With the "Die-Hards" in Siberia Part 13

Directly it became known that Semianoff and Kalmakoff had set the Omsk Government at defiance, numerous other would-be s.e.m.e.noffs came on the scene until the very residence of the Supreme Governor and his Headquarters Staff scarcely escaped attack, and it became necessary to show the British Tommy on the side of order. This was the position up till the early days of December, 1918.

Just about this time the fact that Germany was beaten began to take shape in the j.a.panese military mind, and the fact was hammered home by the terms of the Armistice. For some days the j.a.panese Mission at Omsk flatly refused to believe the cables; their national pride refused to admit that they had so far misunderstood the power of Britain and her Allies. It was a terrible awakening to the self-styled "Lords of the East" that all their schemes should be brought to nought, that British and American squadrons might be expected to cruise in the Sea of j.a.pan, and perhaps hold the scales fair between her and her temporarily helpless neighbour. I do not suppose it will ever come to that, but such was her fear. From this time on, while the objects of j.a.pan in Siberia were still the same, she pursued them by quite different methods.

The first sign of change was that j.a.panese soldiers were allowed to salute British officers and were no longer allowed to use the b.u.t.ts of their rifles on inoffensive Russian citizens. Their military trains no longer conveyed contraband goods to their compatriots who had _acquired_ the Russian business houses in the main trading centres along the railway. The Staff no longer commandeered the best buildings in the towns for alleged military purposes and immediately sub-let them to private traders. j.a.pan at once re-robed herself with the thin veil of Western morals and conduct which she had rapturously discarded in 1914.

While Hun methods were in the ascendancy she adopted the worst of them as her own. She is in everything the imitator _par excellence_, and therefore apparently could not help herself.

The British and French mildly protested against the att.i.tude of j.a.pan towards Semianoff and Kalmakoff, but it was continued until the anarchy created threatened to frustrate every Allied effort. Not until the Peace Conference had disclosed the situation did a change in policy take place. From this time on the conduct of j.a.pan (both civil and military) became absolutely correct. President Wilson brought forward his famous, but impossible, proposal that the different Russian belligerents should agree to an armistice and hold a conference on the Turkish "Isle of Dogs." If patriotism is the maintenance of such rules of human conduct and national life as will justify one man in killing another, then no Russian patriot could meet in friendly conference those who had destroyed and murdered their own country and people. Russia during the previous two years had shown that there could be no compromise between anarchy and order, or their several adherents. This was, however, the policy of America, and as such received the blessing of every representative, Jew or Gentile, of the U.S.A. in Siberia. j.a.pan saw a kink in the American armour and took full advantage of the chance to damage U.S.A. prestige. She rallied Russian patriotism to her side by advising that no notice be taken of this harebrained suggestion. j.a.pan's advice received the secret blessing of both French and English who knew the situation, though in our case we had to admit that the British Premier had stood sponsor for this international monstrosity. This gave j.a.panese diplomacy its first clear hold upon Russian patriotism and enabled her to appear as a true friend of orderly government.

American diplomacy in Russia had received its first great shock, but with careful handling it was still possible to recover the lost ground.

With the utter failure of the "Isle of Dogs" policy, Russian rage quickly subsided and a normal condition soon returned. The Allies had received a salutary warning, and most of them took the hint, but America continued on her debatable course. Having failed diplomatically to effect a compromise, she tried to force her views by military means. The neutral zone system of her commanders was the natural outcome of President Wilson's proposal. The intention was excellent, that the results would be disastrous was never in doubt. It forced the American command to adopt a sort of local recognition of the Red Army within the zone, and enabled the j.a.panese to appear as the sole friend of Russian order. The j.a.panese were attacked by Red forces collected in these zones, with American soldiers standing as idle spectators of some of the most desperate affairs between Red and Allied troops. j.a.pan was ent.i.tled to reap the kudos such a situation brought to her side, while America could not expect to escape the severest censure.

Profiting by the blunders of her great antagonist, j.a.pan managed in six months to recover all the ground she had lost while suffering under the illusion of a great Hun victory that was to give her the Lords.h.i.+p of the East. From a bl.u.s.tering bandit she has become a humble helper of her poor, sick, Russian neighbour. In which role she is most dangerous time will show. The world as a rule has little faith in sudden conversions.

This, then, was the situation in the Far East in June, 1919. As I was leaving Vladivostok I heard that the Red forces that had been organised in the American neutral zones had at last boldly attacked their protectors. If this was correct, it may be the reason why Admiral Koltchak was able to report their defeat and rout over the Chinese border and we were back again at the point at which British and Czech co-operation had arrived a year previously.

CHAPTER XXIV

GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

Before we decide our policy as to withdrawal or otherwise from Russia it is necessary to know whether we have contracted any obligations to the Russian people, and what is the nature of such obligations, if any. Are they moral, military, or political?

Towards the end of 1914, when our army had been driven back behind the Marne and the future of Europe and our Empire was in the balance, frantic appeals were made by British statesmen, and even by still more august authority, asking Russia to rush to our aid and save us from destruction. This appeal was backed by British public and Labour opinion, and through our Press made a profound impression upon the Russian people. The Russian Government, regardless of their best military advice, forced their partially mobilised legions to make a rapid flying raid into East Prussia, which immediately reduced the pressure upon our own armies and made the victory of the Marne possible.

Hurriedly mobilised, imperfectly equipped, not too brilliantly led, these legions, const.i.tuting the chivalry of Russia, became the prey of Prussia's perfect military machine. The Russian Government never dared to tell the Russian peasant the number of Russian souls who were mutilated by high explosives and smothered in the cold Masurian marshes in that sublime effort to save her friends. Russia lost as many men in saving Paris during that raid as did all the other Allies in the first year of the war.

Russia continued to fight and mobilise until 1917, by which time she had collected a huge army of over twelve million men. The Hohenzollern dynasty and its military advisers came to the conclusion that it would soon be impossible to stem this human tide by ordinary military means, and having a complete understanding of Russian psychology through its dynastic and administrative agents, decided to undermine the _moral_ of the Russian people. German "Black Books" were not employed against British leaders exclusively. We need not wonder at the rapid spread among Russians of suspicion against their civil and military leaders when we remember that the same sort of propaganda admittedly influenced the administration of justice in England. The people of Russia were true to their friends, demoralisation and decomposition began at the head, rapidly filtering down to the lowest strata of society.

If the Allied cause was deserted, it was the desertion of a ruling cla.s.s, not of a people or its army. German treachery wormed its way in at the top, and so destroyed a great race it never could have conquered.

Having disorganised the Russian military machine, Germany sent her agents to continue the disorder and prevent recovery. She secured the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, and made a levy of several hundred millions sterling upon her bailiffs, whom she put in possession of her neighbour's property. Lenin and Trotsky found anarchy the most effective weapon to further the interest of their masters and protect their Eastern flank. A peace which virtually extended German conquest to the hinterland of Tsing-Tchau was dangerous to every civilising influence in the Far East.

The Bolshevik treaty was not less dangerous to Europe herself, since it brought a war-like population of one hundred and eighty millions within the sphere of German military influence.

The British Expeditionary Force was ordered to Siberia in June, 1918, to a.s.sist the orderly elements of Russian society to reorganise themselves under a national Government and to resurrect and reconstruct the Russian front. Firstly, to enable Russia to resist German aggression; secondly, to weaken German military power on the Western front, where at that time she was again delivering hammer-blows at the gates of Paris. This expedition was approved by every party and patriot in Britain, and the only criticism offered at the time was that it should have been so long delayed. Soviet power under German and Austrian direction had released the German and Austrian prisoners of war, armed and organised them into formidable armies to perform the double task of maintaining their creatures in power at Moscow and extending their domination over a helpless friendly Allied Power.

There was every reason for treating the Dictators.h.i.+p of Lenin and Trotsky as a mere side-show of the German military party; they were, in fact, a branch of the military problem with which the Allies were bound to deal. Under Entente direction anti-Bolshevik Governments were established, and were promised the unstinted help of the Allies to recover their territory and expel the agents of the enemy who had so foully polluted their own home. It was on this understanding that Admiral Koltchak, by herculean efforts, hurled the German hirelings over the Urals, and awaited near Vatka the advance of the Allies from Archangel preparatory to a march on Petrograd. Alas! he waited for seven long months in vain; the Allies never came! After expending his last ounce of energy and getting so near to final victory, we failed him at the post. Why?

The menace to our own armies in France had disappeared; there was, I suppose, no longer an urgent necessity to re-establish the Russian front, though the possibility of such re-establishment had kept huge German forces practically demobilised near the Russian and Ukrainian frontiers. Koltchak and his gallant comrade Denikin had served the Entente purpose. Lenin and Trotsky, by wholesale intimidation and murder, had aroused the enthusiasm of similarly disposed compatriots in Allied countries. These compatriots were becoming noisy in the const.i.tuencies. The establishment of order to enable the Russian people to establish a clean democratic Government, and arise from their nightmare of unbridled anarchy, while very desirable in itself, was not a good party cry in any of the Western democracies. I grant all these things; but what about honour? Has this no longer any place in the political curriculum of the Allied Powers?

These are only some of the things it is necessary to remember before we finally decide to desert a temporarily sick friend. If I were the ruler of a state I should pray the G.o.ds to preserve me from half-hearted Allies and over-cautious friends. If I wished to help a fallen state or lend an honest hand in a great cause, whether it were to eradicate a hideous and fatal national malady or a.s.sert a principle of right and justice, first s.h.i.+eld me from the palsy of Allied diplomacy! One clear-sighted, honest helper is worth a dozen powerful aiders whose main business is to put obstacles in each other's way.

If we were discussing the question of Allied interference before the fact, I could give many reasons for remaining neutral; but we have to recognise that for their own purposes they have interfered, that their Military Missions and forces have been operating in the country for over a year, during which time they have made commitments and given pledges of a more or less binding character. That these commitments and pledges are not the irresponsible acts of subordinates on the spot, but have been made by Allied statesmen, both in and out of their several Parliaments; and in this respect our national leaders are no exception to the rule. Without filling my pages with quotations, readers will be able to find and tabulate such for themselves. So categorical are the nature of these that it is impossible to imagine them to have been made without fully understanding their import and significance to the orderly section of the Russian people who, on the faith of these pledges, gave us their trust.

It cannot, therefore, be a discussion upon interference or non-interference; _that_ has long since been disposed of by our words and acts. It is now a question whether we shall withdraw from Russia because we have thought fit to change our att.i.tude to the Russian problem. It is certain that our decision to-day upon this subject will decide our future relations with this great people. If you desert a friend in his hour of need, you cannot expect that he will be particularly anxious to help you when he has thrown off his ill-health and is in a position to give valuable help to those who gave succour in his distress.

If our desertion turns this people from us, they will become the prey of our recent enemies, and if that happens we can prate about the Treaty of Paris as much as we like. The Teuton will have more than balanced the account.