The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science Science and Method Part 34

This postulate a.s.sumed, let us see how the velocity of light has been measured. You know that Roemer used eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter, and sought how much the event fell behind its prediction. But how is this prediction made? It is by the aid of astronomic laws; for instance Newton's law.

Could not the observed facts be just as well explained if we attributed to the velocity of light a little different value from that adopted, and supposed Newton's law only approximate? Only this would lead to replacing Newton's law by another more complicated. So for the velocity of light a value is adopted, such that the astronomic laws compatible with this value may be as simple as possible. When navigators or geographers determine a longitude, they have to solve just the problem we are discussing; they must, without being at Paris, calculate Paris time. How do they accomplish it? They carry a chronometer set for Paris.

The qualitative problem of simultaneity is made to depend upon the quant.i.tative problem of the measurement of time. I need not take up the difficulties relative to this latter problem, since above I have emphasized them at length.

Or else they observe an astronomic phenomenon, such as an eclipse of the moon, and they suppose that this phenomenon is perceived simultaneously from all points of the earth. That is not altogether true, since the propagation of light is not instantaneous; if absolute exact.i.tude were desired, there would be a correction to make according to a complicated rule.

Or else finally they use the telegraph. It is clear first that the reception of the signal at Berlin, for instance, is after the sending of this same signal from Paris. This is the rule of cause and effect a.n.a.lyzed above. But how much after? In general, the duration of the transmission is neglected and the two events are regarded as simultaneous. But, to be rigorous, a little correction would still have to be made by a complicated calculation; in practise it is not made, because it would be well within the errors of observation; its theoretic necessity is none the less from our point of view, which is that of a rigorous definition. From this discussion, I wish to emphasize two things: (1) The rules applied are exceedingly various. (2) It is difficult to separate the qualitative problem of simultaneity from the quant.i.tative problem of the measurement of time; no matter whether a chronometer is used, or whether account must be taken of a velocity of transmission, as that of light, because such a velocity could not be measured without _measuring_ a time.

XIII

To conclude: We have not a direct intuition of simultaneity, nor of the equality of two durations. If we think we have this intuition, this is an illusion. We replace it by the aid of certain rules which we apply almost always without taking count of them.

But what is the nature of these rules? No general rule, no rigorous rule; a mult.i.tude of little rules applicable to each particular case.

These rules are not imposed upon us and we might amuse ourselves in inventing others; but they could not be cast aside without greatly complicating the enunciation of the laws of physics, mechanics and astronomy.

We therefore choose these rules, not because they are true, but because they are the most convenient, and we may recapitulate them as follows: "The simultaneity of two events, or the order of their succession, the equality of two durations, are to be so defined that the enunciation of the natural laws may be as simple as possible. In other words, all these rules, all these definitions are only the fruit of an unconscious opportunism."

CHAPTER III

THE NOTION OF s.p.a.cE

1. _Introduction_

In the articles I have heretofore devoted to s.p.a.ce I have above all emphasized the problems raised by non-Euclidean geometry, while leaving almost completely aside other questions more difficult of approach, such as those which pertain to the number of dimensions. All the geometries I considered had thus a common basis, that tridimensional continuum which was the same for all and which differentiated itself only by the figures one drew in it or when one aspired to measure it.

In this continuum, primitively amorphous, we may imagine a network of lines and surfaces, we may then convene to regard the meshes of this net as equal to one another, and it is only after this convention that this continuum, become measurable, becomes Euclidean or non-Euclidean s.p.a.ce.

From this amorphous continuum can therefore arise indifferently one or the other of the two s.p.a.ces, just as on a blank sheet of paper may be traced indifferently a straight or a circle.

In s.p.a.ce we know rectilinear triangles the sum of whose angles is equal to two right angles; but equally we know curvilinear triangles the sum of whose angles is less than two right angles. The existence of the one sort is not more doubtful than that of the other. To give the name of straights to the sides of the first is to adopt Euclidean geometry; to give the name of straights to the sides of the latter is to adopt the non-Euclidean geometry. So that to ask what geometry it is proper to adopt is to ask, to what line is it proper to give the name straight?

