Moral Theology Part 106

2203. Vows that Promise Something Displeasing to G.o.d.--(a) Vows that promise what is always evil (e.g., to steal) are invalid and, on account of the irreverence, gravely sinful, at least if the sin promised is mortal. (b) Vows that promise something that may turn out either evil or good (e.g., Jepthe's vow to immolate the first living being that came before him) are imprudent, and should not be kept as to the part that is sinful.

2204. What should be said of vows that promise something good, but that have an evil end or other evil circ.u.mstances?

(a) The vow is invalid and illicit if the evil circ.u.mstance affects the thing promised itself, so that the fulfillment of the vow must be sinful, for example, when one promises to give an alms in order to seduce the recipient into sin or to build a church in order to gratify pride or spite. Similarly, invalid and illicit are vows made to obtain something evil (e.g., the vow of an alms in order to obtain success in a robbery) or to render thanksgiving for success in evil already done (e.g., the vow to give G.o.d half the booty taken in robbery); for such vows can not be fulfilled without the implicit protestation that G.o.d is the author of sin.

(b) The vow is valid but illicit if the evil circ.u.mstance affects only the act of vowing; for the thing promised is good and is to be performed properly, but the disposition of the vower is not free from sin as he makes his promise. It should be noted, however, that the evil circ.u.mstance does not always deprive the act of vowing of substantial goodness (see 78). Thus, if one vows to build a church and the sole motive for making the vow is the applause one will receive, the vow is substantially illicit; but if vainglory is only a secondary motive, the vow is substantially licit.

(c) The vow is valid and licit if the evil circ.u.mstance affects neither the act promised nor the act of vowing, both of these being good. Thus, it is lawful to vow an alms for every time one yields to a sinful habit. It is also lawful to vow an offering to G.o.d if one escapes unhurt from a duel, for such a vow does not ask G.o.d to bless the duel but to protect one's life.

2205. Vows that Promise Something Indifferent.--(a) These vows are invalid if there is no circ.u.mstance to make the promise honorable to G.o.d (e.g., if one promises to save up a certain percentage of one's earnings each month). The sin committed by those who vow necessary, impossible or indifferent things, does not seem to exceed venial fault _per se_, for the vow is illicit, not because its matter is evil and displeasing to G.o.d, but because it is not good and pleasing to Him. The sin seems to be one of levity rather than of irreverence.

(b) These vows are valid and lawful if there is a circ.u.mstance that makes the indifferent subject-matter honorable to G.o.d (e.g., if one vows to save up so much each month in order to practise frugality, or to set aside means for some charitable or pious cause).

2206. Meaning of a Better Good.--It is also necessary for validity of a vow that the thing promised be a better good; for this is the will of G.o.d, our sanctification (I Thess., iv. 3), and the vow is made to G.o.d.

(a) By the better good is not meant that which has no good superior to it, for then one could vow only the most excellent good, which is not true.

(b) By the better good, then, is understood that which is preferable to its contrary good (e.g., virginity is better than marriage), that which is absolutely or objectively preferable to its contradictory (e.g., it is better to give an alms than not to give one, it is better to keep the law of fasting than not to keep it), that which is relatively or subjectively better than its contradictory (e.g., it is better to marry than to commit fornication, or live in concubinage, or give scandal, or leave children illegitimate). Generally, however, it is not advisable to vow matrimony, for, even if the vow is not invalid, it seems to have little advantage. If a person thinks marriage is better for him, let him take the marriage vows or engage to marry the woman of his choice.

2207. Vows Invalidated by Promise of Lesser Good.--(a) The vow to do what is less pleasing to G.o.d (e.g., never to make a vow, never to embrace a counsel) is invalid _per se_. There may be cases, however, in which a vow of this kind would be better and therefore valid (e.g., when a person who is p.r.o.ne to making vows is bidden by the confessor to make no other vows without advice).

(b) The vow to do what may easily become less pleasing to G.o.d also seems to be invalid. Thus, if one were to make a vow to play no more games in order to give more time to prayer or to avoid temptations, the vow might later be a cause of spiritual harm, for at times it is more pleasing to G.o.d to take recreation than to abstain from it.

