What Germany Thinks Part 23

It was solely the fear of perpetuating British supremacy[189] which has led Germany consistently to reject the extended hand of friends.h.i.+p.

Standing side by side with Great Britain, either in friends.h.i.+p or alliance, Germany would have given her approval to Britain's historical position in the world. When this country departed from the policy of "splendid isolation" repeated attempts were made to establish more intimate relations with Germany (1898-1902).

[Footnote 189: Graf Ernst zu Reventlow: "Der Vampir des Festlandes ("England, the Vampire of the Continent"). Berlin, 1915, p. 117.

"England's withdrawal from the policy which sought to establish a mutual plan of procedure in world politics between Germany and Britain dates from the time when Britain recognized that Germany would not allow herself to be employed against Russia. In Germany to-day, voices may be heard proclaiming that von Bulow chose wrongly in refusing England's offer, especially as Russia has repaid our loyalty and friends.h.i.+p with iniquitous ingrat.i.tude. The latter represents the truth.

"But in judging the policy of that period two factors must be borne in mind. The acceptance of Great Britain's offer would have placed a tie upon the German Empire which would have been unendurable. Germany would have become the strong but stupid Power, whose duty would have been to fight British battles on the continent. Besides which the choice concerned Germany's world future, above all the development of the German war fleet."]

But as Professor Marcks (p. 315) observes: "Germany refused the hand extended to her." Count Reventlow and a host of other writers have chronicled the fact too, yet on September 2nd, 1914, the German Chancellor dared to say to representative American journalists: "When the archives are opened then the world will learn how often Germany has offered the hand of friends.h.i.+p to England."

It is only one more confirmation that the "law of necessity" is incompatible with the truth. The truth is that Germany preferred to drive Britain into another and hostile camp rather than have her friends.h.i.+p. Germany preferred British hostility rather than relinquish her plans for unlimited naval expansion--which she believed to be the only means of destroying Britain's position, and with that resolution already taken the Kaiser presented his photograph to a distinguished Englishman with this significant remark written on it with his own hand: "I bide my time!"

Although Britain drew the sword to defend Belgium, the supreme issue--and the only one which occupies the German mind to-day--is whether this country shall continue to hold the position allotted to her by destiny and confirmed by history, or whether she is to be supplanted by Germany. That is the one political thought which permeates German intelligence at this moment, and no other considerations must be allowed to darken this issue.

Professor Oncken reviews the events of the period 1900-1914 in considerable detail, and to him the policy of _ententes_ appears to be the main cause leading up to the world war. From this alone it is obvious that, consciously or unconsciously, he is wrong; the _ententes_ in themselves are results, not prime causes. The prime causes leading to these political agreements are to be found in Germany's att.i.tude to the rest of Europe. In a word they were defensive actions taken by the Powers concerned, as a precaution against German aggression.

German aggression consisted in committing herself to unlimited armaments, cheris.h.i.+ng the irreconcilable determination to be the strongest European power. According to her doctrine of might, everything can be attained by the mightiest. British advances she answered with battles.h.i.+ps, simultaneously provoking France and Russia by increasing her army corps. The balance of power in Europe, Germany declares to be an out-of-date British fad, invented solely in the interests of these islands.

In secret Germany has long been an apostate to the balance-of-power theory; the war has caused her to drop the mask, and it was without doubt her resolve never to submit to the chains of the balance in Europe, which forced three other States to waive their differences and form the Triple Entente. Simply stated this is cause and result. But Professor Oncken maintains--and in doing so he voices German national opinion--that the entire _entente_ policy was a huge scheme to bring about Germany's downfall.

He goes further and proclaims that the Hague Conference (1907) was a British trick to place the guilt of armaments on Germany's shoulders.

"England filled the world with disarmament projects so that afterwards, full of unction, she could denounce Germany as the disturber of the peace. At that time the Imperial Chancellor answered justly: 'Pressure cannot be brought to bear on Germany, not even moral pressure!'"[190]

And in that sentence German obstinacy and sullen irreconcilability is most admirably expressed.

