Moral Theology Part 102

Insurance contracts and the civil laws governing them are so complicated that expert legal knowledge is required to understand the legal status of many insurance cases. However, a few dispositions of the civil law which differ from the tenets of the natural law should be kept in mind by the priest or confessor in dealing with the matters.

Two favor the insurance companies over the insured:

1) when fraud or misrepresentation lead to accidental error, the contract is declared void or voidable;

2) innocent non-disclosure or misrepresentation in good faith leading to accidental error also render the insurance contract voidable or perhaps even void. It is probable that the beneficiary in such cases might be permitted to claim the benefits due him according to the naturally valid contract, since these civil law dispositions are contrary to the conclusions of the natural law. He would be obliged, however, to rest.i.tution for damages caused by his fraud or misrepresentation committed with grave theological fault.

One prescription recognized by civil law and in some places made mandatory favors the insured, the convalidating or incontestability clause. The insurance company recognizes the validity of the policy after a specified period of time has elapsed, even in cases involving fraud on the part of the insured. If the contract prior to the time was voidable, the company loses its right to contest its validity; if the contract was void, it becomes convalidated. By terms of this clause, the natural-law obligation to restore by reason of fraud ceases and the beneficiary may lawfully keep the insurance money.

Obligations Arising after the Policy Is Issued. 1) The insured must pay the premiums at the times and according to the terms stated in the policy.

2) The insured must not increase the risk a.s.sumed by the company.

Concretely, in cases of property insured, the insured is bound in commutative justice not to deliberately destroy or damage the property covered by the policy under penalty of losing all rights to compensation. Compensation could be claimed, however, if the damaging or destructive action was only theologically right.

3) He must not claim or accept indemnity for articles not damaged; he must not submit a claim beyond a just estimate of the real damage. Some moralists maintain that a claim may be made for a higher amount with the intention of getting a just value after the insurance adjustor has made his investigation and lowered the estimated value. The adjustor's estimate, even if higher than the insured estimate, may be accepted provided no means have been taken to prevent a full and free examination of damage.

Operations on the stock market and similar markets are primarily contracts of buying and selling; they become contracts of chance when they a.s.sume the quality of speculation, i.e., gambling on future changes of prices. It is generally conceded that such contracts are not morally wrong in themselves and follow the laws of betting. Additional justification is added on the ground that such transactions in many instances supply the capital required for large-scale operations, future deliveries, etc. Occasional dissenting voices insist that certain aspects of such transactions, e.g., dealing in future values of wheat, rye, and other commodities, are immoral since they tend to determine prices independent of the real value of the products, the laws of supply and demand, etc. However, the arguments seem to involve more abuses controllable, if not actually controlled, by marketing laws and civil laws rather than any immorality in the operations themselves.

(c) Onerous Contracts.--These contracts require that there be equality between the recompense and the thing received. Thus, in a lease the lessor must not charge excessive rent, and the lessee must pay the rent faithfully; in a contract of labor, the employer must pay a fair wage (that is, one that at the minimum will meet the primary needs of the worker and his family to live in frugal comfort, and which will moreover equal the special value of the service given; for a complete treatment of the theology of the just wage, see Fr. Jeremiah Newman, "The Just Wage," _Theology Digest_, Vol. 2, Spring 1957, pp. 120-126, and "A Note on the Living Wage," by Edward Dui, S.J., in the same issue), and the laborer on his part must give a fair day's work as to quant.i.ty and quality; in partners.h.i.+p, the members must divide the profits and loss according to a reasonable distribution; in guaranty, pledge, and mortgage, justice requires that the burden a.s.sumed be not out of proportion to the benefit that is received.

2138. Fraudulent Contracts.--Examples of fraud in contracts are the following:

(a) in gratuitous contracts, a donee who by false representations obtains a gift, a lender who fails to make known to the borrower defects or dangers in the thing loaned;

(b) in onerous contracts, a landlord who conceals defects from one who is renting a house, members of a business concern who keep back information from partners or who give out false statements in order to entice investors, creditors who conceal their knowledge about the unreliability of a man for whom surety is given them;

(c) in aleatory contracts, in a pure wager, a person who bets on a thing supposed to be uncertain but about which he has certain information, or who knows that he will be unable to pay should be lose, or who will allow no odds though he knows that the probabilities are in his favor; in gaming, a player who pretends to be ignorant in order to inveigle another person into a game of skill, or who does not observe the rules of the game, or who fixes the cards or dice for himself in a game of chance; in lottery, a drawer who manipulates the lots so as to favor some of the players, etc.