2208. Case in Which One Has Taken Two Opposite Vows.--(a) If the vows are equally good, or if it is doubtful which is better, the first prevails; the second being impossible does not oblige. (b) If the second is certainly better, it prevails, and the first does not oblige, being impossible. Thus, if one has first vowed to go on a pilgrimage and next to stay at home and attend the sick during an epidemic, the pilgrimage should not stand in the way of the more urgent good of caring for those in distress.

2209. The Obligation of a Vow.--Every valid vow obliges to fulfillment, for it is a promise, and loyalty to promises is a moral duty. Scripture declares that one must pay one's vows, and that it is better not to vow than to vow and not fulfill (Eccles., v. 4), that G.o.d will hold as sin the neglect of a vow (Deut., xxiii. 21), that a faithless promise displeases Him (Eccles., V. 3).

(a) The Quality of the Obligation.--A vow is an act of religion, since it promises to G.o.d a tribute of honor, even though the thing promised (e.g., a fast, virginity) does not belong to wors.h.i.+p but to some other virtue. Hence, the violation of a vow is a sin against fidelity and also against religion. But it seems that sacrilege is committed only by sins against certain vows, namely, those whose matter is a sacred thing dedicated to G.o.d; for example, the violation of the vow to fast would not be sacrilegious, while the violation of a public vow of chast.i.ty is a sacrilege. All transgressions of vows, as such, are sins of the same species, namely, sins against religion.

(b) The Quant.i.ty of the Obligation.--A vow, as being a duty of religion (see 2146, 2148), obliges under grave sin. But in an individual case the sin committed may be only venial on account of lightness of matter or imperfection of the act.

2210. Gravity of the Obligation of a Vow.--A vow has the nature of a private law, since it is an obligation which the vow-maker voluntarily imposes on himself. But a law obliges under grave sin when the subject-matter itself and the intention of the lawgiver require strict obligation (see 381 sqq.). Hence, gravity of matter in a vow depends on the great importance of the thing vowed and on the will of the vower to a.s.sume a grave obligation.

(a) Thus, the thing vowed must be of great importance, either in itself (e.g., chast.i.ty) or from its relation to divine wors.h.i.+p (e.g., a fast, a communion). One cannot oblige oneself to a grave obligation under a vow whose matter is absolutely and relatively of minor importance (e.g., a daily Hail Mary, an alms of twenty-five cents; see 382).

(b) The intention of the vower must be to bind himself under grave sin.

He is free not to oblige himself by vow at all, and hence, should he elect to vow, he may bind himself, even though the matter of the vow is of great importance, either under grave or under light sin (or only to penalty), as he wishes. Exception must be made, however, for public vows taken in religious inst.i.tutes and for the vow of chast.i.ty and celibacy taken in the reception of subdeacons.h.i.+p, for the law of the Church on account of the public good decrees that these vows oblige under grave sin.

2211. Rules for Determining What Is Important Matter in a Vow.--(a) In personal vows, an act of omission may be made the subject of grave obligation, if it may be made the subject of grave precept by the Church (e.g., the hearing of Ma.s.s, Confession, Communion, a fast or abstinence, a Rosary).

(b) In real vows, some fix grave matter according to the standards for commutative justice (see 1896 sqq.). But such a rule seems unsuitable.

The amounts absolutely and relatively grave in theft are determined by the wealth of the person stolen from, but, since G.o.d is owner of all things, we do not see how those amounts could be fixed in reference to Him. On the other hand, the duty of religion obliges more strictly than that of commutative justice, and hence it does not seem that grave matter should be the same for both. In practice, the matter is not grave when it is quite inconsiderable (say less than a dollar), or when the vower intends only a light obligation. If the matter is not inconsiderable and the intent of the vower is uncertain, one may decide as to the obligation of the vow from presumptions based on custom, the circ.u.mstances of the vow, or the rule that grave obligation is not to be taken for granted (see 709, 714, 659).

2212. Coalescence of Light into Grave Matter.--(a) If the vower has determined the relation of the items of the vow one to another, coalescence can be judged from his intention. Thus, if the vower intends that the items shall be parts of one whole, there is coalescence (e.g., if he vows to give fifty cents in alms daily and neglects this for a year, there is grave sin); but if he intends the items as separate promises, there is no coalescence (e.g., if he vows to say a Hail Mary every day and neglects this for a year, there are many venial sins). If some of the items have been performed, others omitted, and the omissions coalesce, there is grave sin according to some as soon as a notable quant.i.ty is reached, but others believe that there is grave sin only when a notable percentage (say one-third or one-fourth) of the matter vowed has been neglected.

