The United States Since the Civil War Part 28

The best brief general accounts of recent conditions are in F.A. Ogg, _National Progress_, with an excellent bibliography, which may be supplemented by the _American Year Book_. On hours and conditions of labor, J.R. Commons and J.B. Andrews, _Principles of Labor Legislation _(1916). The decision in Lochner _v._ New York is in _United States Reports_, vol. 198, p. 45. For the courts and economic legislation, C.G. Haines, _American Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy _(1914), already referred to. An excellent historical account of the workmen's compensation idea is by A.F. Weber in _Political Science Quarterly_ (June, 1902). Ida M. Tarbell, _New Ideals in Business_ (1917), describes the accomplishments of the industrial leaders rather than of the rank and file.

Some of the political innovations are discussed in A.L. Lowell, _Public Opinion and Popular Government_ (1913); _Proceedings of the American Political Science a.s.sociation_, V, 37, "The Limitations of Federal Government"; Elihu Boot, _Addresses on Government and Citizens.h.i.+p _(1916), "How to Preserve the Local Self-Government of the State." The most complete account of the historical development of the power of the president is in Edward Stanwood, _History of the Presidency, II _(1916), Chap. V. The fullest account of the movement for popular election of senators is G.H. Haynes, _The Election of Senators _(1906).

The initiative, referendum and recall have given rise to a literature of their own. Convenient volumes are: C.A. Beard and B.E. Shultz, _Doc.u.ments on the State-wide Initiative_, _Referendum and Recall_ (1912); W.B. Munro, _The Initiative, Referendum and Recall_ (1912); J.D. Barnett, _Operation of the Initiative, Referendum, and Recall in Oregon_ (1915).

_American Political Science Review _(Aug., 1915), "Presidential Preference Primaries." The articles in A.C. McLaughlin and A.B. Hart, _Cyclopaedia of American Government_ (3 vols., 1914), are a convenient source on most topics considered in this chapter.

On the use of money in politics: _Report of the Legislative Insurance Investigating Committee _(10 vols., 1905-1906), Armstrong-Hughes committee; _Testimony before a Sub-committee of the Committee on Privileges and Elections, United States Senate, 62d Congress, 2d session, pursuant to Senate Resolution 79_ (Clapp Report).

[1] Above, pp. 320-323.

[2] Below, p. 508.

[3] Above, p, 442.

[4] An act of 1906 had been declared unconst.i.tutional.

[5] It should be said, however, that the meaning of this law is far from clear and is yet (1920) to be interpreted by the courts.

[6] Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt also favored it. See Ogg, _National Progress_, 123-130.

[7] Below, p. 571.

[8] By 1920 twenty-three states had adopted the referendum or the initiative and referendum.

[9] The amendment reads: Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any State, on account of s.e.x. Section 2. Congress shall have power, by appropriate legislation, to enforce the provisions of this article.

The amendment was ratified by the required number of states and proclaimed in force August 26, 1920.

[10] The election of Senator Isaac Stephenson of Wisconsin occasioned another outbreak of reform sentiment. Investigation betrayed the fact that he had expended $107,793.05 in his primary campaign. The salary of a senator at that time was $7,500 per annum.

[11] An investigation of federal campaign expenditures conducted in 1912-1913 by a committee headed by Senator Moses Clapp uncovered much that had hitherto been only the subject of rumor. The Standard Oil Company, for instance, contributed $125,000 in 1904. Archbold, the vice-president of the company, testified that he told Bliss, the Republican treasurer, "We do not want to make this contribution unless it is thoroughly acceptable and will be thoroughly appreciated by Mr.

Roosevelt"; and that Bliss "smilingly said we need have no possible apprehension on that score." Archbold complained later when the administration attacked the company, but Roosevelt declared that he was unaware of the contribution at the time. The Republican fund in 1908 was $1,655,000. The testimony of Norman E. Mack, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, indicated his perfect willingness to accept money wherever he could get it, and that he refused to receive contributions from corporations only because of Bryan's scruples.

Roosevelt declared, on the authority of an insurance officer, that the Democrats in the campaign of 1904 were after all the corporation funds they could get.

