Moral Theology Part 67

(c) Mediate and not indispensable coperation is justified by the avoidance of a loss to self less than the loss of the injured party, but in proportion to it, Example: Balbus is usually honest, but today he is going out to "fleece" a number of unsuspecting victims, and he gives orders to his servant t.i.tus to get his coat and hat and open the door, and to his chauffeur Caius to drive him to the gambling place.

t.i.tus and Caius have an inkling of Balbus' plans, but no proofs. If they disobey his orders, other servants will do what Balbus asks, the swindling will not be stopped, but t.i.tus will be demoted, and Caius thrown out of the position necessary for his livelihood.

1523. When the sin committed by the princ.i.p.al agent is against some good of a public character, though not against the common safety, still greater reasons are necessary for coperation than those given above.

(a) Thus, immediate and indispensable coperation is allowed to avoid a greater public evil, or an equal public evil joined with grave loss to self; for it is lawful to permit a lesser in order to escape a greater evil. Thus, the law may tolerate certain evils for the sake of public tranquillity, if the attempt to suppress them would lead to serious disturbances. One may delay to denounce a practice that is doing harm to a family, if an immediate complaint would cause an equal harm to the family and bring on the maker of the complaint a serious evil.

(b) Immediate and not indispensable coperation, or mediate and indispensable coperation, is permitted when it is necessary to avoid an equal public evil, or a very serious personal evil proportionate according to prudent judgment to the public harm done. Thus, an actor who has a harmless part in a somewhat evil play may act it for a time, if the company can easily obtain subst.i.tutes but he cannot easily obtain other employment and needs his wages. Similarly, the owner of the only theatre in town may rent it to that company in order to be able to refuse it to another company that is worse.

(c) Mediate and not indispensable coperation may be allowed when there is need of avoiding a grave loss to self which cannot be prevented except by coperation. Thus, the ushers in the theatre who have no present way of supporting dependents except by the wages they are earning, may help patrons to seats, even when the play that is being shown is not morally un.o.bjectionable.

1524. When the sin committed by another is directed against the necessary public welfare (i.e., against the common safety of Church or State), one may not coperate, but should resist. In this case: (a) coperation is unlawful, for there is no greater public good to justify it, and much less can it be justified by private good; (b) resistance should be made, if possible; for the individual should be willing to suffer loss, spoliation, and death itself to conserve the safety of the Church or of the State.

1525. In giving reasons sufficient for coperation with sins injurious to the sinner alone or to some third party, we considered only the harm or loss to oneself that would result from a refusal to coperate. But the good of others may also suffice for coperation.

(a) Thus, the good of the sinner may justify one in coperating, as when one a.s.sists in order to prevent the commission of a greater evil.

It would not be wrong to give whisky to one who wished to make himself drunk, if otherwise he would take poisoned alcohol.

(b) The good of a third party may justify coperation, as when one a.s.sists in perpetrating a minor injury against him in order to stop a major injury. It would not be wrong to bind and gag a man who was being robbed, if otherwise a burglar would murder him.

(c) The common good will often be a justifying reason. Thus, in political affairs it is at times necessary in indifferent matters to compromise with opponents, whose general policies one does not approve, in order to secure the election of good citizens or the pa.s.sing of good laws, when these ends are very important for the general welfare. It is lawful to administer a Sacrament to one who is unworthy in order to avoid a public evil, such as disturbance or scandal among the people.

1526. Lawfulness of Immediate Coperation.--(a) If one cannot coperate immediately without performing an act that is intrinsically evil (see 1517), immediate coperation is, of course, unlawful. Thus, if one helped a trembling a.s.sa.s.sin to administer poison or to stab or shoot to death the victim, one would be an accomplice in murder; if one a.s.sisted a decrepit pagan to burn incense before an idol, one would be an accomplice in false wors.h.i.+p. (b) If one can coperate immediately without performing an act intrinsically evil, immediate coperation is held lawful by some authorities, but there are others who say that all immediate coperation is sinful.

