The History of Cuba Volume I Part 16

There was a stairway on the outside of the building, constructed of wood and it was obvious that in case of attack that stairway might easily be destroyed by cannon shot and thus communications between the two stories of the fortress be cut off. The moat had not yet been constructed, and numerous wooden and even some masonry houses had been constructed close to the fort, which might give sheltered approach to an attacking party.

The King and the Council obviously apprehended some friction between the Governor and the newly appointed Captain-General, and they therefore prepared an elaborate code of rules and regulations intended to avert such trouble and to conduce to harmonious co-operation between the two officials. Thus it was provided that in all matters of law relating exclusively to the soldiers, the Captain-General should have entire jurisdiction. In all matters relating entirely to civilians, the Governor should have jurisdiction. In cases in which both soldiers and civilians were concerned the two officials should act together with concurrent jurisdiction, and in case they could not agree the senior royal official at Havana should act as umpire between them.

This plan seemed fair enough and was expected to work well. But Luzan immediately protested against the whole scheme with much vigor and even violence of speech. In this he was heartily supported by the town council of Havana. When his protests were ignored by the Crown, or at least were not favorably heeded, he asked to be relieved from office as Governor and to be a.s.signed to duty elsewhere. This request the King refused to grant, at the same time bidding Luzan to avoid any quarrel or disagreement with Quinones. In spite of this admonition within a few weeks a bitter quarrel arose over the case of a soldier and a civilian who had had some strife over an alleged insult offered by the soldier to a young woman. From this there developed a bitter feud between the Governor and the Captain-General which soon became apparently irreconcilable. Each reviled the other, not only in his public capacity but in relation to his private life and morals. The partisans of each took up the strife and the entire city was soon involved in it.

Such was the deplorable state of affairs, when, as already related, Torquemada began his investigations. He found affairs in what seemed to him as bad a state as possible. The City of Havana, and indeed the entire Island of Cuba, were rent by faction. The Governor and the Captain-General each had a band of armed retainers in Havana, and these were at the point of open conflict which would amount practically to civil war. Regarding the emergency as critical, Torquemada acted promptly and strenuously. He ordered both the Governor and the Captain-General under arrest, commanding Luzan to remain within his own dwelling and Quinones to remain within La Fuerza. Then he literally read the riot act to them both. He reproved them scathingly for their lack of loyalty to the King in letting personal animosities and jealousies have sway over their sense of duty. He secured from each a full statement of his complaints and grievances against the other. Then he compelled them to submit their cases to a tribunal consisting of himself, the Captain of a Mexican fleet who happened to be visiting Havana, and two judges of the Supreme Court of Hispaniola. As a result of the deliberations of this tribunal the two men were compelled to shake hands and pledge friends.h.i.+p and co-operation. They were then released from arrest and told to attend to their respective duties without any more nonsense.

This did not halt Torquemada, however, in his investigation of the general conduct of Luzan's administration in other respects than the quarrel with Quinones. The charges which were made against the Governor were of a very serious character. It was said that he had interfered with the administration of justice by preventing people who had grievances from communicating with the courts or with the royal government in Spain. He had defied the authority of the Supreme Court in Hispaniola and treated it with contempt. He had enriched himself by taking bribes. He had encouraged desertions of soldiers from the garrison of La Fuerza. He had interfered with the functions of the Royal Treasurer and other officials. In view of these accusations Torquemada ordered Luzan to relinquish the exercise of all official functions until the truth or falsity of the charges could be determined. Then he removed from Havana to Bayamo and summoned Luzan to follow him thither in order that the case might be tried in a place free from the local influence of Havana. Luzan obeyed the order but at the same time sent his sister to Spain to intercede with the King and the Council for the Indies, and also sent her husband to Hispaniola to plead his cause before the Supreme Court.

