The Practical Values of Space Exploration Part 2

OUR POSITION IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Like the military values of s.p.a.ce research, the practical value of s.p.a.ce exploration in terms of world prestige has also been acknowledged almost from the beginning of the satellite era.

The White House, in its initial statement on the national s.p.a.ce program, declared:

It is useful to distinguish among (the) factors which give importance, urgency, and inevitability to the advancement of s.p.a.ce technology (one of which) is the factor of national prestige. To be strong and bold in s.p.a.ce technology will enhance the prestige of the United States among the peoples of the world and create added confidence in our scientific, technological, industrial, and military strength.[18]

Only recently, however, has the full impact and meaning of this phase of our national s.p.a.ce program come to be widely recognized. It has been stated, perhaps in its most forceful and succinct form, by an American official in a unique position to know. The Director of the U.S.

Information Agency, part of whose job is to keep track of the esteem in which America is held abroad, has told Congress:

Our s.p.a.ce program may be considered as a measure of our vitality and our ability to compete with a formidable rival and as a criterion of our ability to maintain technological eminence worthy of emulation by other peoples.[19]

This element of s.p.a.ce exploration takes on particular significance in light of the current international struggle to influence the minds of men, in light of the rising tide of nationalism throughout the world, and in light of the intensification of the cold war as demonstrated by the now-famous U-2 incident and the hardening att.i.tude of oriental communism.

In the words of an influential newspaper:

Wholly apart from the intellectual compulsions that now drive man to move higher and higher into the high heavens, it seems clear that our country can be n.i.g.g.ardly in this field only at the risk of being completely and forever outcla.s.sed by Russia--a gamble that could have the most fearful political, economic, and military consequences.[20]

Incidentally, there is another prestige factor to be considered. This is what might be called the chain-reaction factor: the likelihood that technological preeminence in the s.p.a.ce field will attract top talent from other parts of the world to the banner of the country which develops it, and thus constantly nourish and replenish the efforts of that country. It is a consideration which has not received general attention, although it has been discussed before some of the world's leading s.p.a.ce scientists.[21]

Here again, as with the military situation, the Soviets are making every effort to exploit their dexterity in s.p.a.ce. They are pursuing the prestige gambit directly and indirectly. In the first category, for example, they give top priority to s.p.a.ce exhibits in important public forums--as their duplicate sputniks strategically placed at the world's fair and the United Nations attest. Premier Khrushchev's delight in making gifts to foreigners of miniature Soviet pennants similar to that carried in Lunik II--which hit the Moon--is another instance.[22]

The indirect drive for prestige via s.p.a.ce technology is far more important. It has been described by a congressional committee as follows:

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union in the last several years has demonstrated a great skill in coordinating its progress in missilery, its success in s.p.a.ce missions, and its foreign policy and world image. Shots seem to have been timed to maximize the effects of visits of Soviet leaders and to punctuate Soviet statements and positions in international negotiations. This is not to equate their s.p.a.ce activities with hollow propaganda. Empty claims do not have a positive effect for long. Nor is there any firm evidence that it has been possible for political policymakers to call their shots at times inconsistent with good scientific and technical needs. The conclusion is rather that the many elements of scientific, technical, military, political, and psychological policy are all weighed, and tests which make a full contribution to such a combined strategy are carried out and supported with appropriate publicity.[23]

There is also evidence that scientific endeavor by the Russians for prestige purposes is having repercussions on internal policy. Great emphasis is currently being placed on the demonstrable usefulness of scientific effort--to the extent that Soviet colleges, research inst.i.tutions, examining boards, and academies of science have been directed to be more exacting in conferring scientific degrees and t.i.tles. Newness and usefulness are requisite, but, at the same time, degrees may now be awarded for other than dissertations; inventions and textbooks of major importance may also earn a degree for their authors.[24]

Within the prestige context, it is true that the United States must labor under certain handicaps because of the nature of its democratic system.

No effort is made in the American s.p.a.ce program to hide the failures which result from its highly complex character. Our burnups, misfires, explosions, fizzles, and lost or wayward vehicles are well publicized.

Those of the Soviet Union rarely are. Even though most nations are well aware that the Russians must be having their troubles, too, the appearance of uniform success fostered by the U.S.S.R. inevitably contributes to an image of scientific superiority. In addition, the Soviets have developed a habit of striving for spectacular "firsts,"

most of which undoubtedly are undertaken almost as much for prestige reasons as for scientific ones.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIGURE 4.--Symbolic of the American effort in s.p.a.ce is this Thor-Able rocket, shown here launching the Tiros weather satellite into a near-perfect orbit. This same vehicle, which launched the record-breaking 23 million-mile communication probe--Pioneer V--has contributed enormously to U.S. prestige abroad.]