CHAPTER XXIII

LATER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS[1]

At the close of the war with Spain it was commonly remarked that the United States had become a world power; books and periodicals written on the history of the period were based upon the a.s.sumption that America had swung out into the current of international affairs and that the traditional isolation of this country had become a thing of the past. Time must be appealed to, however, for answers to fundamental questions concerning the character of this change. Did the United States become a world power in the sense that the majority of its people threw off that policy of steering clear of permanent alliances which had been expressed by Was.h.i.+ngton in his farewell address, in favor of the policy of partic.i.p.ation in world affairs on a footing with the larger European states? Did the people of the United States after 1898 take a constant and informed interest in world politics and international relations? Or did the people, after a slight excursion into the West Indies and the Philippines, return to the traditional att.i.tude of "splendid isolation"? Was the extent to which the United States became a world power sufficient to make probable its entry into a European war?

A cardinal principle of the foreign policy of the United States has always been its attachment to international peace, particularly through the practice of arbitration. The great hopes raised by the two Hague Conferences were striking proofs of this fact. In 1899, at the suggestion of Czar Nicholas II of Russia, twenty-six leading powers conferred at The Hague, in order to discover means of limiting armaments and ensuring lasting peace. A second conference was held in 1907 at the suggestion, in part, of President Roosevelt. At this gathering forty-four states were represented, including most of the Latin-American republics. During the two conferences many questions relating to international law were discussed, and the conclusions reached were expressed in the form of "Conventions," which the several powers signed. In the main these agreements related to the rights and duties of nations and individuals in time of war. Most important among the agreements was one for the pacific settlement of international disputes, according to which, in certain less important controversies, the states concerned would appoint a "commission of inquiry" which would study the case and give its opinion of the facts involved. It was also agreed to organize a Permanent Court of Arbitration to be available at all times for the peaceful settlement of differences.

Strictly speaking this body was not a Court, but a list of judges to which each nation was to contribute four, and when any countries became involved in a controversy they could draw arbitrators from the list.

Moreover the powers agreed "if a serious dispute threatens to break out between two or more of them, to remind these latter that the Permanent Court is open to them."

The United States was a party to four of the fifteen cases presented to the Court between 1902 and 1913. The first controversy was between the United States and Mexico and involved "The Pious Fund," a large sum of money which was in dispute between Mexico and the Roman Catholic Church of California, and the second concerned claims of the United States, Mexico and eight European countries against Venezuela. As the Court was successfully appealed to in case after case, high hopes began to be entertained that the "Parliament of Man" had at last been established.

Elihu Root, the Secretary of State, a.s.serted in a communication to the Senate in 1907 that the Second Conference had presented the greatest advance ever made at a single time toward the reasonable and peaceful regulation of international conduct, unless the advance made at The Hague Conference of 1899 was excepted.

In the meantime, in 1904, under President Roosevelt's leaders.h.i.+p, treaties were arranged with France, Germany, Great Britain and other nations, under which the contracting parties agreed in advance to submit their disputes to The Hague Court, although excepting questions involving vital interests, independence or national honor. While the Senate was discussing the treaties, it fell into a dispute with the President in regard to its const.i.tutional rights as part of the treaty-making power, and although there was general agreement on the value of the principle of arbitration, yet the Senate insisted upon amending the treaties, whereupon the President refused to refer them back to the other nations. Secretary Root revived the project, however, in 1908 and 1909 and secured amended treaties with a long list of nations, including Austria-Hungary, France and Great Britain. President Taft signed treaties with France and England in 1911 which expanded the earlier agreements so as to include "justiciable" controversies even if they involved questions of vital interest and honor, but again the Senate added such amendments that the project was abandoned. Bryan, Secretary of State from 1913 to 1915, undertook still further to expand the principles of arbitration, and during his term of office many treaties were submitted to the Senate, under which the United States and the other contracting parties agreed to postpone warfare arising from any cause, for a year, in order that the facts of the controversy might be looked into. Many of these treaties were ratified by the Senate.

The att.i.tude of the American people toward the pacific settlement of international disputes found expression in many ways in addition to the arrangement of treaties. At Lake Mohonk, yearly conferences were held at which leading citizens discussed phases of international peace.

Andrew Carnegie and Edwin Ginn, the publisher, devoted large sums of money to countrywide education and propaganda on the subject. The leaders of the movement and the members.h.i.+p of the organizations included so many of the most prominent persons of their time--public officials, university presidents and men of influence as to prove that the traditional American reliance upon international arbitration was more firmly rooted in 1914 than ever before in our history.

