa, at the other side of the bay, where he was joined during the day by a majority of the residents of Havana. Lobera, on the other hand, now that he was face to face with a great crisis, forgot his fears and acquitted himself as a man of valor. With his little garrison, half of whom were negro slaves, and with a score of refugees, old men, women and children, he shut himself within the fort, with its walls of stone and gates of timber, and prepared to fight to the death. He had found three more cannon and had taken them into the fort, thus totalling six, with a good supply of ammunition and provisions. He dispatched a message to Angulo, reproaching him for his cowardly flight and imploring him to send all able bodied men to the aid of the garrison, for the honor of Spain. This the governor promised to do at or before nightfall; a promise which was not kept.

The invaders were commanded by Captain Sores in person. They took possession of the town without resistance, and then summoned the fort to surrender; expecting to find in it much treasure from Spanish vessels which had recently been wrecked on the Florida coast, though in fact no such treasure was there. Lobera unhesitatingly refused to surrender, and the fight began. The first a.s.sault upon the fort, from the landward side, was repulsed. Then the brigantine was seen to be approaching at the other side, accompanied by another and larger vessel of Sores's squadron, which had just arrived; wherefore Lobera had to transfer two of his cannon to that side of the fort to prevent a landing of more troops. A second a.s.sault was repulsed, during which a Spanish gunner shot down the French flag from the staff on which Sores had raised it at the stone house of Juan de Rojas, which the French had occupied as headquarters. A third a.s.sault, near nightfall, was also repulsed, but the two wooden gates of La Fuerza were burned with nearly all the contents of the tower. The little garrison and the refugees spent the night on an open terrace, with only a little powder and shot and not a day's food left. Hoping for help from the governor and citizens, Lobera fired his largest gun at intervals during the night, beat the drums and sounded bugle calls; but all in vain. "The darkness gave no token."

The French demanded his surrender, promising good treatment, but threatening a ruthless a.s.sault which would mean death if he persisted in trying to hold his indefensible position. Lobera refused, until the break of day. Then he saw that no help was approaching from Angulo, that an overwhelming force of French soldiers surrounded him on all sides, and that successful defence was impossible. His ammunition was all but gone. The cords of the crossbows with which his men were armed were frayed and broken. Some of his men were slain, while some of the survivors, especially one German gunner, mutinously held converse with the enemy. The refugees fell on their knees before him bidding him die fighting if he would, but to let their lives be spared. In this desperate plight Lobera yielded, offering to surrender on honorable terms, if the lives of his men were spared and the women were protected from dishonor. To this Sores gave his word, and the fort capitulated.

The flag of France was raised over La Fuerza, and twenty-odd Spanish subjects were prisoners.

The women and children were quickly released, but all the men were locked up in the house of Juan de Rojas, which was the strongest stone building in the city. About a score more were added to their number, of Spaniards and Portuguese whom Sores had captured elsewhere.

A few hours after the surrender, word was received from Angulo. He had at last organized a force of about fifty men, chiefly Indians, and had started to the relief of the fort when he heard of its capitulation. At this he realized that all was lost, and retired to Guanabacoa, there to seek negotiations with the French for the ransom of Havana. A truce was declared, and the prisoners were released from Rojas's house on parole, pledged not to fight, or to leave town, and to return to their prison at nightfall. Angulo offered a ransom of three thousand ducats, declaring that no more could be raised. The Frenchmen scorned the offer, and demanded thirty thousand pesos--eighty thousand had been collected at Santiago the year before--and a hundred loads of bread. Angulo protested his inability to raise such an amount, but begged for time in which to see what he could do.

A week pa.s.sed, the French occupying Havana at their ease and Angulo scouring the surrounding country, ostensibly for ransom money but in fact for men and arms. By the end of the week he had surrept.i.tiously collected a force of 335 men, of whom about thirty-five were Spaniards and the rest negroes and Indians. They were armed chiefly with clubs and stones. Himself and eight others were mounted on horseback. With this motley force he hoped to surprise the French by night, and to capture Rojas's house, where he would take Sores himself prisoner and release the Spanish captives.