Still, the United States has not done badly from the prestige angle. So far as the world's scientific fraternity is concerned, it may even be well in the lead.

In the first 30 or so months following the opening of the s.p.a.ce age, as signaled by the launching of Sputnik I in October 1957, the United States put 21 satellites into orbit out of 42 attempts. Two out of five deep-s.p.a.ce probes were successful. The degree of success for all major launchings ran better than 50 percent. The American effort has been based on a broad scope of inquiry and includes long-range communications, weather reporting, navigation and surveillance vehicles, as well as information-gathering satellites.

During the same period the Soviets launched four Earth satellites, one deep-s.p.a.ce probe, one lunar-impact probe and one satellite into a much elongated Earth orbit which circled and photographed the Moon. Most of their vehicles have been substantially heavier than those launched by the United States, although complete information on their scientific purposes and the result obtained has never been disclosed.

The world political value of such programs cannot be discounted. To the extent that the welfare of the United States depends upon its stature in the eyes of the rest of the world (which is believed considerable) and to the extent that the scientific capability of the United States influences such stature (which is also believed considerable) our s.p.a.ce venture has very marked practical utility. It may even mean the difference between freedom and dictators.h.i.+p, between survival and oblivion.

s.p.a.cE AS A SUBSt.i.tUTE FOR WAR

A natural outgrowth of the military and prestige facets of s.p.a.ce exploration is the question of whether this activity, in time, will replace the forces which have historically driven nations into armed conflict.

Any number of social scientists and historians have speculated that this might occur. The theory is that the conquest of s.p.a.ce may prove to be the moral equivalent of war by subst.i.tuting for certain material and psychological needs usually supplied through war; that the absorption of energies, resources, imagination, and aggressiveness in pursuit of the s.p.a.ce adventure may become an effective way of maintaining peace.

Put another way, nations might become "extroverted" to the point where their urge to overcome the unknown would dwarf their historic desires for power, wealth, and recognition--attributes which have so often led to war in the past.

The fact that the United Nations, late in 1959, agreed to set up a permanent Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer s.p.a.ce attests to the hopes and potential of such a development.

Of course, whether this condition will actually develop is anybody's guess. But in a world where brute force is becoming increasingly dangerous and catastrophic, the bare possibility of such a result should not be ignored by those who may be contemplating the values of s.p.a.ce exploration. It could be the highest value of them all.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIGURE 5.--Today's a.s.sembly lines for automobiles and aircraft are being supplemented by the growing astronautics industry, here shown turning out capsules for manned s.p.a.ce flight.]

FOOTNOTES:

[8] Public Law 85-568, 85th Cong.

[9] H. Rept. 1633, 86th Cong., 2d sess., p. 6.

[10] Speech to the Supreme Soviet, Jan. 14, 1960.

[11] a.s.sociated Press dispatch, dateline London, Dec. 2, 1959.

[12] Scott, Brig. Gen. Robert L., USAF (retired), s.p.a.ce Age, February 1959, p. 63.

[13] Ostrander, Maj. Gen. Don R., USAF, before the American Rocket Society, Los Angeles, May 10, 1960.

[14] c.o.x, Donald and Stoiko, Michael, s.p.a.cepower, John C. Winston Co., Philadelphia, 1958, p. 16.

[15] Saenger, Dr. Eugen, New Scientist, Sept. 10, 1959, p. 383.

[16] Boushey, Brig. Gen. H. A., USAF, Hearings before the House Select Committee on Astronautics and s.p.a.ce Exploration, Apr. 23, 1958.

[17] Pierce, Dr. J. R., "The Dream World of s.p.a.ce," Industrial Research, December 1959, p. 58.

[18] 5 supra.

[19] Allen, George V, testimony before the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, Jan. 22, 1960.

[20] Editorial in the Was.h.i.+ngton Evening Star, Apr. 4, 1960.

[21] Remarks of Hon. Aubrey Jones, Minister of Supply, to the International Astronautical Federation, London, Sept. 1, 1959.

[22] a.s.sociated Press dispatch, dateline Rangoon, Feb. 18, 1960.

[23] "s.p.a.ce, Missiles, and the Nation," report of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, May 18, 1960, p. 53.

[24] The New Scientist, Mar. 3, 1960, p. 547.