The att.i.tude of the United States toward purely European controversies was ill.u.s.trated in our action on the Moroccan question. In 1905-1906 a controversy broke out between Germany and France in relation to Morocco, and in January of the latter year a conference was held at Algeciras in southern Spain in which ten European nations and the United States took part. The result of the meeting was an "Act" which defined the policy of the signatory powers toward Morocco. The Senate, in ratifying the Act, a.s.serted that its action was not to be considered a departure from our traditional policy of aloofness from European questions.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Caribbean interests of the United States]

The outstanding incident in our relations with that part of America south of the republic of Mexico was the controversy with Colombia over the Panama Ca.n.a.l strip. The project for a ca.n.a.l across the Isthmus of Panama was as old as colonization in America. For present purposes, however, it is not necessary to go farther into the past than the Clayton-Bulwer treaty of 1850, by the terms of which the United States and Great Britain agreed that neither would obtain any control over an isthmian ca.n.a.l without the other. As time went on, however, American sentiment in favor of a ca.n.a.l built, owned and operated by the United States alone grew so powerful that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901 was arranged with Great Britain. This agreement permitted a ca.n.a.l constructed under the auspices of the United States. Sentiment in Congress was divided between a route through Nicaragua and one through that part of the Republic of Colombia known as Panama, but in 1902 an act was pa.s.sed authorizing the President to acquire the rights of the New Panama Ca.n.a.l Company, of France, on the isthmus for not more than $40,000,000, and also to acquire a strip of land from Colombia not less than six miles wide.[2] In case the President was unable to obtain these rights "within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms," he was to turn to the Nicaragua route. President Roosevelt was himself in favor of the Panama project.

The Hay-Herran convention with Colombia was accordingly drawn up and signed in January, 1903, giving the United States the desired rights on the isthmus, but the Senate of Colombia rejected the treaty. Thereupon the New Panama Ca.n.a.l Company became alarmed because it would lose $40,000,000 in case the United States turned from Panama to Nicaragua, and its agents busied themselves on the isthmus in the attempt to foment a break between Colombia and its province of Panama; the people of Panama became aroused because their chief source of future profit lay in their strategic position between the two oceans; and the President was concerned because Congress would soon meet and might insist on the Nicaragua route or at least greatly delay progress. He hoped for a successful revolt in Panama which would enable him to treat with the province rather than with Colombia, and he even determined to advise Congress to take possession forcibly if the revolt did not take place.

The administration meanwhile kept closely in touch with affairs in Panama, and having reason to suspect the possibility of a revolution sent war vessels to the isthmus on November 2, 1903, to prevent troops, either Colombian or revolutionary, from landing at any point within fifty miles of Panama. Since the only way by which revolution in Panama could be repressed was through the presence of Colombian troops, the action of the American government made success highly probable in case a revolt was attempted. On the next day the plans of the Ca.n.a.l Company agents or of some of the residents of Panama came to a head; early in the evening a small and bloodless uprising occurred; and while the United States kept both sides from disturbing the peace, the insurgents set up a government which was recognized within two days, and Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a former chief engineer of the Company, was accredited to the United States as minister. A treaty was immediately arranged by which the United States received the control of a zone ten miles wide for the construction of a ca.n.a.l, and in return was to pay $10,000,000 and an annuity of $250,000 beginning nine years later, and to guarantee the independence of Panama. The Secretary of State, John Hay, described the process of drawing up the treaty in a private letter of November 19, 1903:

Yesterday morning the negotiations with Panama were far from complete. But by putting on all steam, getting Root and Knox and Shaw together at lunch, I went over my project line by line, and fought out every section of it; adopted a few good suggestions: hurried back to the Department, set everybody at work drawing up final drafts--sent for Varilla, went over the whole treaty with him, explained all the changes, got his consent, and at seven o'clock signed the momentous doc.u.ment.

Although the Senate ratified the treaty, the action of the President was the cause of a storm both in that body and throughout the nation.

In self-defence Roosevelt condemned Colombia's refusal to ratify the Hay-Herran treaty and a.s.serted that no hope remained of getting a satisfactory agreement with that country; that a treaty of 1846 with Colombia justified his intervention; and that our national interests and the interests of the world at large demanded that Colombia no longer prevent the construction of a ca.n.a.l. On the other hand the President's critics called attention to the unusual haste that surrounded every step in the "seizure" of Panama; condemned the disposition of war vessels which prevented Colombia from even attempting to put down the uprising; and insinuated that the administration was in collusion with the insurgents. Roosevelt's successors in the presidency felt there was some degree of justice in the claim of Colombia that she had been unfairly treated by her big neighbor and several different attempts were made to negotiate treaties which would carry with them a money payment to Colombia. On July 29, 1919, the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate unanimously reported to that body the favorable consideration of a treaty providing for a money payment of $25,000,000, but other matters intervened and no further progress resulted.[3]

