Moral Theology Part 26

Art. 3: A CERTAIN CONSCIENCE

(_Summa Theologica_, I-II, q. 57, a. 5; II-II, q. 47, a. 9.)

640. As was said above, only that conscience is a safe guide which is not only good--that is, in agreement, as far as one's efforts can secure this, with the external law--but also certain. A certain conscience is one which, without any prudent fear of erring, judges that a particular act is obligatory or unlawful, and hence here and now to be done or omitted.

641. Necessity of Cert.i.tude.--We must be sure we are right before we act; otherwise, we expose ourselves to the danger of sinning, and therefore commit sin (see 582). Hence, it is necessary to act with a certain conscience, and unlawful to act with an uncertain conscience.

"If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?" (I Cor., xiv. 8) may be accommodated to conscience. In Rom., xiv. 22, 23, the Apostle declares that he who acts with conviction is blessed, whereas he who acts in uncertainty is condemned.

Examples: Semp.r.o.nia doubts whether it is sinful to sew on Sunday; she is not sure, but has grave suspicions that sewing is servile work; if she goes ahead, she will be guilty of violating the law, as being willing to take the risk, and therefore the responsibility. t.i.tus offers another a drink, being uncertain whether it has poison in it or not; he is guilty of sin, since he has no right to expose himself to sin and his neighbor to the danger of death.

642. Those persons who act with a doubtful conscience, and later discover that what they feared might be wrong was not wrong, or not so bad as they suspected, must bear in mind: (a) that their past conduct is not to be judged by their newly acquired knowledge, for that conduct must be judged by the knowledge had at the time. Example: Semp.r.o.nia does some work on Sunday, doubting whether she is committing a grave or a slight sin. Later she discovers that it was really only a venial sin, and she congratulates herself that she did not sin seriously. Her judgment is wrong, because she did not know at the time of the work that it was not a grave sin; (b) that they must guide themselves in future acts by their newly acquired knowledge.

643. Kinds of Cert.i.tude.--Judgments may be certain in a greater or less degree.

(a) They are metaphysically certain, when error is absolutely impossible, the opposite of what is held by the mind being a contradiction in terms which omnipotence itself could not make true.

Example: The judgments that the same, identical act cannot be both good and bad, that good is to be done and evil to be avoided, that G.o.d is to be honored, are metaphysically certain, since they result immediately from the very concepts of being, of goodness, and of G.o.d.

(b) Judgments are physically certain, when error is impossible according to the laws of nature, the opposite of what is held by the mind being unrealizable except through intervention of another cause.

Example: The judgments that he who takes poison will destroy life, that he who applies fire to a house will destroy property, are physically certain. because natural agencies, like poison and fire, act infallibly when applied to suitable matters and under suitable conditions and left to their course, unless they are overruled by superior power.

(c) Judgments are morally certain, when error is impossible according to what is customary among mankind, the opposite of what is held by the mind being so unlikely that it would be imprudent to be moved by it.

Examples: One is morally certain that what a reputedly truthful and competent person relates to one is true. A person is morally certain that a conclusion he has drawn about his duty in a particular instance is correct, if he believes that he has overlooked no means of reaching the truth. Testimony and inference, since they come from free and fallible agencies, may lead into error; but, when they appear to have the requisite qualities indicative of truth, they are for the most part reliable and in practical life have to be considered as such.

644. As to the certainty that is required in the judgment of conscience, the following points must be noted:

(a) Metaphysical certainty is not required, since conscience does not deal with primary propositions, but with deductions about particular acts. The first moral principles, which are the object of synderesis, and at least some of the general conclusions, which are the object of moral science, are metaphysically certain (see above 145, 300), as they are based on necessary relations; but the particular conclusions, which are the object of conscience, are concerned with the contingent and the individual.

(b) Physical certainty is not required for the judgment of conscience, since conscience is not concerned with the activities of natural agents, but with the activities of moral agents that act with freedom and responsibility.

(c) Moral cert.i.tude, therefore, is sufficient for the conclusions drawn by conscience. That a higher kind of cert.i.tude is not necessary should not surprise us, for it would be unreasonable to expect that the same degree of a.s.sent be given to judgments that are concerned with particular and contingent cases as to those that are concerned with universal and necessary principles.