1527. Arguments for the Opposing Opinions on Immediate Coperation.--(a) Those who deny the lawfulness of all immediate coperation argue that immediate coperation does not differ from complicity, and hence that it is always intrinsically wrong. If theft is the taking away of goods without the knowledge and consent of the owner, what shall we call the act of a servant who a.s.sists a thief by carrying out the family silver to a waiting automobile? The fact that the servant does this to save himself from wounds or death cannot change the moral character of the act, else we shall have to say that the end may justify the means. And what is said of theft, can be said likewise of other species of sin.

(b) Those who affirm the lawfulness of immediate coperation in certain cases argue that circ.u.mstances may take away evil from an act of a.s.sistance given to a sinner, so that the act becomes indifferent or good. Thus, theft is the taking away of what belongs to another against the reasonable will of the owner. Now, the owner would be unreasonable if he were unwilling that one should coperate in removing his goods, if one had to do so in order to protect one's life, at least if one had not engaged to defend his goods; for one is bound to protect one's life in preference to the goods of another. If a starving man may take a loaf of bread without the owner's consent, why may not one save one's life by a.s.sisting a desperate criminal to carry off money? Moreover, it is commonly admitted that a person in great need may lawfully ask a Sacrament from a minister who is unworthy and who will sin by conferring it; that is, one may coperate immediately with the unworthy administration of a Sacrament and yet be free of guilt on account of the circ.u.mstances.

1528. Special Cases of Coperation.--The cases of coperation, like those involving scandal, are innumerable, but there are certain cases which occur today more frequently than others, namely, those of coperation with evil publications, dances, and theatres, and those of the coperation of merchants, innkeepers, renters, servants, and workingmen. Coperation in sins against faith and sins against justice are treated in their proper places, but it will be useful here to speak of these other special kinds of coperation, since they offer many difficulties and a consideration of them now will ill.u.s.trate the general principles on coperation just given. However, the following points should be noted:

(a) The application of the definitions and rules about coperation to particular cases is one of the most difficult tasks of Moral Theology, and hence there will be found great diversity of opinion among theologians on particular points. s.p.a.ce forbids a discussion here of the opposing opinions, and we shall have to content ourselves, in some of the ill.u.s.trations that follow, with solutions that are likely, but whose opposites are also likely.

(b) The cases that follow are treated according to the principles of coperation. But frequently in actual life there will be other factors to be considered, such as the occasion of sin to oneself or scandal to others. It should be remembered, then, that when a particular kind of material coperation is here said to be lawful, this must he understood as abstractly speaking; for in an individual instance there may be circ.u.mstances of danger or disedification which would make it unlawful--a thing that often happens.

1529. Formal Coperation with Evil Reading Matter.--(a) Cases of formal coperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are those of the managers, editors, ordinary collaborators and authors of periodicals, newspapers, books, etc., which are opposed _ex professo_ to faith and good morals; for these persons are the brains which direct and select what is to be written and published, and the matter they are creating or putting on paper is evil, and has no direct purpose except evil.

(b) Cases of formal coperation on account of implicit intention to do harm are those of the responsible heads of printing or publis.h.i.+ng firms and their printers, who agree to publish such objectionable written matter; of booksellers, owners of newsstands, etc., who agree to sell it; for, as we suppose, these persons understand that the matter in question is intrinsically harmful and gravely forbidden.

1530. Coperation with evil newspapers and other reading matter is material and lawful if the matter itself is not entirely evil, that is, if it has good uses as well as bad, and one has a reason for coperation that is just and proportionate to the kind of coperation.

The following are examples of coperation that may be merely material and lawful:

(a) Moral coperation is given by writers of good matter who a.s.sist as collaborators; by those who offer small notices or advertis.e.m.e.nts; by readers who use a book, periodical, newspaper, etc., for the good matter it contains and skip the rest. For all these persons contribute in a greater or less degree, according to their influence, reputation, and ability, to the prestige and success of the journal, magazine or volume, with which their names are connected or which they patronize.

Reasons sufficient to excuse in these cases, given by some authors, are the following: for a permanent contributor, a very grave reason, such as the need of support for his family which he cannot earn in any other way; for an occasional contributor, a rather grave reason, such as the opportunity of refuting error or of setting forth true principles (see Canon 1386, 2); for the habitual reader, a reason somewhat grave, such as the advantage of reports useful for his business which cannot be found elsewhere; for the occasional reader, a slight reason, such as entertainment to be derived from reading a good story; for the small advertiser, a slight reason, such as profit in business. Those who by laudatory descriptions in advertis.e.m.e.nts or book reviews urge others to buy and read evil books are guilty of seduction, rather than coperation (see 1495).