The result was that in mid August of 1584 the Supreme Court reversed Torquemada's order and authorized Luzan to resume the full exercise of his powers and functions as Governor. Luzan at once did so and immediately the old quarrel with Quinones was resumed. So furious did their strife become that within three months the Supreme Court reversed its own orders and restored that of Torquemada. At this Quinones cast off all restraint and summarily ordered Luzan to leave Havana and to go to Santiago to protect that place against the hostile raiders who were hourly expected to descend upon the Cuban coast. Luzan demurred, whereupon Quinones threatened him with arrest. Thereupon Luzan left Havana, but instead of going to Santiago went to Guanabacoa and thence by slow degrees to Bayamo, where he opportunely arrived, as we shall see, at the beginning of January, 1586.

In the interim the civil affairs of Havana were conducted by the Town Council until the end of 1585, when one of Menendez's soldiers, Pedro Guerra de la Vega, was sent by the Supreme Court of Hispaniola to serve as Mayor. He got on well enough with Quinones, but not with Rojas, the Royal Treasurer, who frankly declared him unfit for office and charged him with possessing a too itching palm. His administration of affairs seems to have been confined to purely local matters and, as we shall see, in a very short time, before the spring of 1586, Luzan was again exercising his full civil authority as Governor, though still most of the time absent from Havana. Quinones was also in full authority as Captain-General, and these two former enemies were acting together in complete accord.

This radical change in the aspect of affairs was due to an impending crisis, the most serious thus far in the history of the Island. A new enemy had arisen, far more formidable than any the Island had yet known. For years Cuba had been harried by French privateers often little better than pirates, but now the English rovers of the sea began to infest the Spanish Main. In 1577 Sir Francis Drake entered upon his memorable voyage around the world, defiantly navigating that South Sea which Spain has regarded as exclusively her own, and ravaging the Peruvian treasure s.h.i.+ps even more ruthlessly than the French had preyed upon those of Mexico. Early in Luzan's administration warnings were given that this bold adventurer was planning a descent upon the West Indies and probably, therefore, upon Cuba.

This menace naturally caused great alarm at Havana and throughout the Island, and urgent appeals were made to the royal government and also to the Viceroy in Mexico for aid. It was represented that galleys were needed to patrol and to defend the coast. Artillery was needed for La Fuerza and for other fortifications at Havana and elsewhere. A larger garrison was also needed for La Fuerza. To these and other like appeals the King made no satisfactory reply. He apparently had no galleys nor men to spare for the defense of the Island. The best he would do was to direct Luzan to utilize his own resources to the full. A military census of the Island was to be taken, the first in its history, and all available men including Indians and negroes, were to be mustered into service.

The result of this enrolment, which was made in the spring of 1582, was unsatisfactory. In Havana itself only 226 men fit for service could be found, and no other town on the Island could furnish more than a quarter as many. They were, moreover, chiefly men unused to arms and therefore of little prospective value against the formidable fighting men whom Drake was reported to have in his train. As for La Fuerza, sickness and desertion had so depleted its garrison that not a score of able-bodied men were left. Quinones gathered in reinforcements of 60 or 70, chiefly young and inexperienced men and thus raised the apparently effective strength to something less than 100, when more than 200 were considered necessary. Two small bra.s.s cannon and a supply of powder and small arms came from Spain, and Luzan either purchased or requisitioned from a visiting s.h.i.+p four more small cannon. The Governor also destroyed, by burning, all the houses which had been built close to La Fuerza so as to leave an open zone of considerable strength around that fortress.

Despite the conflict between Luzan and Quinones already recorded, some substantial progress was made, especially by the latter, in strengthening the defenses of Havana to meet the coming storm. La Fuerza was improved in various respects, though it was impossible to get rid of the dampness which pervaded the place. On the Punta at the entrance to the harbor trenches were dug and a gun platform was built. The efficiency of these was unsparingly ridiculed by the Royal Treasurer, Rojas, and indeed Quinones himself soon realized their unsatisfactory character. He therefore undertook the construction of the real fort, and by the end of 1583 had it sufficiently completed to permit the mounting of eight pieces of artillery. He then declared that if he were properly supplied with powder and shot he could defend Havana against all comers.