645. Moral cert.i.tude is of two kinds: (a) cert.i.tude in the strict sense, which excludes not only the fear of error, but every doubt, prudent and imprudent, great and small, Example: t.i.tus thinks of a way in which he could easily make money dishonestly; but his conscience sees that the thing is manifestly wrong and decides without the slightest fear or doubt that it must not be done; (b) cert.i.tude in the wide sense, which excludes all fear of error and every serious or prudent doubt, but not one or other slight and imprudent doubt.

Example: Caius was baptized by an excellent priest, but the date was omitted in the register. The doubt occurs to Caius that perhaps something essential was also omitted, and that it may be his duty to seek another Baptism. His doubt is unreasonable.

646. Moral cert.i.tude in the wide sense is sufficient for a safe conscience, even in matters of great importance, since it is frequently the only kind of cert.i.tude one can have, and he who would strive to be free from every slight and baseless suspicion would be soon involved in a maze of scruples and perplexities. Example: If the Caius above referred to were to yield to his doubt and be rebaptized, a similar doubt about the second Baptism might easily arise in his mind, and he would be no more contented than before.

647. From the point of view of its object, cert.i.tude is twofold. (a) Speculative cert.i.tude refers to a judgment considered as a general law, abstraction being made from particular circ.u.mstances. Example: It is speculatively certain that farm work on a holyday is a forbidden kind of work, and that clerics are obliged to say the Divine Office. (b) Practical cert.i.tude refers to a judgment which is an application of a general law to a particular case, consideration being given to all the pertinent circ.u.mstances. Example: It is practically certain that t.i.tus may make hay on a holyday, if otherwise he will suffer great loss; and that a cleric is excused from the Divine Office, if his physician has warned him that he is physically or mentally unable to perform it.

648. Speculative certainty is not sufficient for conscience, but practical cert.i.tude is required, since conscience refers not to abstract laws but to concrete cases--not to what is right if only the object of the act is considered, but to what is right when one considers the object, the motive, and all the circ.u.mstances here and now present.

649. From the point of view of the arguments on which it is based, cert.i.tude is of two kinds. (a) Demonstrative cert.i.tude is the a.s.sent that rests on a conclusion logically drawn from certainly true premises. Example: Caius argues that he is obliged to go to Ma.s.s on Sunday, because the law is certain, and it is also certain that the law applies to him. (b) Probable cert.i.tude, which is the a.s.sent that rests on a conclusion, whose premises, though not certain, seem to be true, and against which there is no counter conclusion, or none that cannot be readily answered (see 703). Example: Caius is pretty sure that he is seriously ill, because he perceives a number of alarming symptoms; the possibility that these may be due to imagination is excluded by the fact that they are new and sudden. Caius, therefore, concludes that he may hold himself excused from attendance at Ma.s.s.

650. Probable cert.i.tude is sufficient for conscience, for in moral matters it is impossible to have at all times reasons that amount to a demonstration, and hence a person acts prudently in following a decision that is solidly probable and unopposed by any contrary serious probability. What is called "probable cert.i.tude" here is very different from probable opinion, about which there will be question below (662 sqq.)

651. From the point of view of the manner in which it is obtained, cert.i.tude is again twofold. (a) Direct cert.i.tude is that which is obtained from principles that are intrinsic to the case by applying to the matter the law concerning it. Examples: A judge who decides according to the evidence and proofs given in court that an accused is guilty, and a son who concludes from the Fourth Commandment that he is bound to help his parents in necessity, have direct certainty in their judgments, because they argued from principles that deal with the question before them. (b) Indirect cert.i.tude is that which is obtained from principles that are extrinsic to the case by applying to the matter in hand reflex principles (i.e., rules that direct how one should act in doubt) or the principle of authority (i.e., the argument drawn from the opinion of those who are acknowledged as competent to decide). Examples; If a judge is not able to form a certain judgment from intrinsic reasons concerning an accused, because strong arguments have been given both for guilt and for innocence, he has recourse to principles that have reference to his own state of doubt, and which declare that he must acquit when he is not certain of guilt. If a man is not able to decide whether the Fourth Commandment obliges him to keep his grandparents or mother-in-law in his home, when they upset his family and are able to take care of themselves, he can have recourse to the external principle of authority by consulting his confessor.