(b) Financial coperation is given by those who endow or subsidize a publication, by shareholders, by large advertisers, by subscribers, etc. Reasons considered sufficient in these cases are as follows: for the original providers of capital, only a most grave reason; for the buyers of much stock or advertising s.p.a.ce, only a very grave reason; for subscribers, a grave reason such as would suffice for habitual reading.

(c) Material a.s.sistance is given by those who produce or distribute a publication and by those who furnish necessary material. Among the producers, the proximate coperators are, first, the managers of the printing company, and, secondly, the printers, the "readers" and the correctors; the remote coperators are the typesetters, arrangers of ink and paper, binders, and machine operators. For proximate coperation it is held that a most grave reason suffices, as when a printer cannot otherwise support himself and his family; for remote coperation a grave reason is needed. Among the distributors, there are degrees of proximity in coperation as follows: first, those who put the reading matter into the hands of others (e.g., by keeping it on the tables in their waiting rooms or offices); next, those who keep it for purchasers who may ask for it; finally, those who are employed as keepers of newsstands, newsboys, etc. We cannot think of any reason sufficient to excuse the first kind of coperation, since there is no lack of good reading matter which doctors, lawyers, barbers, etc,, can provide for those who are waiting in their rooms; for the second kind of coperation, a very grave reason suffices, such as loss of trade by a poor bookseller, if he would not supply his patrons with popular books or periodicals of a less elevated kind; for the third kind of coperation, a grave reason suffices.

Among the suppliers are those who sell to the printer his ink, type, machinery, etc. These coperate only remotely, and it is held that profit is a sufficient reason for their coperation. This we admit, if the coperation is not indispensable, but we do not think that profit alone would uniformly justify voluntary coperation upon which depended the publication of pernicious matter.

1531. Formal Coperation with Evil Dances or Plays.--(a) Cases of formal coperation on account of explicit intention to do harm are those of the originators of sinful dances and the writers of indecent plays. (b) Cases of formal coperation on account of implicit intention to do harm are those of the managements that produce bad shows, organize bad dances, or make the arrangements or issue the invitations for these affairs.

1532. Material Coperation with Evil Dances or Plays.--Material coperation is lawful, if the coperation is not itself intrinsically wrong, and if there is a sufficient reason for permitting it.

(a) Cases of immediate material coperation are those of players and dancers who have harmless parts in the performance. A very grave reason, such as avoidance of penury, is considered as sufficient excuse here, at least for a time.

(b) Cases of proximate material coperation are those of musicians or singers, who do not perform lascivious music; of spectators, who show no approval of the evil that is done; of those who buy tickets but do not attend. A more serious reason is required in the musician at the dance than in the musician at the play, for the former directs the dance, while the latter only accompanies the play. Likewise, a more serious reason is required when one attends often, or when one's patronage is essential to the success of the occasion, than when one attends only rarely, or when the play or dance does not depend on one's presence or patronage.

(c) Cases of remote material coperation are those of the owners who rent their theatres or dance-halls or cabarets, of ushers, guards, box-office employees, stage hands, etc. It is held that profit is a sufficient reason to justify the owners in renting their places, if the theatrical company or dance management can readily find other places in case they are sent away. The ushers, guards, and the like are excused, if they cannot easily find other employment; but this does not justify gazing on immodest spectacles or laughing at or applauding obscene jokes.

1533. Formal Coperation by the Manufacture or Sale of Objects Whose Sole Purpose is Gravely or Venially Sinful.--(a) Cases of explicit coperation are those of the inventor of contraceptives or of instruments that frustrate generation, of the designers of blasphemous representations or of tablets in honor of false deities, the authors of somewhat profane or irreverent cards, and the like. (b) Cases of implicit coperation are those of persons who, for profit only, make or sell objects such as those just mentioned, while knowing that the purpose to which they naturally tend is the commission of sin.

1534. Material coperation by the manufacture or sale of objects that are used for gravely or venially sinful purposes, is lawful under the conditions given in 1515. Hence, in the first place, the coperation itself must not be intrinsically sinful, that is, the object made or sold must have good as well as evil uses. There are two cla.s.ses of objects of this kind: (a) there are some objects which may have good uses, but which in fact are nearly always made to serve bad ends (e.g., idols, insignia of forbidden societies, pictures of the nude, ultra-fas.h.i.+onable dress, certain drugs or poisons, blackjacks, and pistol silencers); (b) there are other objects which are indifferent in themselves, although often employed for sinful uses (e.g., dice, playing cards and chips, rouge, lipsticks, necklaces and other feminine adornments, imitation jewelry, adulterated articles, and the like).

1535. The rules about proportionate cause for coperation by the manufacture or sale of things that are employed in committing sin are those given above in 1519.

(a) Hence, the greater the sin that will be committed or the more harmful the consequences that will ensue from the use of an object, the greater the reason required for making, repairing or selling it. In some instances only a most grave reason will excuse, such as peril of instant death for refusal. Thus, one may not sell poison or drugs to a person who contemplates suicide, murder, or abortion. One may not sell narcotics to a person who asks for them in good faith and who cannot obtain them elsewhere, but who will become a drug-fiend if they are given him. One may not sell morphine, heroin, etc., to a person who is already a drug-addict and who will abuse the drugs, unless there is a very grave reason for not refusing, such as danger that refusal will lead him to set fire to the building. If one has all the playing cards in some remote hamlet, one should not sell them without grave reason to a customer who will spend a great part of the time at games to the neglect of serious duties, nor without a very grave reason to a customer who is a card sharper and who will swindle many innocent victims, or to a gambler who will waste the money due to his wife and family.

(b) The more closely related an object is with sinful uses, the graver must be the excuse for having part in its manufacture or sale. Thus, an ordinary reason (e.g., profit) might suffice for selling a lamb to a pagan or attractive ornaments of dress to a woman, where only a very grave or most grave reason would suffice for selling incense to a pagan or ornaments that are frequently used as amulets or charms. Generally speaking, it is seriously wrong and gravely sinful to make or sell articles whose ordinary use is gravely sinful.

(c) The more a customer depends on a determinate manufacturer or merchant to obtain such an object, the more serious must be the reason for making or selling it. Thus, a grave reason, such as a notable loss, is sufficient reason for selling a special fancy apparel to a notorious "vampire" (i.e., a woman who carries on scandalous flirtations in order to get presents), if the adornments can be obtained from other dressmakers or modistes or stores; but a much graver reason would be required, if the apparel could not be purchased except at one place. In the former case, refusal to sell would not prevent the activities of this woman; in the latter case, it would at least hinder her to some extent.

(d) The more certain it is that an object will be employed sinfully, the greater must be the reason for making, repairing or selling it.

Examples: Semp.r.o.nius, a curio dealer, is asked by three men for a statue of Joss along with joss-sticks and papers. The first customer says he intends to use these articles for religious rites; the second will not tell what his purpose is; the third wishes to present the articles to a museum. Semp.r.o.nius may not sell to the first customer except for a most grave reason, such as fear of death if he refuses; he may not sell to the second customer without a very great reason, such as a very considerable loss to himself; he may sell to the third customer for an ordinary reason, such as the profit he makes from the sale. t.i.tus, who sells firearms, knows that some of his customers, though he has no particular individuals in mind, will use these weapons unlawfully in poaching or shooting out of season. Since evil is not to be presumed of any particular individual, t.i.tus has the right to sell to all for the usual reason of business profit.

1536. Is a merchant bound to inquire the use which a customer will make of an article that is often employed for sin?

(a) If the positive law requires that the merchant inform himself, he is bound to make inquiries necessary for obtaining the information.

Thus, if the civil law forbids the sale of weapons without a permit or of poisons without a prescription, the merchant has to ask for the customer's authorization to buy.

(b) If the positive law has no such regulation, we should distinguish between articles that are frequently used for sin and articles that are generally used for sin. When an article of the former cla.s.s is requested, there is no obligation to make inquiries, for such an obligation would be unduly burdensome; but, if an article of the latter cla.s.s is desired, one should make inquiries, unless one is morally certain that the intention of the customer is good, or there is a very grave reason for seeking no information. Thus, one may sell a deck of cards to a stranger without asking for proofs that he is not a confidence man in disguise; but one may not sell deadly poison to an entire stranger merely on the strength of his word that he needs it for medical or other lawful purposes.

1537. Sinful Coperation in Providers of Food and Drink.--(a) There is explicit formal coperation with sins of gluttony, drunkenness, violation of fast or abstinence, whenever one gladly supplies the means for these sins to those who are about to commit them. Thus, if a host supplies a guest who is overdrinking with all the intoxicants the latter desires, and secretly wishes that the guest may make himself drunk, there is explicit coperation. There is implicit formal coperation when he who supplies the food or drink does not directly intend evil, but when the act of giving the food or drink is from the circ.u.mstances of the case an evil act, as when a person is given a meal which will not agree with him and will make him sick or aggravate a malady, or when a person who wishes to violate a fast ostentatiously to show contempt is furnished with the eatables he asks for. (b) There is unlawful material coperation when one does not approve of the sin that will be committed, but nevertheless without sufficient reason supplies the food or drink. Thus, there is sinful coperation when a restaurant owner gives meat on Friday to one not dispensed, for no other reason than the profit he himself will make.

1538. Material coperation in providing food or drink to those who ask it, but have no right to take it, is lawful when one has the right to provide the food or drink, and there is a sufficient reason for coperation. The sufficiency of the reason depends on circ.u.mstances, as explained in 1519.

(a) Hence, a greater reason is required when the sin that the other person will commit will be greater. Thus, a grave reason, such as indignation of a customer, might suffice for coperation with a venial violation of temperance or abstinence; but a graver reason, such as a serious quarrel, is required if the violation will be mortally sinful.

A graver reason is also necessary when the consequences will be more harmful (e.g., the fights of the drunkard, or the serious illness of one who has neglected his diet) than when they are less harmful (e.g., the foolish talk of the drunkard, or the stupefaction of the glutton).

(b) A greater reason is required when the coperation is closer. Thus, in supplying meat the butcher coperates only remotely, while the cook who prepares it and the waiter who serves it coperate proximately.

(c) A greater reason is necessary when one's coperation is essential to the commission of the sin. Thus, in a large town where there are many restaurants, the fact that a customer would quarrel if denied meat on a day of abstinence would excuse coperation, whereas in a small village which has only one eating place, it seems there should be a more serious reason, such as blasphemies or boycott or strike against one's business which the refusal of meat might evoke.

(d) A greater reason is called for when the sin of the other person is more certain to follow. Thus, a restaurant-keeper who is patronized by strangers of all kinds, temperate and intemperate, Catholic and non-Catholic, may serve wine at meals, where this is allowed, and provide meat on days of abstinence for all comers; for the diners are not known to him, and it would not be possible for him to inform himself whether they are sober in their habits or exempted from the law of abstinence. But in a boarding house the landlady should not consent to have strong beverages on the table, when she knows that some of those present will thereby become intoxicated; neither should she agree to provide meat on Fridays for a Catholic who is not excused from abstinence, unless there is a serious reason, such as the loss of this boarder which she cannot afford on account of her poverty. Moreover, since dispensation is given from the laws of fast and abstinence but not from the law of temperance, there is less certainty about the intent to sin when one asks for meat on Friday than when one asks for a great quant.i.ty of liquor to be brought to one's table. Drunkenness is also more certain when a person who asks for drink is already somewhat under its influence.

1539. The sins with which one coperates by supplying food or drink to others who have no right to it are more or less serious according as they violate the natural law or only positive human law.

(a) Thus, violation of fast and abstinence is opposed to the natural law when it is intended as a manifestation of hatred of religion. One may not coperate with a violation of fast and abstinence which is manifestly of this character.

(b) Violation of temperance is also opposed to natural law, and doubly so when it leads to such evils as quarrels, fights, murders, blasphemies, etc. It is not lawful to coperate with intemperance, unless this is necessary in order to prevent the commission of a greater sin by the other person, or a serious loss to oneself. Thus, it is not unlawful to supply whisky to a burglar who wishes to get drunk, if this is the only way one can prevent the robbery of a third party or serious injury to oneself.