He did not wish more soldiers, and indeed he strongly protested against the levies from Mexico for which Luzan had sent. During the spring of 1583 about 100 men did arrive from Mexico under a Captain who looked to Luzan and not to Quinones for orders; a circ.u.mstance which naturally added to the confusion and conflict of authority. But after a few months Luzan himself agreed with Quinones in regarding the men as practically worthless, and a.s.sented to their s.h.i.+pment back to Mexico.

CHAPTER XXI

Such, then, was the state of affairs when in 1585 war began between Spain and England. English adventurers infested Spanish territory on the main land in the northern part of the vast region which the Spanish still called Florida. They planned an English colony at the Bay of Santa Maria and renamed that place "Roanoke" and they also renamed that part of Florida after the Queen of England; calling it "Virginia." The news of this invasion appears to have been known in Cuba, by the way of Southern Florida, before it was known in Spain, and a fleet vessel was accordingly sent from Havana to bear the tidings to the King and to ask for further protection from Cuba.

There was a period of hesitancy and uncertainty, and then the storm broke. On January 10th, 1586, Sir Francis Drake landed in Hispaniola and occupied the City of Santo Domingo, the nominal capital of all the Spanish West Indies. Some of the judges of the Supreme Court at that place escaped and fled to Cuba, where they arrived a week later with the startling news. Luzan, as already related, was then at Bayamo, and it was there that he received the news. He was startled and alarmed, but appears not to have been panic stricken. Indeed he acted with coolness and judgment and in a manner which must be regarded as going far toward redeeming his reputation from the reproaches which he had formerly incurred. Discreetly a.s.suming that Drake's attack upon Cuba, whenever it was made, would be not at Bayamo but at the Capital and metropolis itself, his first thought was for Havana. Immediately upon receiving the news from Santo Domingo he dispatched hors.e.m.e.n across country from Bayamo to Havana to bear the tidings to Quinones, bidding them also to spread the news through all the country as they went and to command all towns to marshal all available men and send them on to Havana for the reinforcement of that place. As soon as possible he also sent two vessels from Bayamo to Havana laden with men and supplies. Ignoring their former quarrels in the face of the common danger he wrote to Quinones outlining his plans for a defense of the Island and urging that an appeal should be sent to Mexico for aid, from which country it could be procured much more quickly than from Spain. Then he hastened to Santiago and from that port sent two vessels to Spain to tell the King what had happened at Santo Domingo and what was being done to avert, if possible, a like calamity at Havana.

The Governor's appeals to the various munic.i.p.alities were not without effect. The people of Cuba seemed to be aroused by the imminence of danger to a better degree of public spirit than they had ever before manifested. Bayamo, Sancti Spiritus, Puerto Principe, and even poor little Trinidad, the smallest and weakest town of the Island, contributed men and arms to their full ability, and when at the beginning of May these levies were mustered in Havana they numbered more than 225 efficient men, tolerably well armed. Luzan himself remained at Bayamo, in the absence of orders or even permission to return to Havana, professing readiness and eagerness to serve the King there or elsewhere, wherever he could be of most use. At Havana Quinones was in command, loyally supported by the Town Council, the royal officials and the entire community. Even the austere and censorious Rojas, the Royal Treasurer, who had been the bitter critic and opponent of Quinones, forgot his animosity and hastened to offer his services in any capacity in which they might be utilized. It is related that Rojas, despite his years, his wealth and his social dignity, worked as a common laborer with pick-axe and shovel in digging trenches and throwing up breastworks for the fortification of the town, thus setting an example which left no other citizen any excuse for s.h.i.+rking duty and indeed went far toward inspiring the whole community with patriotic fervor. A proclamation was also issued by the Mayor, Pedro de la Vega, addressed to all citizens who, because of debts, quarrels, crimes, or other causes, had sought sanctuary in the church or gone into hiding in the jungle, asking them to come forward and aid in the defense of Havana, and promising them immunity from arrest or prosecution and a period of a fortnight's grace in which to return to their asylums or their hiding places after the need of their services was ended. This extraordinary call was responded to by scores of fugitives.

