History of the Nineteenth Army Corps Part 4

Such was the scene of the action now about to be fought, known to the Union army as the battle of Bisland or Fort Bisland; to the Confederates, as the battle of Bethel Place or Bayou Teche.

During the whole of the night of the 12th a dense fog prevailed, but this lifting about eight o'clock on the morning of Monday, the 13th of April, disclosed a day as bright and beautiful as the scene was fair. At an early hour the whole line advanced to within short musketry range, in substantially the same order as on the previous day. An attack by a detachment of Confederate cavalry upon the skirmishers of the 4th Wisconsin, in advance of the sugar-house, was easily thrown off, and a later demonstration by the Confederate infantry upon Paine's position in the grove shared the same fortune. Emory moved first the 8th New Hamps.h.i.+re, and afterwards the 133d and 173d New York, to the support of the 4th Wisconsin. At the same time Banks ordered Emory to send the other four regiments of Gooding's brigade and the two remaining sections of the 1st Maine battery to reinforce Bryan with the 175th New York on the left bank of the Teche, in order to be prepared, not only to meet a flank movement of the Confederates from that direction, but also to carry to works on that side, should this be thought best. After these dispositions had been completed the advance was steady and continuous, yet not rapid, until toward noon the last of the Confederates retired behind their breastworks and opened fire with musketry. The ditches already spoken of hindered the progress of the Union artillery, yet not seriously, while they afforded an excellent protection for the supports of the batteries and enabled the lines of infantry to rest at intervals: no small gain, for the sun grew very hot, and the march over the heavy windrows and across the deep ditches was exhausting.

The Confederate gunboat Diana took position well in front of the works, so as to command completely the right flank of Emory and Weitzel as they approached by a fire that, had it not been checked, must have enfiladed the whole line. Just as this fire was beginning to be disturbing it was silenced by a fortunate shot from one of the two 30-pounder Parrott guns, served by the 1st Indiana, posted in rear of Weitzel's left and trained upon the Diana, under the personal supervision of Arnold. The third shot from this battery, aimed at the flash of the Diana's guns, exploded in her engine room; then above the trees, whose leaf.a.ge full and low hid the vessel, was seen a flash like a puff of vapor; a rousing cheer was heard from the sharpshooters of the 4th Wisconsin and 8th New Hamps.h.i.+re, who had been told off to keep down the fire of the gunboat; and the Diana was seen to pa.s.s up the bayou and out of the fight.

All risk of an enfilade file being thus removed, the whole Union line quickly closed with the Confederates, and the engagement became general with artillery and musketry. On both sides of the bayou the firing was brisk, at times even severe. Save where the view was broken here and there by the trees or became lightly clouded by the smoke of battle, the whole field lay in plain sight. As the course of the Teche in ascending turned toward the left, Gooding, on the east bank, had the wheeling flank, while Weitzel formed the pivot.

Gooding went forward in gallant style, his men quickening their pace at times to a run, in order to keep the alignment with the main body on the west bank. Perceiving on his extreme right, toward the lake, a fine grove or copse, Gooding threw out Sharpe with the 156th New York to examine the wood with a view of attempting to turn the left flank of the Confederate lines. These, as it proved, did not extend beyond the grove, but there ended in an unfinished redoubt. Indeed, nearly the whole of the Confederate works on the east side of the bayou, although laid out long since, had been but recently and hastily thrown up, after it became known to Taylor that Banks was crossing to attack him. In the wood, about five hundred yards in advance of the breastworks, Mouton had posted Bagby's 3d Texas regiment. The Texans held their ground so stiffly that Gooding found it necessary to send his own regiment, the 31st Ma.s.sachusetts, to the support of Sharpe. Mouton supported Bagby with the left wing of the 18th Louisiana and part of Fournet's and Waller's battalions. Gooding's men carried the rifle-pits in the wood by a spirited charge, in which they took two officers and eighty-four men prisoners. His main line in the open ground between the wood and the bayou was formed by the 38th Ma.s.sachusetts, deployed as skirmishers, covering the front and followed, at a distance of about one hundred and fifty yards, by the 53d Ma.s.sachusetts, in like order. Behind the 53d, two sections of the 1st Maine battery were posted to command two parallel plantation roads leading up the bayou, while the third section was held in reserve. After the 31st Ma.s.sachusetts had gone to the support of the right, the main line here was composed of the 175th New York. Shortly after five o'clock the 53d Ma.s.sachusetts relieved the 38th, which had expended its ammunition, and was falling back under orders to replenish. When this was done, the 38th once more advanced and formed in support of the skirmish line.