Art. 5: THE QUASI-INTEGRAL AND POTENTIAL PARTS OF JUSTICE; THE VIRTUE OF RELIGION AND THE OPPOSITE VICES

(_Summa Theologica_, II-II, qq. 79-100.)

2139. The Quasi-Integral Parts of Justice.--The integral parts of a virtue are certain functions necessary for the perfect use of the virtue; for example, memory, perception, docility and quickness are needed for the fullest exercise of prudence (see 1648 sqq.). These parts are called here "quasi-integral," so as not to be confused with the properly integral parts, or divisions of quant.i.ty, in a material composite. In its first use "integral part" is spoken of bodily things; in its derived use of incorporeal things (such as virtues). The two previous articles treated the subjective parts of justice; the present article will begin with a consideration of the integral parts and the opposite sins.

2140. The integral parts of justice are expressed in the words of Psalm x.x.xiii. 15--"Turn away from evil, and do good"--for the perfectly just man will both establish the equality of justice by giving others their dues, and will preserve that equality by refraining from injuries.

(a) Thus, these integral parts are acts of virtue, and hence the avoidance of evil here is not a purely negative att.i.tude; it includes a positive repudiation by the will of all wish to harm others, and it is exercised especially when one is attacked and yet refuses to resort to injustice.

(b) These integral parts of justice are also distinct, one from the other. The other moral virtues regulate the pa.s.sions by bringing them to the moderation that lies midway between two evil extremes, and hence in respect to those virtues to turn away from evil is the same thing as to do good. But justice regulates human operations and external things both by reducing them to due equality and also by avoiding that which upsets the equality, and thus in the matter of justice it is one thing to do good, another thing to avoid evil.

(c) These integral parts of justice are also special, that is, they are distinct from other virtues. For, while every virtue turns away from evil and does good, the two acts we are now considering do these things with the express purpose of fulfilling justice. Thus, he who observes the commands and prohibitions of the law in order to render to G.o.d and the common good their dues, is perfect in general or legal justice; he who gives to other individuals what is owed them and also avoids doing them injury, is perfect in particular justice. To the two integral parts of justice are opposed the two sins of transgression and omission (see 35-39).

2141. The Potential Parts of Justice.--The potential parts of justice, that is, its annexed virtues, are those good habits that are subsidiary to justice, partaking in some degree, but not entirely, of its nature or activity. We saw above (1664 sqq.) that wise deliberation and wise decision belong to prudence, inasmuch as they are concerned with the government of conduct by reason, but that they fall short of its princ.i.p.al act, which is wise direction, and hence they are counted as potential parts. In like manner, there are a number of virtues which must be a.s.signed to justice, since they regulate man's will towards others, but which must be considered as its potential parts, because they do not share in one or the other of the two remaining essential notes of strict justice, namely, that a return is given which is equal to a debt, and that the debt is owed on account of a strict or legal right (see 1692).

2142. In the following enumeration are given the chief potential parts of justice in which there is a strict debt, but not an equal repayment.

(a) Thus, to G.o.d man owes whatever honor and veneration he manifests, but with all his efforts man can never pay to G.o.d a wors.h.i.+p that is equal to the debt. Thus, man cannot sufficiently thank G.o.d for His benefits: "What return can I make to the Lord for all that He has done for me?" (Psalm cxv. 12). The virtue of religion, therefore, is a potential part of justice.

(b) To parents children cannot make a full return for the benefits of life and upbringing, and the same may be said of one's country: "A due return is out of the question in honors paid to the G.o.ds and to parents . . . but a person is considered to be virtuous if he pays such regard as lies within his power" (Aristotle, _Ethics_, lib. VIII, cap. 16).

Hence, the virtue of piety is also a potential part of justice. In exceptional cases, however, a child may make an equal or even a greater return to his parents for the benefits received from them; for example, by saving his father from death he makes an equal return for the benefit of life, and by converting his parents to the faith he gives them spiritual life, which is more valuable than the natural life he received from them.

(c) To men of virtue we are unable to make a sufficient return for the good they do us by their instruction and example, and hence the honor we show them is less than the benefit we receive from them. The virtue of reverence (_observantia_) is then a potential part of justice.

2143. Degrees of Moral Debt.--The remaining potential parts of justice are those in which there is not a legal debt, which is enforced by some law, but a moral debt to which one is obliged from the decency or the greater decency of virtue. There are, then, two degrees of moral debt.