There was no neglect, either, in preparation for the defense of the suburbs of Havana. Chorrera was generally regarded not only as a possible but as a very probable landing point for the invaders, from which a march could be made by land against Havana. It was not practicable to fortify the place strongly enough to prevent the landing of any considerable force, but a small camp was established there, occupied by a company of hors.e.m.e.n, who were to keep watch day and night for the approach of the enemy, and upon his first appearance were to ride post-haste to Havana with the news. The first horseman was to set out the moment the enemy was sighted in the distance. A second was to follow as soon as the fleet was near enough for the number of vessels and their approximate strength and men and guns to be determined. A third would set out the moment the enemy's intention, either of landing there or of proceeding on to Havana, was ascertained. A fourth would wait until the enemy was actually landing and his numbers could be determined, and would then hasten after the others with the news.

Nearer the city there were several other possible landing places at inlets of the coast and some of these were fortified with earth-works and artillery. Chief among these was the inlet of San Lazaro, where in addition to earth works an enclosed fort of timber, stone and earth was constructed with several cannons mounted on a platform. At the entrance to the harbor of Havana itself the strongest preparations were made. At Punta a dozen guns were in readiness to make that the chief point of defense outside of La Fuerza itself. Much attention was given to all roads leading into the city for several miles around; particularly toward the west from which direction the attack was chiefly expected.

Some of the roads were blocked altogether, others were mined and provided with pitfalls. Still others were screened and hidden with trees and brushwood so as to serve as secret means of pa.s.sage for the Spaniards in advancing against or retreating from the enemy, and these were so mined that after having served their purpose to the Spaniards they could be readily destroyed. Elsewhere trees, underbrush and jungle were cleared away so that there would be no cover nor concealment for the invading force. Trenches and earth-works were constructed between La Fuerza and Punta, and the former fortress was provisioned and prepared for a siege. Special parapets of timber, stone and earth were constructed upon the top of the fort, and numerous houses and other buildings near it were destroyed in order that there might be no shelter for an attacking force.

Nor was the possibility of an attack from the eastward overlooked. On the Morro headland at the important entrance a battery of three guns was placed, well protected by breast-works of timber, stone and earth, and the coast from Morro to Matanzas was continually patrolled by hors.e.m.e.n on the lookout for the coming of strange vessels, and under orders similar to those which had been given to the watchmen at Chorrera. As for the harbor itself, a great chain was stretched across its entrance buoyed with logs and fastened with a huge padlock at the foot of the Morro headland.

Finally the few swift sailing vessels which could be mustered into the service were kept cruising off the sh.o.r.e to espy the approaching squadron. They were not sufficiently strong to give battle, but they could give warning to the city. Also they could bear to Spain or to Mexico tidings of what occurred. Thus one vessel lay in the estuary of the Puercos River, ready to flee to Mexico, while another cruised around Ycacos Point, to hasten to Spain to tell if Havana should fall into the hands of the foe.

Meanwhile in Havana itself all possible forces were mustered for defense. The volunteers from the other towns were drilled into an efficient state of discipline. Such was their zeal that they gladly served without pay while a considerable number of them in addition provided their own rations at their own cost. For the necessary expenses of their maintenance Rojas, the Royal Treasurer, used what royal funds were in hand regardless of the purpose for which they had been designed, and when these were insufficient he collected taxes without authority, on the principle that the safety of the city and Island was the supreme law. At the beginning of April some welcome aid arrived from Mexico, which even Quinones was now glad to have. The Viceroy sent four vessels, bearing about 300 fighting men, with six months' supplies of food and with pay for eight months in advance. These increased the force under Quinones to more than 900 well-trained soldiers. During the month of April Luzan arrived from Bayamo with nearly 100 more men, thus increasing the garrison of Havana to about 1,000. This was a force which the Captain-General confidently believed would be able to resist and to repulse any force which Drake might be able to land.