The desperate plan would probably have succeeded had not some of the Indians indiscreetly uttered their war cry as they rushed upon the house, arousing the Frenchmen and giving them time to close and bar the ma.s.sive doors. The few Frenchmen who were sleeping outside of the house were quickly overcome and slain, and Angulo laid siege to the house itself, summoning Sores to surrender. The French commander was furious at what he not unreasonably regarded as a breach of the truce. Moreover, his brother was among those who had been killed outside the house. In a fury he ordered that all the Spanish prisoners in the house be put to death. This was quickly done, with the exception of Lobera, who was confined in an upper room. Sores reserved the killing of him for himself, and entered the room where Lobera was for that purpose. Lobera defended himself, meanwhile protesting that he had had no part in the treachery; and his evidently honest pleas moved a French officer to intervene in his behalf and to disarm Sores. Then, at the direction of Sores, Lobera showed himself at a window and addressed Angulo, reproaching him for the breach of truce, and imploring him to withdraw.

Angulo refused, declaring that he had already recaptured the town, and that at daylight he would complete the work by capturing the Rojas house and its inmates.

With the coming of daylight, however, the folly of this course became apparent. Angulo had, indeed, a larger force than the Frenchmen still remaining in Havana; though as the latter were far the better armed a conflict between them would probably have been disastrous to the Spaniards. But the two s.h.i.+ps in the harbor were now aroused and began firing upon the Spaniards with their artillery, while reenforcements of men for Sores put off for sh.o.r.e in boats. Sores and his companions made a fierce sally from the house. The few Spaniards made a stand, but the negroes and most of the Indians would not oppose clubs and stones to swords and arquebuses. They fled incontinently to the jungle, followed by Angulo himself.

His victory thus completed, Sores returned to the house where he had left Lobera locked in a room with the dead and dying. He absolved the commander from all responsibility for Angulo's treacherous conduct, and complimented him upon the valor with which he had defended La Fuerza as well as upon his good faith. He would not, however, release him without a ransom, according to the custom of the times. In default of the ransom, he would take him to France as a prisoner, though treated with all consideration. Lobera was without means, but his friends with whom he was permitted to communicate soon raised the required sum of two thousand two hundred pesos, and he was set at liberty. He thereafter went to Spain, carrying with him the news of what had happened to Havana.

The negotiations for the ransom of the town were less successful. Angulo had fled far inland, and could not be reached, and the Spaniards who remained could not offer more than a thousand pesos, a sum which Sores scorned. In default of ransom, therefore, the place was looted and burned. Three buildings alone remained standing: La Fuerza, the church, and the hospital. Indeed, the interior of the church was almost entirely destroyed. Sores and his men were fierce Huguenots, and they tore down the images of saints and took the robes and altar vestments to make cloaks for themselves. All the boats found in the harbor were burned.

The neighboring estates for miles around were destroyed, and some of the negroes who offered resistance were hanged. The harbor was carefully surveyed and sounded, to facilitate future entries. Finally, his work being thus thoroughly done, Sores sailed away at midnight of August 5, less than a month after his arrival.

At the end of September a little French vessel, containing only a dozen men, entered the harbor, inspected the ruins of the city, and seized a Spanish caravel which lay there, taking it away with them to the harbor of Mariel, where there were several French s.h.i.+ps. Ten days later the entire French force entered the harbor of Havana and landed many men.

They did not, however, molest the Spanish residents nor destroy the new buildings which they were beginning to erect, but seemed to regard them with good humored tolerance, as too insignificant to merit attention.

Indeed, there were only a few dozen of the Spanish, all told, and they were helpless and disheartened. The Frenchmen contented themselves with going to several of the outlying farms and taking all the hides they could find to add to the cargo which they were already carrying. They remained there, on amicable terms with the Spanish, for more than a fortnight, and then sailed away.