It is evident that experiment can not settle such a question; one would not ask, for instance, experiment to decide whether I should call _AB_ or _CD_ a straight. On the other hand, neither can I say that I have not the right to give the name of straights to the sides of non-Euclidean triangles because they are not in conformity with the eternal idea of straight which I have by intuition. I grant, indeed, that I have the intuitive idea of the side of the Euclidean triangle, but I have equally the intuitive idea of the side of the non-Euclidean triangle. Why should I have the right to apply the name of straight to the first of these ideas and not to the second? Wherein does this syllable form an integrant part of this intuitive idea? Evidently when we say that the Euclidean straight is a _true_ straight and that the non-Euclidean straight is not a true straight, we simply mean that the first intuitive idea corresponds to a _more noteworthy_ object than the second. But how do we decide that this object is more noteworthy? This question I have investigated in 'Science and Hypothesis.'

It is here that we saw experience come in. If the Euclidean straight is more noteworthy than the non-Euclidean straight, it is so chiefly because it differs little from certain noteworthy natural objects from which the non-Euclidean straight differs greatly. But, it will be said, the definition of the non-Euclidean straight is artificial; if we for a moment adopt it, we shall see that two circles of different radius both receive the name of non-Euclidean straights, while of two circles of the same radius one can satisfy the definition without the other being able to satisfy it, and then if we transport one of these so-called straights without deforming it, it will cease to be a straight. But by what right do we consider as equal these two figures which the Euclidean geometers call two circles with the same radius? It is because by transporting one of them without deforming it we can make it coincide with the other. And why do we say this transportation is effected without deformation? It is impossible to give a good reason for it. Among all the motions conceivable, there are some of which the Euclidean geometers say that they are not accompanied by deformation; but there are others of which the non-Euclidean geometers would say that they are not accompanied by deformation. In the first, called Euclidean motions, the Euclidean straights remain Euclidean straights and the non-Euclidean straights do not remain non-Euclidean straights; in the motions of the second sort, or non-Euclidean motions, the non-Euclidean straights remain non-Euclidean straights and the Euclidean straights do not remain Euclidean straights. It has, therefore, not been demonstrated that it was unreasonable to call straights the sides of non-Euclidean triangles; it has only been shown that that would be unreasonable if one continued to call the Euclidean motions motions without deformation; but it has at the same time been shown that it would be just as unreasonable to call straights the sides of Euclidean triangles if the non-Euclidean motions were called motions without deformation.

Now when we say that the Euclidean motions are the _true_ motions without deformation, what do we mean? We simply mean that they are _more noteworthy_ than the others. And why are they more noteworthy? It is because certain noteworthy natural bodies, the solid bodies, undergo motions almost similar.

And then when we ask: Can one imagine non-Euclidean s.p.a.ce? That means: Can we imagine a world where there would be noteworthy natural objects affecting almost the form of non-Euclidean straights, and noteworthy natural bodies frequently undergoing motions almost similar to the non-Euclidean motions? I have shown in 'Science and Hypothesis' that to this question we must answer yes.

It has often been observed that if all the bodies in the universe were dilated simultaneously and in the same proportion, we should have no means of perceiving it, since all our measuring instruments would grow at the same time as the objects themselves which they serve to measure.

The world, after this dilatation, would continue on its course without anything apprising us of so considerable an event. In other words, two worlds similar to one another (understanding the word similitude in the sense of Euclid, Book VI.) would be absolutely indistinguishable. But more; worlds will be indistinguishable not only if they are equal or similar, that is, if we can pa.s.s from one to the other by changing the axes of coordinates, or by changing the scale to which lengths are referred; but they will still be indistinguishable if we can pa.s.s from one to the other by any 'point-transformation' whatever. I will explain my meaning. I suppose that to each point of one corresponds one point of the other and only one, and inversely; and besides that the coordinates of a point are continuous functions, _otherwise altogether arbitrary_, of the corresponding point. I suppose besides that to each object of the first world corresponds in the second an object of the same nature placed precisely at the corresponding point. I suppose finally that this correspondence fulfilled at the initial instant is maintained indefinitely. We should have no means of distinguis.h.i.+ng these two worlds one from the other. The relativity of s.p.a.ce is not ordinarily understood in so broad a sense; it is thus, however, that it would be proper to understand it.