Meanwhile on the left of the Teche the main body moved forward in two lines of battalions deployed, Paine on the right and Weitzel on the left, while Ingraham, in column of companies, formed the reserve for both. Paine's first line on the right, nearest the bayou, was composed of the 4th Wisconsin and 8th New Hamps.h.i.+re, his second line of the 133d New York and the 173d New York. Mack's 20-pounders commanded the bayou road, and Duryea went into battery in advance of the centre, between Paine and Weitzel.

Weitzel's front line was composed of the 8th Vermont and 114th New York, with the 12th Connecticut, 160th New York, and 75th New York in the second line. The guns of Bainbridge and Carruth went into battery near the left flank, and working slowly kept down the fire of the Confederate artillery in their front. When the fire of musketry became hot, Weitzel sent the 75th New York to try to gain the canebrake on the left, in advance of the enemy's works, with a view of turning that flank. Of this movement Taylor says in his report that it was twice repulsed by the 5th Texas and Waller's battalion, under Green, and the 28th Louisiana, Colonel Gray, aided by the guns of Semmes's battery and the Valverde battery. However, the counter-movement on the part of the Confederates, being begun in plain view, was instantly seen, and Banks sent word to Weitzel to check it. With this object, Weitzel ordered the 114th New York to go to the support of the 75th. A brisk fight followed, without material advantage to either side. In truth, the canebrake formed an impenetrable obstacle to the combatants, who, when once they had pa.s.sed within the outer edge of the tangle, were unable either to see or approach one another, although the struggle was plainly visible from the front of both armies.

The reserve of Parrott guns, manned by the 1st Indiana and composed of four 30-pounders and four 20-pounders, was posted under McMillan to cover the left flank and the broken centre where it was pierced by the bayou, as well as to watch for the return of the Diana to activity. Toward evening the remaining guns of the 1st Indiana, two 12-pounder rifles under c.o.x, after being posted in support of the centre, were sent to the left to a.s.sist Bainbridge and Carruth, whose ammunition was giving out.

Banks, after gaining advanced positions in contact with the enemy, forbore to press them hard because, as has been seen, his whole purpose was to hold the Confederates where they stood until he could hear of Grover or from Grover. As the day advanced without news or the long-expected sound of Grover's guns, Banks began to grow impatient and to fear that the adventure from which so much had been hoped had somehow miscarried. He therefore became even more anxious than before lest the Confederates should move off under cover of the coming night. Accordingly, during the afternoon, although it had been his previous purpose not to deliver an a.s.sault until certain that Grover held the Confederate line of retreat, Banks gave discretionary orders to Emory and Weitzel to form for an attack and move upon the Confederate works if a favorable opportunity should present itself. The exercise of this discretion in turn devolved upon the commanders of the front line, that is, upon Weitzel and Paine, for Gooding, being out of communication, except by signal, with the troops on the west bank, was occupied in conforming to their movements. Paine and Weitzel, after conferring, resolved to attack, and having made every preparation, only waited for the word from the commanding general.

The day was waning; it was already past four o'clock; and Banks was still somewhat anxiously weighing the approach of night and the cost of the a.s.sault against the chance of news from Grover, when suddenly, straight up the bayou, and high above the heads of Banks and his men, a 9-inch sh.e.l.l came hurtling, and as it was seen to burst over the lines of Bisland, from far in the rear broke the deep roar of the Clifton's bow-gun. Soon from below the obstructions that barred her progress came a messenger bearing the long-expected tidings of Grover. At last he was on land and in march toward his position. With a sense of relief Banks recalled the orders for the a.s.sault and drew his front line back out of fire of the Confederate musketry so that the men might rest. To relieve the exhausted skirmish line, the 4th Ma.s.sachusetts and the 162d New York of Ingraham's brigade were sent forward from the reserve, leaving him only the 110th New York.