These things occurred at the time when Philip of Spain was marrying Queen Mary of England and was taking possession of the Netherlands, and when Spain vaunted herself as the foremost military power of the world.

It must not be wondered at that the people of Cuba, and particularly of Havana, regarded themselves as grievously neglected by those who should have been their protectors, and bitterly reproached not alone the governor but even the King himself for not having afforded them more ample protection. The explanation was, doubtless, that Spain regarded Mexico, South America, and of course her European possessions, as of far greater importance than the island whose gold mines were about exhausted, which had failed to provide iron for Spanish artillery, and which had served chiefly as a stepping stone to more valuable lands. It was a strange irony of fate that the island which was thus slighted was destined to be the most faithful and the longest held of all the colonial possessions of Spain.

CHAPTER XVI

The disastrous events which have been related in the preceding chapter suggested to the Spaniards in Cuba and also to the government at Seville the desirability, if not the necessity, of establis.h.i.+ng a more militant administration of affairs if the island was not to be the prey of all comers and perhaps ultimately be lost to the Spanish crown. Thitherto, with the exception of Velasquez and the possible exception of De Soto, every governor of the island had been a civilian and a lawyer. It seemed an experiment worth making, then, to appoint a military man to the office, in the hope that he would be better fitted to provide for the protection of the island against the privateers and corsairs who roved the seas in increasing numbers and with increasing boldness. True, immediately after the abdication of Charles I and the accession of Philip II, in 1556, a truce was concluded between France and Spain, which was to last five years. But few expected that it would last so long, as indeed it did not, being broken in two years; and even while it did last privateering was by no means abolished. In any case, be it peace or be it war, Spain had tried to hold her western empire by virtue of Divine Right and ecclesiastical decrees, and had failed. Now she would try holding what was left of it with military and naval force; and to that end would have a soldier for governor of Cuba.

The man chosen was indeed an expert and competent soldier, by no means devoid of statesmans.h.i.+p. Diego de Mazariegos had been one of the most efficient lieutenants of Cortez in Mexico, and distinguished himself as a brave and skilful fighter against the Indians. He had also given much attention to international relations, and to the privateering which had become such a scourge of the seas. Indeed, it was through some of his writings on this latter subject that the court of Seville was led to consider him as a candidate for the Cuban governors.h.i.+p. Dr. Angulo had been appointed in 1550, and five years was long enough, it was thought, for a man to serve, unless he served better than Angulo had done in the latter part of his term. So Mazariegos was selected to succeed him, in March, 1555. Juan Martinez, a lawyer, was selected to go with him as lieutenant governor. These were the last appointments made in Cuba by King Charles before his retirement from the throne.

Some time was required for preparations for the voyage and for residence in a new land, so that Mazariegos and Martinez did not sail from Spain until late in the summer. On the way they suffered s.h.i.+pwreck and Martinez and all his family were drowned. Mazariegos escaped, but lost everything he had with him save the clothes which he was wearing. This disaster made it necessary still further to postpone his a.s.sumption of the governors.h.i.+p, so that he did not reach Cuba until March 7, 1556. It is noteworthy that instead of landing at Santiago, as every other governor had done, he went straight to Havana, where Angulo awaited him, and the very next day, March 8, he was installed as governor. In accordance with custom he conducted an investigation of Angulo's accounts and general administration, which was permitted to pa.s.s as a merely formal and perfunctory performance. The pa.s.sionate demands for Angulo's indictment and punishment were by this time forgotten.

Havana had been partially rebuilt since the raid of Captain Sores, and had been completely transformed in character. It had a very much larger population than before, and that population was restless and turbulent to a degree. It contained adventurers from every country and of every type; fortune hunters, fugitive criminals, gamblers, bankrupts, the shady output of Mexico, Darien and Peru, who sought in Cuba a No Man's Land in which they would not be troubled with law and order. In this expectation they reckoned without their host. Or perhaps they counted upon the rough and ready soldier as likely to countenance a large degree of laxity. If so, they were mistaken. Mazariegos had indeed the personal morals of a soldier of fortune. Soon after the death of Angulo he took the latter's widow for his mistress and lived with her openly, to the great scandal of the church, until after the death of the lady's mother, when he married her, as he said he had all along intended to do; the delay being due to his unwillingness to have a mother-in-law. But this was regarded by the governor as a trifling peccadillo. Upon graver offenses, murder, robbery, brawling and what not, he frowned with the wrath of a Precisian.