If one of these universes is our Euclidean world, what its inhabitants will call straight will be our Euclidean straight; but what the inhabitants of the second world will call straight will be a curve which will have the same properties in relation to the world they inhabit and in relation to the motions that they will call motions without deformation. Their geometry will, therefore, be Euclidean geometry, but their straight will not be our Euclidean straight. It will be its transform by the point-transformation which carries over from our world to theirs. The straights of these men will not be our straights, but they will have among themselves the same relations as our straights to one another. It is in this sense I say their geometry will be ours. If then we wish after all to proclaim that they deceive themselves, that their straight is not the true straight, if we still are unwilling to admit that such an affirmation has no meaning, at least we must confess that these people have no means whatever of recognizing their error.

2. _Qualitative Geometry_

All that is relatively easy to understand, and I have already so often repeated it that I think it needless to expatiate further on the matter.

Euclidean s.p.a.ce is not a form imposed upon our sensibility, since we can imagine non-Euclidean s.p.a.ce; but the two s.p.a.ces, Euclidean and non-Euclidean, have a common basis, that amorphous continuum of which I spoke in the beginning. From this continuum we can get either Euclidean s.p.a.ce or Lobachevskian s.p.a.ce, just as we can, by tracing upon it a proper graduation, transform an ungraduated thermometer into a Fahrenheit or a Reaumur thermometer.

And then comes a question: Is not this amorphous continuum, that our a.n.a.lysis has allowed to survive, a form imposed upon our sensibility? If so, we should have enlarged the prison in which this sensibility is confined, but it would always be a prison.

This continuum has a certain number of properties, exempt from all idea of measurement. The study of these properties is the object of a science which has been cultivated by many great geometers and in particular by Riemann and Betti and which has received the name of a.n.a.lysis situs. In this science abstraction is made of every quant.i.tative idea and, for example, if we ascertain that on a line the point _B_ is between the points _A_ and _C_, we shall be content with this ascertainment and shall not trouble to know whether the line _ABC_ is straight or curved, nor whether the length _AB_ is equal to the length _BC_, or whether it is twice as great.

The theorems of a.n.a.lysis situs have, therefore, this peculiarity, that they would remain true if the figures were copied by an inexpert draftsman who should grossly change all the proportions and replace the straights by lines more or less sinuous. In mathematical terms, they are not altered by any 'point-transformation' whatsoever. It has often been said that metric geometry was quant.i.tative, while projective geometry was purely qualitative. That is not altogether true. The straight is still distinguished from other lines by properties which remain quant.i.tative in some respects. The real qualitative geometry is, therefore, a.n.a.lysis situs.

The same questions which came up apropos of the truths of Euclidean geometry, come up anew apropos of the theorems of a.n.a.lysis situs. Are they obtainable by deductive reasoning? Are they disguised conventions?

Are they experimental verities? Are they the characteristics of a form imposed either upon our sensibility or upon our understanding?

I wish simply to observe that the last two solutions exclude each other.

We can not admit at the same time that it is impossible to imagine s.p.a.ce of four dimensions and that experience proves to us that s.p.a.ce has three dimensions. The experimenter puts to nature a question: Is it this or that? and he can not put it without imagining the two terms of the alternative. If it were impossible to imagine one of these terms, it would be futile and besides impossible to consult experience. There is no need of observation to know that the hand of a watch is not marking the hour 15 on the dial, because we know beforehand that there are only 12, and we could not look at the mark 15 to see if the hand is there, because this mark does not exist.

Note likewise that in a.n.a.lysis situs the empiricists are disembarra.s.sed of one of the gravest objections that can be leveled against them, of that which renders absolutely vain in advance all their efforts to apply their thesis to the verities of Euclidean geometry. These verities are rigorous and all experimentation can only be approximate. In a.n.a.lysis situs approximate experiments may suffice to give a rigorous theorem and, for instance, if it is seen that s.p.a.ce can not have either two or less than two dimensions, nor four or more than four, we are certain that it has exactly three, since it could not have two and a half or three and a half.