[Footnote 190: "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 495.]

Having seen that Professor Oncken has failed to recognize the prime causes which provoked the _entente_ policy, it is not surprising to find him equally in error when discussing the diplomatic clashes between the rival camps. The professor calls them _Machtproben_ ("tests of power"); but how he can dare to state that these diplomatic trials of strength were engineered by Great Britain--remains his own secret.

"King Edward's meeting with the Czar at Reval in June, 1908, was followed by a far-reaching Macedonian reform programme, the commencement of the division of European Turkey. What Britain had failed to induce Germany to help her in executing, was to be attained with the sword's point directed against Germany. And Britain proceeded in cold blood to conjure up an era of might-struggles, which, in the island language, is called preserving the balance of power."[191]

[Footnote 191: Ibid., p. 297.]

The trials of strength recounted by Oncken are the Bosnian crisis, the Morocco question, and the Austro-Serbian quarrel which led to the present war. It seems ba.n.a.l to have to point out that Bosnia was unlawfully annexed by Germany's va.s.sal--Austria; that Germany, herself, brought Europe to the verge of war by sending the _Panther_ to Agadir; and that the final catastrophic _Machtprobe_ was likewise provoked by Germany's eastern va.s.sal.

For good or evil Germany has been convinced for nearly two decades that the balance of power in Europe was an obstacle to her world future.

Furthermore, she believed that the balance imposed fetters upon her which only mighty armaments could break. All Germany's energies in the domain of diplomacy have been set in motion to make the balance of power a mere figment of the imagination.

In pursuing this end it has suited her purpose to declare all attempts at maintaining the outward appearances of equality between the Powers of Europe to be Machiavellian schemes against her existence; or to cite the Kaiser's own words, "to deprive Germany of her place in the sun."

Britain's _entente_ policy was the only one calculated to preserve our own existence, and to restrain Germany from establis.h.i.+ng a hegemony in Europe. She was completely convinced that the domination of Europe belonged to her by right of mental, moral and military superiority over her neighbours. Not in vain have Germany's educational inst.i.tutions inculcated the belief in her population that the British Empire is an effete monstrosity with feet of clay; France a rotten, decaying empire, and Russia a barbarian Power with no new _Kultur_ to offer Europe except the knout.

Inspired by such conceptions, together with an astoundingly exaggerated idea of Germany's peerlessness in order, discipline, obedience, morality, genius and other ethical values, as well as an unshaken belief in Germany's invincibility by land and sea--the entire nation, from Kaiser to cobbler, has long since held that by right of these virtues--by right of her absolute superiority over all other nations--Germany could and must claim other rights and powers than those which fell to her under an antiquated balance of European power.

In few words that is the gospel of _Deutschland, Deutschland, uber alles_. These are the motives which inspired Germany's naval expansion and forbade her to accept a compromise. The same ideals led to her endeavours to shatter the _ententes_, and it is alone the general acceptance of this gospel, which explains the remarkable unanimity with which the German nation has stood behind the Kaiser's Government in each trial of strength. They have learned to consider all attempts of the lesser peoples (Britain, France and Russia included) to maintain themselves against the Teutonic onset as impudent attacks on sacred Germany, which also illuminates the fact that Germans call the present struggle--"Germany's holy, sacred war."

German statesmen were quite clear as to the national course at least fifteen years ago. Hence they have persistently pursued a policy of no compromise and no agreements. A compromise recognizes and perpetuates, in part at least, the very thing which stands in the way. An agreement with Britain in regard to naval armaments would have perpetuated British naval supremacy, as well as recognized its necessity. Likewise an agreement, or the shadow of an understanding with France on the question of Alsace-Lorraine would have been a recognition of French claims. Hence on these two questions--which are merely given as examples ill.u.s.trative of German mentality--every attempt at an agreement has been a failure.

A cardinal point in Germany's programme has been the consistent manner in which she has tried to separate her European neighbours from Britain in order to deal with them separately or alone. That her endeavours ended in failure is due to the instinct of self-preservation which has drawn Germany's opponents closer together, in exact proportion to the increasing force of her efforts. Both in peace and war, Germany desired and endeavoured to switch off Britain's influence in Europe.