The work of constructing the waterway was delayed by changes of plan until 1906, when a lock ca.n.a.l was decided upon, and shortly afterward a start was made. So huge an undertaking--the isthmus is forty-nine miles wide at this point--was an engineering task of unprecedented size, and involved stamping out the yellow fever, obtaining a water supply, building hospitals and dwellings and finding a sufficient labor force, as well as the more difficult problems of excavating soil and building locks in regions where land-slides constantly threatened to destroy important parts of the work. At length, however, all obstacles were overcome and on August 15, 1914, the ca.n.a.l was opened to the pa.s.sage of vessels.

The final diplomatic question relating to the ca.n.a.l concerned the rates to be charged on traffic pa.s.sing through. By the terms of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty with Great Britain, the United States agreed that the ca.n.a.l should be free and open to all nations "on terms of entire equality." In 1912 Congress enacted legislation exempting American coast-wise vessels from the payment of tolls, despite the protest of Great Britain. As President Wilson was of the opinion that our action had been contrary to our treaty agreement, he urged the repeal of the act upon his accession in 1913, and succeeded in accomplis.h.i.+ng his purpose.

The construction of the Ca.n.a.l under American auspices committed the United States to new responsibilities in the Caribbean. Her coaling station in Cuba, the possession of Porto Rico and the protection of the isthmus made it a matter of national safety to preserve stable governments in Central America and the West Indies. The infiltration of American capital into the region served to ally economic with political interest, for like European investors, our capitalists have taken a part in the exploitation of South American sugar, fruit, coffee, oil and asphalt. With the islands and sh.o.r.es of the Caribbean Sea alone, American trade doubled in the decade after 1903. Orderly government south of the United States became accordingly essential to the welfare of our outlying possessions, and to the commercial interests of a group of investors. The most important international questions that have arisen in Spanish America related to Venezuela in 1902 and Santo Domingo in 1905.

Venezuela had long granted concessions to foreign investors--Germans, English, Italians and others--in order to develop her mines, timber and railroads, but unsettled conditions in the country frequently resulted in the non-fulfillment of the obligations which had been entered into.

Germany, for example, claimed that the government of Venezuela had guaranteed dividends on the stock of a railroad built by German subjects and had failed to live up to the contract. Having in mind the possible use of force to compel Venezuela to carry out her alleged obligations, Germany consulted our state department to discover whether our adherence to the Monroe Doctrine would lead us to oppose the contemplated action. The att.i.tude of President Roosevelt in 1901 was that there was no connection between the Monroe Doctrine and the commercial relations of the South American republics, except that punishment of those nations must not take the form of the acquisition of territory. In 1902 Germany, Great Britain and Italy proceeded to blockade some of the ports of Venezuela, and the latter thereupon agreed to submit her case to arbitration. Apparently, however, Germany was unwilling to relinquish the advantage which the blockade seemed to promise, and in the meantime Roosevelt became fearful that the result of the blockade might be the more or less permanent occupation of part of Venezuela. He therefore told the German amba.s.sador that unless the Emperor agreed to arbitration within ten days, the United States would send a fleet to Venezuela and end the danger which Roosevelt feared.

The pressure quickly produced the desired results, and during the summer of 1903 many of the claims were referred to commissions. The three blockading powers believed themselves ent.i.tled to preferential treatment in the settlement of their claims, over the non-blockading nations, while the latter held that all of Venezuela's creditors should be treated on an equality. This portion of the controversy was referred to the Hague tribunal, which subsequently decided in favor of the contention raised by Germany, Great Britain and Italy, and eventually all the claims were greatly scaled down and ordered paid.[4]

The Venezuela case made evident the possibility that European creditors of backward South American nations might use their claims as a reason for getting temporary control over harbors or other parts of these countries. There was also ground for the fear that temporary control might become permanent possession. Hence in the Santo Domingo case, the United States adopted a new policy. The debts of Santo Domingo were far beyond its power to pay; its foreign creditors were insistent. An arrangement was accordingly made by which the United States took over the administration of the custom houses, turned over forty-five per cent. of the income to the Dominican government for current expenses, and used the remainder to pay foreign claims. The plan worked so well that its main features were continued and imitated in the protectorates over Haiti (1915) and Nicaragua (1916).