By dawn the next morning, at all events, Banks calculated, the turning column would be in place; accordingly during the night he gave orders to a.s.sault along the whole front as soon as it should be light enough to see.

However, shortly after midnight, sounds were heard on the picket line, indicating some unusual movement behind the Confederate works. When, at daybreak, the various skirmishers moved forward in eager rivalry, they found the Confederates gone. Captain Allaire, leading his company of the 133d New York, was the first to enter the works; the regiment itself and the 8th New Hamps.h.i.+re followed closely, and the colors of the 8th were the first to mount the parapet, where they were planted by Paine. On the left bank, this honor fell to the 53d Ma.s.sachusetts. But in truth the surge was so nearly simultaneous that the whole line of entrenchments on both sides of the bayou, from right to left, was crossed almost at the same instant.

It was nine o'clock on Monday night when Taylor learned of Grover's movements and position, as narrated in the next chapter. Taylor at once began to move out of the lines of Bisland and to direct his attention to Grover in order to secure a retreat. Just before daylight Green, to whom, with his 5th Texas, Waller's battalion, and West's section of Semmes's battery, Taylor had given the more than usually delicate task of covering the rear, marched off the ground, leaving nothing behind save one 24-pounder siege gun and a disabled howitzer of Cornay's battery.

Without losing an instant the pursuit of the retreating Confederates was begun, Weitzel leading the way, and was conducted with vigor and with scarcely a halt, notwithstanding the energetic opposition of the Confederate rear-guard, until early in the afternoon, just beyond Franklin, Emory's advance guard, under Paine, following the bayou road, ran into Grover's under Dwight, approaching from the opposite direction. Weitzel, having entered Franklin without opposition, kept the left-hand or cut-off road until he came to the burnt bridge over the Choupique, by which, as will presently be seen, the Confederates had escaped.

Gooding, after occupying the works in his front, crossed the Teche by a bridge to the west bank and fell into Emory's column behind Ingraham. The Clifton, as soon as the obstructions could be removed, got under way and moved up the bayou abreast with the advance of the army.

The losses of the Nineteenth Army Corps in this its first battle were 3 officers and 37 men killed, 8 officers and 176 men wounded; in all 224. The 38th Ma.s.sachusetts headed the list with 6 killed and 29 wounded, and Gooding's brigade, to which this regiment belonged, reported 87 casualties, or 38 per cent. of the whole. In the six light batteries 15 horses were killed and 12 wounded, and one caisson of the 1st Maine was upset and lost in crossing the Teche to go into action.

The losses of the Confederates have never been reported and no means are known to exist for estimating them.

The disparity of the forces engaged was more than enough to overcome the Confederate advantage of position, for Banks had 10,000 men with 38 guns, while Taylor reports but 4,000 men with four batteries, estimated at 24 or 25 guns. To these must be added the Diana, until disabled on Monday morning, and to the Union strength the Clifton, after she arrived and opened fire at long range on Monday afternoon.

At Bisland the new headquarters flags were for the first time carried under fire. These distinguis.h.i.+ng colors, as prescribed in General Orders on the 18th of February, were guidons four feet square attached to a lance twelve feet long, made for convenience in two joints. In camp or garrison they served to indicate the quarters of the general commanding the corps, division, or brigade, while on the march they were borne near his person by a mounted orderly, commonly a trusty sergeant. The flag of the Nineteenth Army Corps was blue with a white four-pointed star in the middle, and on the star the figures 19 in red. From this the division flags differed only in having a red ground and the number of the division in black. The brigade flags had blue, white, and blue horizontal stripes of equal width, with the number of the brigade in black in the white stripe. Thenceforward these colors were borne through every engagement in which the corps took part. Not one of them was ever abandoned by its bearer or taken by the enemy.

CHAPTER XI. IRISH BEND.