(a) A moral debt is more urgent, when without its fulfillment one cannot keep to the decency of virtue, that is, one cannot preserve the character of a virtuous man. Thus, if a moral debt is considered from the side of the debtor, he is obliged to show himself in words and deeds to others what he really is, has been, or intends to be (virtue of truthfulness); if the debt be viewed from the side of the creditor to whom some recompense is owed, there is the duty of grat.i.tude to him for his benefits and of punishment for his injuries (virtues of grat.i.tude and vindication). These parts of justice just mentioned are readily distinguishable from acts that pertain to general or particular justice and that are owed as legal debts. Thus, truthful testimony on the witness stand is a legal obligation, for the person who questions has a strict right to hear the truth; but veracity in social intercourse, or the habit of speaking the truth to others, is a moral obligation, one imposed by G.o.d but not enforced legally. Compensation for services bestowed according to contract is a legal duty, and the debtor can be compelled to pay; but thankfulness for gifts or other benefits is only a moral duty, and generally laws do not take account of ingrat.i.tude. Punishment of a delinquent by public authority is an act of commutative justice; but punishment meted out by a private person in self-defense, who appeals to the law or who forcibly but lawfully repels an injury, is an act of a virtue annexed to justice.

(b) A moral debt is less urgent, when without its fulfillment one can preserve virtue, but not the more becoming or more perfect course of virtue. The chief examples here are the virtues of friends.h.i.+p or affability and of liberality. To treat others in a friendly manner and to make oneself agreeable in company is suitable, not chiefly because of any benefits one has received from others, but because one is better for this oneself and by it the ways of life are made easier for all.

Likewise liberality is not due, but it shows a better disposition as to money and other temporal goods to be willing to distribute them to others willingly and generously. Without friends.h.i.+p and liberality the peace and harmony of social intercourse may be maintained, but with them it is maintained more easily and receives an added grace and distinction.

2144. Epieikeia.--The above-mentioned potential parts of justice are adjuncts of particular justice. There remains one more virtue to be noted, that of epieikeia or equity, which pertains to legal justice.

This is a subjective part of justice, since it is the superior function of legal justice, guiding it to follow what is substantial right, and preserving it from the danger of mere legalism or over-strict interpretation or application of Written law (see 358). With this, the crowning virtue of justice, the enumeration of its parts is brought to a close.

2145. The Virtue of Religion.--We shall now proceed to treat of the various parts of justice in the order in which they were given above (2142-2144), beginning with the virtue that renders to G.o.d His due.

Religion (holiness) is defined as "a moral virtue that disposes us to offer to G.o.d the wors.h.i.+p and honor that belong to Him as the supreme Author of all things."

(a) Thus, religion is a moral virtue, for, though it tends towards G.o.d, it is not numbered among the theological virtues, but among the moral virtues, being one of the potential parts of justice.

(b) It is an inclination, that is, it is a habit of the soul or the exercise of that habit in some act. The acts of religion are either elicited by it or commanded by it, according as they are its own proper activities and proceed directly from it and are directed immediately to G.o.d (e.g., acts of adoration, sacrifice, prayer), or belong to some other virtue employed by religion for the honor of G.o.d; for example, to visit the widows and orphans in their tribulation is an act of mercy, to keep oneself unspotted from this world is an act of temperance, but when used for the honor and glory of G.o.d these acts are also acts of religion (James, i. 27).

(e) It is paid to G.o.d, that is, being an act of justice, it renders to another what is His due. Religious honor given the saints or sacred images refers to G.o.d, for whose sake they are venerated.

(d) It is paid to G.o.d as the Supreme Being, that is, just as we are bound to tend to G.o.d and to serve Him, because He is our Last End, so are we bound to honor Him, because He is our Maker and Ruler.

(e) It offers to G.o.d the tribute of wors.h.i.+p, that is, some internal or external work done in acknowledgment of G.o.d's Majesty and with the purpose of impressing the wors.h.i.+pper or others with the sense of His greatness, or it is the sense of that greatness.

2146. Religion as a Moral Virtue.--(a) Religion takes its rank among the moral, not among the theological, virtues. A theological virtue has the Last End for its immediate object or subject-matter (e.g., faith is concerned directly with G.o.d, since it believes Him and in Him), and has no mean of virtue (e.g., faith cannot go to extremes by believing G.o.d too much); whereas a moral virtue has the means to G.o.d for its immediate object (e.g., justice is concerned directly with the actions we owe to others) and it must observe the golden mean (e.g., justice must pay the just price, neither more nor less, and at the proper time, place, and to the proper person, etc.). Now, it is clear that religion has for its immediate object the due performance of wors.h.i.+p, although G.o.d is the person for whose sake it is offered and His excellence the foundation of its necessity; and also that one must observe moderation in wors.h.i.+p as to circ.u.mstances of place, time, etc., although it is impossible to be extreme in the quant.i.ty or fervor one gives to wors.h.i.+p, since even the best efforts will fall short of the honor G.o.d deserves (Ecclus., xliii. 33).