Luzan had meantime, in February, received from Spain orders to resume the governors.h.i.+p of the Island with full power, to return to Havana, and to consider his term of office indefinitely prolonged. He had been appointed in 1579 for a term of four years and had a.s.sumed office in 1580, so that his original term was by this time long since expired.

Reckoning the four years from his actual a.s.sumption of office in the summer of 1580 his term had ended in 1584. If his return to Havana was not altogether agreeable to Quinones, and it is quite probable that it was not, at least a semblance of harmony was preserved between them, and there was certainly efficient if not cordial co-operation. To this auspicious state of affairs the Royal Treasurer contributed in no small degree.

In fact, in the face of the great peril which confronted it, all Cuba arose to the occasion with a unity of public spirit never before known in its history, and wholly admirable. All the officials, civil and military, insular and royal, were in accord, and all cla.s.ses of the population, Spaniards, Indians and negro slaves were loyal and devoted in their support. In these circ.u.mstances it is of fascinating interest to speculate upon what might have happened had Drake made the expected descent upon Havana. It is well within the limit not only of possibility but of probability that he would have been decisively defeated. It is even possible that in the conflict with more than a thousand well-armed, well trained and resolute Spaniards, than whom there were then no braver or better fighting men in all the world, he would himself have been captured or slain. And such a disposition of Francis Drake in the summer of 1586, only two years before the descent of the Invincible Armada upon the sh.o.r.es of England, might well have changed the history of the world.

But this was not to be. Some say that Drake did not intend to attack Havana at that time, preferring to raid Carthagena, as he did. Some say that by means of spies he ascertained the strength of Havana's defenses and deemed it, therefore, prudent not to meddle with that place. Some say that there was an interposition of Providence to dissuade him from what might have been a disastrous fiasco. We have also, as we shall presently see, the testimony of some Spanish fugitives, which is entirely plausible, though not certainly correct. Conjecture is inconclusive. Only the fact remains that Drake pa.s.sed by and left Cuba una.s.sailed.

From the latter part of February until the beginning of May no word of his doings came to Havana; anxiety meanwhile prevailing and preparations for his antic.i.p.ated arrival being unabated. At last word came, most ominous. A vessel from Spain, a heavily armed frigate, had been searching for Drake. It had tracked him from Santo Domingo to Carthagena, and had found him in full possession of the latter place.

There apparently, after two months' occupancy, he was preparing for some fresh adventure. This information convinced the Cuban authorities that the great struggle was at hand, and that the approach of the enemy would be from the westward by way of Cape San Antonio. After despoiling Carthagena Drake's logical course would be to raid Havana, and preparations for defense were therefore redoubled. Nor were these antic.i.p.ations soon to be dispelled. A few weeks later, on May 27th, a courier arrived from Cape San Antonio, the western extremity of the Island, with the news that five days before a powerful British armada, doubtless Drake's, had touched at that point for fresh water and other supplies. It was no mere raiding flotilla of privateers, such as those with which the French had long been troubling the Cuban coasts, but it was a fleet of thirty-sail, probably with two or three thousand soldiers aboard, and with artillery far superior both in number and range to all the defenses of Havana. The courier could not tell what the intentions of the fleet were or what was its destination. Possibly it was simply seeking to antic.i.p.ate and capture the treasure s.h.i.+ps of Spain coming from Mexico or from Darien with the silver, gold and gems of Peru and Golden Castile. More probably it was planning the conquest of Havana, as Santo Domingo and Carthagena had been conquered. This latter supposition seemed to be confirmed two days later, when another messenger arrived from the west, telling that it was indeed Drake's fleet and that it had sailed from Cape San Antonio eastward toward Havana.

In a minor measure Havana and all Cuba now antic.i.p.ated the feelings which England had two years later upon the approach of the Invincible Armada. Every man was summoned to his appointed place in the scheme of defense and insistent vigilance was maintained night and day. For this there was full need. Within an hour of the arrival of this second messenger from the west a Spanish s.h.i.+p from Mexico came flying into the port of Havana with half a dozen English s.h.i.+ps in hot pursuit. She pa.s.sed Punta and gained safety before they came up, the big chain being slackened to let her pa.s.s within and then tightened again to shut out her pursuers. They did not, however, attempt to enter the harbor. One came so near as to draw a few shots from the guns of the Morro Fort and then withdrew without returning fire. But an hour later eight more English sails appeared, making fourteen in all.