Nor was he any respecter of persons. When Francisco de Angulo, the son of the lady whom he had taken as his mistress and was soon to make his wife, scandalized law and order with his drunkenness and brawling, he exiled him to Mexico. For like offenses he also banished Gomez de Rojas, the youngest brother of Juan de Rojas, one of the foremost citizens of Havana; expressing as he did so a fervent wish that the young man might quickly meet with an evil death. As for his own nephew, Francisco de Mazariegos, when he became notorious for gambling, lechery and fighting, he inflicted upon him with his own hands a physical chastis.e.m.e.nt which was a more than nine days' example to all the other youth of the town.

Santiago still being the nominal capital of the island, the new governor thought it inc.u.mbent upon him at least to visit it. In fact, he spent nearly the whole year 1557 there, endeavoring to provide it with means of defence against French privateers. He stationed a captain of the army there, with four small cannon, some muskets and pikes, and a supply of gunpowder, urging the citizens to learn to fight so as to defend themselves. Then, in January, 1558, he hastened back to Havana to defend it against raiders who were said to be on their way thither. Five months later a French privateer visited Santiago, took the place without so much as a blow from the captain, considered it too small and poor to be worth looting or burning, and sailed away again after collecting only 400 pesos ransom; probably the smallest ransom on record for a capital city!

On his return to Havana, Mazariegos showed the value of a military governor for the protection of a city. For six weeks that summer a French squadron of four vessels lay off Havana, without venturing to attack the place, knowing that Mazariegos had mobilized and trained for fighting every able-bodied man in the place, and even some robust and athletic negro women. But the governor was not satisfied with defence alone. He contrived to get word to some Spanish captains at Nombre de Dios, who were going to convoy treasure s.h.i.+ps to Spain, with the result that they presently came up unannounced and captured the whole French squadron. Again and again thereafter Havana was menaced, even attacked, but invariably Mazariegos repulsed the enemy, generally with heavy loss to the latter.

He felt, however, the need of better equipment, particularly of more cannon, and asked the crown to provide it. The crown declined or at any rate failed to do so, whereupon he set about doing it himself, and succeeded in getting, sometimes by rather strenuous means, a number of cannon and a good supply of powder. But a better fort than the ruins of La Fuerza was also needed, and to that enterprise he turned his attention with zeal. At the beginning of his administration Geronimo Bustamente de Herrera was commissioned by the crown to build a new fort, but after making plans and engaging workmen he fell ill and had to abandon the job. At the beginning of 1558, just as Mazariegos returned thither from Santiago, Herrera was replaced by Bartolome Sanchez, a competent engineer; who prepared new plans for the rebuilding of La Fuerza as it stands to this day. The Viceroy of Mexico, who was much interested in the safety of Mexican treasure s.h.i.+ps which might put in at Havana, contributed 12,000 pesos in gold for the beginning of the work.

There was much trouble in getting laborers for the work, in Spain.

Sanchez wanted at least a hundred negro slaves. The government thought the number excessive, and gave him authorization for only thirty; whereupon he declared that the enterprise might as well be given up. In fact he secured in Spain only fifteen workmen, and with them he sailed for Cuba, hoping to secure the rest there, or elsewhere in the West Indies.