(b) Religion is the greatest of the moral virtues, since the person in whose favor it is exercised is G.o.d Himself, and its obligation is correspondingly stricter than that of the other virtues. General and particular justice are owed to creatures, but the claim of a creature is much less than that of G.o.d. There is no contradiction in making religion a part of justice and then preferring it to justice, for it is more correct to speak of the integral and potential parts of virtues as quasi-parts, since they are called parts only from a.n.a.logy to parts that are found in material or living things, though they are not similar to those parts in all respects (see 1647, 1648, 2139). Neither does the fact that religion cannot pay in full make it inferior to justice, since in matters of virtue good will take precedence over the ability to pay. Since religion is the supreme moral virtue, irreligion is the chief offense against the moral virtues (e.g., malicious blasphemy is worse than injustice or intemperance).

2147. Superiority of Religion as a Virtue.--Religion, therefore, is superior to the following virtues: (a) it is superior to legal justice, the chief of the moral virtues that deal with human and natural good; (b) it is superior to humility, the chief of the moral virtues moderative of the pa.s.sions; (c) it is superior to mercy, the greatest of the virtues that relieve distress, for religion is offered to G.o.d, not for His utility, but for His external glory and our benefit; (d) it is greater than repentance, for it honors G.o.d, while repentance only disposes or prepares for satisfaction to His honor; (e) it is greater than large external offerings made to G.o.d without spirit, for "obedience is better than victims" (I Kings, xv. 22); that is, the internal acts of religion (reverence and devotion) are of more importance than external acts of wors.h.i.+p conducted with great pomp or magnificence but without the inner reverence, the obedience or other dispositions pleasing to G.o.d.

2148. Necessity of the Acts of Religion.--(a) The internal acts (devotion and prayer) are chiefly necessary, for these are exercised by the soul, and it is through them that the external acts are made truthful: "G.o.d is a spirit and those who adore Him must adore in spirit and in truth" (John, iv. 24).

(b) The external acts (adoration, sacrifice, etc.) are also necessary to man. G.o.d does not need these acts (Psalm xlix. 13), it is true, for no creature can add to the glory G.o.d has from Himself. But man needs the elevation and perfection which he receives from communication with the Supreme Being, and, as he is not all spirit, he must employ symbols and ceremonies to arouse, hold and strengthen the affections of his soul. Hence, although the ceremonial law of the Old Testament was abolished by Christ (see 342), the Christian religion recognizes the need of ceremonies, as is plain both from the Scriptures and the teaching and practice of the Church at all times. In the New Testament we read that Our Lord used vocal prayer, prayed on His knees, and made use of sacred hymns; and like external acts of religion are ascribed to Sts. Peter, Paul, and Stephen (Luke, xxii. 31; Matt., xxvi. 39; Acts, ii. 42, vii. 59, ix. 40). Public wors.h.i.+p is also a necessity on account of the nature of the Church as a visible society.

2149. The Internal Acts of Religion.--These internal acts are offerings made to G.o.d of the wors.h.i.+p of the soul itself, and they may be reduced chiefly to two: (a) devotion, which is the offering of the will and the highest act of religion, since from the will the other acts arise; (b) prayer, which is the offering of the intellect; for in prayer the thoughts of the mind rise to G.o.d as an oblation made to Him.

2150. Definition of Devotion.--Devotion is defined as "the will to give oneself readily to those things that pertain to the divine service." We find an example of it in Exod., x.x.xv. 21, where it is said that the mult.i.tude offered first fruits to the Lord with a most ready and devout mind. One who is devoted to another is strongly attached to that other's interests, and so one who is devout is zealous for the service of G.o.d.

(a) Thus, devotion is an act of the will, that is, an offering of oneself to the service of G.o.d, the Last End. But devotion will be found in other acts in so far as they are done under the will's impulse, such as prayer, adoration, sacrifice. The looks, gestures, and voice of those who pray or take part in services of divine wors.h.i.+p are influenced by internal devotion, and so become fitting expressions of honor shown to G.o.d and an inspiration to beholders.

(b) Devotion contains a ready willingness, that is, the devout person is quick to choose the divine honor as a purpose, quick also to select and to employ suitable means for this purpose. The great model of this is Our Lord, who declared that His very food was to serve His Father (John, iv. 34).

(c) Devotion is exercised in things that pertain to the divine service, that is, to the wors.h.i.+p or honor of G.o.d. Thus, he who offers himself to G.o.d intending the offering as an act of spiritual union or friends.h.i.+p exercises the virtue of charity, while he who forms the intention of doing good in order to glorify G.o.d exercises devotion. But devotion and charity are not separated, for charity inspires devotion and devotion nourishes charity.