652. Direct cert.i.tude is not necessary for the judgment of conscience, for often, as in the cases just mentioned, it is not possible.

Moreover, indirect cert.i.tude suffices to give one who is in doubt such practical a.s.surance that one's fears become unimportant and one is able to act prudently in spite of them.

(a) The principle of authority--that "in doubt we can safely follow the advice of those who are experts and truthful"--is reliable, as both the conditions required for authority (viz., knowledge and truthfulness) and also daily experience show.

(b) Reflex principles likewise, although they do not prove what is deduced from them, are well founded, and point so clearly the side to be taken when judgment is suspended between alternatives that they enable one to act with all the cert.i.tude that prudence demands.

Example: The principle that "in doubt decision should be given in favor of the accused," is based on the fact that a man's right to his life and liberty is so certain that he does not forfeit that right unless it is proved convincingly that he is guilty.

653. Examples of uncertain and certain consciences are the following:

(a) Uncertain conscience: It is lawful to make a just contract (major premise certain); but this contract is just (minor premise a matter of doubt or opinion); therefore, this contract is lawful (conclusion a matter of doubt or opinion).

(b) Conscience directly certain: It is lawful to make a just contract (certain); but this contract is just (certain); therefore, I may make this contract (certain).

(c) Conscience indirectly certain: It is lawful to follow competent advice or a moral system approved by the Church (certain); but a competent spiritual adviser or an approved system of Moral Theology holds that this kind of contract is lawful (certain); therefore, it is lawful for me to make this contract (certain).

654. An Uncertain Conscience.--Uncertainty of conscience can be understood in two senses.

(a) Conscience is uncertain in a more strict sense, if the verdict of the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that no decision can be given either way, either because there are no reasons of importance on either side (negative doubt), or because the opposing reasons balance so perfectly that it is impossible to choose between them (positive doubt). Examples: t.i.tus, wis.h.i.+ng to do some drawing on Sundays, asks himself whether drawing is servile work. Not knowing the definition of "servile," he can only reply to his doubt that he has no reasons either for affirmation or for negation. Caius reads moral authors on the same question, and the pros and cons seem to him so equally strong that he cannot p.r.o.nounce for either side.

(b) Conscience is uncertain in a less strict sense, if the verdict of the moral judgment on a question of lawfulness or unlawfulness is that the mind inclines to one side more than the other, but cannot decide in its favor (suspicion), or that it decides for one side, while perceiving that the arguments for the contrary are not to be despised (opinion). Example: t.i.tus decides to spend a good part of Sunday taking photographs. Caius argues that this is unlawful; Semp.r.o.nius, that it is lawful. t.i.tus thinks the arguments of both are strong, but is better pleased with those of Semp.r.o.nius. If he feels he cannot act on either opinion, his state of mind is what we called suspicion; if he feels that the opinion of Semp.r.o.nius has prevailed, his state of mind is one of opinion.

655. From what was said above concerning the cert.i.tude requisite for conscience (see 641 sqq.), it follows that: (a) when the state of mind is positive or negative doubt, one is not allowed to act; for a person who is ignorant of what he should do, or who is fluctuating between opposites, runs the risk of sin and its consequences, if he acts blindly; (b) when the state of mind is suspicion, one is not allowed to act, for conscience must be more than conjecture or inclination; (e) when the state of mind is opinion, one is or is not allowed to act, according as the opinion has or has not the qualities required for cert.i.tude that is moral and practical (as explained above in 643 sqq.).

656. Doubt and Suspicion.--The following are the duties of a person whose state of mind about his obligation is one of doubt or suspicion:

(a) If he has no time to resolve his hesitation but must decide at once, he should follow the rules given for a perplexed conscience (see above, 611 sqq.). Example; Semp.r.o.nius is ordered by his father to go on an errand; by his mother, to remain at home. He does not know whom he should obey, but argues that there can be no harm in performing the errand, since he feels that he is forced anyway. Semp.r.o.nius' impromptu decision proceeds from a sense of moral responsibility; it is good, and as certain as he is able to make it.

