The Medallic History of the United States of America 1776-1876 Part 91

"I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, "Braxton BRAGG, "_General commanding_."

Not being willing that he should get his army off in good order, Thomas was directed early on the morning of the 23d to ascertain the truth or falsity of this report by driving in his pickets and making him develop his line. This he did with the troops stationed at Chattanooga, and Howard's corps (which had been brought into Chattanooga because of the apprehended danger to our pontoon bridges from the rise in the river and the enemy's rafts) in the most gallant style, driving the enemy from his first line and securing to us what is known as "Indian Hill" or "Orchard Knoll," and the low range of hills south of it. These points were fortified during the night and artillery put in position on them.

The report of this deserter was evidently not intended to deceive, but he had mistaken Bragg's movements. It was afterward ascertained that one division of Buckner's corps had gone to join Longstreet, and a second division of the same corps had started, but was brought back in consequence of our attack.

On the night of the 23d of November Sherman, with three divisions of his army, strengthened by Davis' division of Thomas', which had been stationed along on the north bank of the river, convenient to where the crossing was to be effected, was ready for operations.

At an hour sufficiently early to secure the south bank of the river, just below the mouth of the South Chicamauga, by dawn of day, the pontoons in the North Chicamauga were loaded with thirty armed men each, and floated quietly past the enemy's pickets, landed and captured all but one of the guard, twenty in number, before the enemy was aware of the presence of a foe. The steamboat "Dunbar" with a barge in tow, after having finished ferrying across the river the horses procured from Sherman, with which to move Thomas' artillery, was sent up from Chattanooga to aid in crossing artillery and troops, and by daylight of the (p. 402) morning of the 24th of November, eight thousand men were on the south side of the Tennessee and fortified in rifle trenches. By twelve o'clock M. the pontoon bridges across the Tennessee and the Chicamauga were laid, and the remainder of Sherman's forces crossed over, and at half-past three P.M. the whole of the northern extremity of Missionary Ridge to near the railroad tunnel was in Sherman's possession. During the night he fortified the position thus secured, making it equal if not superior in strength to that held by the enemy.

By three o'clock of the same day, Colonel Long with his brigade of cavalry of Thomas' army, crossed to the south side of the Tennessee, and to the north of South Chicamauga Creek and made a raid on the enemy's lines of communications. He burned Tyner's station, with many stores, cut the railroad at Cleveland, captured near a hundred wagons, and over two hundred prisoners.

His own loss was small.

Hooker carried out the part a.s.signed him for this day, equal to the most sanguine expectations. With Geary's division (12th Corps) and two brigades of Stanley's division (4th Corps) of Thomas' army, and Osterhaus' division (15th Corps) of Sherman's army, he scaled the western slope of Lookout Mountain, drove the enemy from his rifle pits on the northern extremity and slope of the mountain, capturing many prisoners, without serious loss.

Thomas having done on the 23d, with his troops in Chattanooga, what was intended for the 24th, bettered and strengthened his advanced position during the day and pushed the 11th Corps forward along the south bank of the Tennessee river across Citico creek, one brigade of which with Howard in person, reached Sherman just as he had completed the crossing of the river.

When Hooker emerged in sight of the northern extremity of Lookout Mountain, Carlin's brigade of the 14th Corps was ordered to cross Chattanooga creek and form a junction with him. This was effected late in the evening and after considerable fighting.

Thus on the night of the 24th, our forces maintained an unbroken line with unbroken communications, from the north end of Lookout Mountain through Chattanooga Valley to the north end of Missionary Ridge.

On the morning of the 25th, Hooker took possession of the mountain top with a small force, and with the remainder of his command in pursuance of orders, swept across Chattanooga Valley, now abandoned by the enemy, to Rossville. In this march he was detained four hours in building a bridge across Chattanooga creek. From Rossville he ascended Missionary Ridge and moved northward toward the centre of the now shortened line.

Sherman's attack upon the enemy's most northern and most vital points was vigorously kept up all day. The a.s.saulting column advanced to the very rifle pits of the enemy, and held their position firmly and without wavering. The right of the a.s.saulting column being exposed to the danger of being turned, two brigades were sent to its support. These advanced in the most gallant manner over an open field on the mountain side to near the works of the enemy, and laid there, partially covered from fire for some time. The right of these two brigades rested near the head of a ravine or gorge in the mountain side, which the enemy took advantage of, and sent troops, covered from view below them (p. 403) and to their right rear. Being unexpectedly fired into from this direction, they fell back across the open field below them, and reformed in good order in the edge of the timber. The column which attacked them was speedily driven to its entrenchments by the a.s.saulting column proper.

Sherman's position not only threatened the right flank of the enemy, but, from his occupying a line across the mountain and to the railroad bridge across Chicamauga Creek, his rear and stores at Chicamauga Station. This caused the enemy to ma.s.s heavily against him. This movement of his being plainly seen from the position I occupied on Orchard Knoll, Baird's division of the 14th Corps was ordered to Sherman's support; but receiving a note from Sherman informing me that he had all the force necessary, Baird was put in position on Thomas' left.

The appearance of Hooker's column was at this time anxiously looked for and momentarily expected, moving north on the ridge, with his left in Chattanooga Valley and his right east of the ridge. His approach was intended as the signal for storming the ridge in the centre, with strong columns; but the time necessarily consumed in the construction of the bridge near Chattanooga creek, detained him to a later hour than was expected. Being satisfied, from the latest information from him, that he must by this time be on his road from Rossville, though not yet in sight, and discovering that the enemy in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress of Sherman, was weakening his centre on Missionary Ridge, determined me to order the advance at once. Thomas was accordingly directed to move forward his troops, const.i.tuting our centre,--Baird's division (14th Corps), Wood's and Sheridan's divisions (4th Corps), and Johnson's division (14th Corps),--with a double line of skirmishers thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force, and carry the rifle pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to reform his lines in the rifle pits with a view to carrying the top of the ridge.

These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle pits at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive, stopped but a moment until the whole were in line, and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy, without further orders. They encountered a fearful volley of grape and canister from near thirty pieces of artillery, and musketry from still well filled rifle pits on the summit of the ridge. Not a waver, however, was seen in all that long line of brave men. Their progress was steadily onward until the summit was in their possession.

In this charge the casualties were remarkably few for the fire encountered. I can account for this only on the theory that the enemy's surprise at the audacity of such a charge caused confusion and purposeless aiming of their pieces.

The nearness of night and the enemy still resisting the advance of Thomas' left, prevented a general pursuit that night, but Sheridan pushed forward to Mission Mills.

The resistance on Thomas' left being overcome, the enemy abandoned his position near the railroad tunnel in front of Sherman, and by twelve o'clock at night was in full retreat, and the whole of his strong positions on Lookout Mountain, Chattanooga Valley and Missionary Ridge were in our possession, together with a large number of prisoners, artillery, and small arms.

Thomas was directed to get Granger with his corps, and (p. 404) detachments enough from other commands, including the force available at Kingston, to make twenty thousand men, in readiness to go to the relief of Knoxville, upon the termination of the battle at Chattanooga, these troops to take with them four days'

rations and a steamboat loaded with rations to follow up the river.

On the evening of the 25th November orders were given to both Thomas and Sherman to pursue the enemy early the next morning, with all their available force except that under Granger, intended for the relief of Knoxville.

On the morning of the 26th Sherman advanced by way of Chicamauga Station, and Thomas' forces, under Hooker and Palmer, moved on the Rossville road toward Grayville and Ringgold.

The advance of Thomas' forces reached Ringgold on the morning of the 27th, where they found the enemy in strong position in the gorge and on the crest of Taylor's Ridge, from which they dislodged him after a severe fight, in which we lost heavily in valuable officers and men, and continued the pursuit that day until near Tunnel Hill, a distance of twenty miles from Chattanooga.

Davies' division (14th Corps) of Sherman's column reached Ringgold about noon of the same day. Howard's Corps was sent by Sherman to Red Clay to destroy the railroad between Dalton and Cleveland, and thus cut off Bragg's communication with Longstreet, which was successfully accomplished.

Had it not been for the imperative necessity of relieving Burnside, I would have pursued the broken and demoralized retreating enemy as long as supplies could have been found in the country. But my advices were that Burnside's supplies would only last until about the 3d of December. It was already getting late to afford the necessary relief. I determined, therefore, to pursue no further. Hooker was directed to hold the position he then occupied until the night of the 31st, but to go no further south at the expense of a fight. Sherman was directed to march to the railroad crossing of the Hiwa.s.see, to protect Granger's flank until he was across that stream, and to prevent further re-enforcements being sent by that route into East Tennessee.

Returning from the front on the 28th, I found that Granger had not yet got off, nor would he have the number of men I had directed. Besides he moved with reluctance and complaints. I therefore determined, notwithstanding the fact that two divisions of Sherman's forces had marched from Memphis and had gone into battle immediately on their arrival at Chattanooga, to send him with his command, and orders in accordance therewith were sent him at Calhoun, to a.s.sume command of the troops with Granger in addition to those with him, and proceed with all possible dispatch to the relief of Burnside.

General Elliott had been ordered by Thomas on the 26th of November, to proceed from Alexandria, Tennessee, to Knoxville, with his cavalry division to aid in the relief of that place.

The approach of Sherman caused Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville and retreat eastward on the night of the 4th of December. Sherman succeeded in throwing his cavalry into Knoxville on the night of the 3d.

Sherman arrived in person at Knoxville on the 6th, and after a conference with Burnside in reference to "_organizing a pursuing force large enough to either overtake the enemy and beat him (p. 405) or drive him out of the State_," Burnside was of the opinion that the corps of Granger, in conjunction with his own command, was sufficient for that purpose, and on the 7th addressed to Sherman the following communication:

"To "Knoxville, December 7th, 1863.

"MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN.

"I desire to express to you and to your command my most hearty thanks and grat.i.tude for your promptness in coming to our relief during the siege of Knoxville, and I am satisfied that your approach served to raise the siege. The emergency having pa.s.sed, I do not deem for the present any other portion of your command, but the corps of General Granger, necessary for operations in this section, and inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the forces immediately with him in order to relieve us, thereby rendering portions of General Thomas' less secure, I deem it advisable that all the troops now here, except those commanded by General Granger, should return at once to within supporting distance of the forces operating against Bragg's army. In behalf of my command I again desire to thank you and your command, for the kindness you have done us.

"A. E. BURNSIDE, _Major-General_."

Leaving Granger's command at Knoxville, Sherman with the remainder of his forces returned by slow marches to Chattanooga.

I have not spoken more particularly of the result of the pursuit of the enemy, because the more detailed reports accompanying this do the subject justice. For the same reason I have not particularized the part taken by Corps and Division Commanders.

To Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, Chief Engineer, I feel under more than ordinary obligations for the masterly manner in which he discharged the duties of his position, and desire that his services be fully appreciated by higher authority.

The members of my staff discharged faithfully their respective duties, for which they have my warmest thanks.

Our losses in these battles were 757 killed, 4529 wounded, and 330 missing; total 5616. The loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was probably less than ours, owing to the fact that he was protected by his entrenchments, while our men were without cover.

At Knoxville, however, his loss was many times greater than ours, making his entire loss at the two places equal to, if not exceeding ours. We captured 6142 prisoners, of whom 239 were commissioned officers; 40 pieces of artillery, 69 artillery carriages and caissons, and 7000 stand of small arms.

The armies of the c.u.mberland and of the Tennessee, for their energy and unsurpa.s.sed bravery in the three days battle of Chattanooga and the pursuit of the enemy, heir patient endurance in marching to the relief of Knoxville, and the Army of the Ohio for its masterly defence of Knoxville and repeated repulses of Longstreet's a.s.saults upon that place, are deserving of the grat.i.tude of their country.

I have the honor to be, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant, U. S. GRANT, _Major-General U. S. A._

No. 74. (p. 406) PLATE LXXIV.

_March 17, 1862._

A grateful country to her generous son Cornelius Vanderbilt.

[Rx]. Bis dat qui tempori dat 1865.

CORNELIUS VANDERBILT.

[_Free Gift of Steams.h.i.+p Vanderbilt._]

A GRATEFUL COUNTRY TO HER GENEROUS SON * * * CORNELIUS VANDERBILT * * *.

Undraped bust of Cornelius Vanderbilt, facing the right. On edge of bust, S. ELLIS. F. (_fecit_).

America, personified as Minerva, stands, leaning with her left hand on the American s.h.i.+eld, and holding in her right a sword which rests on her shoulder; to the right the American eagle; to the left, the genius of the maritime cities imploring her aid and protection. In the background, in the open sea, is the steamer Vanderbilt under steam; above, a cloud with thunderbolts. Exergue: BIS DAT QUI TEMPORI DAT.[118] (_He gives twice who gives in time._) 1865. ELLIS SC.

(_sculpsit._) LEUTZE DEL. (_delineavit._)[119]