Grover's instructions were to gain a landing on the sh.o.r.e of Grand Lake, and then marching on Franklin, to cut off Taylor's retreat or to attack him in the rear, as circ.u.mstances might suggest.

We have seen how, instead of being ready to move from Berwick Bay on the morning of the 10th of April, Grover found his departure delayed by the various causes already mentioned until the morning of the 12th was well advanced.

The flotilla, under Lieutenant-Commander Cooke, composed of the flag-s.h.i.+ps Estrella, Arizona, Clifton, and Calhoun, having completed the ferriage of Emory and Weitzel over Berwick Bay, was now occupied in a.s.sisting the army transports to convey Grover to his destination, besides standing ready to protect his movement and his landing with its guns.

About noon, when off Cypress Island, the Arizona ran hard and fast aground, and four precious hours were lost in a vain attempt to get her afloat. If, in the light of after events, this may seem like time wasted, it should always be remembered that all four of the gunboats were crowded with troops, while an attack from the Queen of the West and her consorts was to be looked for at any moment. Finally, rather than to put the adventure in peril by a longer delay, Cooke determined to leave the Arizona to take care of herself, and once more steaming ahead, at half-past seven o'clock, the gunboats and transports came to anchor below Miller's Point, off Madame Porter's plantation. At this place, known as Oak Lawn, Grover in the orders under which he was acting had been told he might expect to find a good sh.e.l.l road leading straight to the Teche, and crossing the bayou about the middle of the bow called Irish Bend. Grover at once sent Fiske with two companies of the 1st Louisiana ash.o.r.e in the Clifton's boats to reconnoitre. It was midnight when, after carefully examining the ground, Fiske returned to the gunboat and reported the road under water, and quite impracticable for all arms. The fleet then got under way, and proceeding about six miles farther up the lake, anch.o.r.ed beyond Magee's Point.

Before daylight Dwight sent two of his staff officers, Captain Denslow and Lieutenant Matthews, ash.o.r.e, with a small detachment from the 6th New York, to examine the plantation road leading from this point to the Teche. The road being found practicable for all arms, the debarkation began at daybreak.

Dwight landed first. As soon as his leading regiment, the 1st Louisiana, reached the sh.o.r.e, Holcomb threw forward two companies, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fiske, as skirmishers, and formed the battalion in line to cover the landing.

Taylor, when he first learned that the gunboats and transports had pa.s.sed up Grand Lake, had sent Vincent, with the 2d Louisiana cavalry and a section of Cornay's battery, to Verdun landing, about four miles behind Camp Bisland, to observe and oppose the movement. This was about noon on Sunday, the 12th. In the evening, hearing of the progress of the fleet, Taylor sent a second section of Cornay's battery to the lake, and going himself to Vincent ordered him to follow the movement and try to prevent a landing. The next morning Taylor sent Reily with the 4th Texas, to join Vincent and aid him in r.e.t.a.r.ding Grover's progress.

Taylor seems to have censured Vincent for letting Grover land, yet in truth Vincent was not to blame. The line he had to watch was too long for his numbers, and the Union flotilla could and did move more rapidly on the lake than the Confederate troops by the roads. When he had stationed his pickets at the probable landing-places, and taken up a central position to support them, he had done all that lay in his power. The range and weight of the 9-inch sh.e.l.ls of the navy were alone enough to put a serious opposition to the landing out of the question, but as soon as Vincent found where the attempt was to be made, he disposed his men and guns to r.e.t.a.r.d it. Two of Cornay's guns even tried, ineffectually of course, to destroy the transports: Cooke quickly drove them off.

As Holcomb's skirmishers deployed they were met by a brisk fusillade from Vincent's men strongly posted in ambush behind a high fence in the thick wood that skirts the sh.o.r.e; but when Holcomb advanced his battalion Vincent's men fell back on their main body and left the wood to Holcomb, who immediately moved to the edge of the clearing and held it, observing the enemy on the farther border. This was Vincent with his regiment and the four guns of Corney; and from this moment all that was happening on the lake sh.o.r.e pa.s.sed unseen by the Confederates.