Of all the theorems of a.n.a.lysis situs, the most important is that which is expressed in saying that s.p.a.ce has three dimensions. This it is that we are about to consider, and we shall put the question in these terms: When we say that s.p.a.ce has three dimensions, what do we mean?

3. _The Physical Continuum of Several Dimensions_

I have explained in 'Science and Hypothesis' whence we derive the notion of physical continuity and how that of mathematical continuity has arisen from it. It happens that we are capable of distinguis.h.i.+ng two impressions one from the other, while each is indistinguishable from a third. Thus we can readily distinguish a weight of 12 grams from a weight of 10 grams, while a weight of 11 grams could be distinguished from neither the one nor the other. Such a statement, translated into symbols, may be written:

_A_ = _B_, _B_ = _C_, _A_ <>

This would be the formula of the physical continuum, as crude experience gives it to us, whence arises an intolerable contradiction that has been obviated by the introduction of the mathematical continuum. This is a scale of which the steps (commensurable or incommensurable numbers) are infinite in number but are exterior to one another, instead of encroaching on one another as do the elements of the physical continuum, in conformity with the preceding formula.

The physical continuum is, so to speak, a nebula not resolved; the most perfect instruments could not attain to its resolution. Doubtless if we measured the weights with a good balance instead of judging them by the hand, we could distinguish the weight of 11 grams from those of 10 and 12 grams, and our formula would become:

_A_ < _b_,="" _b_="">< _c_,="" _a_=""><>

But we should always find between _A_ and _B_ and between _B_ and _C_ new elements _D_ and _E_, such that

_A_ = _D_, _D_ = _B_, _A_ < _b_;="" _b_="_E_," _e_="_C_," _b_="">< _c_,="">

and the difficulty would only have receded and the nebula would always remain unresolved; the mind alone can resolve it and the mathematical continuum it is which is the nebula resolved into stars.

Yet up to this point we have not introduced the notion of the number of dimensions. What is meant when we say that a mathematical continuum or that a physical continuum has two or three dimensions?

First we must introduce the notion of cut, studying first physical continua. We have seen what characterizes the physical continuum. Each of the elements of this continuum consists of a manifold of impressions; and it may happen either that an element can not be discriminated from another element of the same continuum, if this new element corresponds to a manifold of impressions not sufficiently different, or, on the contrary, that the discrimination is possible; finally it may happen that two elements indistinguishable from a third may, nevertheless, be distinguished one from the other.

That postulated, if _A_ and _B_ are two distinguishable elements of a continuum _C_, a series of elements may be found, E_{1}, E_{2}, ..., E_{_n_}, all belonging to this same continuum _C_ and such that each of them is indistinguishable from the preceding, that E_{1} is indistinguishable from _A_, and E_{_n_} indistinguishable from _B_.

Therefore we can go from _A_ to _B_ by a continuous route and without quitting _C_. If this condition is fulfilled for any two elements _A_ and _B_ of the continuum _C_, we may say that this continuum _C_ is all in one piece. Now let us distinguish certain of the elements of _C_ which may either be all distinguishable from one another, or themselves form one or several continua. The a.s.semblage of the elements thus chosen arbitrarily among all those of _C_ will form what I shall call the _cut_ or the _cuts_.

Take on _C_ any two elements _A_ and _B_. Either we can also find a series of elements E_{1}, E_{2}, ..., E_{_n_}, such: (1) that they all belong to _C_; (2) that each of them is indistinguishable from the following, E_{1} indistinguishable from _A_ and E_{_n_} from _B_; (3) _and besides that none of the elements _E_ is indistinguishable from any element of the cut_. Or else, on the contrary, in each of the series E_{1}, E_{2}, ..., E_{_n_} satisfying the first two conditions, there will be an element _E_ indistinguishable from one of the elements of the cut. In the first case we can go from _A_ to _B_ by a continuous route without quitting _C_ and _without meeting the cuts_; in the second case that is impossible.