The work began early in December, 1558. A stone quarry was opened near Guanabacoa, and a kiln for making lime was built. But labor was still lacking. Sanchez wanted two hundred, negro slaves or others, and appealed to the people of the town to help him get them. In response they procured for him thirty slaves--their own, whom they were willing to turn over to him "for a consideration." Then the governor took a hand in the game. There were forty slaves at Santiago, who had been brought thither without the proper s.h.i.+pping papers, and were being held for that reason. Mazariegos sent to Santiago, confiscated them all, and brought them up to Havana, to work on the new fort. Some French prisoners who had been taken in a fight off Matanzas were also set at work on it. All tramps and vagabonds who were arrested were sent to La Fuerza or to the quarry, and for a time, until the crown stopped it, one third of the Indian village of Guanabacoa were kept at work on the fort.

Although Sanchez was in charge of the work and was responsible for it, Mazariegos spent much of his time there, watching it, directing it, and chastising with tongue and sometimes even with rod all who seemed laggards at the job. In time he succeeded Sanchez in authority. For Sanchez incurred much enmity on the part of some influential citizens, whose houses he took in order to make an open place about the fort. They accused him of corruption, of making gross errors in the plans for the fort, of fomenting discord, and of wasting money. He was too busy with building the fort to pay much attention to these things, even when they took the form of letters to the King. The outcome of it was that in the summer of 1560 Sanchez was removed from his place, and Mazariegos was put in charge of the completion of La Fuerza. A few months later Sanchez reached Seville, and pleaded his case to so good effect that the crown was convinced that injustice had been done him, and that he should not have been discharged. However, it was not practicable to reinstate him, though he was sent back a few years later to make an official inspection of the completed fort.

In addition to La Fuerza, Mazariegos built the first forerunner of the Morro Castle. In 1563 he built on the Morro headland a tower of masonry more than thirty feet high. It was intended primarily as a landmark, and was therefore painted white in order to make it visible at the greatest possible distance. But a watchman was generally kept in it, to espy approaching vessels and to signal to the city news of their approach.

The tower is said to have cost only 200 pesos, and was paid for by the city of Havana.

Mazariegos presently became involved in affairs outside of Cuba. Many men deserted at Havana from the vessels of Angelo de Villafane, governor of Florida. Villafane complained and wanted Mazariegos to capture and return them. Mazariegos replied that he could not do it; to which we may doubtless add that he would not have done so if he could. He was desirous of increasing the population of Cuba, even in that way. When Villafane attempted to plant a Spanish colony at what is now Port Royal, South Carolina, and failed, Mazariegos had some correspondence with the King, and probably acquiesced in the royal opinion, that it would be impracticable to establish a colony at that point. In 1563, however, the King learned that the French had been quite successful in planting a colony on that very spot where the Spaniards under Villafane had failed, and he informed Mazariegos of the fact. The governor, acting upon his own initiative, but shrewdly guessing what would be acceptable to the King, sent Hernando de Rojas thither with a frigate and twenty-five soldiers, to see how much of a settlement the French had made, and to destroy it if he was able to do so with that force. In the summer of 1564 Rojas returned, reporting that the settlement had been abandoned by the French. He brought back with him one young Frenchman as a prisoner, and also a memorial stone which the French had set up to commemorate the founding of the place, bearing the date, 1561. Mazariegos commended Rojas for his work, sent the memorial stone to Seville, and then began planning to go in person or to send an expedition to search the Carolina and other coasts in quest of new French colonies. His theory was that the more French settlements there were, the more French vessels there would be, and therefore the more subject Cuba would be to alien annoyance.

This, however, was not to be. The end of Mazariegos's administration was already drawing near. He fell into some violent disputes with the citizens of Havana, over the appointment of alcaldes, a duty which they charged him with neglecting. He was also charged with packing the town council with his own creatures, with tampering with the mails so as to prevent people from writing to Spain any complaints of his maladministration, and of other misdemeanors. Bartolome Sanchez, who had returned from Spain and who had a bitter personal grudge against the governor for supplanting him as builder of the fort, pet.i.tioned the King to have a judge sent from Hispaniola to investigate him, but the King refused. Mazariegos, learning this, and feeling unwarrantably secure in royal favor, adopted a more arrogant att.i.tude toward his opponents and critics, which did him no good.