Meanwhile the landing went on very slowly, for the transports could not come nearer to the beach than a hundred yards, and, although the foot-soldiers were able to jump overboard and scramble ash.o.r.e, and the horses could also take to the water, it was necessary to make a bridge of flats for the guns and caissons of the artillery. Thus it was four o'clock in the afternoon before the whole division found itself a.s.sembled on the plantation of Duncan McWilliams on the sh.o.r.e of the lake, with the Teche at the upper reach of Irish Bend four miles to the southward, and Charenton in the hollow of Indian Bend lying but two miles toward the southwest. There were roads in either direction, but Irish Bend was the way to Franklin, and to Franklin Grover was under orders to go.

About nine o'clock in the morning Dwight had borrowed from Birge his two leading regiments, the 13th Connecticut and the 159th New York, to support the 1st Louisiana. Grover also gave Dwight Closson's battery and Barrett's troop of cavalry. Toward noon, moving a detachment by his left, Dwight seized the bridge that crosses the Teche in approaching Madame Porter's plantation from the northward, just in time to extinguish the flames that Vincent's men had lighted to destroy it. After seizing the bridge at Oak Lawn, Barrett galloped down the left bank of the Teche and seized the bridge a mile or two below, by which the same small plantation is reached from the eastward; probably by the sh.e.l.l road that Grover had been told to take, and at which he had tried to land. Barrett was in time to save the bridge from Vincent, and to hold the advantage thus gained Dwight soon sent Holcomb with the 1st Louisiana, 131st New York, 6th New York, 22d Maine, and Closson's battery.

Meanwhile, the division being entirely without wagons, save a few that were loaded with the reserve ammunition, still another wait took place while the men's haversacks were being filled with hard bread and coffee. All these delays were now having their effect upon Grover's own calculations. He now knew nothing of Banks's movements or his situation. Of his own movements he was bound to suppose that Taylor had received early and full information. Moreover, the topography of the country where Grover found himself was obscure and to him unknown. Instead, therefore, of marching forward as fast as his troops could land, boldly and at all hazards to seize the roads by which Taylor must retreat, Grover now took counsel with prudence and concealing his force behind the natural screen of the wood, waited till his whole division should be fully ready.

Thus it was six o'clock and the sun stood low among the tree-tops when Grover, with Birge and Kimball, took up the line of march for the Teche. Crossing the upper of the two bridges, he went into bivouac on the right bank on the plantation of Madame Porter, and called in Dwight's detachment. Before setting out to rejoin the division Holcomb burned the lower bridge, under orders, and then marching up the left bank, crossed the upper bridge at a late hour of the night. In Grover's front stood Vincent alone, for Reily had not yet come; but in the darkness it was impossible for Grover to make out the enemy's force, or even to find his exact position.

When about nine o'clock that night, as related in the last chapter, Taylor heard the news from Reily, he supposed Grover to be already in strong possession of the only road by which the Confederates could make good their retreat up the Teche; yet desperate as the situation seemed, Taylor at once made up his mind to try to extricate himself from the toils. Sending his wagon train ahead, soon after midnight he silently moved out of the lines of Bisland and marched rapidly on Franklin, leaving Green to cover the rear and r.e.t.a.r.d the pursuit. These dispositions made, Taylor himself rode at once to his reversed front, a mile east of Franklin. With him were Reily, whom he had picked up on the road below Franklin, Vincent who with the four guns of Cornay was still watching Grover, and Clack's Louisiana battalion, which had come in from New Iberia just in the nick of time. The plantation with the sugar-house, then belonging to McKerrall, is now known as Shaffer's. The grounds of Oak Lawn adjoin it toward the east and north, and along its western boundary stand Nerson's Woods, whence the coming battle takes the name given to it in the Confederate accounts. Here, beneath the trees, along their eastern skirt and behind a stout fence, Taylor formed his line of battle, facing toward the east, and waited for the coming of Grover. South of the bayou road stood Clack; on his left, two pieces of Cornay's battery, next Reily, then Vincent with a second section of Cornay's guns. The task before them was simple but desperate. They were to hold off Grover until all but they had safely pa.s.sed behind the living barrier. Then they were to extricate themselves as best they could, and falling in the rear of the main column of the Confederate army try to make good their own escape. Before this could happen, Grover might overwhelm them or Banks might overtake them; yet there was no other way.