The diplomatic battles of 1905, 1908 and 1911 were a few of the efforts to dislodge Great Britain from her _ententes_, while her repeated attempts to buy this country's neutrality, down to the eve of war, are proof that Germany wanted a free hand in Europe.[192] If she had succeeded in her purpose, it is exceedingly doubtful whether any Power could have prevented her from exercising a free hand in the whole world.

[Footnote 192: Professor Schiemann: "Wie England eine Verstandigung mit Deutschland verhinderte" ("How England prevented an Understanding with Germany"). Berlin, 1915; pp. 20-21: "From the very commencement Berlin was convinced that the probability of a combined Franco-Russian attack was exceedingly small, if England's entrance to this Germanophobe combination could be prevented. Therefore we endeavoured to secure England's neutrality in case of war (1909), that is, if an Anglo-German alliance could not be achieved--an alliance which would have guaranteed the world's peace." (Schiemann's insinuation that Germany desired an alliance is an instance of _suggestio falsi_. Germany had decided in 1902 never to conclude an alliance with this country.--Author.)]

Coming down to the last trial of diplomatic power, we are confronted by the immovable fact, that it too was a challenge on the part of the Central Empires. The conditions seemed peculiarly favourable to them, for the British Amba.s.sador declared to the Russian Government on July 24th, 1914, that Britain would never draw the sword on a purely Serbian question. Moreover, in the preceding year, a British minister, says Professor Schiemann, had given what we may style a remarkable semi-official promise that Great Britain would never go to war with Germany.

"On February 18th, 1913, Mr. Charles Trevelyan, M.P., paid me a visit, and a.s.sured me with the greatest certainty that England would under no circ.u.mstances wage war on Germany. A ministry which made preparations for war, would be immediately overthrown."[193]

[Footnote 193: Ibid., p. 27. In the light of this revelation it would be interesting to know what was the real motive which induced Mr. Trevelyan to resign his office when war broke out. Either he was conscious of having seriously compromised his position as a Minister of the Crown, or he conscientiously believed that Britain was drawing the sword in an unjust cause. Unfortunately a section of the British public accepted the latter interpretation. In any case, Mr. Trevelyan's indiscretion affords overwhelming proof that he had an utterly false conception of Germany.--Author.]

Professor Schiemann affirms that his good impression was strengthened by a visit to London during March and April, 1914, and reports a conversation which he had with Lord Haldane when dining privately with the latter in London. After returning to Berlin, he says he received a letter from Lord Haldane dated April 17th, 1914, but from Schiemann's quotation it is not evident whether the following is an extract or the entire letter:

"It was a great pleasure to see you and to have had the full and unreserved talk we had together. My ambition is like yours, to bring Germany and Great Britain into relations of ever-closer intimacy and friends.h.i.+p. Our two countries have a common work to do for the world as well as for themselves, and each of them can bring to bear on this work special endowments and qualities. May the co-operation which I believe is now beginning become closer and closer.[194]

[Footnote 194: Lord Haldane has stated during the war that his visit to Berlin in 1912 had filled his mind with doubt and suspicion in regard to Germany.--Author.]

"Of this I am sure, the more wide and unselfish the nations and the groups questions make her supreme purposes of their policies, the more will frictions disappear, and the sooner will the relations that are normal and healthy reappear.[195] Something of this good work has now come into existence between our two peoples. We must see to it that the chance of growth is given."[196]

[Footnote 195: A word or phrase appears to have been dropped in this sentence.--Author.]

[Footnote 196: Professor Schiemann's book, pp. 27-8.]

It is not difficult to conceive that such utterances, on the part of two British ministers, would raise hopes in the German mind, for it would be useless to imagine that Professor Schiemann would keep them secret for his own private edification. And it is possible that they led the German Government into a false reckoning as to what this country would do under certain circ.u.mstances, and so encouraged Germany into taking up an irreconcilable att.i.tude in the crisis of July, 1914.