The progress which has been made in composing the jarring relations among the American states is due in part to the Pan American Union and to the Pan American Conferences. The Union is an organization of twenty-one American republics which devotes itself to the improvement of the commercial and political relations of its member states. The first Pan American Conference, held at Was.h.i.+ngton in 1889, has already been mentioned.[5] At the second, at Mexico City in 1901, the American republics which had not already done so agreed to the conventions signed at The Hague in 1899. At the third conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1906 and the fourth in Buenos Aires in 1910, its field of effort was further broadened, and in the latter year a recommendation was pa.s.sed that the Pan American states bind themselves to submit to arbitration all claims for pecuniary damages.

President Wilson continued unbroken the policy of protectorates which President Roosevelt had initiated in the case of San Domingo. His statements of general policy were conciliatory and evidently designed to allay suspicion, and he constantly expressed the view that the American states were cooperating equals. And having a.s.serted that the United States had no designs upon territory, and nothing to seek except the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents, he gave practical evidence of his purposes by urging that all unite to guarantee one another their independence and territorial integrity, that disputes be settled by investigation and arbitration, and that no state allow revolutionary expeditions against its neighbors to be fitted out on its territory.[6]

American relations with Great Britain between 1896 and 1914 were such as to lend themselves to amicable settlement. The question of the boundary between Alaska and Canada, to be sure, contained some of the elements of trouble. The treaty of 1825, between Russia and Great Britain, had established the boundary between Alaska and Canada in terms that were somewhat ambiguous, the most important provision being that the line from the 56th degree of north lat.i.tude to the 141st degree of west longitude should follow the windings of the coast, but should be drawn not more than ten marine leagues inland. The coast at this point is extremely irregular, and the few important towns of the region are at the heads of the bays. With the discovery of gold in the Klondike region in 1897 and the consequent rush of population to the coast settlements, the question of jurisdiction became important.

The claim of Great Britain was that the word "coast" should be interpreted to include adjacent islands. Hence the ten league line would follow the general direction of the sh.o.r.e but would cut across the inlets and headlands and thus leave the towns in the possession of Canada. The American contention was that the line should follow closely the windings of the sh.o.r.e of the mainland, thus giving the United States a continuous strip of coast. The controversy was referred in 1903 to a board composed of three Americans, two Canadians and the Lord Chief Justice of England. On all the important points the English representative concurred with the Americans and a line was subsequently drawn in general conformity with our contention.[7]

The most complicated negotiation of the period, as well as one of the most complicated in our history, concerned the North Atlantic Coast fisheries. Under the treaty of 1818 relating to matters remaining over from the War of 1812, the United States possessed certain rights on the fis.h.i.+ng grounds off Newfoundland and Labrador. From then on there was intermittent negotiation concerning the meaning of the terms of the treaty and the justice of fis.h.i.+ng regulations made by Canada. In 1908 the United States and Great Britain made a general arbitration treaty, under the terms of which the fisheries question was referred to members of the Court of Arbitration at The Hague.[8] The award, made in 1910, upheld the rights of American fishermen on the coasts of Newfoundland, and recommended the establishment of a permanent fishery commission to settle all future controversies. This was accomplished in 1912 and an irritating and long-standing dispute was put to rest.

"Dollar diplomacy" was the chief novelty in our relations with China.

The expression was used in President Taft's administration, when his Secretary of State, P.C. Knox, devoted much attention to promoting loans, contracts and concessions in Central and South America, and more particularly in China. The argument for dollar diplomacy was that it opened new fields for the use of American capital, and thus indirectly benefited the whole people. The President also believed that investments in China would further American influence there and react favorably in continuing the open-door policy which had been initiated by Secretary Hay. The objection most commonly made was that the government became bound up in the interests of investors and might be compelled to interpose with armed force when difficulties arose between the investor and the state where the investment was made.

An opportunity for large investments in China was presented during 1912-1913. In the former year a revolution in that distracted country had come to an end and a republic had been set up with Yuan s.h.i.+h-kai as President. Since the new government was in need of funds, it undertook to borrow through an a.s.sociated group of bankers from six foreign nations, the United States among them. The financial interests agreed to the loan, but insisted on having a hand in the administration of Chinese finance, so as to ensure repayment. At this point President Wilson's administration began. The bankers at once asked him whether he would request them to partic.i.p.ate in the "six-power" loan, as President Taft had done. Wilson declined to make the request, fearing that at some future time the United States might be compelled to interfere in Chinese financial and political affairs, whereupon the American bankers withdrew and the six-power group subsequently disintegrated.