Evidently the crisis was at hand. Every available man in Havana was in his place. Every available cannon was double-shotted and trained upon the spot at which the English vessels would first come within range.

There was, however, no panic, no confusion. All men were resolute, confident and in high spirits. All night long sentinels watched the English fleet expecting to see it send boat loads of men ash.o.r.e; ready to signal the news with beacon fires and torches. But all night long the English fleet lay dark and silent in the offing.

The morning of May 30 dawned. It was clear and bright, the sea was smooth, the wind just sufficient to fill the sails. There could be no fitter day for a landing or for an approach to the harbor to bombard the forts and city. The sentinels on Morro counted all thirty of Drake's vessels, drawn up in line. Now and then one swept out in pursuit of some incautious or uninformed coasting vessel, but did not go far. The whole fleet maintained order as if in preparation for some great concerted operation.

Hours pa.s.sed and nothing was done. At mid-afternoon some boats were sent toward the sh.o.r.e near Chorrera, and the watchers on Morro signaled to La Fuerza that a landing was being made; only a little later to recall the tidings as those of a false alarm. Night came on, and again under cover of darkness it was imagined that Drake's men were seen approaching Chorrera. Every man in Havana remained awake with arms in hand, but the night waned and daylight showed the fleet still motionless and the sh.o.r.e at Chorrera still untouched. Thus for three days and nights the tension was maintained. The thirty English vessels lay off Havana, firing not a shot, sending not a man ash.o.r.e, and making no sign of their commander's purpose.

Then the suspense was ended, to the relief of many but to the disappointment of some. On June 4th the English fleet spread all its canvas and sailed away, heading north and east, and vanished forever from the sight of the watchers at Havana. Not the Cuban capital but the chief city of Florida was to be its prey, and presently word came back that Drake had attacked and captured the town and fortress of St.

Augustine, which Menendez had built and in the building of which he had drawn so sorely upon the scanty resources of Cuba. Quinones regretted that Havana had not been attacked, confident that the result would have been disastrous to the a.s.sailants. He took, however, all possible precautions against a surprise by a possible return of the English fleet. The coast patrols to Matanzas and beyond were maintained and vessels were sent out as scouts to follow in Drake's track and watch for his turning.

But no more was seen of Drake or heard of him until the end of June.

Then word came of his destruction of St. Augustine and of his departure thence to the northward, on some unknown errand. It was supposed that he had gone straight home. In fact, he went first to Virginia to visit the English colony at Roanoke and to take back to England its few discouraged survivors. Thus relieved from fear of invasion Havana rejoiced and gave a most practical turn to its thanksgiving by sending a vessel or two richly laden with supplies to the relief of the hapless people of St. Augustine, many of whom had been former residents of Cuba.

Meantime some explanation, as we have already seen, came to Havana of the reason for Drake's failure to take that place. Several Spaniards whom Drake had captured at Carthagena, had contrived to make their escape from him when he touched at Cape San Antonio, and after much wandering found their way to Havana. They reported that on the way from Carthagena to Cuba the English fleet had been sorely afflicted with disease including scurvy and possibly also yellow fever, so that many persons died and many more were incapacitated. Moreover his vessels were crowded with captives and with plunder. In these circ.u.mstances he was obviously in no condition to attack so strong a place as Havana, and in a conference with his captains he practically decided to pa.s.s by that place and to seek cooler northern lat.i.tudes where his sick men might more speedily recover.

Havana's deliverance was Santiago's disaster. The preparations for the defense of the former city had drawn thither the fighting strength of the entire Island. Men, munitions, even artillery, had been stripped from all other places for Havana's sake. Even after the departure of Drake, and after it was known that he had at least for the time abandoned his designs against Havana, the forces were still retained at the capital. This, of course, was known to the foes of Cuba and of Spain, as well as to Havana itself, and there were those who were not slow to take advantage of it. French privateers were still hostile and were raiding Spanish ports wherever opportunity afforded, and the stripping of Santiago for Havana's defense gave such opportunity.