(b) If a person has time to resolve his hesitation, he should not trust to common sense, but should consult moral theology, if he is competent to understand and apply it, or should have recourse to his confessor, if he is not a theologian. The attention given to his problem should be proportionate to the gravity of the duty in question, its importance for third parties, etc. (see below, 667 Sqq.). Example: If a layman is uncertain whether a practice he follows in his business is dishonest, he should consult a priest; if the priest is uncertain, he should refer to his theology and study the matter until he is able to give a well-founded, morally certain judgment.

657. Reflex principles by the aid of which a negative doubt may be solved, when the question is about the existence or non-existence of some fact connected with obligation, are the following:

(a) If the fact at issue is one about which presumption may be had from general or personal experience, the doubt may be settled by the principle: "In uncertainty decide according to what usually happens."

Examples: t.i.tus is uncertain whether his boy of seven years has the use of reason and is bound to go to Ma.s.s. As a rule, children attain discretion at the age of seven; and hence t.i.tus should take his boy to Ma.s.s. Fr. Caius is uncertain whether he has said Terce. His experience is that such uncertainties on his part have always been baseless in the past; hence, he may consider that he has said Terce as usual.

(b) If the fact at issue is one about which no presumption is afforded, either from general or personal experience, recourse may be had to the principle: "A fact should not be taken for granted, but must be proved." Examples: Semp.r.o.nia doubts whether her practice of saying the Rosary daily was the result of a vow; but, as there is no proof or circ.u.mstantial evidence of a vow, it may be held that her practice originated in a resolution. Caius, a stranger, claims that t.i.tus owes him for an unpaid debt of his father. t.i.tus knows nothing of the alleged debt, and the only substantiation for its existence is the word of the stranger. t.i.tus is not obliged to pay.

658. Presumption of a fact is of three kinds according to Weight:

(a) Violent presumption is based on indications so significant or numerous that it leaves only slight room for evasion. This kind of presumption suffices, but is not essential in solving doubts. Example: Caius has no direct proof or disproof that he paid t.i.tus in a certain business transaction, because all the papers have been lost. But he remembers distinctly that he drew the money and went personally to the office of t.i.tus on the day payment was to be made, and that the latter, up to the time of his death several months later, always acted as if full settlement had been made.

(b) Strong presumption is based on circ.u.mstances or signs so moving that they permit one to infer a fact as being their natural or usual accompaniment or result. This kind of presumption suffices in solving the doubts we are considering. Example: If Caius, spoken of above, has no individual recollection of any circ.u.mstances bearing on the payment of his debt to t.i.tus, but knows that it was his invariable custom to pay all his debts promptly, the presumption that he paid this debt is strong.

(c) Light presumption occurs when the reasons are so slight, that they hardly ever suffice to permit us to infer a given fact from them.

Example: If we suppose that Caius was dilatory in paying debts, and that he has no better indication of payment having been made than the fact that t.i.tus gave him a cigar about the time of their business transaction, there is little presumption that the debt was paid.

659. Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative doubts about the quality of an act performed are the following:

(a) If there is an individual presumption, the quality of the act may be inferred from what usually happens. Example: Semp.r.o.nius cannot remember whether a certain good work he undertook was prompted by zeal or ambition. But, as he usually tried to keep his motives pure, it may be concluded that the work in question proceeded from a right intention.

(b) If there is no individual presumption, the quality of an act may be settled from general presumptions or principles. When the act was according to law, and the doubt concerns its validity or sufficiency, one may take it that all was rightly done; for it usually happens that he who complies with the substance, also complies with what is accessory. Moreover, the welfare of the public and of individuals require that an act done outwardly according to law should be deemed as rightly performed unless the contrary can be proved. Hence the rules: "In doubt decide for the validity of what was done"; "What has been done is presumed to have been rightly done." Examples: Caia cannot remember whether she really consented when she married t.i.tus.

Semp.r.o.nius cannot remember whether he had sufficient attention in hearing Ma.s.s on Sunday. The presumptions are that Caia married validly and that Semp.r.o.nius heard Ma.s.s properly, if they acted in good faith.

660. Reflex principles that may be used to settle negative and invincible doubts concerning law or obligation are the following: