Manual of Military Training Part 29

The Range

=425. Importance of correct sight setting.= Beyond close range, the correct setting of the rear sight is of primary importance, provided the troops are trained and well in hand. The necessity for correct sight setting increases rapidly with the range. Its importance decreases as the quality of the troops decrease, for the error in sight setting, except possibly at very long ranges, becomes unimportant when compared with the error in holding and aiming. (411)

=426. Determination of ranges.= In attack, distances must usually be estimated and corrections made as errors are observed. Mechanical range finders and ranging volleys are practicable at times.

In defense, it is generally practicable to measure more accurately the distances to visible objects and to keep a record of them for future use. (412)

Distribution of Fire and Target

=427. Purpose of fire superiority; distribution of fire and target.= The purpose of fire superiority is to get hits whenever possible, but at all events to keep down the enemy's fire and render it harmless. To accomplish this the target must be covered with fire throughout its whole extent. Troops who are not fired upon will fire with nearly peacetime accuracy.

The target is roughly divided and a part is a.s.signed to each unit. No part of the target is neglected. In attack, by a system of overlapping in a.s.signing targets to platoons, the entire hostile line can be kept under fire even during a rush. (Pars. 400-401.) (413)

Observation

=428. Observation of target.= The correctness of the sight setting and the distribution of fire over the target can be verified only by careful observation of the target, the adjacent ground, and the effect upon the enemy. (414)

=429. Observation determines whether fire fight is being properly conducted.= Observation only can determine whether the fire fight is being properly conducted. If the enemy's fire is losing in accuracy and effect, the observer realizes that his side is gaining superiority. If the enemy's fire remains or becomes effective and persistent, he realizes that corrective measures are necessary to increase either volume or accuracy, or both. (415)

Discipline

=430. What discipline accomplishes.= Discipline makes good direction and control possible and is the distinguis.h.i.+ng mark of trained troops.

(416)

=431. Communication on firing line by means of signals.= The discipline necessary in the firing line will be absent unless officers and noncommissioned officers can make their will known to the men. In the company, therefore, communication must be by simple signals which, in the roar of musketry, will attract the attention and convey the correct meaning. (417)

Expenditure of Ammunition

=432. Use of ammunition in attack.= In attack the supply is more limited than in defense. Better judgment must be exercised in expenditure. Ordinarily, troops in the firing line of an attack can not expect to have that day more ammunition than they carry into the combat, except such additions as come from the distribution of ammunition of dead and wounded and the surplus brought by reenforcements. (418)

=433. True economy in expenditure of ammunition.= When a certain fire effect is required, the necessary ammunition must be expended without hesitation. Several hours of firing may be necessary to gain fire superiority. True economy can be practiced only by closing on the enemy, as explained in par. 344, before first opening fire, and thereafter suspending fire when there is nothing to shoot at. (419)

Supporting Artillery

=434. Artillery fire princ.i.p.al aid of infantry.= Artillery fire is the princ.i.p.al aid to the infantry in gaining and keeping fire superiority, not only by its. .h.i.ts, but by the moral effect it produces on the enemy. (420)

=435. Functions of artillery fire in attack and defense.= In attack, artillery a.s.sists the forward movement of the infantry. It keeps down the fire of the hostile artillery and seeks to neutralize the hostile infantry by inflicting losses upon it, destroying its morale, driving it to cover, and preventing it from using its weapons effectively.

In defense, it ignores the hostile artillery when the enemy's attack reaches a decisive stage and a.s.sists in checking the attack, joining its fire power to that of the defending infantry. (421)

=436. Fire of artillery over friendly troops.= Troops should be accustomed to being fired over by friendly artillery and impressed with the fact that the artillery should continue firing upon the enemy until the last possible moment. The few casualties resulting from shrapnel bursting short are trifling compared with those that would result from the increased effectiveness of the enemy's infantry fire were the friendly artillery to cease firing.

Casualties inflicted by supporting artillery are not probable until the opposing infantry lines are less than 200 yards apart. (422)

=437. When no longer safe for artillery to fire over friendly troops.= When the distance between the hostile infantry lines becomes so short as to render further use of friendly artillery inadvisable, the commander of the infantry firing line, using a preconcerted signal,[5] informs the artillery commander. The latter usually increases the range in order to impede the strengthening of the enemy's foremost line, as explained in pars. 345-346. (423)

Fire of Position

=438. Fire of position, when used.= Infantry is said to execute fire of position when it is posted so as to a.s.sist an attack by firing over the heads, or off the flank, of the attacking troops and is not itself to engage in the advance; or when, in defense, it is similarly posted to augment the fire of the main firing line.

Machine guns serve a like purpose, as set forth in par. 555.

In a decisive action, fire of position should be employed whenever the terrain permits and reserve infantry is available. (424)

DEPLOYMENT

=439. Formation of troops before and during deployment.= Troops are ma.s.sed preparatory to deployment when the nature of their deployment can not be foreseen or it is desirable to shorten the column or to clear the road. Otherwise, in the deployment of large commands, whether in march column, in bivouac, or ma.s.sed, and whether forming, for attack or for defense, they are ordinarily first formed into a line of columns to facilitate the extension of the front prior to deploying.

The rough line or lines of columns thus formed enable troops to take advantage of the terrain in advancing and shorten the time occupied in forming the firing line. (425)

=440. Action of brigade and regimental commanders in deployment of division.= In deploying the division, each brigade is a.s.signed a definite task or objective. On receipt of his orders, the brigade commander conducts his brigade in column or in line of regiments, until it is advisable that it be broken into smaller columns. He then issues his order, a.s.signing to each regiment its task, if practicable.

In a similar manner the regimental commanders lead their regiments forward in column, or in line of columns, until the time arrives for issuing the regimental order. It is seldom advisable to break up the battalion before issuing orders for its deployment. (426)

=441. Personal reconnaissance before deployment.= Each subordinate commander, after receiving his order for the action, should precede his command as far as possible, in order to reconnoiter the ground personally, and should prepare to issue his orders promptly. (427)

=442. Each commander to guard his command against surprise.= Each commander of a column directs the necessary reconnaissance to front and flanks; by this means and by a judicious choice of ground he guards against surprise. (428)

=443. Premature formation of firing line to be avoided.= The premature formation of the firing line causes unnecessary fatigue and loss of time, and may result in a faulty direction being taken. Troops once deployed make even minor changes of direction with difficulty, and this difficulty increases with the length of the firing line. (429)

=444. Rectification of deployment in wrong direction.= In the larger units, when the original deployment is found to be in the wrong direction, it will usually be necessary to deploy the reserve on the correct front and withdraw and a.s.semble the first line. (430)

=445. Number of troops to be deployed in beginning.= To gain decisive results, it will generally be necessary to use all the troops at some stage of the combat. But in the beginning, while the situation is uncertain, care should be taken not to engage too large a proportion of the command. On the other hand, there is no greater error than to employ too few and to sacrifice them by driblets. (For division of the battalion in attack see 335-339.) (431)

=446. Dense, well-directed, and controlled line of heavy fire gives fire superiority.= When it is intended to fight to a decision, fire superiority is essential. To gain this, two things are necessary: A heavy fire and a fire well-directed and controlled. Both of these are best obtained when the firing line is as dense as practicable, while leaving the men room for the free use of their rifles.

If the men are too widely separated, direction and control are very difficult, often impossible, and the intensity of fire is slight in proportion to the front occupied. (432)

=447. Density of 1 man per yard; occupation of only sections of long lines.= In an attack or stubborn defense the firing line should have a density of one man per yard of front occupied.

Where the tactical situation demands the holding of a line too long to be occupied throughout at this density, it is generally better to deploy companies or platoons at one man per yard, leaving gaps in the line between them, than to distribute the men uniformly at increased intervals. (433)

=448. Use of thin firing line.= A relatively thin firing line may be employed when merely covering the movements of other forces; when on the defensive against poor troops; when the final action to be taken has not yet been determined; and, in general, when fire superiority is not necessary. (434)

=449. Length of firing line employed by whole force; strength of supports and reserves; density of charging line.= The length of the firing line that the whole force may employ depends upon the density of the line and the strength in rear required by the situation.

Supports and reserves const.i.tute the strength in rear.

In a decisive attack they should be at least strong enough to replace a heavy loss in the original firing line and to increase the charging line to a density of at least one and one-half men per yard and still have troops in rear for protection and for the other purposes mentioned above. (435)

=450. Strength of reserve; troops deployed varying from 1 to 10 men per yard.= In the original deployment the strength of the reserve held out by each commander comprises from one-sixth to two-thirds of his unit, depending upon the nature of the service expected of the reserve.

A small force in a covering or delaying action requires very little strength in rear, while a large force fighting a decisive battle requires much. Therefore, depending upon circ.u.mstances, the original deployment, including the strength in rear, may vary from 1 to 10 men per yard. Against an enemy poorly disciplined and trained, or lacking in morale, a thinner deployment is permissible. (436)