Whatever Germany expected must, however, for the present, remain a matter of conjecture. Schiemann's comment on the above letter leaves no doubt that he expected Lord Haldane[197] to resign. "When one remembers that Lord Haldane belonged to the inner circle of the Cabinet, and was therefore privy to all the secret moves of Sir Edward Grey, it is hard to believe in the sincerity of the sentiments expressed in this letter.

Besides, he did not resign like three other members of the Cabinet (Lord Morley, Burns and Charles Trevelyan) when Sir Edward's foul play lay open to the world on August 4th."

[Footnote 197: Lord Haldane seems to have injured his reputation both in Great Britain and Germany. Professor Oncken designates him: "the one-time friend of Germany, the decoy-bird of the British cabinet."

_Vide_ "Deutschland und der Weltkrieg," p. 561.]

The most regrettable side of the whole incident is that the resignation of the above gentlemen has been proclaimed by innumerable German writers as proof of Sir Edward Grey's double dealing, and proof that Britain is waging an unjust war. Still, it may console these gentlemen to know that the nation which wages war on women and children acclaims them to-day "all honourable men," and doubtless without the Shakespearian intonation.

By reason of the above incidents, and more of a similar nature, Germans accuse the late Liberal Government with perfidy of the basest kind. The author is not in the least inclined to admit the charge, but thinks, rather, that the Government in question--individually and collectively--was astonis.h.i.+ngly ignorant of European conditions and problems, especially those prevailing in the Germanic Empires.

To what a degree Germany was obsessed by the idea that Britain was trying to strangle her by an encircling policy, is apparent in a diplomatic doc.u.ment quoted by Professor Oncken. Its author's name is not given, and it was doubtless a secret report sent to the German Foreign Office in 1912; its freedom from bias is also questionable. Moreover, it is probable that it belongs to the same category of doc.u.ments as those quoted in the French Yellow Book--reports intended to exercise due influence on the mind of the Emperor.

"French diplomacy is succeeding more and more in entangling England in the meshes of her net. The encouragement which England gives, directly or indirectly, to French chauvinism may one day end in a catastrophe in which English and French soldiers must pay with their blood on French battlefields for England's encircling policy. The seeds sown by King Edward are springing up."

Another link in the chain of proof of Britain's guilt, is found in the doc.u.ments seized by the Germans in Brussels. The enemy seems to attach great importance to them, for they are being employed in much the same way that parliamentary candidates use pamphlets during an election. Yet they do not contain a particle of proof that Britain had hostile intentions against Germany, but only confirm the presence of the German menace.

The doc.u.ments[198] in question are reports sent by the Belgian Legation Secretaries in London, Paris and Berlin to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Brussels. These gentlemen held opinions identical with those expressed again and again in German newspapers, and even in some British and French organs. Messieurs Comte de Lalaing (London), Greindl (Berlin), Leghait (Paris), evidently believed that the activities of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente endangered the peace of Europe.

[Footnote 198: Published by the Berlin Government as supplements to the _Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_, July 29th and 31st; August 4th, 8th and 12th, 1915.]

Further they believed the latter constellation to be the more aggressive of the two, and formally reported these convictions to the Belgian Government. If read as a modern edition of "Pepys' Diary" they form entertaining literature, but by no stretch of the imagination could they be cla.s.sed as historical sources. A gentleman who reports to his Government that King Edward took breakfast in company with M. Delca.s.se and that the Press had neglected to chronicle the incident, can hardly rank as an historian.

Moreover, it is by no means clear why the German Press should laud M.

Greindl as a gentleman of German origin. If this be true it would probably explain everything which deserves explanation in the said doc.u.ments, and would probably account for the intimate, confidential treatment which M. Greindl received at the hands of German officials.

German newspapers are gloating over the fact that the British Government has not deigned to reply to these "revelations." There is really nothing to which it can reply; three observers expressed their opinion on contemporaneous happenings during the years 1905-1911. But a brutal sequence of events in 1914 showed them--if they had not been convinced during the preceding three years--that they had drawn false conclusions from their observations.