As early on the morning of Tuesday the 14th of April as it was light enough to see, Grover marched on Franklin by the winding bayou road. Preceded by Barrett and a strong line of skirmishers, Birge with Rodgers's battery led the column; Dwight with Closson's battery, followed; while Kimball with Nims's battery brought up the rear.

The head of Grover's column had gone about two miles, and in a few moments more would have turned the sharp corner of the bayou and faced toward Franklin, when, on the right, near the sugar-house, Birge's skirmishers ran into those of Clack's battalion, and the battle of Irish Bend began.

Between Birge and the concealed Confederate ranks, past which he was in fact marching, while his line of direction gave his right flank squarely to the hostile front, lay the broad and open fields of McKerrall's plantation, where the young sugar-cane stood a foot high above the deep and wide furrows. From recent ploughing and still more recent rains the fat soil was soft and heavy under foot, and here and there the cross-furrows, widening and deepening into a ditch, added to the toil and difficulty of movement, both for men and guns. On the left flowed the dark and sluggish Teche. On the right lay the swamp, thickly overgrown and nearly impa.s.sable, whence the waters of the Choupique begin to ooze toward the Gulf. Along the southern border of this mora.s.s ran a great transverse ditch that carried off the gathered seepage of the lesser drains. In front, on the western edge of the cane-field, stood Nerson's woods, where, as yet unseen, the Confederates lay in wait; while before them, like a screen, stretched a low fringe of brake and undergrowth.

Birge's order of march placed the 25th Connecticut in the advance, one wing deployed as skirmishers across the road, the other wing in reserve. Next came the 26th Maine with Bradley's section of Rodgers's battery, then the 159th New York, then the remainder of Rodgers's battery, while the 13th Connecticut brought up the rear. When he saw his skirmishers briskly engaged and by the sound and smoke discovered the position of the enemy, Birge made the reserved battalion of the 25th Connecticut change front forward and move across the field against the Confederate left. Bissell led his men quickly to within a hundred yards of the wood, where they lay down under the partial cover of a ditch and began firing. Hubbard, with the 26th Maine, came up on Bissell's left and took up the same tactics. At once the enfilade fire of the Confederate line became vigorous and annoying, until Bradley took his two guns at a gallop to the skirt of the undergrowth opposite the interval between the infantry battalions and, opening fire at five hundred yards' range, engaged for a time the whole attention of the Confederate cannoneers. Then Grover, who rode with Birge, sent in the 159th New York on the left of the 26th Maine, with orders to take the wood, while the 13th Connecticut, marching round the bend of the bayou, formed on the extreme left between the stream and the road.

Molineux promptly deployed his regiment, and gallantly led it forward at the double-quick over and beyond the left of the line already formed, until the men were within short point-blank range of the enemy's musketry; there, finding them exhausted by the rapid advance over the rough and heavy ground, as well as suffering severely from the bullets of the enemy, he made the men throw off their blankets and overcoats, lie down, and open a vigorous fire. Perhaps under the stress of this, but more probably in preparation for the counter-attack, the Confederates slackened their fire, and Molineux, perceiving his opportunity, as it seemed, was in the act of uttering the command "Forward!" when a bullet struck him in the mouth and he fell, painfully wounded, leaving the command of the regiment, for the time, to Captain Dayton. Lieutenant-Colonel Draper had already fallen, and Major Burt was with Grover, serving on the staff.

At the word the men sprang to their feet, but before the command could be carried out, suddenly came the crisis of the battle. About seven o'clock, Gray had brought up the 28th Louisiana to Taylor's aid, and with it the news that the rest of the forces from Bisland were close at hand and all was well with them. Under cover of the wood, Taylor moved Gray quietly to the left, and perceiving that his line now overlapped Grover's right, promptly determined to gain the brief time he still needed for the safe retreat of his main body by a bold and vigorous attack with the whole force he had under his hand. The order was obeyed with spirit. Out of the wood beyond the right, and from the main ditch, well in the rear of the 159th, the Confederates came charging strongly, and halting, they poured in a hot volley. Seeing that the situation was critical Dayton ordered the regiment to retire. Under a severe fire it fell back quickly, yet in good order, to the road. There it promptly re-formed on its colors, and Burt rejoining took command.