So at the very time when Havana learned that Drake had taken Carthagena and was on his way to the Cuban capital, two French vessels appeared off Santiago with hostile intent. A demand was made for food, which the town authorities refused. Probably the demand was a mere pretext. At any rate the refusal of it was the signal for immediate attack. From noon to night of May 2nd the battle raged, the Spaniards, only a handful of men, displaying invincible valor in circ.u.mstances of desperate difficulty.

The leader of the defense was a parish priest who was badly wounded by one of his own men. One other Spaniard was killed by the explosion of a wretched little cannon which had been pressed into service, all good guns having been taken to Havana. But these were the only Spanish losses. On the other hand, one of the French s.h.i.+ps, going aground, was almost destroyed by the Spanish fire before her consort could pull her off. And the two riddled with shot were at last glad to make their escape in flight, throwing overboard as they sailed away more than a score of bodies of men killed by the Spanish musketeers. It was too much to hope, however, that this repulse of the French would prove final. It would almost certainly be followed with a stronger attack for vengeance, and Santiago made what scanty preparations it could to meet the coming storm.

Gomez de Rojas, a member of the ill.u.s.trious family whose members played so great a part in early Cuban history, was at that time the deputy of the Governor in that part of the Island, making his headquarters at Bayamo. A few days before this attack on Santiago he and his men had killed seven Frenchmen and captured ten more under the lead of a notorious freebooter. The heads of the seven he displayed on pikes at Bayamo, and on the very day when the two French vessels reached Santiago he hanged eight of the ten prisoners. It is recorded that the trial of these men was not yet concluded. But Rojas grimly observed that the trial could be finished after the hanging just as well as before, as there could be no doubt as to what the verdict and the sentence would be. For this ruthless proceeding the Bishop, Salcedo, reprimanded and indeed excommunicated Rojas, and there was danger that thus disastrous dissension would arise among the Spaniards. But Rojas, who seems to have been a diplomat as well as a soldier and administrator, contrived to make peace with the Bishop, and all was well.

Of such unity there was sore need. For a few days later a squadron of seven French s.h.i.+ps, carrying 800 soldiers, appeared off Santiago. To meet them Santiago, with all possible aid from Bayamo and the country around could number less than 100 men, some say not more than 70, indifferently armed and with only a few pounds of gunpowder. For several days the French vessels lay off Santiago, frequently firing upon the town at a range at which their own cannon were effective but at which the Spaniards, with far inferior guns and little ammunition, were quite helpless. However, the French made no attempt at landing, a circ.u.mstance which for a time puzzled the Spaniards. Then came the explanation. While their fleet lay directly before Santiago the French had put 150 men ash.o.r.e at Zuragua, and these were advancing upon Santiago over land. As soon as this was known a little force of 20 Spaniards and 10 Indians was sent out to meet them, with only two or three rounds of ammunition to each man. They met in unequal battle and the Spaniards lost five men.

But they killed twenty Frenchmen before they were completely exhausted and were compelled to surrender. Another detachment of thirty Spaniards kept up a good fight at the landing place in Santiago until their ammunition was exhausted and then they retreated to the hills. The French fire from the s.h.i.+ps destroyed more than half the town, and the troops who were then landed demolished most of the remaining buildings.

Then a hasty retreat was made, presumably through fear of the rumored approach of the powerful Spanish fleet, which unfortunately did not materialize.