(b) If the vower has not determined the relation between the items of the vow, the presumption as a rule favors coalescence in real vows, non-coalescence in personal vows (as in the examples of a vow to give fifty cents daily and of a vow to say a Hail Mary every day). But there are exceptions, as when one vows to give a small alms every Sat.u.r.day in honor of the Blessed Virgin, for the chief intention in this case may be to show respect to the Mother of G.o.d and not to give a certain amount to the poor.

2213. The Time When a Vow Obliges.--(a) A negative vow (e.g., not to drink certain intoxicants) obliges at once and always (see 371).

(b) An affirmative vow to which the vower has annexed a time for fulfillment obliges at the time determined. If the time was intended as a princ.i.p.al circ.u.mstance (e.g., a vow to say the Rosary on the Feast of the a.s.sumption), the vow ceases with that time, even though performance was culpably neglected; but if the time was intended only as a secondary circ.u.mstance (e.g., a vow to go to confession next week made by one who needs it badly), the vow continues in force even after the time set has elapsed without fulfillment (see 468 sqq.). Antic.i.p.ation of fulfillment on account of inability to fulfill at the time appointed in the vow, is not necessary, unless the vow was attached to a certain s.p.a.ce and cannot be fulfilled in the latter part of this s.p.a.ce; for example, if one has vowed to say the Rosary today and foresees that the whole afternoon will be occupied, one should say the Rosary in the forenoon (see 470, 471).

(c) An affirmative vow for which the vower has fixed no special time should be accomplished as soon as this can be conveniently done, for such is the rule in every absolute promise, and, moreover, no better time for fulfillment can be a.s.signed; "When thou hast made a vow to the Lord thy G.o.d, thou shalt not delay to pay it, because the Lord thy G.o.d will require it. And if thou delay it shall be imputed to thee for a sin" (Deut., xxiii. 21).

2214. Delay in Fulfilling Vow.--Sin may be committed by delaying to keep a gravely obligatory vow for which no date was set.

(a) There is no sin if the delay is reasonable in view of the subject-matter of the vow (e.g., to put off a Rosary or fast for two or three days, a pilgrimage of 50 miles for a week, a pilgrimage of 1000 miles for several months, etc.) or of the circ.u.mstances (e.g., if one has to delay entrance into religion until one has better health or has closed up a business).

(b) There is venial sin if the delay is unreasonable but does not notably diminish what is promised or endanger its fulfillment. Thus, a Rosary, a fast, or a pilgrimage is as good next year as this year, and, apart from danger of forgetting or omitting, no lapse of time seems to const.i.tute a notable delay in respect to such obligations.

(e) There is mortal sin if the delay is unreasonable and notably depreciates what is promised or notably endangers performance of the vow. Thus, to put off the fulfillment of a vow to enter religion lessens the value of the thing promised, if one waits until old age; it imperils the promise, if one remains in the world for several years exposed to the danger of losing vocation. Moralists hold that three or four years would be a considerable delay in reference to a vow to enter religion.

2215. The Person Obliged to Fulfill a Vow.--(a) A personal vow obliges only the vower, because by its nature a vow is a law which one imposes on oneself (see 463, 1696, 188). But vows taken by a city or community may be obligatory on the subjects in virtue of law, and vows taken by ancestors may oblige posterity in virtue of lawful and obligatory custom. (b) A real vow (and a mixed vow as to the part that is real) obliges also the heirs, for this kind of vow is a debt of the vower's estate (see Canon 1310). The obligation of the heirs is one, not of religion, but of justice, and they are not held beyond the resources of the estate.

2216. The Manner of Fulfilling a Vow.--(a) As to Internal Disposition.--It is not necessary that one have at the time of fulfillment the purpose of fulfillment, provided there is no intention exclusive of that purpose, for the vow binds one only to do what was promised (cfr. 477). Hence, if one has vowed to hear Ma.s.s and then hears a Ma.s.s out of devotion, not thinking of the vow, one may take this a.s.sistance at Ma.s.s as a satisfaction of the vow.

(b) As to External Performance.--If a vow is personal, one must perform it personally, for one's own act was promised, and hence, if personal performance becomes impossible, it is not necessary or valid to use a proxy; if a vow is real, one may use goods given by others, but one is not obliged in case of poverty to seek the goods of another, since one's own goods were promised.