In their retreat the New Yorkers swept over the position of the 26th Maine and the 25th Connecticut and carried these already shaken regiments with them, in some natural disorder; but his lasted hardly longer than was needed for Dwight to hear and obey the command that now came back from Grover, to deploy the first brigade and take up the broken battle.

Bradley held his ground stoutly to the last moment, and when finally the choice was narrowed to retreat or capture, he retired in good order to a fresh position, and there serving his canister with coolness and deliberation, held off the enemy's advance. At this point, Rodgers, who with his centre section was in the road on the left, engaged at 800 and 400 yards with Cornay's right section, turned his attention to the Confederate infantry on the right, and crossing with spherical case-shot the canister fire of his Lieutenant, made good the check.

Almost at the moment when Taylor's left was thus roughly bearing down the right of Birge, on his left his own 13th Connecticut, under Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, enveloped in a grove, was moving steadily on the Confederate right, where Clack stood and the two guns of Cornay. Emerging from the grove into an open field that still lay between them and the enemy in the wood, Warner's men instantly replied to the volleys of cannon and small-arms that greeted their appearance and pushed on, firing as they went. More fortunate than their comrades in the direction and the moment of their attack, they pressed back Clack, drove off Cornay's guns, and took two of his caissons, a limber, and a color presented to his battery by the ladies of Franklin. Nearly 60 prisoners at the same time fell into their hands. They were still advancing when Grover's orders recalled them to the restored line of battle of the brigade.

As Birge's right retired, Dwight deployed in two lines, the 6th New York and the 91st New York in front, the 22d Maine, 1st Louisiana, and 131st New York in support, and advancing against Taylor's left flank and overlapping it in its turn pushed it back into and beyond the woods. In this movement Dwight took 70 prisoners. The resistance he encountered was feeble compared with the vigor with which Birge had been met and turned back, for in that effort the Confederate line of battle had practically gained its main object and had now only to extricate itself and make good its own withdrawal.

Birge, at the same time that he drew back the 13th Connecticut, once more moved forward his three other regiments and re-formed the brigade in two lines on Dwight's left.

Kimball, whose brigade was in two lines in reserve, brought up the 12th Maine to the support of the 13th Connecticut.

This done, Grover advanced the whole division through the woods to the open fields on their farther or western verge, and seeing the Confederates in force on the knoll beyond, to which they had retired, halted and began to observe and reconnoitre.

To cover the right flank of the last Confederate position Semmes brought up the Diana, whose injuries of the day before he had during the night partly made good by repairs. Her 30-pounder Parrott now opened a slow fire without great effect other than to add to Grover's caution.

Shortly after eight o'clock Mouton rode up. To him Taylor turned over the command of the force confronting Grover, and then rode into Franklin to direct the retreat. By half-past nine Green with the rear-guard moved out on the direct road toward New Iberia. The last of Green's troopers had not quitted the little town at the upper end when the first of Weitzel's entered at the lower end.

Some time pa.s.sed before Mouton knew of this. Then for a brief s.p.a.ce his peril was great; but fortunately for him the unlooked-for situation of affairs raised a momentary doubt in the minds of Green's pursuers. Should they go to the right or to the left? And where was Grover? After questioning prisoners and townspeople, Banks directed Weitzel to follow by the cut-off road and Emory to move up the bayou. The interval, short as it was, enabled Mouton to fall back quickly, and taking a by-way across country to strike into the cut-off road beyond the northern outskirts of Franklin. Not an instant too soon, for in the confusion Sibley had fired the bridge over the Choupique and across the blazing timbers lay Mouton's last hope of escape. Hardly had his men reached the north bank in safety when Weitzel's advance guard came in sight down the road. They galloped to the bridge only to find it impa.s.sable.