Gomez de Rojas had been at Bayamo when this attack began. As soon as he heard of it he hastened on horseback to Santiago, but arrived in time only to see the last French sail vanish in the distance. Had he been there it is not certain that he could have saved the town. Indeed it is probable that he could not have done so. But it is certain that he saved it after the event. So completely had Santiago been demolished by the French that many of the people were determined not to attempt to rebuild but to abandon the place and go elsewhere. A council of war was held on May 25, at a country house a league inland from the ruined city, at which all the officials and most of the citizens of Santiago were present. Rojas was, fortunately, the presiding officer. The military commander, Captain Camacho, told of what had happened and what the condition of the place was. It had no military strength. There was not a pound of powder or shot left. The few pieces of artillery which had not been captured or destroyed were concealed in the woods, but were of course useless without ammunition. Fewer than a score of houses were standing. The cathedral and the monastery had been destroyed, though the hospital and a church had received little damage. There was, he believed, nothing left to serve as the nucleus of a rebuilt town.

Much discussion followed his report. Some were resolute for rebuilding the place, which they regarded rightly as the birthplace of the Spanish settlement of Cuba. Others were equally bent on abandoning it altogether and migrating to Havana or elsewhere. Opinions were so evenly divided that it was finally agreed to suspend decision until one other leading citizen, who was absent from the meeting, could be heard from, with the understanding that his vote should be decisive.

Then it was that Gomez de Rojas rose to the height of the occasion. He ascertained secretly that this missing citizen was in favor of abandoning Santiago and would so declare himself. Determined to forestall and to prevent such a decision and thus to save the town, Rojas immediately ordered the clergy to celebrate ma.s.s next morning. He ordered the town authorities to put all the remaining buildings in order for occupancy and to repair those which had been damaged. He ordered every man in town to appear at the church that morning, ready for any action which might be needed. He ordered the Town Council to meet as usual the next day. He ordered the market to be opened at once, and artisans to get to work and the Indians to burn the bodies of the Frenchmen who had been killed in battle, and in brief he ordered everybody in Santiago to get to work to rehabilitate the town. The sheer energy of this one strong man carried the day, and Santiago arose from its ruins larger and more important than ever before, though it was never again to be the capital of all Cuba. Havana had already for several years been practically, though without full authority, the capital of the Island. The formal and authoritative change was made a few years later, in 1589.

During the administration of Governor Luzan there was some renewed interest in copper mining in Cuba, although the wealth of the island in that metal was not yet appreciated. In 1580 what was supposed to be an immensely rich mine was discovered, but it proved to be a mere "pocket"

of limited extent. That disappointment, together with the cost of transportation from the neighborhood of Santiago to Havana for s.h.i.+pment, discouraged further efforts for a time. But in May, 1587, after inspection of the Cobre mine, near Santiago, the Governor reported to the Spanish government: "There is so much metal, and the mines are so numerous, that they could supply the world with copper." Comparatively little was done, however, until 1599, when effective work was begun at El Cobre. The ore was conveyed to Havana for smelting and casting, and on the site of the present Maestranza Building there was established a foundry where copper was cast into both cannon and kettles.

CHAPTER XXII

It is an interesting circ.u.mstance that what threatened to be a great disaster to Cuba proved in fact to be one of the greatest blessings that the Island had enjoyed since the Spanish settlement. We have already seen how great an alarm was caused at Havana and throughout Cuba by the threatened attack of the British under Sir Francis Drake and how fine a degree of public spirit and unity among all cla.s.ses was thereby inspired. The threatened attack did not occur, and it was many years before an actual British conquest or even invasion of the Island was effected. But the lessons learned in that period of agitation and after were not speedily forgotten, either in Cuba or in Spain. Therefore, a much larger degree of public spirit and of unity prevailed in the Island, among the Government officers and among the people, while the Spanish crown was awakened to a fuller realization than ever before of the value of Cuba and the imperative necessity of defending the Island if the integrity of the Spanish Empire in the Western Hemisphere was to be maintained. It was then that Philip II began to appreciate Cuba as the bulwark of the West Indies and of the City of Havana, its capital, as the key to the New World. Hitherto Cuba had been nothing but a stepping stone between Spain on the one hand and Mexico, Darien and Florida on the other; and Havana was merely a convenient base of operations and a port of call. But now the immense strategical importance of Havana was realized, while the value of the Island, in its products of copper, wood, sugar, hides and other commodities, was appreciated.