2217. The Obligation of Certain Kinds of Vows.--(a) Conditional Vow.--The vower is not obliged by the vow unless the condition is fulfilled, and this is probably true even when the condition is equivalently, but not formally, fulfilled (e.g., t.i.tus, who has to support his mother, vows to enter religion as soon as she contracts marriage, but the mother unexpectedly dies and t.i.tus is thus freed of her support). The vower is not guilty of sin against the vow if he prevents the fulfillment of the condition, unless he uses unlawful means. Such means are not employed if one is not obliged to fulfill the condition (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $10 if one gets drunk), or if non-fulfillment is due to weakness, not to the purpose to defeat the vow (e.g., a vow to pay an alms of $100, if one remains sober for a year, when the vower becomes intoxicated accidentally or through frailty before the year is up), or if non-fulfillment is due to the exercise of one's right (e.g., a vow to enter religion if one's parents consent, when the vower in lawful ways persuades his parents not to consent). The vower is guilty of sin against the vow, if he uses unlawful means to prevent the condition's fulfillment (e.g., if he gets drunk purposely in order to evade the alms promised for sobriety, or if he uses fraud or force to keep his parents from consenting to a vow which he has made dependent on their consent).

(b) Penal Vow.--The vower is not obliged by the vow if the act against which the vow is made is committed by him but is not sinful (e.g., Claudius vowed not to play cards, but on a certain occasion did play after having received a dispensation), or is only materially sinful (e.g., Balbus vowed not to use profane language, but on a certain occasion did use such language inadvertently), or is not sinful against the vow, at least if the penalty is for violation of the vow (e.g., Caius vowed not to quarrel under penalty of an alms for breaking the promise, but on a certain occasion did quarrel, adverting to the sin against charity, but not to the vow), or is venially sinful on account of the imperfection of the act, at least if the penalty is grave. If the vower has not determined the number of times the penalty is to be paid, it seems that it should be paid only after the first fault, if the penalty is grave and one that is not customarily repeated (e.g., a distant pilgrimage, a large alms), but should be repeated after every fault if the penalty is slight and one that is customarily repeated (e.g., a decade of the Rosary, a small alms).

(c) Disjunctive Vow.--The vow is null if one of the objects to be chosen from is evil, vain or impossible (e.g., a vow either to earn or to steal the money for an alms). The vower is held to nothing if before his choice one of the things to be chosen from has become impossible (e.g., Claudius vows to give one or the other of two chalices he owns, but before he makes his choice one of the chalices is stolen), or if after his choice the thing chosen becomes impossible (e.g., Claudius decided to give the larger of two chalices, but before he could give it, it was stolen). The vower is held, however, if one of the things to be chosen from has become impossible before choice through the vower's own fault (e.g., Claudius' chalice was stolen before his choice because he had culpably delayed to make a choice), or if the thing not chosen has become impossible after the choice (e.g., Claudius decided to give the large chalice and the small one was stolen afterwards).

(d) Doubtful Vow.--Doubts about the essentials, that is, whether a vow was really made (e.g., whether it was a vow or only a resolution, whether there was the requisite intention or deliberation, whether the vow was invalid on account of fear, etc.), or whether a vow certainly made was fulfilled, must be settled according to the principles for directing a doubtful conscience (see 672 sqq.). Thus, if it is more probable that a vow was made or that a vow was not fulfilled, the decision must be for obligation according to the Probabiliorists; but if there remains a positive doubt whether only a resolution was made, or whether a vow was fulfilled, there is no obligation according to the Probabilists. Doubts about accidentals, that is, whether a vow was of this kind or that (e.g., the circ.u.mstances of quality, quant.i.ty, number, etc.), must be settled according to reasonable rules of interpretation of the mind of the vower.

2218. General Rules of Interpretation of Doubtful Vows.--(a) Private vows must be interpreted according to the expressed or presumptive intention of the vower, for a vow is a private law, and the vower the lawmaker. (b) Public vows must be interpreted according to the sound doctrine of approved authorities on theology and Canon Law.

2219. Special Rules for Interpreting the Mind of the Vower.--(a) A doubtful vow should be interpreted from internal evidence, that is, from the language of the vow itself and the significance usually attached to the terms used, for the presumption is that the vower meant to express himself in the ordinary speech used for vows. Thus, a vow of "virginity" usually means the same as a vow of "chast.i.ty," and should be so understood unless there is reason for a stricter interpretation.