In the spring of 1565, Garcia Osorio de Sandoval was appointed to succeed him as governor. Mazariegos thereupon wrote to the King, asking that there be no unnecessary law suits brought against him, as he was old, and ill, and poor. (He was not yet fifty years of age!) The King granted his request, and in consequence instructed Osorio to make his investigation as little annoying as possible. Osorio obeyed, and although the report of the inquest filled three big volumes, Mazariegos was not brought to trial on any charges and had no fines a.s.sessed against him. He remained living at Havana for some time, and then completed his career in the King's service as governor of Caracas, Venezuela. His administration had been a stormy one, but on the whole advantageous to Cuba, and had confirmed the Seville government in its policy of appointing others than mere lawyers to the insular governors.h.i.+p.

Garcia Osorio de Sandoval became governor of Cuba on September 12, 1565.

As he was not a lawyer, the precedent which had been set in Mazariegos's case was followed in his, of appointing a lieutenant governor who was a lawyer to serve with him. His lieutenant was Luis Cabrera, who did not reach Cuba until later in the year, having suffered s.h.i.+pwreck and been obliged to put back to Spain and await the sailing of another vessel.

Osorio appears to have been a soldier, though probably retired from active service at the time of his appointment to the governors.h.i.+p. At any rate he made it his first care to improve the defences of the island. It is related that he bore with him from Spain to Havana a cargo of arms and munitions, including four bra.s.s cannon. These he placed upon the fortification, thus making a battery of eight pieces, and built a substantial platform of timber for them to stand upon. La Fuerza was not yet completed, but he took measures to expedite the work and hoped to have it finished in a year. In order to protect the place from possible raids by land, he closed and blocked all roads and trails leading into it from the west excepting the one along the beach. He organized a force of seventy men armed with arquebuses, to be quickly summoned in an emergency, and required them and all citizens to a.s.semble for service whenever a strange sail was sighted. In addition, as a permanent contribution to defence, a s.p.a.cious a.r.s.enal was built near the water front, to contain the stores of ammunition and to shelter the guards and citizens.

There was thus much promise that Osorio would prove to be an energetic and useful governor. Unfortunately, at the very beginning of his administration he came into conflict with another and much stronger functionary of the Spanish crown; indeed, one of the most formidable figures of the time. This was none other than Pedro Menendez de Aviles, whose record fills so large a place in the early annals of Florida and the West Indies. He took to the sea in boyhood, and became one of the most expert navigators of Spain. At the age of thirty he was captain of his own s.h.i.+p, and it was one of the most active and efficient vessels among all that guarded and convoyed the treasure s.h.i.+ps and fleets of the Spanish Main. At that time he warned the government of Hispaniola and also that of Mexico of the grave danger of letting the French get any foothold upon those sh.o.r.es, or even of navigating those waters. The Bahama Channel, the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea should all, he insisted, be declared and kept closed seas, into which no vessels but those of Spain should enter save by special license.

[Ill.u.s.tration: PEDRO MENENDEZ DE AVILES.]

Menendez was, moreover, an ardent and indeed fanatical Catholic, who deemed it a duty to extirpate "Lutheran dogs," as he termed the French Huguenots and other Protestants; and as most of the French seamen and foreign adventurers at that time were of the Huguenot faith, he cherished a special animosity against them.

Now, his recommendations to the governments of Hispaniola and Mexico were transmitted to Seville and were laid before the King. Charles was at that time weary of royal cares and was about to resign them, and he paid little or no attention to the letters of the young captain. But when Philip II came to the throne, attention was given to them. That painstaking monarch read them and was much struck by them, both in their warning of military danger from the French and in their zealous animosity against heretics. Their writer was evidently, he thought, a man after his own heart. So he sent for Menendez, talked with him, and commissioned him to be the guardian of the highway to the Indies, with the t.i.tle of captain-general. It was his function to guard Spanish treasure s.h.i.+ps all the way across the Atlantic, from Mexico to Spain, as he had formerly guarded them in the narrow seas about the Indies. It was thus that he was serving during a part of Mazariegos's administration in Cuba, and in that capacity he spent much time at Havana. On one or two occasions he took charge of the few little vessels which formed Mazariegos's navy, and did good service with them. At this time, also, he wrote to the King about the increasing ravages and peril of French privateers in those waters, very much as he had written to the local governments years before.