The language of a vow is to be understood in the light of the purpose of the vower (e.g., a vow to give a chalice to a church does not mean a gla.s.s chalice, since the Church employs only chalices of precious metal); a vow to hear Ma.s.s daily does not mean that one must hear two Ma.s.ses on Sunday, since the purpose of the vow is to let no day pa.s.s without a.s.sistance at Ma.s.s.

(b) A doubtful vow that cannot be sufficiently construed from internal evidence should be judged from general presumptions, that is, from the custom as regards the vow taken (e.g., one who vows an alms is understood to promise the amount that others in his condition promise), from the custom or law as regards the matter of the vow (e.g., one who vows a perpetual fast is understood to promise a fast on days other than Sundays and holydays, for the church law distinguishes between fast days and feast days), from the rules governing the interpretation of laws (e.g., since things odious are to be of strict interpretation, he who vows to give something may himself determine what he wishes to give, provided it is not ridiculously small), from the conditions that are implied in every vow as to possibility, the rights of others, change in circ.u.mstances, etc. (e.g., he who promises to become a religious means that he will do so, if a Religious Order will accept and keep him; he who promises a gift means that he will give without prejudice to the claims of third parties, etc.).

2220. The Advantages of Vows to the Vowers.--(a) A first advantage is that a vow strengthens the will of the vower to do good and avoid evil.

This is an important advantage, since human nature is so weak and inconstant and so much in need of helps that will add resolution and perseverance to its efforts. The vow is a promise binding not only in honor but also as a religious duty, and an act that has a special claim on divine a.s.sistance and a favorable answer, and hence it is a powerful ally to a virtuous life. True, he who takes a vow is subject to greater sin if he is unfaithful. But there is no good that has not some risk attached to it, and the risk here is due, not to the vow itself, but to the weakness of the will which may use it improperly. The person who thinks only of the dangers of storms will neither sow nor reap (Eccles., xi. 4).

(b) A second advantage is that a vow makes the good done more meritorious and praiseworthy. It adds to the virtue practised (e.g., abstinence) the virtue that directs (viz, divine wors.h.i.+p or religion, the most excellent among the moral virtues); it offers G.o.d a more perfect subjection, since it presents to Him, not only a single act here and now, but the power itself of the will to do the opposite; it acts from a greater resolution and firmness, a circ.u.mstance that gives perfection to virtue. All this should be understood _per se_, or with the qualification "other things being equal"; for if we suppose that a person who has no vow serves G.o.d with great charity and fervor, there is no doubt that he is better before G.o.d than one who has vows and performs them carelessly and reluctantly.

2221. When a Good Vow May Be Sinful.--A vow good in itself may be sinful or the occasion of sin on account of the dispositions of the vower.

(a) Thus, in taking vows one commits sin if one acts imprudently in not taking into consideration the circ.u.mstances. Hence, before making a vow one should consider carefully and consult one's confessor or director or some other prudent man.

(b) After taking vows one commits sin by regrets, if these regrets include the desire not to comply with obligations (e.g., when one regrets having lived up to a vow in the past or intends not to live up to it in the future, or when one keeps the vow only from human motives and wishes one could violate it), or if they manifest ingrat.i.tude towards G.o.d (e.g., when one regrets without good reason that one ever took the vow). The sin committed by desire not to comply with obligation is mortal or venial according to the nature of the obligation; the sin of ingrat.i.tude is venial. There is no sin at all, it seems, if for a reasonable cause one regrets having made a vow or wishes there were no obligation to perform something of supererogation that one vowed, unless by such wishes one is exposed to temptations and the danger of sinning against the vow.

2222. Merit of Fulfilling a Vow that One Regrets.--If one regrets having made a vow but intends to keep it, is the good work performed better by reason of the vow?

(a) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a religious motive (e.g., the desire to please G.o.d or the fear to offend Him), the good work is more meritorious than if there were no vow, for it has the double value of an act of religion and of an act of some other virtue, of a good work done and of a vow to do it.

(b) If the intention to keep the vow is prompted by a human motive (e.g., the desire to please some human person or to secure some temporal benefit), the good work is not made more meritorious, but indeed is not meritorious at all, since not done for G.o.d's sake.