The result was that the King in March, 1565, appointed him to be Adelantado of Florida, and captain-general of the Spanish fleet in that part of the world specially commissioned to guard the coasts and ports of the Indies. That was six months before Osorio became governor of Cuba.

The commission of Menendez bade him to "guard the coasts and ports of the Indies." Very well. Cuba was certainly one of the Indies. Therefore he was commissioned to guard the ports and coasts of Cuba. Being familiar with Cuba, and recognizing its very great importance, he naturally deemed the guarding of that island as one of the very first of his duties. Mazariegos did not demur, since he was himself soon to retire from the governors.h.i.+p. But when Osorio came to Havana six months later, and found Menendez in command of all that pertained to harbor and coast defence, there was trouble. Osorio a.s.serted his rights and authority as governor of Cuba. Menendez replied with an a.s.sertion of his as captain-general "to guard the coasts and ports."

The first clash came because Menendez interpreted his jurisdiction as extending to fortifications on land as well as to s.h.i.+pping; which we must regard as extreme if not overstrained. He a.s.sumed direction of the garrison of Havana, and had two hundred men sent thither from a large detachment which was sent to Florida. As La Fuerza was not yet finished sufficiently to accommodate them, houses were hired to receive them.

Osorio was not notified in advance that they were coming, or that they had arrived; and after they were there they refused to regard his authority but took orders solely from Baltazar Barreda, a captain whom Menendez had a.s.signed to their command. Presently Barreda took charge of La Fuerza and began moving thither the artillery, including the four pieces which Osorio had brought with him from Spain. Osorio remonstrated, saying that the fort was not yet sufficiently completed for use. Barreda defied his authority, and was sustained by Menendez, who happened to be in Havana at the time. The governor yielded, for the time. But as soon as Menendez was out of the city he clapped Barreda into jail, after a violent physical struggle, and appointed Pedro de Redroban to the command of the fort in his stead. News of this reached Menendez and he hastened back and released Barreda. As for Redroban, he and half a dozen of his men fled to the woods, in well-founded fear of Menendez.

Now, Redroban was one of Menendez's soldiers, just as much as Barreda, and was probably as loyal to him as Barreda. But he had deemed it inc.u.mbent upon himself to obey the commands of the governor of the island. Nevertheless, Menendez charged Osorio with having incited mutiny in the garrison, and he denounced Redroban as a deserter and traitor, who should be captured and put to death, and his head exhibited in the market-place with an inscription proclaiming him a traitor to the King and disobedient to his commander. Redroban and some of his comrades were captured, tried, and condemned to death; but on appeal to the crown their sentences were commuted. Menendez then ordered Barreda to set the garrison at work digging a moat about the fort, and demanded picks and shovels from the governor for the purpose. These Osorio refused to supply, and Barreda thereupon secured them from the people of the town.

Still another cause of friction was found in the coming to Cuba of many men, both civilians and runaway soldiers, from Florida. These Osorio received and sent to the interior of Cuba to engage in agriculture.

Menendez complained that Osorio was inciting and a.s.sisting desertions from Florida; and Osorio bitterly replied that affairs were so bad in Florida under Menendez's rule that people had to flee from the place to save their lives from starvation and pestilence.

Whatever were the general merits of the controversy between the two men, it was certain from the beginning that Menendez would win. He had the higher official rank, and he enjoyed the special favor of the King. More and more he made Havana his headquarters, preferring it to any port on the Florida coast; to which it was, of course, naturally much superior.

More and more, too, he a.s.sumed authority in Havana, not alone in military but even in civil affairs. More and more Osorio was ignored.

And as Menendez had the stronger force of men, and was backed by the approval and favor of the King, it was in vain that Osorio resented the slights which were heaped upon him.